Liotta, Alan - Interview master file / Witness to Guantanamo / Duke Digital Repository

Man

Yeah, we're rolling.

0:05

Interviewer

Okay.

0:06

Good morning.

0:07

-

Good morning.

0:08

Interviewer

Oh, we are very grateful to you

0:09

for participating in the witness to Guantanamo project.

0:11

We invite you to speak of you experiences

0:13

in prominent offense and dealing with Guantanamo issues.

0:15

We are hoping to provide you

0:20

with an opportunity to tell you a story in your own words

0:22

people in America and around the world need to

0:26

know the story of Guantanamo

0:28

and having you speak will give us an oil

0:31

a better opportunity to understand me your perspective

0:34

what happened and your placement in that story.

0:37

And we feel that by telling your story,

0:43

you're contributing to history.

0:46

So we're very grateful that you're here.

0:47

And if you want to take a break during this,

0:49

please let us know and we can take it any time.

0:51

And if some of you say

0:53

that you feel shouldn't have been said, we can remove it.

0:54

If you let us know at the end of the interview.

0:58

-

Okay.

1:00

Thank you.

1:01

Happy to participate.

1:02

Interviewer

Thank you very much.

1:03

And so we'd like to begin by asking you your name,

1:05

your little background on where you went to school

1:07

where you were born your age, just to bring us up to date.

1:09

-

Okay.

1:13

So my name is Alan Liotta

1:13

and I was born in upstate New York.

1:15

I'm 58 years old.

1:17

Interviewer

When were you born?

1:20

-

1959.

1:22

So I'm 58 years old.

1:23

I did my undergraduate work

1:24

at Wittenberg university in Springfield, Ohio.

1:26

I was a double major

1:28

in Political Science, East Asian studies.

1:29

I took Chinese language

1:32

through three years at the collegiate level.

1:33

And then in 1981, when the first 25 students

1:35

from the United States were selected to study in China,

1:39

I was the only non Ivy League student selected.

1:42

Went and studied in China, Beijing university

1:45

for a semester, for the summer semester, came back

1:47

finished my graduate school.

1:50

I finished undergraduate school and then went

1:51

to George Washington University for my graduate school

1:54

where I majored in national security politics.

1:56

And go ahead.

1:58

Interviewer

And where did that lead you to?

1:59

-

So that led me to a job in the federal government.

2:01

And I joined the federal government in 1983.

2:03

And then I retired in 2015.

2:05

So more than 32 years of federal government service

2:07

all in the national security apparatus, first

2:09

in the intelligence community, and then in the department

2:11

of defense and at DOD, I was the Deputy Director

2:15

for the Defense Prisoner of War missing personnel office.

2:17

That's the office that does the accounting

2:20

for all of our men

2:22

and women who have not returned from previous conflicts.

2:24

So that led me to a number of trips

2:25

throughout Southeast Asia to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia

2:27

where we recovered a great number of our missing

2:30

and were able to determine what happened

2:32

to them so that we could establish it that

2:34

there were no American still alive in Vietnam or Laos.

2:36

And then I opened the door to North Korea.

2:39

I was able to get former president

2:42

Jimmy Carter to raise it in the meeting

2:44

that he had with Kim Sung to allow us

2:47

to send recovery teams into North Korea, to search

2:49

for the remains of missing men from the Korean war.

2:50

And we ultimately got that.

2:52

I negotiated an agreement that got us access

2:54

and we made numerous trips and recovered more

2:55

than 200 sets remains of US soldiers that were still buried

2:58

in North Korea and brought them home

3:01

and even identified a great number of those.

3:03

And that effort still continues today.

3:04

Interviewer

And you went eight times to North Korea.

3:07

Why so many times?

3:10

-

For negotiations each year, we would have a round...

3:11

Two or three rounds of negotiations

3:13

to allow our teams access.

3:15

So I would go into negotiate the accents

3:16

for the recovery teams and where we could dig

3:18

and what we could do

3:20

and how we would engage the local populace.

3:21

And we were...

3:23

Traveled all over the country.

3:25

I'd say I've been as far north as Pam and John

3:26

but on the North Korean side, I've also been

3:28

on South Korean side, but on the North Korean side

3:30

as far east, as Pusan as far west as Wonsan.

3:31

So basically to the four corners of North Korea.

3:35

Interviewer

And did your language skills

3:37

help you at all?

3:40

-

The Chinese language skills helped me when I would come

3:42

out of North Korea.

3:44

Because I would always go back to China to brief our embassy

3:47

in China and meet with Chinese experts

3:50

on North Korea as well to compare notes

3:51

things that were going on in North Korea

3:52

that I was able to see and observe,

3:54

but I didn't have any Korean background.

3:55

And I relied on state department translators.

3:56

I always had a very good state department linguists

3:58

with me throughout all my negotiations.

4:00

Interviewer

I don't want to spend much time on that

4:03

because it's never really what we do.

4:05

-

Okay.

4:06

Interviewer

I'm just curious what your perceptions

4:07

of North Korea were, if you can tell us

4:08

just a little bit, just...

4:10

-

So it was very intimidating

4:11

because I consider myself a sinologist and an Asian expert

4:13

because of my training and my early background

4:15

and North Korea was a completely different Asian state

4:18

than any other Asian state that I've been throughout

4:21

all of Southeast Asia and China and Japan Mongolia.

4:23

There...

4:25

I just did not see the same sort

4:26

of organized activities towards labor,

4:28

the same sort of work ethics that people would have...

4:30

Characterized many of the Asian countries

4:32

with the bustling economies that we see there.

4:34

And it was all very focused

4:37

on a very strict political hierarchy

4:38

and political strictures on studying

4:40

with the political commissars

4:42

and your local people on all the spots.

4:43

I always thought, I like to say I'd like to...

4:47

Not joke, but I like to say that the...

4:49

During the food crisis, the great...

4:51

I talked with the head

4:52

of the World Food Program who was in Pyongyang,

4:54

same time I was there one time.

4:56

We had dinner together

4:57

and he made the comment that the food crisis could be easily

4:59

solved in North Korea, except for one thing, there's only

5:00

one person that can tell the farmers what to plant,

5:03

when to plant, and where to plant it.

5:05

And he's not an agriculture specialist.

5:07

Interviewer

What year was it?

5:09

-

That would have been about 1994, 1993.

5:10

So after I did that job, then I went...

5:14

I actually was a mass to take position

5:16

with the prisoner of war...

5:19

Not the...

5:21

With the...

5:23

I'm sorry, after that position,

5:24

I was asked to take a new job and that was

5:25

with the defense POW office, but a new leg of it,

5:27

which is still looking at Guantanamo.

5:31

9/11 had happened.

5:32

They had opened Guantanamo.

5:33

I was not familiar with any of it at that time.

5:35

And then secretary...

5:37

One of my responsibilities

5:38

in my previous position, the POWMIA position was

5:40

helping our men survive captivity and be able to escape

5:42

if they were ever captured.

5:45

Interviewer

This was pre 9/11 or--

5:47

-

This was pre 9/11.

5:48

Interviewer

Could you explain what that means?

5:49

-

So we were the policy office that developed the policy

5:51

that the services would use for deter...

5:54

For helping them train our service personnel

5:57

so that if they were captured,

5:59

they could survive in captivity

6:01

or they could escape and return back to friendly sides,

6:03

friendly lines

6:05

-

Was this just with Russia

6:06

or with any particular countries?

6:08

-

This was just general training for...

6:09

So for example, the Air Force trains

6:11

all of our personnel that are on deep strike missions,

6:13

that if something should happen to them

6:16

in a deep strike mission

6:17

no matter where they're serving

6:19

and if they get shot down, how do they survive

6:20

being captured and how is it that they can escape?

6:23

And the military has a whole separate area

6:25

of responsibility from the operational side that does this.

6:26

We're looking at the broader policy side for how

6:27

how do you do this?

6:29

And how do we give them the right policy guidance to

6:31

help them establish programs that would ensure to

6:32

protect our soldiers?

6:34

The other thing that I was very interested in doing again

6:36

I know you don't do the tangent

6:38

but just the other thing that I was very involved

6:40

in was the greatest challenge we had

6:42

in identifying our missing from Vietnam war and why?

6:45

I think, I believe personally, the perception existed

6:49

that men were left behind is because the process

6:51

at that time was if a pilot got shot down,

6:54

the air force would go to that pilot's family members,

6:57

his wife, his daughters, his kids, his parents

7:00

and they would show them possibly a picture

7:03

that we're taking from the media in North Vietnam.

7:05

And the picture might've been after he had crashed

7:09

and he was injured or it might've been

7:11

after he'd been beaten by the crowds or whatever

7:12

but they would show him a distorted picture of his face.

7:14

And they would say, is this your husband?

7:16

Well, the individual desperately wants

7:20

to believe their husband wasn't killed in the crash

7:22

and wants to believe that's the husband.

7:24

So they can't give you an objective viewpoint.

7:25

They're telling you what they really hope is the case

7:27

not what is the case.

7:29

And so the result is that the military spent

7:30

a lot of time looking for guys

7:32

who we subsequently found died, actually died

7:34

in their crash and their bodies were in their crash sites.

7:35

And we were able to recover the remains

7:38

from those crash sites, but spent a lot

7:40

of time carrying them is possibly still alive.

7:42

Cause we didn't know, and we were hinging it

7:43

on this missing relatives perceptions.

7:45

So one of the things that I asked...

7:48

I thought to do is to use technology

7:49

to eliminate that doubt.

7:50

And so if we could take a 360 degree panoramic view

7:52

of the pilot's face computerize that,

7:55

you can now use technology

7:57

and software programs to morph that,

7:59

to show if you got hit in the head by a rifle butt

8:01

and it crack the skull, what would that look like?

8:03

And you can morph that

8:05

until you can not do a computer rendering

8:07

of what that might look like.

8:09

And you can compare that computer rendering

8:10

to his baseline 360 degree picture of him.

8:12

And you can get a more sterile look

8:13

at whether or not that's the same person or not.

8:16

You still might go to the family and that's the family

8:18

but now you have somebody that's a little more

8:20

unbiased to be able to give you

8:23

a technological viewpoint on that.

8:25

So I wanted to make sure that when we had...

8:27

If we ever had someone last again behind enemy lines

8:29

that one, we always knew where they were

8:31

that we could track them and find them.

8:33

And we could rescue them right away.

8:34

Usually within the golden hour

8:36

the first hour after he was missing.

8:37

And two, if we couldn't get to them at that time

8:38

and we started to get propaganda photographs from

8:40

the holding country that we had a way to technologically

8:43

evaluate whether or not this was the person that we thought

8:45

that it was or not.

8:48

And so it's that type of work that we would do and working

8:50

with the military to help provide them first,

8:52

the policy guidance, and then to go to Congress to

8:53

get the funding that would allow us to do this type of work.

8:56

So that...

8:59

My goal was to never have another unaccounted for

9:00

for America, from any future conflict.

9:02

Interviewer

And this was pre 9/11?

9:04

-

This is all pre nine grade.

9:05

Well, this is through 9/11.

9:06

I did this during...

9:07

I was in that office through nine 11 up until 2002.

9:09

Interviewer

Okay.

9:11

So that's kind of important for us just to

9:12

see how you moved into Guantanamo.

9:15

So at 9/11, you were still working in that office.

9:18

-

That's correct.

9:21

Interviewer

Anything changed that they...

9:22

After for you or you continued network for

9:24

another few months?

9:26

-

No, I continued network for another about two more years

9:26

in that work doing that.

9:29

And I knew that though did change for us because we were

9:31

at that point 90%, 95% focused on a historical mission.

9:34

Now, I knew we were going to be going to war in 2011.

9:38

And so we were going to become a very

9:41

contemporary office where we had to make sure

9:42

that the military was properly situated to

9:44

be able to do rescues right away.

9:46

If we were...

9:47

If someone was lost

9:49

if we had an individual--

9:50

-

Lost in Afghanistan?

9:51

-

Looking in Afghanistan, correct.

9:53

And in Pakistan, in that region that the tribal areas

9:54

and the ungoverned areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan

9:56

where we might have to do rescue operations.

9:58

Interviewer

And then could you tell us exactly when you

10:01

were moved into Guantanamo issues and how that happened?

10:03

-

So in about 2003, I was brought in and said, "Hey,

10:06

you've done a great job, helping our...

10:09

Helping develop the policy for helping our guys survive

10:11

in a prison camp atmosphere.

10:14

We have a camp right now, Guantanamo

10:15

that we are not doing as good a job on as we could be doing.

10:18

We need to make changes.

10:21

We need to make improvements. And we'd like you to come over

10:22

and switch over and help us with this contemporary issue.

10:25

So..."

10:26

Interviewer

Who's telling you this?

10:28

-

This was the under secretary for policy

10:29

who we had to had a conversation with Secretary Rumsfeld.

10:30

Interviewer

And what were your thoughts about it?

10:33

Did you know much about Guantanamo at that time?

10:36

-

So I only knew what I had seen in the paper and knew...

10:38

I didn't know anything else beyond that

10:41

because it was completely

10:43

outside my realm of responsibility and focus.

10:44

And when the secretary of defense come to you and say,

10:46

"We have a new assignment for you..."

10:48

I'm a careerist.

10:50

I'm a career official.

10:51

So I say "Yes, okay."

10:52

And then I also was interested because one,

10:53

it was the Middle East

10:54

which was a part of the world where I had not

10:55

had much experience, all my experience was in Asia.

10:58

So I knew that it would be mentally challenging to be

11:00

in a new realm of the globe working on it.

11:02

It was also my way to contribute into

11:03

how the nation responded too

11:05

when we came back from 9/11

11:08

and it was very pertinent

11:09

to the actual war fighting that was going on at that time.

11:11

Interviewer

Do you say Rumsfeld himself asked you

11:13

or was his assistant who asked you?

11:15

-

Well, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

11:18

is the number three person in the Pentagon

11:20

under the secretary.

11:23

And you were going to ask me that, I'm sorry,

11:24

the name escapes me.

11:26

So, yeah, I'm sorry.

11:28

Interviewer

And he asked you when you moved into that

11:29

and what was your first--

11:30

-

So Paul Butler was the Deputy Assistant Secretary,

11:32

actually at that time, it wasn't even...

11:36

it was deputy sitting secretary of defense position.

11:38

So he was the dad's D that was responsible for Guantanamo.

11:40

That was...

11:44

And that office itself fell under the special operations

11:45

low intensity conflict Solak, under the Solak office.

11:48

And so I came in as a special assistant to Paul Butler.

11:51

And about four months after I came in,

11:55

secretary Rumsfeld then pulled Paul up

11:58

to his office to be a special assistant for him

12:01

for the Secretary of Defense.

12:04

And that left the office then without a political appointee.

12:05

And I was put in charge of the office

12:08

as the Careerist to bring the office up to speed.

12:10

And at that time, the primary focus was on the...

12:12

Our process had just begun.

12:16

The administrative review board processes had just begun.

12:17

And so I was hoping to get the administrative

12:20

review board processes rolling

12:22

and getting them fully fledged.

12:24

Interviewer

Well, could you explain exactly

12:26

for people who are not as informed as you are

12:28

what exactly that meant and what time this was?

12:30

-

Sure.

12:33

Let me...

12:33

So let me...

12:34

Interviewer

For the rest of the whole decision?

12:36

-

There's a little bit before that, yeah.

12:37

So let me back up a little bit,

12:39

because I think this is an important part

12:40

of the story that I'm excited

12:41

that the project is willing to tell

12:43

because I think the efforts that the department

12:44

of defense put into and then gradually

12:46

the entire US government put into doing the review

12:48

of the detainees is unprecedented in modern warfare.

12:50

And I think it's been vastly misunderstood

12:55

and distorted in some ways by

12:58

other proceedings as to what it really meant.

13:00

And I think if you actually step back

13:03

and look at it from a broader perspective,

13:05

it's really quite, I think amazing.

13:07

And it's also really the way true governance should work

13:09

in our government.

13:12

And we don't see it very much.

13:13

So let me just do a brief historical timeline

13:15

if that would be helpful to do that.

13:18

So 2001, we have the 9/11 attacks

13:19

and we go into Afghanistan and we begin to capture people

13:24

and we're holding detainees in Afghanistan.

13:29

Decision is made by general Tommy Franks

13:32

that he doesn't want to keep detainees in Afghanistan.

13:35

He doesn't want to be burdened

13:37

with the responsibility of having prisoner of war camps.

13:40

So a decision is made to move the detainees

13:42

out of Afghanistan.

13:45

So the war fighting effort is not inhibited

13:47

by them...

13:49

By that detention effort.

13:50

And they select Guantanamo is a place where

13:51

they want to put the people and they immediately began

13:53

in 2002 to send detainees to Guantanamo.

13:55

(clears throat)

13:58

And then immediately upon the first detainees getting there,

13:59

they realized some of the detainees should not be there.

14:02

And so two months later in 2002,

14:04

the first detainees actually leave Guantanamo

14:06

and are returned back to Afghanistan.

14:09

Some people think the detainees have been here

14:11

the entire time all along,

14:13

but in fact, there were returns going on very early on.

14:14

Interviewer

Two months after they were brought,

14:16

people were already being--

14:17

-

Were already being sent back

14:18

as a new plane would come in with detainees,

14:20

that plane would return to Afghanistan

14:22

with detainees on it that were determined

14:22

they shouldn't be there.

14:24

So that's a good question.

14:26

Who vetted that?

14:27

How is that possible?

14:28

What's happening?

14:30

So what happens is go back to the battle scene.

14:31

We have our forces in kinetic activity, in action

14:33

and they go into a compound.

14:36

They're being fired upon, they'll go into a compound.

14:39

They secure the compound and they have...

14:41

Let's just say, hypothetically,

14:44

they have 10 to 12 adult age males

14:45

in that room that possibly could have been shooting at them.

14:47

And they are asking...

14:50

That little unit is asking who fired at us?

14:52

Who shot at us?

14:53

Why were you shooting?

14:55

And a couple of the guys say, "I didn't, it wasn't me.

14:55

It wasn't me.

14:57

I was just here."

14:58

And the unit determines that's true.

15:00

And they let those guys go.

15:01

But seven of those guys,

15:02

they don't really understand what their role was.

15:04

And they don't understand whether they're

15:06

of any value or if they're important or not

15:08

or how much of a threat they are.

15:10

So they move those people out

15:12

of that frontline person into a rear position

15:14

where there's another interrogation that goes

15:16

on and questioning that goes on.

15:18

And in that question period of those seven guys

15:19

they may determine that two or three of those guys, okay

15:21

really shouldn't have been there

15:22

and they could be let go as well.

15:24

They weren't a threat.

15:25

And they really weren't involved

15:26

in whatever activity was going on there

15:28

and they allow them to leave.

15:29

So now you're down to four or five guys that are left

15:31

of the original 10, 11 that you captured.

15:32

And of those four or five guys, two of them,

15:34

you got some information that you pretty much

15:37

know who they are and you know, they a threat

15:38

and you want a hold on to them.

15:41

But the other two or three,

15:42

you don't really know who they are

15:44

but they're not saying anything.

15:45

They're not talking.

15:46

They're not saying boo.

15:47

So what do you do with them?

15:48

You could let them go, but it might be somebody important

15:49

or somebody dangerous, or you could hold onto them

15:51

and let it go for further vetting.

15:53

So they opted let's hold on to them for further vetting.

15:54

Well, amongst those guys, when they get

15:56

on this plane and they get sent to Guantanamo

15:58

when they land in Guantanamo, they suddenly

16:01

realize this is a much bigger thing than I thought it was.

16:03

And some of those guys

16:06

guys now start to open their mouth and say who they are

16:06

and what they were doing and why they were there.

16:09

And no, they're not a threat

16:10

and this is why they're not a threat.

16:11

And we independently can corroborate that.

16:12

And so we determined, there's no reason

16:13

for these guys to be at Guantanamo.

16:15

And they're the ones who are going back immediately

16:18

afterwards.

16:20

Interviewer

Who makes the decision?

16:21

-

So there at Guantanamo, there were interrogators

16:23

and there were specialists...

16:25

Intelligence specialists

16:26

that were making those determinations at that time.

16:27

And I know you've had some of those people that have come

16:29

to the Guantanamo project as well to talk about that.

16:32

And I'll let them speak for themselves

16:34

on how well they did that

16:36

and this was all before I arrived and how I got there

16:37

before I came to it.

16:39

So that process started and now they all came in

16:40

and the defense department started a process

16:43

because we realized that some

16:46

of the people that were there didn't need to be there.

16:47

The defense department started process in 2001

16:49

which we called the section one process.

16:51

And that's because it was the first process.

16:53

And what that process did was it took the review

16:55

of the detainees and the process

16:57

of review out of the hands of the people down

16:59

on island and back up in Washington

17:02

where you had people that had more objective view

17:04

but also had more information available

17:07

to them than just the information that had come

17:09

from the capturing unit.

17:11

And just from the imprints that they'd come from the field.

17:12

And so they could add a little bit more coloring

17:14

to the information that was there and they began to review

17:16

and look to see whether

17:18

or not detainees still needed to be held.

17:20

And the other thing they looked

17:22

at is if we didn't continue to hold them,

17:23

where would you send them?

17:25

And if you send them to some other countries,

17:26

could that country mitigate any potential threat

17:27

that this individual might represent once released

17:30

from DOD detention?

17:32

And so the section one process began to review all those

17:33

in 2001 and was the process that was in place

17:36

that ultimately was the process that was reviewed

17:39

by the Supreme court rulings as to

17:42

whether or not habeas was necessary and

17:43

whether or not the department...

17:46

And whether or not there could be

17:47

that could be done in the review process.

17:49

And we needed a more structured, something more akin

17:51

to the junior conventions requirements or

17:54

review process that should be done at the time.

17:55

And so in 2004, the de...

17:58

we had the Russel decision and you had the Humvee decision.

18:00

And we had Boumediene, they all came down in that.

18:03

Boumediene was up to 2008, but you had those decisions

18:07

that came down that started to say

18:09

the defense department had to do more

18:10

than what it was doing.

18:12

And so in 2004, the defense department created

18:14

a new position called the administrative review board

18:16

and it create a second role called the

18:18

combatant status review tribunal.

18:21

So the CSRT combatant status review tribunal

18:23

had one singular purpose.

18:26

And that was to look at this detainee and say

18:28

we are right to hold this person.

18:30

We have enough information.

18:32

And it shows he represents a continuing threat

18:34

to the United States government

18:37

and we have legal authority to hold this individual.

18:38

And that's the only CSRT did.

18:40

It was a one-time review to look at each detainee.

18:42

And at that time there were more than 500

18:44

at Guantanamo to look at each detainee and determine whether

18:46

or not we had sufficient information to hold this detainee.

18:49

And we wanted to continue to hold them.

18:51

Then we began the second process

18:53

called the administrative review board

18:55

and the administrator review board's process

18:57

was then take all the information

18:59

that it could get its hands on

19:02

in the US Government's holdings

19:03

and assess that information and determine whether

19:04

or not this individual represented a continuing threat

19:06

particularly if they were to be transferred

19:09

out of DOD custody.

19:11

So DOD was already looking at this and why is this?

19:12

Well, secretary Rumsfeld had made very clear.

19:15

He did not want to be the world's jailer.

19:16

He did not want to hold detainees

19:18

that the United States didn't have to hold

19:20

that other countries could be responsible

19:22

for their nationals.

19:24

Keep in mind, at this point

19:26

we had almost 50 different nationalities at Guantanamo.

19:27

So Rumsfeld's view was other countries should step up

19:29

to the plate and they should mitigate the threat

19:32

of their own nationals.

19:34

We, the United States government shouldn't do that.

19:36

And so the ARB process was designed to have a look

19:37

at these guys to say, okay

19:38

if we can't transfer them, who could we transfer?

19:39

And when can we send them?

19:41

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England

19:43

was the principal decision maker.

19:45

So every art case was reviewed

19:48

by analysts from joint chiefs of staff,

19:50

as well as from within DOD and the intelligence community

19:53

from DIA with information that was available to the ARBs.

19:56

And that information was then used to make a deci...

19:58

A recommendation on whether

20:01

or not this individual should be continued to held,

20:03

whether they could be transferred.

20:05

And if they were going to be transferred

20:07

how would they be transferred?

20:08

And under what conditions would we need a home

20:10

country to take measures

20:12

to help us to ensure they wouldn't get back into the fight.

20:13

And that process went from 2000.

20:15

The ARB process went from 2004

20:17

to 2009 when president Obama was elected

20:21

and he discontinued that process.

20:25

But under the ARB process,

20:27

we transferred more than 400 detainees out

20:29

of Guantanamo, I personally was involved

20:32

in negotiations for almost 300

20:34

of those 400 individuals that we transferred back out

20:36

and it was a review...

20:38

And it was using that review process to tell us

20:40

whether the information that we have,

20:42

whether it shows whether this person is a threat

20:44

and what information do we have showing

20:46

whether he be a continued threat

20:47

if he was released from US custody

20:48

and if he was going to be a continued threat

20:49

was that threat so great

20:51

that only the United States could mitigate it

20:52

or could some other country mitigate that threat?

20:54

And if another country could, then what was the country

20:55

and what would be the measures we'd ask them to take

20:57

to help mitigate that threat.

20:59

And those negotiations.

21:01

As we went from country to country to negotiate,

21:02

we had an inner agency team

21:03

and the team included a representative

21:04

from the Department of Justice, included a representative

21:05

from the Department of State, included representatives

21:09

from my office and from the joint chiefs of staff.

21:11

There were principally former members.

21:13

Sometimes an NSC member would accompany us to

21:16

depending on what the countries were that we were going to.

21:19

And we would then...

21:22

That team would go...

21:23

That small team would go

21:25

and we would negotiate with the countries

21:26

in order to facilitate the return of detainees.

21:28

And sometimes they were small, two or three individuals

21:30

and sometimes they were large.

21:32

We sent, almost...

21:33

Well, we sent over 40 Pakistanis back to Pakistan

21:35

on an individual single transfer that we negotiated

21:38

with the Pakistani government

21:40

on how to mitigate their threat when they went back.

21:41

Interviewer

Did you yourself travel to these countries?

21:44

-

I did.

21:46

Interviewer

Could you tell us how the process worked?

21:47

-

So we knew before we went

21:49

who the individuals were that were up

21:51

for consideration for transfer, and we knew what

21:53

we believed was the threat that they might represent

21:55

or in some cases there may not be any threat.

21:58

And in fact, when the ARB process first began, they did...

22:00

We did this through the C cert review.

22:02

We determined that there were about 22 individuals

22:04

that we should no longer be holding at Guantanamo.

22:06

And they were transferred immediately back.

22:08

And they...

22:10

And so they weren't...

22:11

They never even went through the ARB process

22:12

because we determined through C certs

22:14

that we didn't need to hold them.

22:15

Interviewer

What is C cert?

22:16

-

The Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

22:17

And so they went back right away, but for the others then,

22:19

we do the review and we would look at that.

22:21

And I was...

22:23

I did not conduct the review process

22:24

but I was aware of the review process.

22:25

And I could ask questions,

22:27

particularly because I knew if I was going to go

22:29

and negotiate this individual's return,

22:31

I wanted to have a good enough background

22:33

that I could tell the country that was receiving them

22:34

what type of individual they were going to be receiving

22:37

and what type of measures they would probably need to take

22:38

in order to see that their transfer was successful.

22:40

And that the individual became a constructive member

22:41

of society and not returned back to the fight.

22:43

So then when we went overseas in the negotiation,

22:45

sometimes I would lead the negotiations

22:48

and sometimes state department would lead the negotiations.

22:49

It was a country by country decision based

22:51

largely on our bilateral relationship

22:53

and who had the stronger part of that relationship.

22:55

Was it State or DOD?

22:57

And then we would go in

22:59

and we would talk to them,

23:01

well, before we went, we would provide

23:02

through our embassies a portfolio

23:04

about the information about this.

23:05

So we went to the intelligence community

23:07

and asked to have all the information made available

23:08

to that country so that we could share as much information

23:10

as possible with that country about who this individual was,

23:12

why we believed he was a potential threat,

23:14

and what measures would be appropriate to

23:16

mitigate any potential threat.

23:18

We would send that to the country in advance.

23:20

And then when we got there,

23:22

we would go over that folder with them,

23:24

that portfolio with them,

23:26

answer questions that they might have

23:28

about that individual, and that information

23:30

and where our information came from

23:32

and how sure we were of the information.

23:33

And we would provide them

23:35

then what we thought would be measures that they could take.

23:37

And they would then tell us

23:40

whether they could take those measures

23:42

not based upon their own laws.

23:43

So some countries, for example, can't do listening,

23:44

can't do internet monitoring.

23:46

And so we asked them to monitor the person's internet

23:48

accounts once he's returned to be sure he's not going

23:51

to radical Jihadi websites and things like that.

23:54

Some countries could do it.

23:57

Some countries could not.

23:59

So we would have negotiations then about...

24:00

So that we would know whether

24:02

or not they could or could not do it and if they couldn't

24:03

what substitutions could they do

24:06

or how would they try to do something that would be...

24:07

Give us the same level of comfort of what we saw.

24:09

And then if we had...

24:11

If we finished those negotiations,

24:12

sometimes there might be two

24:14

or three rounds of negotiations

24:15

and sometimes we wouldn't get answers, then we'd come back

24:16

and we would finish those later through diplomatic channels.

24:18

But once we got a response and we had a formal response as

24:20

to whether or not they could do it, if the answer was yes

24:23

and they said, these are the measures that we could take,

24:25

then I would go to deputy secretary England

24:28

and I would sit down with him and I would go over the case.

24:30

And I would tell him about my negotiations.

24:32

And I would say, this is where we've ended up.

24:33

These are the kinds of measures we have in place

24:35

that they've had.

24:37

And the measures were not just security measures,

24:37

they were also humane treatment measures.

24:39

The state department was responsible

24:40

for securing humane treatment measures to ensure

24:42

the person would not be persecuted when we went...

24:44

When he was sent back.

24:46

And then I would make recommendations

24:48

as to whether the individual should be transferred

24:50

or not on the conditions we have here.

24:53

And then secretary England was one who made the decision

24:54

on whether or not the transfer would occur.

24:56

Interviewer

So are there...

24:59

So first of all, does every person

25:00

that was sent back under the Bush administration

25:02

cause that's kind of what you're talking about.

25:05

-

Right.

25:07

Interviewer

Went through this process

25:08

that he was not sent back

25:10

before this group of four more people met

25:11

with the country and asked them to take the person back.

25:15

Is that--

25:18

-

So not so not every personal exact

25:19

there were a few other for the...

25:21

The four that went back to England

25:23

was because of the discussion

25:25

between prime minister Blair and president Bush.

25:28

So, I mean... So there were a few other outliers,

25:30

but the vast majority went back as a result of that process,

25:32

yes.

25:33

Interviewer

And if a country was not interested

25:35

in taking back this "Alleged terrorists,"

25:36

which I'm told some countries didn't want.

25:38

-

Right

25:40

Interviewer

What would you do?

25:41

-

We would look for alternative places.

25:43

So we would look to see if it was...

25:44

If there was another place where they could go.

25:46

So, I mean, an example for that is Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

25:48

I mean, we have done a vast number

25:51

of humanities at Guantanamo, a large number of humanities

25:52

at Guantanamo who have more ties

25:56

to Saudi Arabia than they have to Yemen.

25:59

They lived back and forth across the border, but some served

26:01

in the Saudi military, some had committed crimes

26:03

and had been jailed in Saudi Arabia for crimes

26:05

had committed, non terrorist crimes

26:07

just regular street kind of crimes,

26:09

but they had more of a...

26:11

And most of their families still live in Saudi Arabia.

26:12

They didn't live in Yemen.

26:15

So when we would go to Yemen to talk to Yemen

26:17

about taking some people back, Yemen would say,

26:19

"Well this guy isn't even ours.

26:21

I mean, if you put him here in Yemen

26:22

he's just going to go right back

26:24

across the border of the Saudi Arabia.

26:26

You ought to be talking to the Saudis."

26:29

And we would talk with the government officials

26:31

from Saudi Arabia and they would look at the cases.

26:33

And in many of the cases they would say he's a Yemeni.

26:35

And because they weren't looking to import any many problems

26:36

into Saudi Arabia, and we understood that.

26:38

And so that was part of the hard part

26:40

of the negotiations was trying to find compromises

26:41

and find ways where we resolve the situation

26:42

so that people that...

26:43

And then we had some individuals who we had two

26:44

or three that were stateless.

26:46

I mean, they didn't really have a country

26:49

that they could go back to.

26:50

And so we had to look

26:52

to other countries to really try to extend a hand

26:54

to help us with those individuals.

26:56

And so we started first

26:58

in Europe for some of those individuals to...

26:59

For the European countries to take those countries

27:01

because we had the greatest confidence

27:01

in the European security assurances

27:03

and what they could do to mitigate the threat

27:05

of this person who's coming in

27:06

as that sort of a stateless type of person.

27:07

Interviewer

So you were on the road a lot,

27:09

but you didn't go to every one

27:12

of these countries yourself as part of the team, or did you?

27:13

-

I did.

27:17

Interviewer

Then you'd be flying,

27:18

you know, non-stop 24-7 right?

27:19

-

I was gone a lot.

27:21

Yeah.

27:22

Interviewer

Really?

27:23

-

There was...

27:24

There were a lot of negotiations that went on frequently.

27:25

And once we had a baseline established with the country.

27:26

It didn't require us to have to go back every time

27:29

for a new group of individuals that might go

27:30

to that country.

27:32

We could do that through diplomatic channels

27:34

because we now saw how they were handling the situation

27:35

with the ones who had probably sent back.

27:37

We had confidence in how they're handling them

27:38

so we could send more, they were willing to accept more,

27:40

so we could do diplomatic talks

27:41

through diplomatic channels and agree

27:43

on the individuals that would go back.

27:45

And they were also keep in mind at this time,

27:46

they were also coming to Guantanamo to an interview

27:48

their detainees at Guantanamo.

27:49

So they had a baseline understanding

27:51

of who they were getting coming out of Guantanamo

27:53

separate and distinct

27:55

from the information that we were providing them

27:57

but this was their own observations

27:59

and their own information that they had available to them.

28:01

Interviewer

So when they came to interview their own,

28:02

which is the next question I was going to ask you,

28:03

their own residents or citizens,

28:05

was there any monitoring of their behavior

28:09

with the detainees in terms of the interrogation that they

28:13

themselves did?

28:16

-

Yes. So as a result of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal,

28:17

one of the changes that...

28:20

The department has made a number of changes,

28:21

but one of the changes we made

28:24

is that if there's ever a negotiation...

28:26

If there's ever interviews or interrogations happening

28:27

in a DOD facility, by non DOD people,

28:29

DOD will have a monitor in those sessions.

28:31

They'll either monitor it electronically through television

28:32

and sound or they'll have someone

28:35

in the room and we will know constantly

28:38

of what's going on so that there cannot be any

28:39

mistreatment of individuals in a DOD facility

28:41

that DOD would not become immediately aware of

28:44

and could immediately take action to stop.

28:47

Interviewer

And what kind of person

28:49

would the DOD be monitoring with?

28:51

-

It would be military...

28:54

It'd be the guards and intelligence officials from...

28:55

Because we're talking at Guantanamo.

28:57

And so it would be the military police,

28:59

the guard force, and it would be intelligence specialists

29:00

that would monitor it.

29:02

Interviewer

So you know much more about this than I do

29:03

but the issues that surfaced, one has to do

29:06

with the Chinese when they came to interview

29:10

the Uyghurs apparently they knew a lot more

29:12

about the Uyghurs that we just had revealed a lot

29:16

about themselves to the Americans.

29:21

And that apparently the Americans must have

29:22

told the Chinese acquainted a weakness and we interviewed

29:24

because then the Chinese knew all this

29:27

and they threatened the Wiggins

29:29

about their families as they didn't come back to China,

29:30

their families might be endangered.

29:34

And they knew a lot of information about their families.

29:36

So was that monitored?

29:39

And did the Chinese have the right to do all that

29:40

or am I giving the wrong information about the Uyghurs?

29:44

-

So well, a couple of things

29:48

one when I came to with this job,

29:50

I was the only guy in office that knew what a Uyghur was

29:53

because of my China background.

29:56

And I actually knew some Uyghurn nationality people in that

29:57

I knew what that was.

30:00

And two, the Uyghurs played a role.

30:02

I mean, they were in Torah Bore for a reason

30:04

and they were there for training

30:05

and they were captured guardian active posts

30:09

and some other things they're not the innocent bystanders

30:12

that they've been able to portray publicly themselves

30:16

as doing and looking at that.

30:18

And there's some other things which I won't get

30:19

into on camera about the Uyghur experience at Guantanamo

30:22

but a bit...

30:24

But the answer to your question is really not about

30:26

the Uyghurs, it's about the Chinese

30:27

and what the Chinese did or didn't do.

30:28

And I don't know if you're aware or not,

30:30

but I actually testified in Congress about this

30:31

but was not able to provide any information

30:33

because it's still all very classified information.

30:36

And I almost lost my job

30:38

because the Congress wanted to fire me and disband my office

30:40

because of what they saw as a willingness

30:43

not to cooperate with Congress on this issue.

30:45

When in fact we were cooperating

30:47

with Congress through the appropriate committees

30:48

not just the committee that was conducting that hearing

30:50

at that time, I'm doing that.

30:52

So, unfortunately I won't be able to provide any

30:53

of the details for that.

30:54

I will say though that the timing of what you're looking at,

30:56

if you look at the timing of that

30:58

versus the changes that the department of defense made

30:59

the timing of those events occurred well

31:02

before the changes that were made

31:04

the department defense made as a result of Abu Ghraib

31:05

Interviewer

You don't...

31:08

You probably...

31:10

I'm not sure if he likes this and that

31:12

but my understanding from everything I've read

31:13

besides listening to the Uyghurs is

31:15

that the Uyghurs' issues are with China and not with the US.

31:18

So were they really considered a threat

31:20

to the US when they were phrase captured

31:24

if that's the case?

31:26

-

Excellent question.

31:27

And I think it gets to a part of the question

31:28

that never really got aired publicly very much

31:30

but it was the...

31:33

One of the key issues, the dilemmas

31:35

that policymakers had to face both

31:37

in the Bush administration and in the Obama administration,

31:38

neither of whom when they consider whether

31:40

or not we should allow Uyghurs into the United States.

31:43

We couldn't return them to China.

31:44

And we knew what had happened

31:45

the last time a Uyghur was returned to China

31:47

which was not a United States returned

31:48

but another country, how do we go and return them to China?

31:50

And he got off the airplane and they conducted his trial

31:52

at the bottom of the steps and executed them on the tarmac.

31:54

So we had very serious

31:57

genuine persecution concerns about the Uyghurs.

31:59

And we knew that China was not an option.

32:01

We could not send the individuals back to China.

32:03

So where were you going to send them?

32:05

Where would you put them?

32:06

And one of the places was possibly resettlement

32:07

in the United States that was looked at.

32:09

But the question that I think ultimately

32:11

got decision-makers hung up on this is where I wanted to ask

32:12

the Uyghurs went to Tora Bora to be trained as terrorists,

32:16

but their fight is against the Chinese.

32:17

They want to continue with their terrorist attacks

32:21

against back in China against the Chinese,

32:25

not against the United States,

32:27

but if you have a trained terrorist one,

32:29

he didn't meet the laws had just been passed after 9/11

32:32

you had to get boxes.

32:36

You had to check.

32:37

And one of them was

32:38

have you ever been to a terrorist training camp? Yes.

32:40

Okay.

32:42

You don't come to the United States.

32:42

You need a waiver for that box now because they would be...

32:44

They would check yes for that box.

32:45

So you need a waiver. Well, if you get a waiver

32:46

you have to ask what threat do they represent

32:48

to the United States directly, no threat.

32:50

But if they decide to conduct an operation to blow

32:51

up the Chinese consulate in New York city

32:54

and they take down the apartment building next

32:57

to it and kill 1100 New Yorkers,

32:59

who wants to be the senior policymaker

33:01

to raise their hand to say,

33:03

"I thought it was a good idea to bring them here

33:05

to the United States."

33:07

Or if they decide to ambush the Chinese ambassador

33:09

in a gun battle and try to execute them in the streets

33:09

of DC and shoot up his limousine and bystanders are killed,

33:11

who wants to be the person that raises their hand.

33:14

And I think that question

33:15

and the inability to save from a policy perspective...

33:17

From a senior policy political perspective,

33:20

I'm okay with that threat.

33:23

I'm willing to take that chance is ultimately what can...

33:25

Lead to the United States, never actually admitting any

33:28

of the Tora Bora into the United States.

33:30

Interviewer

Would you just raise...

33:31

Was that actually raised among DOD personnel

33:32

and sanctified personnel?

33:35

That kind of example you just gave was that racist?

33:38

What are the reasons not to allow--

33:40

-

I mean, it was part of the conversation

33:42

but I think policymakers were for...

33:44

The policymakers were very,

33:45

you know, they understood any...

33:47

Bringing into these guys in the United States

33:49

represented bringing terrorists

33:50

in the United States.

33:52

And you have to sell that politically.

33:54

And it's going to be a hard sell to make

33:55

in the United States on the heels of 9/11

33:57

even a year or two later after 9/11

33:59

it's going to be a difficult sell to make and doing that.

34:02

And so one of the questions as a policymaker.

34:04

You're going to have to be able to answer

34:05

as a senior policy maker.

34:08

And those questions I think would come to them.

34:09

But I mean, it was part of the defense

34:11

and state and justice all raised those kinds of concerns.

34:13

And keep in mind, the FBI interviewed the Tora Bora

34:15

when they were being considered...

34:18

When the Obama administration was considering

34:19

bringing the United States.

34:22

The FBI interviewed all the Uyghurs.

34:23

So the FBI was intimately involved

34:25

in making recommendations as well.

34:26

Interviewer

And when the Canadian officials interrogated

34:28

Alma Carter and apparently the tapes of that,

34:30

which I actually even have, were you present

34:33

in your office at that time?

34:36

-

I wasn't present.

34:38

I wasn't in place, that was before I came.

34:39

Interviewer

There was some claim then

34:40

that it was somewhat abusive in the interrogation.

34:42

-

Right.

34:44

But I will say all those claims

34:46

of that type of mistreatment abuse

34:48

and I won't pass comment on those things

34:50

because I wasn't there at the time, but I will say this,

34:52

the measures and the steps that I helped implement

34:54

in DOD and the changes that we made in DOD

34:56

both in the military side and on the civilian policy side,

34:58

all were designed to ensure that no circumstances

35:01

could ever occur that could possibly lead us

35:04

down that path again.

35:06

And those are the processes and the procedures

35:07

that guide the department of defense today.

35:09

And interestingly enough, you know,

35:11

from the European critics who had lots of critics in 2001

35:12

through about 2005 or so, and when these changes came

35:15

through by 2009, 2010, and bill each out had lots

35:18

of experience with this going to European countries.

35:22

They were looking to us as the model

35:24

for them on how they should conduct detention operations.

35:26

Because they understood the United States government,

35:29

the steps we had taken, the measures we taken to ensure

35:31

that those types of things would not happen again.

35:33

Interviewer

Could you tell us,

35:36

just so we all understand what...

35:37

How did Abu Ghraib form the change in DOD procedure

35:39

of these intelligence and interrogation operations?

35:43

Why...

35:48

What did Auburn Gray do...

35:49

What did they do for the DOD to think like that?

35:51

Because you keep saying Abu Ghraib was the watershed--

35:53

-

It was the catalyst, yes.

35:57

Interviewer

Yeah, what was it that...

35:59

Because it wasn't Foreign Interrogasim,

36:01

it was just some low level, apparently so they claimed,

36:05

low level people who were conducting these.

36:09

So what...

36:11

-

So there's been big studies written on this.

36:13

And then in the front, it depends when it was published

36:16

and you know, 395 changes that were made

36:19

from a policy and a military implementation perspective

36:21

after Alba grabbing and the big review that was done

36:24

by the Department of Defense

36:27

and the joint chiefs of staff to ask that question.

36:29

How did this happen?

36:30

The biggest question and the biggest concern

36:31

from secretary Rumsfeld's perspective,

36:33

one of the biggest concerns was nobody

36:34

in Washington knew about it.

36:36

Nobody in Washington had information on it.

36:38

This had happened in the field

36:40

and the field had kept it in the field.

36:41

And hadn't gotten back to us

36:43

even though there were other people

36:45

the ICRC and others that were aware

36:46

or understood something was going on.

36:48

There was not a chain of command that was bringing this back

36:50

to the Department of Defense.

36:53

There wasn't a policy process to bring it back

36:54

to the department of defense.

36:56

So the first thing the secretary also did

36:57

was take the office that we had,

36:58

that I told you Paul Butler headed

36:59

which was sort of an amorphous office that was looking

37:00

at the Guantanamo issue, amidst a lot of other things

37:03

and created a standalone office focused exclusively

37:05

on detention operations, both in Iraq and Afghanistan

37:07

as well as in Guantanamo and to ask what are

37:12

the things that we're doing here that could get us

37:14

into trouble, Abu Ghraib type trouble again

37:17

and then how do we make sure that doesn't happen?

37:20

How do we codify it?

37:22

How do we create policy

37:23

and how do we create military processing procedures?

37:25

And then how do we do military training so

37:26

that we can be sure this never happens again,

37:28

much of Abu...

37:30

I'm not going to comment, but Abu Ghraib,

37:32

a big part of Abu Ghraib was because

37:35

of a lack of military leadership...

37:37

Effective military leadership and field had nothing to do

37:38

with policies that were in place and procedures

37:40

that were in place.

37:42

It had everything to do with people not doing their jobs.

37:44

And so...

37:46

But that still isn't an excuse.

37:47

That's still gives us an area where you have to

37:49

focus the kinds of changes that you need to make

37:50

in order to ensure that we don't have that type

37:52

of incident again.

37:54

So I use it as the catalyst because I came

37:55

to the office just before the Abu Ghraib scandal

37:57

became public.

37:59

And then I was part of the task force that was used to

38:02

try to make all the changes that was there.

38:04

And so for me, it was everything that we looked

38:06

in the Department of Defense to be sure this never

38:08

happened again.

38:10

And that we would never treat people this way again

38:12

that we make leaders processes.

38:14

For me, that was the catalyst, that galvanizing event

38:15

that I could hold up to anybody, the question

38:17

why are we going to make this change or that change and say

38:18

because we're not going to let Abu Ghraib happen again.

38:21

Interviewer

Does it make sense to you

38:23

as someone who's been working with the DOD

38:25

for 30 plus years, that there's no chain of command

38:29

and no one's knowing what's going on in Abu Ghraib?

38:35

I mean, does that seem good?

38:37

-

So it seems hard to believe.

38:38

I understand that.

38:40

But in fact, in a wartime operation

38:43

with the military units that are operating in there

38:45

I saw...

38:47

I mean, there are examples of things

38:48

that don't make their way back to Washington

38:50

unless you have reporting requirements that instruct

38:51

that it has to come back to Washington.

38:53

So for example, one of the things it was is

38:55

that the command was aware

38:56

of ICRC concerns about conditions about Abu Ghraib.

38:58

The command said they'd handle it.

39:00

They'd take care of it.

39:03

Interviewer

Who's in command?

39:04

Who's that?

39:06

-

Cent Com, Central Command.

39:07

So they would take care of it.

39:08

They would...

39:10

They'd...

39:11

Sanchez.

39:12

They would take care of it.

39:13

They would know they would...

39:15

They knew how to solve the problem.

39:16

So those ICRC concerns never came back to Washington.

39:17

The ICRC also made changes in their own structure.

39:19

The ICRC reporting process, they had their people

39:22

in Iraq who made the recommendations

39:23

to the command and they let that...

39:24

They didn't report that back to Geneva and Geneva

39:26

which has a different level of conversation with Washington

39:28

than what Cent Com is having with them out in the field,

39:30

Geneva was blind, Washington was blind.

39:34

And so we changed those, but well, in Cent Com's view

39:36

was this is a military operation.

39:39

It's a military operation and military process.

39:41

And we can handle this from a military perspective.

39:43

And so...

39:45

And from the Secretary Rumsfeld's perspective

39:47

and the chairman of joint chiefs,

39:49

you want to have confidence in your military commanders

39:50

that they will do the right things,

39:51

that they will do those things.

39:53

Abu Ghraib showed that we needed to have more process

39:54

and procedures in place to be sure

39:55

that there was other canaries in the mineshaft

39:57

that could tell us what was happening on site.

40:00

Interviewer

So analogizing, is it possible

40:03

that Rumsfield and people at the top didn't know

40:06

what was going on in Guantanamo in the early days as well.

40:10

I know you weren't then in.

40:14

-

Right, I wasn't then in,

40:15

but I know the reporting from Guantanamo

40:16

was a little bit different because it was a...

40:18

Yeah, two things that are happening,

40:22

one, it wasn't an active theater of operations

40:24

like set like a rock was.

40:26

So you had a little bit more stability

40:27

in how your reporting went back

40:30

and a little bit more view of centralized importance

40:32

from Washington and to well,

40:34

from Washington's perspective, again, I wasn't there.

40:36

So I'm only going on things which I've been told and read,

40:38

but Washington's perspective I think was influenced

40:40

by the fact that these were the guys

40:41

that could perpetuate to the next 9/11.

40:44

So we want to know what's happening.

40:45

We want to know what's going on in the interviewing process

40:47

and the interrogation process.

40:50

So I think there was more...

40:52

Is it possible that things still didn't get community back?

40:53

Absolutely.

40:55

One thing I've learned to say

40:56

at the department of defense in my 32 years

40:58

is never say never because as soon as you say never,

40:59

somebody will prove you wrong.

41:00

So is it possible?

41:02

Absolutely.

41:03

It's possible.

41:04

Did it happen?

41:05

Probably quite likely, it happened from time to time.

41:06

Did it happen as a matter of process in principle?

41:07

No, it didn't. It happened because of people short terming

41:09

the system and things like that, but yes, it's possible

41:11

but that's what we wanted to correct.

41:14

We wanted to be so recognizing that that's a possibility

41:15

that could occur at any time in any conflict, in any place.

41:18

We wanted to be sure that we put in place the policies

41:22

and the procedures, so that Washington...

41:24

The secretary of defense personally was remained

41:26

always informed of what was happening.

41:29

So for the ICRC reports, for example, now,

41:30

if the ICRC issues a report that expresses a concern

41:32

about conditions of detention, the department

41:35

of defense through the command in the field

41:39

all the way up to the special assistant

41:41

to the secretary defense, has an obligation

41:44

to get that report to the secretary's eyes in 48 hours.

41:46

And so that's the kind of changes that we've...

41:48

That I'm talking about that we put in

41:50

and I wrote that change.

41:52

So we wanted to be sure that the secretary

41:53

was immediately made aware of a situation.

41:55

And he might just say, okay,

41:57

tell me how you're going to fix it.

41:58

Right.

42:00

But the point was, you can't hide anything.

42:01

You can't obfuscate anything.

42:02

It's going to...

42:03

A report is going to come back

42:05

down the chain of command very quickly.

42:06

And it's going to be in front of the secretary very quickly

42:07

so that he can make the determination as to whether

42:10

or not he's satisfied with the response he's seen this far

42:11

or whether more needs to be done.

42:14

Interviewer

I want to...

42:15

Interviewer

These policies were implemented in 2004

42:17

or did it take you awhile to get there?

42:19

-

It took a little while to get that.

42:21

It was about 2000, probably about 2006, 2007.

42:22

By the time all of these went through.

42:25

I mean, I said there were 368 changes.

42:27

So they all didn't happen with the flip of the switch.

42:29

We were working through them.

42:31

And sometimes there's a sequence of reason why

42:33

you had to work through them this way and that way.

42:35

But the point was that they were going to get them all done.

42:37

Interviewer

I want to go into some of those changes

42:40

but I just want to back up,

42:41

because one of the first things you said it after LMS

42:43

we captured a lot of these men,

42:45

people have told us, people we've interviewed

42:47

on both sides of the wire have told us

42:51

that a lot of the people in Guantanamo were purchased

42:54

by the US were sold for bounties

42:55

by Afghans and Pakistanis who picked them up

42:57

and sold them to the US, were you aware of that?

43:01

And was that...

43:05

-

I can't comment on it because it...

43:05

Non of that happened during my tenure,

43:08

my time that was there.

43:09

I'm aware of it.

43:10

Yes.

43:12

Because I'm aware of the newspaper stories

43:13

the number of the habeas proceedings and others

43:15

where those types of issues were raised.

43:16

And they came up on that.

43:18

And my experience was, in some cases,

43:19

it might've been some truth to it.

43:20

And a lot of cases, there was not truth to it.

43:21

Interviewer

First thing you said about the Uyghurs,

43:23

I might want to go back, but can...

43:26

Let's talk about some of those changes?

43:27

What are those changes?

43:28

Something that we would want to know going forward

43:30

that effect on trying to know,

43:33

in ways that we might not be aware of?

43:35

You know, you've told us some, but I don't know

43:38

if there's any others that I didn't ask you

43:40

about.

43:42

-

Well, there's, there's 2068.

43:43

There's a lot that will take the whole time

43:45

and reports have been written about it.

43:46

So you can see them from the reports that are written.

43:48

But a couple of examples, I think are important.

43:49

One, I told you already, one about ICRC report

43:51

and how that gets back to the secretary immediately.

43:52

Now, one was on interrogations

43:55

and interrogation techniques.

43:59

The army has always used the army field manual

44:01

for interrogations as their guide for how you

44:05

do interrogations.

44:08

And that's why there was never waterboarding

44:09

in Guantanamo because that's not our proof technique.

44:11

And so all of the techniques the army used

44:14

were to follow what was in the army field manual.

44:17

A lot's been written about Secretary Rumsfeld

44:18

and the enhanced interrogation techniques,

44:21

and whether the enhanced interrogation techniques

44:23

should be used or not used.

44:25

Enhanced interrogation techniques were part

44:26

of the discussion, but you can look...

44:28

The record is showing they were implemented at Guantanamo.

44:30

They were never used at Guantanamo.

44:32

So we used the army field manual.

44:33

When President Obama was elected and came into office,

44:36

oh, so what is...

44:38

The point of that is... The reason why I say that

44:39

is because when we rewrote these rules for interrogations,

44:42

we said the army field manual is

44:43

the standard that will be used in DOD detention facilities.

44:45

No other interrogation techniques can be used

44:47

in DOD detention facilities other than those authorized

44:50

under the army field manual in doing that.

44:53

So...

44:55

Interviewer

Do you remember what year that was?

44:57

-

It would have been in that 0507 timeframe in doing that.

44:58

Then when President Obama came in,

45:02

he conducted an independent review

45:03

of interrogation techniques and an independent review

45:04

of the army field manual.

45:07

And president Obama determined

45:09

that the army field manual was the gold standard, his words.

45:11

The gold standard for interrogations

45:15

and that any US agency that was going to do interrogations

45:16

of foreigners, particularly terrorist.

45:20

In this case, we're looking at, had to abide

45:22

by the army field manual.

45:26

That caused a lot of constellation because the FBI asked,

45:27

what about us?

45:29

What do we have to do?

45:30

And it was determined that they're a domestic organization

45:32

so that was separate and distinct.

45:35

They weren't bound by that, but any other

45:36

and it's very clear who it was meant by any other,

45:37

but any other agency that was going to do interrogations

45:39

in a DOD facility had...

45:41

Or no, in any facility, just DOD interrogations

45:42

by US interrogators, the army field manual

45:43

was the standard that was to be followed to doing that.

45:45

And so we were glad that we had in our procedures

45:48

and changes the army field manual was what people had to use

45:52

if they were coming to the DOD facilities,

45:56

because the president then we thought validated

45:58

that on our selection and doing that

45:59

and choosing it to broaden it even more

46:01

for just all interrogations

46:02

by US interrogators had to abide by the army field manual.

46:03

-

The fact that you're saying that implies that prior

46:05

to your taking office

46:10

or you're taking that position, the army field

46:12

manual wasn't necessarily followed in Guantanamo,

46:15

it certainly wasn't followed in Abu Ghraib

46:18

-

So...

46:20

Right.

46:21

So that's a separate problem, right?

46:22

You have the process, you have the procedures

46:24

that should be followed.

46:25

The second question is,

46:26

are people following those procedures and their processes?

46:27

And if they're not, are we holding them accountable

46:30

for violations for that, which we did.

46:31

We routinely held people accountable for violations of that.

46:33

But again, if you have violations, you want to

46:35

make sure the reporting procedures are such that

46:37

that information about the violations, get back

46:39

to people that can take action on it and get back quickly.

46:41

And that was where some of the other changes

46:43

that the military instituted

46:46

on how those reporting chains would come back

46:47

and who would review interrogation reports

46:49

and who would review who was involved

46:51

in the interrogation and things like that.

46:53

Interviewer

Do you have another crisis

46:55

that you want to share with us

46:57

that is equally interesting and significant?

46:59

-

Well, the other one is...

47:02

I think it's what started us down this chain

47:03

in the beginning was involvement

47:05

of foreigners and foreigners coming

47:07

into DOD detention facilities and foreigners interrogating

47:10

or questioning their nationals and how that happens.

47:12

And there were no ground rules for those

47:14

before we started the process

47:16

after Abu Ghraib.

47:17

Now there are procedures and processes

47:19

and policies in place that govern how to do that.

47:21

And we've had some countries that wanted to abide by those.

47:23

And they've been dis-invited from coming to meet nationals.

47:26

Interviewer

So you kind of say the US is learning...

47:28

Learned a lot over the years as to how to manage people

47:34

they capture, people they hold

47:39

that they didn't know as well in the beginning.

47:41

You're kind of you kind of saying that.

47:43

-

Absolutely, if there's one thing the department

47:44

does know how to do very well is course correction.

47:46

And to be sure that never happens again.

47:49

I mean, seriously, I say that with a smile

47:52

but I don't say that in jest.

47:54

I mean, when we have a crash of an aircraft, right?

47:56

When we have a crash of a helicopter

47:58

lots of reviews to determine why, what happened?

48:00

Was it mechanical?

48:03

Was it pilot?

48:04

If it was pilot, why was it?

48:05

Was he tired?

48:06

Was the exhausted, was he poorly trained?

48:07

And then how do you make the changes?

48:08

So we never have another crash like that again, right?

48:12

To do that.

48:13

You know, you always have system failure

48:15

but you won't have that pilot error.

48:16

You may even decide all those changes.

48:18

You might still end up with pilot error at some point.

48:21

Pilot error happens.

48:23

Same thing here, course corrections.

48:24

We're never going to let this happen again.

48:25

Does that mean it will never happen again?

48:26

I would not be so foolish to sit here

48:28

and tell you that, right?

48:29

Because people are people

48:31

and people will do things that don't conform

48:32

to policy and procedures.

48:33

Do we have methods if that happens?

48:34

Do we have ways to correct it, to be aware of it

48:36

and correct it that didn't exist before?

48:38

Absolutely.

48:39

Interviewer

A lot of detainees we interviewed describe

48:42

Guantanamo as a psychological prison, as opposed

48:45

to physically brutal prison interrogations.

48:48

And even though there were some brutality at one time,

48:53

which we don't need to go into, a lot of them

48:56

describe what they felt was psychological mistreatment.

48:59

Had you ever heard that for Guantanamo?

49:03

-

I mean, I've heard it because I've seen habeas proceedings

49:06

and I've heard other things like that.

49:09

I mean, it's not my experience.

49:10

I mean, it's...

49:12

I mean, detention is not a fun experience.

49:14

I would not like to be in detention personally.

49:16

I would probably go crazy

49:19

and be probably one of the troublemakers

49:20

if I was in detention of my own accord.

49:22

Right?

49:24

I understand that it is a restrictive environment

49:26

by purpose and by mission in doing that.

49:28

But it's always interesting to me.

49:31

You know, I took the Russian Minister of Human Rights

49:33

and something else.

49:40

He had a very long title

49:41

to Guantanamo to meet the only Russian that was remaining

49:43

at Guantanamo and the detainee...

49:48

The Russian official introduced himself and said

49:50

this is who I am.

49:53

And I'm here to check on your status

49:54

and how are things going?

49:55

Are you okay? And he said, "Oh, I'm so glad you're here

49:56

because my human rights are being violated every day

49:58

and you need to stop this violation of my human rights."

50:00

And so the minister got extremely excited and said

50:02

"Please tell me how are they violating your rights?"

50:03

And he asked me, he said, "Do you want to stay?"

50:05

And I said, "Yeah, if he's okay with me staying,

50:06

if we're violating human rights, I need to know."

50:09

And I know I wanna know what's going on.

50:12

So he said, please tell me

50:13

how are they violating human rights?

50:16

And he said, "Well, they won't give me a Russian newspaper.

50:18

I used to get a Russian newspaper

50:21

and they won't give me Russian newspaper.

50:23

And they won't give me Russian channels on the TV anymore.

50:24

I used to be able to watch TV in Russia.

50:25

They won't give me the Russian TV channels anymore."

50:26

And so the Russian minister looked at him and said,

50:27

"So you understand those aren't human rights."

50:30

And he said, "But they're my rights here.

50:32

And I'm being tortured because I'm not getting

50:35

those opportunities to see that."

50:36

And then when I went back immediately

50:38

and talked to the command

50:40

about why are we not giving him his Russian newspapers?

50:42

And why is he not getting to watch Russian channel TV?

50:44

They were all very practical connections.

50:45

One, he never read the newspapers.

50:46

He just threw them in the toilet

50:47

and two the TV channels was he would turn the channel

50:49

to Russian channels when all the other detainees

50:51

were watching some other show.

50:54

So he was constantly being disruptive in the camp

50:56

because he was making anybody else watch Russian TV when

50:58

he was the only Russian speaking person there to watch TV.

51:00

And nobody else wanted to watch that channel.

51:03

So we had to work the command, then worked

51:04

with the detainees to work out a schedule so

51:07

that he would have a few hours a day

51:09

that he could watch Russian TV to which he objected

51:11

because he could only watch during those days.

51:13

But it was one of the restricting factors that we had

51:15

but it was...

51:17

To me, it was, I think indicative

51:19

of how the stories came out.

51:20

Then they... You know, human rights were being violated

51:21

but what did he mean by that?

51:23

And the other example I have

51:24

for that is there was a Yemeni who I was

51:25

at the camp one day and a Yemeni came up to me and asked me

51:27

do I like...

51:31

I was talking through the fence.

51:32

He said, "Do you watch soccer?"

51:35

And I'm a big soccer fan.

51:36

And I said, yes.

51:38

And he said, "Are you watching the world cup qualifiers?"

51:39

And I said, "Yes, I am."

51:40

And he said, "Well, I'm convinced

51:41

that the Yemeni team is going to win and we're going to go."

51:43

And I didn't have the heart to tell him

51:46

that Yemen hadn't even qualified.

51:47

They didn't have a team playing in the world cup.

51:50

And so I said, well, you know, I wish them luck.

51:51

I hope they did well.

51:53

And the next time I was down there

51:55

but weeks later I saw him again by chance.

51:56

And I asked him, I said, you know

51:58

have you been following the Yemen national team?

52:00

And he said, "No."

52:02

He said, "And that's a complaint I've had

52:03

I've made this complaint four times

52:05

with the commanding officer."

52:06

And he said that the guards are torturing me

52:07

because they won't bring me...

52:09

What they do is they bring DVD discs of...

52:11

They tape the games and they'd bring them on DVD disc.

52:12

And they would let them watch the DVD disc.

52:13

He said the guards are torturing me because they

52:15

won't give me any DVD disc of Yemen in the world cup.

52:17

And as I said, well, you know, they didn't qualify, right?

52:19

"No, now you're lying just like them.

52:22

They won't do this.

52:23

Why don't you people tell me the truth.

52:24

I know you're hiding from me to that the Yemen National team

52:26

has done so well.

52:28

And he was very, very agitated, very upset

52:29

and reward back that, you know, he was being tortured

52:31

because he couldn't...

52:33

Now I'm not trying to...

52:35

I don't use these examples to make light of the things

52:36

that some detainees hadn't experienced while they

52:38

were in Guantanamo in the early days, particularly.

52:40

But I mean, I think in the last you know, decade or so

52:42

the kinds of things that we've seen after the early years

52:45

are more these types of things, as opposed to real

52:49

genuine human rights violations, abuses and concerns

52:52

at Guantanamo you know, I took the Belgian head of prisons

52:55

to Guantanamo on a trip...

52:59

On an information trip to

53:01

see what was that Guantanamo was debating these issues.

53:03

And he came home from that trip and made a public

53:05

announcement that Guantanamo was better than any prison

53:08

in Belgium and got promptly fired

53:11

Interviewer

Did he really?

53:14

-

Yes, he did.

53:15

Interviewer

Which year was that?

53:17

-

That would have been about 2006, maybe eight.

53:19

Interviewer

So as you said, and I just think

53:20

it's important for people that are watching,

53:23

things did get better after 2004 or after Abu Ghraib,

53:25

seems like a lot changed in Guantanamo prior

53:29

to that things might've been different as to--

53:32

-

I mean, a lot changed across to the entire Department

53:35

of Defense and Guantanamo was included in those changes.

53:38

Could we made it involve detention operations

53:42

and how we did that.

53:44

And so we just made sure that we were doing things,

53:45

that A, we had policy and that B, we were conforming

53:47

with the policy and the procedures

53:49

and the processes that were the Department of Defense

53:52

for how we would conduct these types of operations.

53:53

Interviewer

And how many times did you go to Guantanamo

53:55

and when was the first time you went?

53:58

-

I went a lot.

54:00

I'm not the most frequent traveler from my office.

54:02

I had one officer that did the travel regularly down there

54:05

but I took VIP delegations,

54:08

I took a lot of foreign delegations.

54:10

I took a lot of Senior Department Officials

54:12

and other officials down to Guantanamo

54:13

a lot of cabinet level officials to Guantanamo.

54:16

I think the first time I went probably was about 2000, 2004.

54:18

I think it was only after I came to the office.

54:27

Interviewer

Can you recall the first time that you went

54:29

the sense of guard of the place?

54:30

-

Actually, I don't, I haven't thought about that.

54:32

I don't.

54:37

I mean, I think the...

54:38

What I recall are discussions that I had with the ICRC

54:39

because I...

54:42

Interviewer

In Washington or in Guantanamo?

54:44

-

Both, I mean, I'm a big fan of the ICRC.

54:46

I've always been a very big fan of the ICRC.

54:47

And the ICRC was instrumental

54:50

when I was in my previous office

54:52

in the prisoner of war missing personnel office.

54:54

We had an unaccounted for, from desert storm

54:56

and the ICRC played a pivotal role

54:57

in helping us negotiate with Saddam Hussein

55:01

so that we could send a recovery team in.

55:03

When we got information

55:05

as to where we thought this individual's plane

55:06

had crashed to find out what had happened to him

55:08

and the ICRC played a pivotal role and a very

55:09

difficult role and took extraordinary measures

55:12

and steps to help us try to answer this question

55:15

which they we're able to answer.

55:17

So I'm a big fan of the ICRC I always have been.

55:19

And when I...

55:22

And I will say when I first came to the department...

55:25

When I first came to this position,

55:27

there was within the Department of Defense,

55:28

a large mistrust to the ICRC.

55:30

There was a very combative relationship with the ICRC.

55:31

And that was one of the things

55:34

that I sought to change right away.

55:36

And I tried to persuade people that I see the

55:37

ICRC very differently

55:39

and I think we can work constructively with them.

55:40

And so if they come to us, and they say they have a concern,

55:41

my first response is not "Thanks very much,

55:43

I'll get back to you.

55:45

My first response is to sit down

55:46

tell me what your concern is and how do we address it."

55:47

At the same time I was going to the ICRC

55:50

and I was picking their brains

55:53

for things that we ought to be doing

55:56

even when they weren't making recommendations.

55:58

And it considered in the 0405 timeframe

56:00

is about the time when the ICRC stopped staying

56:01

and living at Guantanamo 24/7, because they believe

56:03

that Guantanamo was on the correct path at that point.

56:06

And they didn't need to have a permanent presence there.

56:09

Interviewer

They had a permanent presence?

56:12

-

They had a permanent presence since day one. Absolutely.

56:14

Absolutely.

56:16

Yes, indeed.

56:17

Yes.

56:18

-

And so they made it...

And they made...

56:20

It was their decision when they wanted to move away

56:21

from that permanent presence to having a presence

56:23

in Washington that they could go unannounced anytime

56:24

they wanted to go to Guantanamo.

56:26

We...

56:27

And now, we want to help broker that with the term side

56:29

which was we would not stop them.

56:31

And then they could make unannounced representations

56:33

in Guantanamo at any time and conduct their missions

56:36

at any time in lieu of their decision

56:38

not to have a permanent presence there.

56:38

Because I wanted to make sure

56:40

that they were there were frequently.

56:43

And they were there in the role

56:45

that they should be there in an objective fashion.

56:47

Interviewer

Well then is it Colonel super real

56:49

or I'm not sure what his type

56:51

of military travel is, but he invited the ICRC.

56:53

And apparently he got into some difficulty with the DOD

56:55

in inviting them to Guantanamo.

56:59

At least that's what he told us on tape.

57:01

Why would that be--

57:03

-

So I'm familiar with that.

57:04

So I'm imagining it predates me.

57:05

But as I said, when I came, there was a very

57:07

hostile relationship...

57:09

Hostile regard with it.

57:10

I thought a hostile relationship with the ICRC

57:11

and it just trusted them, that permeated

57:13

in the Washington area and that I was independent on.

57:15

And I wanted to change that right away.

57:19

-

But you understood

57:20

that there was presence there all the time.

57:21

That's how you--

57:23

-

That's how the ICRC describes it.

57:24

That's how they say it.

57:26

Interviewer

And the ICRC was permitted to reveal to you

57:28

whatever you asked them,

57:39

they had no restrictions on what they saw?

57:40

-

No, they...

57:44

I mean, they had no restricts...

57:45

The ICRC conducted private interviews with the detainees

57:48

and they may or may not tell us things that are

57:51

from those private interviews, that's their decision

57:53

and their process, their procedures, our request was

57:55

to them, if you get any information about abuse

57:57

or mistreatment, we need to know about that immediately.

58:01

You have to tell you US official, not just a guard on duty,

58:03

but a senior per official, when you do your reports

58:06

you have to tell us that immediately.

58:08

So we need to know that.

58:10

And they agreed that they would do that.

58:11

They would, I think, done that anyhow, if there was ever

58:12

any evidence of they had a report to that.

58:14

But does that mean they told us everything

58:15

the detainee said, absolutely not.

58:17

They had private conversations with detainees

58:19

that we weren't part of, and that was at their request.

58:20

And we completely agreed.

58:23

Interviewer

This changeover after

58:25

Abu Ghraib, you keep describing where's

58:27

that posse coming from?

58:31

It's coming from Gordon England or from Rumsfeld

58:32

or from you or...

58:36

I mean who?

58:36

Which policy, I'm sorry.

58:38

When you say there's this change where now you're going to

58:39

be much more supervisory over the lower DOD person.

58:42

Excuse me?

58:47

-

Yeah, they are in 368 changes that we made. Right?

58:48

Those...

58:51

Yeah.

58:52

So those were across the department of defense.

58:53

So some... So that came from a taskforce that was headed

58:55

by Pete Garren and Lieutenant General Maples.

58:57

That was the Maple Garren's task force.

59:00

They included the joint chiefs of staff, OSD policy,

59:03

the office secretary Pence for policy

59:05

which is my office.

59:08

Interviewer

And who created the...

59:09

-

General counsel.

59:13

Secretary Rumsfeld.

59:14

Rumsfeld created it.

59:15

Interviewer

So he wanted these changes?

59:16

-

Yes, absolutely.

59:17

He created the task force

59:18

with the sole mission of be sure this doesn't happen again.

59:19

Interviewer

Do you to ask a question on that?

59:20

Interviewer

There are some detainees who've gone back

59:22

into the field and committed terrorist acts,

59:26

where they all before all these policies were implemented

59:28

or there have been some who--

59:31

-

Yeah.

59:34

So not the policies, but the review processes

59:36

that I described earlier, right?

59:37

We've had about 30% return to fight rate.

59:39

That's both known...

59:45

Factually known, and those that are suspected

59:47

or not yet confirmed, but we've got multiple sources

59:49

but we haven't able to confirm it yet.

59:51

So it's roughly about 30% is the total number

59:53

that the intelligence community reports out for those.

59:55

And those are all individuals.

59:59

They include some that have gone back early

1:00:00

in the fight where we didn't do the review process

1:00:03

but the vast majority, probably 90, 95%

1:00:05

came as a result of the review process.

1:00:07

I mean, after not the result, but

1:00:09

as after the review processes had cleared them for transfer.

1:00:11

And after the secretary of defense

1:00:14

or the deputy secretary of defense had made a decision,

1:00:15

or even in the PRB process under President Obama

1:00:17

where the policy makers, the top cabinet member officials

1:00:20

in the national security infrastructure reviewed the case

1:00:23

and determined the person could be transferred.

1:00:25

And then they went back and then they still reengaged.

1:00:28

Interviewer

And did you suspect

1:00:30

that they would re-engage since these countries

1:00:32

are expected to be monitoring

1:00:35

what's going on with this individual.

1:00:37

Was this kind

1:00:39

of known and anticipated that some of these folks would go

1:00:43

back?

1:00:46

-

So, so...

1:00:48

Man

Look up here while you're responding.

1:00:48

-

Sure. So in answer to the question is

1:00:50

that there was never an issue

1:00:52

of whether we had a hundred percent confidence.

1:00:56

Someone would not go back to the fight.

1:00:58

All the people that we're talking about here

1:01:01

there were concerns that they may or may not.

1:01:04

They may go back to the fight, which is why

1:01:06

we asked the country to take the types of measures.

1:01:08

We asked the country to take in order to prevent them

1:01:09

from going back to the fight that said,

1:01:11

if we thought someone was going to go back

1:01:12

to the fight whose threat we could not mitigate,

1:01:15

either we are the receiving country,

1:01:17

then we would have asked...

1:01:18

We would not have approved the transfer

1:01:19

or the secretary would not have approved the transfer.

1:01:21

So these are individuals that we made

1:01:23

the determination that we thought the returning

1:01:25

country could mitigate the fight, or

1:01:27

that they themselves were out of the fight

1:01:29

and no longer interested in terrorist activities.

1:01:31

And then they went back and they subsequently re-engaged.

1:01:32

Interviewer

And can I ask a question

1:01:35

about confidentiality and clearance?

1:01:37

You must have a very high clearance

1:01:40

and the information that you got about suspected detainees

1:01:42

as you are clearing them to other countries

1:01:49

were you able to share the highest clearance information?

1:01:51

Did they know everything there was to know

1:01:55

about these folks?

1:01:56

-

So...

1:01:58

So that's a very good question.

1:02:00

And let me just take a minute to talk

1:02:01

about that in two phases.

1:02:02

One, your question was

1:02:03

did they know everything that we knew

1:02:05

about the individuals at the highest levels of intelligence?

1:02:06

And the answer is not everything

1:02:08

because there are some things that we could not

1:02:09

get the intelligence community to be able to share

1:02:10

with the foreign countries, for any number of reasons

1:02:13

largely sources and methods

1:02:14

while they couldn't share that information.

1:02:15

That said, that was one of...

1:02:18

To me, one of the highlights

1:02:19

and one of the bright points of the overall review process

1:02:21

I describe the types of different review processes.

1:02:25

And I actually didn't even get to the end

1:02:27

of those, because after we had the ARBs stopped

1:02:28

by President Obama, President Obama then

1:02:31

conducted the executive order task force review

1:02:32

and he established a senior level task force

1:02:35

of officials from across six different agencies.

1:02:37

And I was the DOD rep to that task force

1:02:39

and they did the work and they reviewed all the cases.

1:02:43

But the point on intelligence information

1:02:47

that I wanted to get through

1:02:49

is that this is where I thought good governance again

1:02:51

came into play.

1:02:52

When you looked at the early section one reviews

1:02:54

which was the first review processes that were done,

1:02:55

the information that the people had

1:02:58

at their disposal was largely the information that came

1:03:00

from the field from the capturing unit

1:03:02

and from field intelligence.

1:03:04

They did not have any exposure

1:03:05

to intelligence information from Washington DC's level

1:03:08

or from the intelligence community that wasn't being shared

1:03:12

outside of what was in the field.

1:03:14

And the community at large knows a lot more information

1:03:16

than just what's being shared in the field.

1:03:18

When the ARB process went into place

1:03:20

and the CSR process went in place,

1:03:23

that was the first time intelligence information

1:03:24

at the Washington level was really introduced

1:03:26

into the process.

1:03:28

But the intelligence community was judicious

1:03:29

in how they released information

1:03:31

and what information they use

1:03:33

and the people that were outside

1:03:35

of it that were receiving the information often

1:03:36

didn't know what other intelligence information was

1:03:39

out there because they weren't the intelligence specialists

1:03:41

they were analysts

1:03:43

or they were people that were doing the review process

1:03:45

but they weren't intelligence specialist to do that.

1:03:48

When president Obama put his task force together,

1:03:50

included in an executive order

1:03:51

establishing the task force was the requirement

1:03:52

that all agencies would produce 100% of all information

1:03:53

about the detainees from every agency in the government.

1:03:57

And it would be turned over to the task force.

1:04:00

And so the task force ended up with much more information

1:04:01

much more intelligence information than any

1:04:04

of the other previous review processes had been access

1:04:05

to before.

1:04:08

And it's determining what they could use

1:04:09

to then determine the threat the individual might weight.

1:04:11

That helped us because at that point,

1:04:13

once all that intelligence information was

1:04:16

in the game, then when we had to clear information

1:04:19

and get clearances to share with foreign countries,

1:04:21

you had a better totality picture of what was...

1:04:24

What that information was

1:04:26

which allowed the intelligence community,

1:04:28

I think to be more forward-leaning

1:04:30

and clearing much more information

1:04:31

than I ever had when I was doing the negotiations.

1:04:33

that I spoke to earlier

1:04:35

because the intelligence community broadened its scope

1:04:37

as to information that could be released

1:04:39

and shared with countries to help them understand

1:04:40

the potential threat that a detainee might pose to us.

1:04:43

Interviewer

I have another question.

1:04:46

As a policy person,

1:04:47

what would you do with the current folks still

1:04:48

in Guantanamo.

1:04:51

Have you thought about that?

1:04:54

There are what 70 left?

1:04:56

Interviewer

41.

1:04:58

-

41.

1:04:59

Interviewer

41 left.

1:05:00

-

Right, 41.

1:05:01

Interviewer

Five were cleared for release.

1:05:02

-

So I'm retired.

1:05:03

So that...

1:05:05

The issue is not mine, but I will tell you,

1:05:06

I mean, yes, it's a concern

1:05:08

and we think about it all the time and it's...

1:05:09

And you know, it's an interesting be current...

1:05:12

Sorry.

1:05:13

Because some of the individuals who are there

1:05:15

really represent genuinely true high level threats.

1:05:17

A lot of the individuals there right now are

1:05:18

because there are many

1:05:21

and we can't send them back to Yemen.

1:05:23

And many other countries have stepped up to the play.

1:05:25

Oman and others have stepped up to the play,

1:05:27

UAE to help us with this issue

1:05:30

and to take detainees back that

1:05:32

aren't their nationals to help us do that.

1:05:34

But I think that, you know

1:05:36

you reach a saturation point at some point.

1:05:38

And so it becomes difficult then really to worry

1:05:40

how do you transfer these other ones who have

1:05:42

who have a threat possibility, but really the

1:05:44

the issue that I believe the issue is driving

1:05:46

their not being able to return home is

1:05:47

because they don't have a home to return back to.

1:05:49

Interviewer

And one last question, when folks were...

1:05:53

Detainees were sent to various countries, were they...

1:05:57

They were able to say, no?

1:06:01

Were they able to say, "No, I won't go to Saudi Arabia?"

1:06:04

-

They were in some challenges to the Supreme court.

1:06:08

And the Supreme court ruled that the United States

1:06:11

government had done due diligence

1:06:13

and that they could be sent back and they were.

1:06:15

Interviewer

Could you tell us about your work

1:06:17

with Callie Stempsin and what role you had

1:06:23

and then you replaced him just so that's on tape.

1:06:28

-

Sure.

1:06:32

So, so Callie was selected as the deputy secretary

1:06:33

of defense for the office of detainee policy.

1:06:36

I was, again, the deputy director.

1:06:38

I was the ranking career official in the office.

1:06:40

And so when Callie ultimately left, resigned and left

1:06:42

as I did with all the other deputies and secretaries

1:06:45

when they resigned and left,

1:06:48

I was the person in charge of the office

1:06:50

until the new political appointee came into place.

1:06:51

Interviewer

So you would never a political appointee--

1:06:53

-

I was a careerist.

1:06:55

In fact, one of the...

1:06:57

If I can boast for a second

1:06:58

one of my things that I'm most proud of fact

1:07:01

is that I received the highest award recognition

1:07:02

you can receive as a career civilian once

1:07:04

from President Bush and once from President Obama.

1:07:06

And so to me, that's the epitomy of what a career

1:07:09

should be is you don't care what the party is

1:07:13

that's in power.

1:07:15

Your job is to execute their policies

1:07:17

and procedures and help them be successful.

1:07:19

Interviewer

You were an analyst at some point?

1:07:21

-

I was

1:07:23

I started my career

1:07:24

as an analyst in a totalist community.

1:07:25

Interviewer

And can you explain

1:07:27

exactly what that entailed?

1:07:29

-

So it's kinda like graduate research work, right?

1:07:30

You have access to a lot of information.

1:07:34

You're looking at a policy level, problem or issue

1:07:36

and you're reviewing that information and then trying to

1:07:38

make informed recommendations

1:07:42

for policy based on the information that you reviewed.

1:07:44

Interviewer

Is there a procedure, again,

1:07:47

since you've been in policy and procedures a lot

1:07:49

in this conversation, was there...

1:07:51

Is there a procedure in place in how to do that?

1:07:53

Or is that up to each analyst?

1:07:56

-

No, no, there's very strict guidelines, not strict

1:07:59

I mean, there's a lot

1:08:02

of very good tools that are made available to the analyst

1:08:03

and analytic procedures, lots of study that goes into it

1:08:05

large lots of companies out there that do a lot

1:08:07

of research based on how the intelligence community assesses

1:08:08

and does unbiased unfiltered information.

1:08:14

And then how do you take a lot

1:08:18

of wide diverse of information, pull it all together

1:08:19

in the aggregate and then break it down from there.

1:08:22

And so for example, some are codified ways

1:08:24

and some are just things that people develop over time.

1:08:27

One of the ones that I developed over time

1:08:29

as an analyst was if I was going to write a policy

1:08:32

paper recommendation for a senior policy maker,

1:08:33

if we took all the information that was available

1:08:39

to us, let me give you a hypothetical

1:08:42

that might be relevant today.

1:08:44

Right now I can give you a hypothetical that's different

1:08:46

than that.

1:08:49

We have a country where we're seeing some agitation

1:08:50

of students.

1:08:54

And so all of what we saw in Beijing and tenement,

1:08:55

we're wondering is it possible that we might see large

1:08:57

massive uprising of students and workers combining together

1:09:00

and is the country likely to react violently to it

1:09:03

the leadership likely to react violently to it.

1:09:05

And if so, is it A, gun endangering to US people?

1:09:07

And does it have any implications for US policy?

1:09:10

And so you go and you get all the information

1:09:14

and the data points that you have

1:09:16

and you try to be as creative as possible to

1:09:18

make sure you've got all the data that you can

1:09:21

and you bring all that data in

1:09:23

and you review that data and you come

1:09:25

up with a conclusion.

1:09:27

It's likely, it's not likely

1:09:28

and these are the implications if it does

1:09:29

or if it doesn't, what happens from there.

1:09:30

And then you write that up as a policy recommended...

1:09:34

You write that up as an intelligence view of everything

1:09:35

and it may include a policy recommendation.

1:09:38

Most likely it does not.

1:09:40

And most likely it simply says we reviewed all

1:09:41

the information.

1:09:43

And we think that it's highly likely

1:09:45

that within the next three to six months

1:09:47

there could be a violent clash between these protesters

1:09:49

and the government that could result in human rights

1:09:51

abuses that the US would have to respond to.

1:09:53

But when you do that in order...

1:09:54

Before you can take that conclusion up to your boss

1:09:56

and up to ultimately to the head of the agency

1:09:59

and ultimately to the president, you need to...

1:10:02

My view was you need to look at this as though

1:10:05

you're walking down a hallway

1:10:09

with a lot of open doors and every one

1:10:11

of those doors is a potential hole

1:10:12

to your analysis or a whole to your logic

1:10:13

or a hole in the information that you have available to you.

1:10:14

That some other...

1:10:15

If you had another piece

1:10:15

of information that could help you with

1:10:16

and what you want is by the time you get

1:10:17

to the end of that hallway, you turn around and you see

1:10:19

that every one of those doors has slammed, shut and locked.

1:10:20

And then, you know, you've written the piece as best...

1:10:24

As well as it can be written with...

1:10:27

As straightforward and as comprehensive as it can be written

1:10:28

with the best recommendation you can make.

1:10:32

And then you can take it forward.

1:10:33

And that, you know, the work with intelligence

1:10:34

is usually gray, not black and white.

1:10:37

So you can't always get all those doors closed

1:10:38

but you darn well want to make sure you've

1:10:40

addressed every one of those doors and looked in it

1:10:43

be sure you answered those questions before you go forward

1:10:45

so that you can at least answer the questions that come

1:10:46

to you about why did you think this?

1:10:48

Or why did you rely on this source and not that source?

1:10:49

Interviewer

So then somebody didn't do the job

1:10:51

you just described for 9/11,

1:10:54

because there were rumors that people had a sense

1:10:56

that 9/11 was going to happen in August of that year.

1:10:59

And yet no one seemed to act on it.

1:11:01

-

So again, I wasn't involved with any of that

1:11:07

but I mean, in reviewing the reports that have come

1:11:09

out and then the congressional reviews and things like that

1:11:10

that was the conclusion that was reached,

1:11:12

is that there were, there were holes

1:11:15

in peoples and blind spots and how people look

1:11:17

at information and what they did with information.

1:11:19

Interviewer

So do you think...

1:11:21

I know you haven't worked in other agencies,

1:11:23

but do you think the DOD is probably better

1:11:25

at coordinating its work and being clear in what processes

1:11:26

and policies to follow than some of the other agencies?

1:11:34

I mean, you take a lot of pride in it.

1:11:37

-

I do take a lot of pride in it

1:11:38

and I think we've seen, as I said it, that's it.

1:11:40

I mean, I think we've seen a historical change

1:11:43

in how the department

1:11:44

of defense is conducting detention operations

1:11:46

and particularly the review processes that we use to

1:11:48

ask the question, do we still need to hold this individual?

1:11:49

Or can this individual be returned?

1:11:52

That's unprecedented, the closest that you have

1:11:54

of anything of a return like this

1:11:56

before the end of a conflict is the Korean war.

1:11:58

When we did operations, big and little switch

1:12:01

and operational little switch involve the exchange

1:12:04

of sick and wounded, and then operation big switch

1:12:06

with the exchange of prisoners on both sides

1:12:08

that both sides were holding, even though we still are

1:12:10

at a state of war with North Korea today

1:12:12

because we only have an armistice, we don't know...

1:12:13

We never had a peace treaty signed.

1:12:17

And so, as a result of that, since that time,

1:12:19

you haven't had that type of...

1:12:21

Those types of exchanges, but that ongoing conflict

1:12:23

that's still happening

1:12:24

that the enemy still regards as

1:12:26

as a valid conflict of what's happening.

1:12:28

And so I think that the fact that we have put

1:12:30

in place and now regularly exercised and regularly tested

1:12:32

in the courts successfully,

1:12:34

the processes and the procedures that we have

1:12:35

in place that shows a very comprehensive review using all

1:12:38

of the information that's available

1:12:40

to the intelligence community

1:12:42

from the intelligence community and everybody else

1:12:44

all the commands and combatant information,

1:12:46

all that information is processed looked

1:12:47

at by an inter-agency group

1:12:49

not just one agency, but an inter-agency group

1:12:51

all of whom have their own perspectives to bring

1:12:52

to the information and then make a recommendation

1:12:54

on that is light years ahead of where we were before.

1:12:57

Even when I was doing the team

1:13:00

that I would go negotiate with

1:13:02

I think was a starter, a precursor to this process.

1:13:04

The process that we have in place,

1:13:07

a result of the Obama administration

1:13:08

I think significantly strengthened and codified

1:13:10

that in a way that we've never seen before.

1:13:14

Interviewer

So then why did Chuck Hagel

1:13:16

secretary of defense for a couple of years hesitate

1:13:17

to release people after six agencies

1:13:21

have vetted the persons so thoroughly

1:13:23

the way you just described

1:13:26

and everyone really did their homework.

1:13:27

What was he concerned about?

1:13:30

-

You'd have to...

1:13:32

I haven't talked to him about those specific concerns

1:13:33

so you'd have to address those to him.

1:13:35

Interviewer

Okay.

1:13:36

Did you ever hear about Jose Padilla?

1:13:38

Do you know he is, he was in the military break.

1:13:39

Did you do any vetting?

1:13:42

-

I did not.

1:13:44

Cause he was largely through what was going to

1:13:46

be the start of the military commissions.

1:13:48

He ultimately didn't go through military commissions

1:13:50

but through judicial processes with DOJ.

1:13:52

-

All of a sudden you started surrounding the military deal.

1:13:54

-

Right.

1:13:57

Interviewer

And what about Alma Cada?

1:13:57

Were you involved in his release since he was

1:13:59

released after when you...

1:14:01

-

I joined...

1:14:03

Ambassador Freed was our lead negotiator

1:14:05

but I joined Dan on the trips

1:14:07

to Canada when we negotiated for his transfer, yes.

1:14:08

Interviewer

And we know Carter was accused

1:14:10

of killing an American soldier

1:14:12

which might or might not be true,

1:14:15

could that inform your decision and decisions of people.

1:14:17

What did they release him if in fact people believed that?

1:14:20

-

So it did inform decisions.

1:14:24

And we have, I think very clear evidence as to his role

1:14:27

and his participatory role in that is and that was

1:14:30

all shared and discussed with the Canadian government as

1:14:33

well.

1:14:35

And the process that led up to those things.

1:14:37

But again, as with any transfer, what it really came down to

1:14:39

for us was the question of, is there another country

1:14:40

that can mitigate this threat or are we the only country

1:14:43

that can mitigate the threat?

1:14:47

In Carter's case, once a determination was made

1:14:49

that there was not going to be a formal prosecution

1:14:50

through military commissions channels,

1:14:52

then the question became, okay.

1:14:53

What's the likelihood

1:14:54

of his returning to the fight and can anybody else

1:14:56

besides the United States government mitigate

1:14:58

that likelihood?

1:14:59

And we determined the government of Canada could

1:15:02

mitigate that likelihood.

1:15:04

And so that's when negotiation talks really gained steam.

1:15:05

Interviewer

And you were involved in that

1:15:07

and you had that decision too

1:15:09

Canada couldn't handle it and therefore it's acceptable.

1:15:11

What do you...

1:15:14

With you're take on military commissions,

1:15:15

do you think we should continue them?

1:15:18

Have you watched them over a decade?

1:15:21

-

I think we missed the boat on military commissions

1:15:23

since 2011.

1:15:30

I mean, I think there was a time

1:15:31

and a place when we could have done it

1:15:32

and probably should have done it.

1:15:35

But the fact that we didn't do it has led us

1:15:38

to a point now where it's I think probably

1:15:42

not a useful use of US dollars and pursuing that.

1:15:43

Interviewer

Why do we keep pursuing it, do you think?

1:15:45

-

I don't know.

1:15:50

Interviewer

Did you think President Obama

1:15:52

was going to close down Guantanamo

1:15:53

when he said he would and he was elected?

1:15:56

Did you think he would?

1:15:58

-

Oh yeah.

1:15:59

I mean, he clearly stated

1:16:00

that that was going to be his objective

1:16:01

and that he intended to close down Guantanamo.

1:16:03

I think the hardest thing though

1:16:05

was that realizing that one, his team came in

1:16:06

without a real solid understanding of a lot of the detainees

1:16:08

and who the people were that were there and what they were

1:16:11

and then to the transfer processes that were

1:16:14

in place already to try to move people out.

1:16:17

And so how those processes work

1:16:20

and how a change in those processes may help

1:16:21

or impede that process in doing that.

1:16:24

But ultimately, I think, you know the decision to say

1:16:26

I want to close Guantanamo is very different than the policy

1:16:30

of why you have a Guantanamo, because at the end of the day

1:16:33

you're still going to have a group

1:16:37

of individuals who no other country can mitigate

1:16:40

the threat that they represent.

1:16:42

And that the US government is going to have to

1:16:45

continue to hold as long

1:16:48

as they continue to represent that level of threat.

1:16:50

And so where do you hold them?

1:16:51

And, you know, the idea which was looked at

1:16:53

and I was involved in the process

1:16:54

of finding a facility in the United States where

1:16:55

we could transfer those detainees who ultimately

1:16:57

would not be transferable.

1:16:58

And we would have to continue to mitigate the threat

1:16:59

hold them in the United States while that decision

1:17:00

would allow you to close the physical structure

1:17:03

of Guantanamo,

1:17:05

it did not allow you to close the question of Guantanamo.

1:17:07

Which is not a question of Guantanamo,

1:17:10

it's a question of wartime detention.

1:17:11

And is this a legal exercise of wartime detention?

1:17:13

Because all that was doing was moving the problem

1:17:15

northward moving into the United States.

1:17:17

And so I always long believed and still believe

1:17:20

to this day that even if we'd gotten to that point

1:17:24

it would not have ended the habeas proceedings.

1:17:26

It would not have ended the critics that say

1:17:29

that we don't have one tunnel,

1:17:33

it only would have transplanted

1:17:34

the problem someplace different

1:17:35

and we'd have a whole new set of issues associated

1:17:37

with it when it's transplanted to someplace different

1:17:38

be that the United States or any other facility

1:17:40

that was chosen to put them in to doing it.

1:17:42

And so just closing the facility might have

1:17:43

a political value to it

1:17:45

but it doesn't help you solve the problem

1:17:46

which is what I was trying to do is help solve the problem.

1:17:49

Interviewer

And what did you think America should do

1:17:51

with people who we do not have enough evidence

1:17:54

to prosecute, but we also think

1:17:57

that they are ongoing threat and we can't release them?

1:18:01

-

So I think that you know, and Bill will talk eloquent

1:18:04

upon this and the rule of law and all,

1:18:06

but I'm not a lawyer, I'm a policy person.

1:18:08

I just spend my days with lawyers.

1:18:10

But I think quite honestly, that's where this got screwed

1:18:11

up in the beginning is that the lawyers tie this

1:18:13

up in knots by not allowing us to call them POW's.

1:18:16

I fully understand why the lawyers made

1:18:21

the legal determination that they're not prisoners of war.

1:18:24

Right.

1:18:28

Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense

1:18:29

and Department of State

1:18:30

and NSC, white house lawyers in the Bush administration.

1:18:32

When the first decisions were made

1:18:33

about what are we going to call them?

1:18:34

They could have said, we're going to call them POW's.

1:18:36

Technically, they're not POW's they don't...

1:18:39

The Taliban is not a nation state, does not belong...

1:18:41

Is not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions.

1:18:43

Is not bound by the Geneva Conventions.

1:18:45

You're extending the rules of war

1:18:47

to a group that should not be entitled to those doing that

1:18:50

but by not doing that, and by coming up

1:18:53

with the unlawful enemy combatant description

1:18:55

which they use, it completely mired the public discussion

1:18:57

and the public debate about whether these guys were...

1:19:01

You said, we're not going to prosecute them.

1:19:03

Well, we never intended to prosecute them.

1:19:06

They were captured in a wartime activity, in an active war

1:19:07

by serving a leadership structure that believed they were

1:19:09

at war.

1:19:12

Some had been on pursue the United States for peace.

1:19:14

They wanted to end the war in suit for peace.

1:19:16

You don't do that if you don't think you're at war.

1:19:18

So this was not a police action.

1:19:20

This was not a action by detectives doing a lot

1:19:21

of research and going and making an arrest.

1:19:24

And now bringing that arrest forward

1:19:26

to a prosecution and potential conviction.

1:19:28

This is a war time detention and the enemy...

1:19:30

And if you're at war

1:19:33

you have the legal right to hold people

1:19:34

until such time that the war is over

1:19:36

or they no longer represent a threat.

1:19:38

Actually we've added the element.

1:19:41

They no longer represent a threat that you can go ahead

1:19:43

and release them to that.

1:19:44

Otherwise we could hold them till the end of the conflict.

1:19:45

And I'll just...

1:19:47

You got me on my hobby horse now, right?

1:19:49

But some people say, you know, well how...

1:19:51

When's the end of the conflict?

1:19:52

And there's not going to be a signing

1:19:53

on the USS Missouri showing the end

1:19:55

of the conflict with Al-Qaeda or with the Taliban.

1:19:56

But the fact is that's the element that we

1:19:59

introduced was we don't need to wait

1:20:01

for the end of the conflict

1:20:04

because we're looking to see when does the conflict end

1:20:06

for this individual. And case by case, person by person,

1:20:08

are you still in the fight?

1:20:10

And the PRB process, I think has done a very good job

1:20:11

at looking at the remaining detainees at Guantanamo

1:20:14

and asking that question, are you still in the fight?

1:20:16

And if you are not in the fight

1:20:19

then we're going to transfer you back.

1:20:21

And if you are still in the fight

1:20:22

then we'll see if someone else can mitigate your threat.

1:20:24

And if they can't

1:20:26

then the United States government will continue to

1:20:28

hold you so long as you're, you are still in that fight.

1:20:30

And so it becomes, you know, when you look at

1:20:32

and you know, the Americans, I go back to my earlier job.

1:20:35

When you look at the Americans who were shot

1:20:38

down in Vietnam and, and held captive, they didn't know

1:20:40

if they were going to be held by the north Vietnamese

1:20:42

for one day, one week, one month, 10 years

1:20:45

or the rest of their lives.

1:20:47

No one had any idea how the Vietnam war was going to

1:20:48

end when it went in, what would happen with it.

1:20:51

So there is no guarantee of when the end of conflict is.

1:20:53

So what we did was rather than ask an abstract question

1:20:56

of when's the end of the conflict with terrorists?

1:20:59

We asked when's the end of the conflict for this individual.

1:21:01

And then how is it

1:21:04

that we can mitigate any potential threat that allows us

1:21:06

to no longer have to hold this individual?

1:21:07

Interviewer

So that's great.

1:21:09

That's really interesting, but I just want to

1:21:11

confirm what you said at the beginning of this, you feel

1:21:13

and obviously many other people feel that we made a mistake

1:21:15

or the US government made a mistake

1:21:21

and not declared them to be POW's prisoners of war

1:21:22

at the beginning, when we first held them

1:21:25

-

I wouldn't use the word mistake.

1:21:27

I would just say that my view is

1:21:29

that I think we vastly complicated the process

1:21:30

and we confused a lot of people.

1:21:34

And by allowing the lawyers to determine that

1:21:36

and that again, you asked

1:21:41

for another one of the other 368 changes, right?

1:21:42

Is that early on through pre Guantanamo and early one

1:21:44

Iraq, policy did not play a big role in detention.

1:21:48

It was the lawyers that played a big role

1:21:51

in and making those policies speeches, and lawyers

1:21:54

aren't policy people.

1:21:57

I'm going to speak for prejudice

1:21:59

but they're not policy people, they're lawyers.

1:22:00

And they're looking at that.

1:22:01

They should look at the law

1:22:03

and tell you are your actions conforming

1:22:04

with the law or not conforming with the law

1:22:06

and what do you need to do to change them

1:22:07

if they aren't conforming?

1:22:09

One of the changes that came through is the established

1:22:11

of the office that I used to head as a permanent office

1:22:14

a full structured office that looked

1:22:15

from a policy perspective, just

1:22:18

at this question for the secretary of defense

1:22:19

to be sure that they were looking ahead,

1:22:21

looking around the curves, looking for the next conflict

1:22:23

and the next battle.

1:22:25

And are we properly situated so

1:22:26

that we don't repeat mistakes from the past?

1:22:28

Interviewer

And you said something else

1:22:29

that I hadn't heard of before,

1:22:32

you said that Bin Ladin suit for peace?

1:22:33

-

Yes.

1:22:36

Interviewer

Could you tell us something about--

1:22:37

-

I only know...

1:22:38

I just read that it was a New York times article

1:22:39

long time ago, like, oh it was after an...

1:22:41

It was like six to eight months

1:22:43

after 9/11, when he sued for peace.

1:22:44

Interviewer

Did you get a sense when you travel overseas

1:22:47

that other countries somewhat kind of Mo

1:22:51

as are staying on America and

1:22:55

that when you said, you know, if we close it on some level

1:22:57

of Guantanamo moves to the US and some other prison

1:23:00

but maybe it's a good thing

1:23:04

because the image of Guantanamo was harming the US?

1:23:06

-

So the sense that I had

1:23:09

was that it wasn't the facility that was harming US.

1:23:12

It was the policy of detention that people were critical...

1:23:16

That the Europeans were most upset about.

1:23:17

It was the...

1:23:20

Indefinite was their words,

1:23:21

indefinite detention, without an end of sight

1:23:23

where we would be holding people

1:23:25

without an ability for them to prosecute,

1:23:27

or be prosecuted for those things.

1:23:30

And it was that question we just discussed, I think

1:23:32

is what drove that, that perception on that.

1:23:34

Interviewer

And do people actually articulate that

1:23:36

to you when you saw these other countries?

1:23:39

-

Not really because I was there for a different purpose.

1:23:41

I was there to negotiate specific transfers of individuals.

1:23:43

So the broader policy question of

1:23:46

should we have a Guantanamo or not have a Guantanamo

1:23:48

and we...

1:23:50

I mean, I knew I knew the country's view

1:23:52

because I knew their perspective on it.

1:23:54

And some might...

1:23:56

We might bring it up and say.

1:23:57

But I never had someone say to me directly, you know

1:23:58

if you just got rid of this Guantanamo

1:24:00

it would improve our bilateral relationship at that.

1:24:01

But they may not have that conversation with me.

1:24:03

They may have that with others.

1:24:05

Interviewer

Did they ever say to you

1:24:07

why won't you the US take these people

1:24:08

and you're asking us to take them?

1:24:10

-

Yes, frequently.

1:24:12

Interviewer

And how did you answer that?

1:24:13

-

It would depend on where we were in the timing

1:24:15

but part of the answer could be, you know

1:24:18

we're on the heels of 9/11

1:24:20

and it's untenable to talk about bringing terrorists

1:24:21

in the United States at this time with the US populace

1:24:24

the way it is in the aftermath of 9/11.

1:24:26

Some of it could be that, you know

1:24:28

they wanted to know why we weren't...

1:24:30

I mean, we have...

1:24:31

A question that was frequently asked

1:24:33

particularly at the DOJ representatives

1:24:35

on my negotiating team was,

1:24:37

"Why aren't you prosecuting them?"

1:24:38

Why aren't you, you know...

1:24:39

"Why do you want us to prosecute them if we can,

1:24:40

why aren't you prosecuting?

1:24:42

And you probably have more information to prosecute them

1:24:43

than we do."

1:24:46

And the answer would frequently come back to the, well

1:24:47

we don't have any information that from a crime perspective

1:24:50

that they can be prosecuted.

1:24:51

We're holding them on a wartime detention.

1:24:53

So we spent a lot

1:24:55

of time educating other countries about that dichotomy

1:24:56

between the law of war and more time detention

1:24:57

versus potentially being held for persons to be prosecuted.

1:24:59

But that didn't mean that some

1:25:02

of those other countries didn't have a way to

1:25:05

prosecute a lot of those countries.

1:25:08

You know, these guys left illegally false passports

1:25:10

other kinds of things, they had reasons.

1:25:13

And most of the prosecutions that they did do

1:25:15

they would prosecute for things like that, for offenses

1:25:17

for leaving their entering the country illegally

1:25:18

and passport fraud, passport violations.

1:25:20

And that gave them an opportunity then to

1:25:21

incarcerate the individual.

1:25:23

And then they could look and see

1:25:24

if there's any other things that ground truth

1:25:26

to some of the other terrorists type information

1:25:28

that could give them something else.

1:25:30

And so many of these cases

1:25:31

they were successful able to do that.

1:25:32

And other cases they weren't, and they, you know

1:25:33

after they served their minimum amount

1:25:35

of time from the initial one, then they were released.

1:25:37

But at that time they were still now

1:25:39

on that government's books.

1:25:40

So to say, because, you know

1:25:43

having been prosecuted and confined at some point

1:25:44

Interviewer

Were you involved in sending

1:25:47

the French de Kaneese back to France

1:25:48

because they were incarcerated

1:25:50

as soon as they went back right?

1:25:52

-

They were, but the French system's a little bit different

1:25:53

than a lot of the other European systems that they can

1:25:56

they can incarcerate

1:25:59

throughout the investigative period when they do that.

1:26:00

And so they frequently will incarcerate

1:26:02

for a lengthy period of time while they investigate.

1:26:04

And they ultimately determined that there's nothing

1:26:07

to prosecute, but they will have had a year more

1:26:10

of incarceration when we're doing that

1:26:11

which is completely different than us than others.

1:26:11

Interviewer

You know that was true

1:26:13

when you send them back to France.

1:26:14

So you weren't enrolled in that?

1:26:15

-

Yes.

1:26:18

Interviewer

So that made it easier for you?

1:26:19

-

Well, it was a factor in determining

1:26:20

whether or not they could mitigate the individual's threat.

1:26:21

Yes.

1:26:23

Johny

And you have 12 minutes.

1:26:25

Interviewer

Okay.

1:26:26

Thanks, Johnny.

1:26:28

When you were involved in sending the first group

1:26:29

of Uyghurs to Albania.

1:26:31

-

Yes.

1:26:33

Interviewer

Could you...

1:26:34

Did you negotiate the Albania on that or did you--

1:26:36

-

Oh yeah, the state department had the lead

1:26:37

but I was involved in the negotiations.

1:26:39

It was a inner agency process for that.

1:26:41

Yes.

1:26:42

Interviewer

What were your thoughts about Albania?

1:26:44

Did it seem like inappropriate place for the Uyghurs

1:26:47

or it didn't really matter

1:26:49

because there was no place that would take--

1:26:51

-

No.

1:26:51

I mean, we were very pleased with Albania because we...

1:26:53

The measures, the social infrastructure safety net

1:26:54

that they were going to install

1:26:58

below the Uyghurs to ensure they didn't fall

1:26:59

through the cracks was quite honestly quite impressive.

1:27:02

And so we thought we had the best bet

1:27:05

of seeing the workers have a successful re-entry

1:27:07

in that country than we did any place else, because

1:27:08

of the measures that the Albanian government

1:27:11

was going to take.

1:27:14

Interviewer

Do you look at the housing

1:27:16

and the facilities and perhaps counseling, or...

1:27:19

Do you look at those kinds of factors?

1:27:20

-

I never did.

1:27:22

No.

1:27:23

-

I mean, we looked at the factor, you know,

1:27:24

are we going to...

1:27:25

The purpose of transfer was not to have the person fail

1:27:27

and return to the fight.

1:27:30

The purpose of transfer was to have the person

1:27:33

become a successful constructive member of society

1:27:36

wherever he was going to be.

1:27:37

And so in some countries, you're going to need more

1:27:38

of a safety net than you would in other countries

1:27:40

particularly if the detainee has less of an acquaintance

1:27:42

with that country or no family and things like that.

1:27:44

So you have to have a better safety net that's there.

1:27:46

And so all those issues of what type of safety net

1:27:49

and what's the appropriate safety net that you

1:27:50

would need always, were part of the conversation

1:27:53

and the discussions.

1:27:55

-

You would be involved in that.

1:27:55

-

Depending, I mean, sometimes state, as I said before

1:27:57

sometimes state had lead in them.

1:28:00

And in the later years

1:28:01

particularly during the Obama administration

1:28:02

state always had the lead for those things.

1:28:06

So I know you've talked with cliff and

1:28:06

and I think Lee also, but they had the lead

1:28:09

for those things in doing that.

1:28:10

But back when, earlier that with Dan freed,

1:28:12

Dan freed and I frequently traveled together, Dan did Europe

1:28:14

on his own, but every place he went outside of Europe

1:28:15

I always went with Dan on negotiating those things.

1:28:19

Interviewer

I have one more question.

1:28:21

We're going to need to take a break to change the card

1:28:23

but do the US ever give money to these countries?

1:28:26

Or what did...

1:28:28

What was the incentive for these countries

1:28:29

to take these people?

1:28:31

-

So we did give money to some

1:28:33

of the countries in a way in order to help establish

1:28:34

that social safety net that I referred to.

1:28:36

Right? So if they're going to provide housing

1:28:38

or things like that, it's enough to get them started.

1:28:40

Certainly not enough.

1:28:41

That's going to last them for a long period of time

1:28:42

because by then the individual hopefully

1:28:43

will become a constructive member of the society.

1:28:45

So it was, it was basically feed money

1:28:46

startup money to get the individual transfers successfully

1:28:48

and to relieve the burden.

1:28:51

Because many of the countries

1:28:52

we were sending them to Plough and others.

1:28:54

They don't have a lot of resources themselves.

1:28:57

And so the idea was we want this to be a success.

1:28:59

We don't want this to be a failure, so we can...

1:29:01

We will see that startup in order to get this off

1:29:03

to a successful start.

1:29:04

Interviewer

Why don't we take a break?

1:29:06

I have a question I'll pull out that we can--

1:29:08

-

Okay.

1:29:11

Interviewer

Thank you.

1:29:12

Okay. Let's take a break.

1:29:13

Man

Okay. We're rolling.

1:29:14

Interviewer

Speaking since you mentioned Poli

1:29:15

before we had to take a break,

1:29:15

my understanding from several people is that

1:29:17

the men who was sent to pull out the Uyghurs

1:29:20

is a six no longer there,

1:29:23

but it had gone on to another country.

1:29:25

And so people had told me it was Turkey that been

1:29:28

our Turkey.

1:29:32

So I just wanted the...

1:29:33

No one has..

1:29:35

Either no one is monitoring them

1:29:37

or the US assisted that going there

1:29:38

or how did that happen if in fact they're supposed

1:29:40

to be monitored when they're released to the countries.

1:29:43

-

So yeah, I've been away from it for some time now.

1:29:47

So I'm not following the individuals that were

1:29:50

formally implied that left Pilou.

1:29:53

There were a number of individual circumstances

1:29:54

for some of them. One of them lost a son in an accident

1:29:55

and some other circumstances that happened.

1:29:57

So, you know, I think we were aware that they had left.

1:30:00

Palauan where they had gone back to Turkey.

1:30:03

We didn't have a lot of influence over the decision

1:30:08

at that time where they're going is my understanding

1:30:10

from state department.

1:30:12

Interviewer

But you don't...

1:30:14

I know you don't want to say much about this,

1:30:15

Alan I don't...

1:30:17

I'm not asking you to, but the US

1:30:18

had to be aware of it either before it happened

1:30:19

or became way after, because they didn't really care

1:30:23

that much about the wig as something

1:30:25

but I'm just...

1:30:28

The reason why I'm asking you this

1:30:28

is because Levalasky told us

1:30:30

that no one's really monitoring the people now

1:30:32

because Trump doesn't have anybody in office to do that.

1:30:35

And I'm wondering if they even monitor them,

1:30:39

then if in fact, they were able

1:30:41

to just leave and go to another country.

1:30:43

-

So I can't comment to state and state's ability to monitor

1:30:44

or watch over people and where they're doing that.

1:30:47

But I mean, there are mechanisms and procedures

1:30:50

in place that are not effected

1:30:54

by who President Trump has appointed

1:30:54

or not appointed in terms of normal process, work,

1:30:56

intelligence work and things like that,

1:30:59

it happens that, you know, should be

1:31:01

keeping track on somebody on the individuals.

1:31:02

There are a lot of people that went back and does that mean

1:31:05

that every country is, you know, we rely on state department

1:31:07

for regular interventions, with the countries where

1:31:09

we send people to be sure that they're doing fine.

1:31:11

I mean, state has an obligation as well to be

1:31:13

sure they're not being mistreated.

1:31:16

And then maybe they mistreat them initially.

1:31:17

But if they'd done something down the road

1:31:18

so I know the state department takes that obligation

1:31:20

seriously and how they look at that and whether

1:31:22

or not it's affected by theirs there is,

1:31:24

or there isn't a head of that office

1:31:26

and say, tomorrow there are other offices

1:31:27

as well that have some of that responsibility.

1:31:30

Interviewer

So the DOD have somehow monitored

1:31:31

on its own separate from state?

1:31:35

Or you can't tell us, I'm just curious.

1:31:36

-

Yeah, well it's a whole of government approach

1:31:38

and we rely on whole of government approach to do that.

1:31:41

So it's not something that DOD does exclusively.

1:31:43

It's not something that we could do exclusive.

1:31:45

We don't operate in some

1:31:47

of the countries where detainees have gone back.

1:31:50

So it's a whole of government approach

1:31:51

Interviewer

But the DOD and again,

1:31:52

you don't have to say anything more

1:31:55

but I'm just to understand the DOD might have

1:31:56

some monitoring or might be involved somehow to watch some

1:31:58

of these people who are released

1:32:01

-

I'm not aware of duty that's involved

1:32:03

in monitoring of any of the detainees that have gone back.

1:32:05

Interviewer

And when you had your group

1:32:08

of six agencies that veteran the men

1:32:12

when Obama became president,

1:32:14

the CIA was one of those six agencies, right?

1:32:16

So the CIA now gave you information

1:32:19

that you might not have had access to before?

1:32:21

-

So there were seven agencies together, six voting agencies

1:32:23

and one consulting agency

1:32:27

which was the CIA's role would be a consulting agency.

1:32:30

So they didn't have a vote to do that.

1:32:32

And then they were...

1:32:34

And their role is as a consultant.

1:32:35

And she was to be sure that the group

1:32:37

had all the information that was available

1:32:39

including all the information that was available

1:32:41

throughout the intelligence community.

1:32:43

Interviewer

And why wouldn't they give it a vote?

1:32:45

-

It's not...

1:32:47

They're not a policy office there.

1:32:48

Their job is to provide information

1:32:50

but not to make policy recommendations.

1:32:51

Interviewer

And when you had a vote,

1:32:52

did you need unanimous for the six agencies?

1:32:54

-

We did not need unanimous

1:32:56

but we almost always had unanimous.

1:32:57

Interviewer

And did the personal change

1:32:59

of the six agencies in terms of the meetings

1:33:01

to review each person?

1:33:03

Or was it always the same?

1:33:06

-

By large it was the same individuals though.

1:33:08

You had substituted.

1:33:10

We don't want the process to stop because then

1:33:11

we took vacation.

1:33:13

So you had people that could stand

1:33:15

in for others, but not by and large,

1:33:16

it was the same individuals.

1:33:18

Interviewer

And you represented DOD in these eight...

1:33:20

-

I did both for the executive order task force.

1:33:21

And then for the follow-on periodic review boards to PRBS

1:33:22

I was the initial senior representative

1:33:26

from the Department of Defense.

1:33:27

-

Okay.

1:33:29

I don't have any more questions, but nothing that you

1:33:31

raised that I really interested in is you mentioned you

1:33:33

spoke to some detainees when you went to Guantanamo.

1:33:35

How common was that for you to go

1:33:37

up to a detainee and start talking to them?

1:33:39

Why did you do that?

1:33:42

-

It wasn't common, but it wasn't isolated.

1:33:43

I mean, I did on occasion,

1:33:45

depending on what the circumstances

1:33:47

and why, you know, what I was there

1:33:49

and when...

1:33:51

How long my visit was.

1:33:52

Most times my visits were such that they...

1:33:53

I didn't have the opportunity to do that,

1:33:55

which is why I relish the opportunities.

1:33:56

When I did have the chance to do that

1:33:56

to talk to people, to see that perspective

1:33:58

Interviewer

And what...

1:34:00

Will you be talking to people

1:34:01

who would be released soon and you want to see who they are?

1:34:02

-

No, I... In fact, generally, I didn't know who they were

1:34:05

that I was talking to because they were just

1:34:07

just a detainee on the other side

1:34:09

of the fence that I saw that I was talking to.

1:34:10

Interviewer

And what was your take on that?

1:34:11

What were you... Why did you want to do that?

1:34:13

And what were you getting out of that?

1:34:15

-

It just gave me an opportunity to

1:34:16

I mean, they knew I was official from Washington.

1:34:18

So if they wanted to complain about something

1:34:20

or express concern about something, it was an opportunity

1:34:24

for them to do that in an unfiltered way.

1:34:26

Interviewer

And military had no right to stop you

1:34:27

from doing that because you were DOD, I guess.

1:34:31

-

Well, they could've stopped me from doing it

1:34:32

but there was nobody needed a reason to stop it.

1:34:34

My just having a casual interaction

1:34:36

with a detainee was not disruptive

1:34:38

to the overall camp procedures.

1:34:40

I wouldn't want to do anything that was disruptive

1:34:41

to camp procedures, but I mean, it wasn't, you know,

1:34:44

it wasn't disruptive.

1:34:47

So they had no reason to question, you know...

1:34:48

And I was with the guard force anyhow,

1:34:49

I wasn't just strolling through the camps by myself.

1:34:51

So...

1:34:55

Interviewer

And did you go to your isolation?

1:34:56

Did ever see men in isolation?

1:34:56

-

There was no isolation at Guantanamo.

1:34:58

Interviewer

There was no isolation in Guantanamo?

1:35:00

-

No.

1:35:01

Interviewer

So when people said

1:35:02

they were held in isolation, what were they saying?

1:35:04

-

I don't know.

1:35:05

For the times that I heard that,

1:35:06

but the times that I've been there, there was no ice.

1:35:08

I mean, some people misrepresent being in a single cell

1:35:10

as isolation, but that's not the case at all.

1:35:12

They communicate to each other, they can talk

1:35:15

up and down the hallways, they recreate together.

1:35:18

It's not what people think of is, you know

1:35:19

isolation or the black hole

1:35:21

or anything like that, that, that just doesn't exist.

1:35:23

And in fact, when I went with the white house lawyers

1:35:26

the first time with Greg Craig,

1:35:29

Greg Craig asked,

1:35:31

"Can I see where we put people in solitary confinement?"

1:35:32

And the commander said, there is no place here

1:35:34

for solitary gun.

1:35:36

We don't have solitary confinement.

1:35:39

And Greg Craig said, no, no.

1:35:40

I mean, and he went like five different descriptions

1:35:42

of what he was trying to say.

1:35:44

And the commander was very frustrated.

1:35:45

He says, "You're not understanding we don't have that.

1:35:46

There is no solitary confinement.

1:35:48

There is no isolation.

1:35:50

There is no...

1:35:51

We just don't have that here."

1:35:52

Interviewer

Did you go to Camp Echo with Leslie

1:35:54

and also while we'll be held, they were not considered

1:35:59

in isolation from the rest of the camp, or...

1:36:04

-

They were not

1:36:06

they never considered themselves that way either.

1:36:07

Interviewer

Did you think there was isolation

1:36:09

at that point in time before you went down there?

1:36:12

-

I didn't think that there was,

1:36:14

because I was aware of how we're doing things

1:36:16

and what we were doing, but I mean, it's always good.

1:36:18

That's one of the reasons why I would make visits

1:36:20

is to double check and just make sure that everything was

1:36:22

in Washington understood the way we wanted.

1:36:24

It was the same as what was happening on the ground.

1:36:26

Interviewer

Do you think there was any before

1:36:27

you kind of got involved

1:36:29

in Guantanamo because the men who told us that were there

1:36:31

in the early years again.

1:36:33

-

Right.

1:36:35

So I can't talk about that cause I wasn't there then,

1:36:36

but I mean I do know that there was some things

1:36:37

that were done that we changed those procedures.

1:36:38

So, I mean, is it possible again?

1:36:41

I say never say never, but I mean, I'm not...

1:36:43

That's not an...

1:36:44

It's not an advocacy that it did happen.

1:36:45

I'm just saying, I don't know.

1:36:46

Interviewer

And so one lawyer told us

1:36:49

that his client was put in isolation.

1:36:51

He couldn't talk to anybody

1:36:55

and then they have a big fan blowing.

1:36:57

So that they'd be noisy.

1:36:58

We try to yell to someone else.

1:36:59

He couldn't hear it.

1:37:01

You've heard nothing like that.

1:37:02

-

I've heard those things from the lawyers and habeas

1:37:04

but I mean, those, those concerns have been addressed

1:37:05

in habeas and they've generally been found, not true.

1:37:08

So...

1:37:09

But I don't know the specific circumstances here

1:37:10

and I wouldn't be able to address it

1:37:12

even if I did know the specific ones you're talking about.

1:37:14

But I'm just saying in terms

1:37:16

of how things were done in Guantanamo, that's not the case.

1:37:17

Interviewer

And for camp seven

1:37:18

where the high value detainees they held

1:37:20

have you been there?

1:37:23

You can't describe it.

1:37:24

I know, but...

1:37:25

-

I'm not going to be able to answer

1:37:26

any Camp Seven questions at all.

1:37:27

So for purposes of this interview

1:37:28

Interviewer

Yeah.

1:37:30

That that's a separate, is there something that I

1:37:31

didn't ask you that you were hoping to tell us when you had

1:37:33

or when you thought

1:37:37

about coming here, just in terms of understanding

1:37:41

Guantanamo.

1:37:43

-

No, I mean, I think that I'm glad to participate.

1:37:45

I think it was very thorough.

1:37:48

I mean, I guess at the point of emphasis, the one thing

1:37:50

I'd like to come back through is that I really do believe

1:37:52

and I think it was probably come

1:37:54

through with my overall enthusiasm that we've

1:37:56

used this process to create a government structure

1:37:58

and a government interaction

1:38:01

in a way that I've never seen before

1:38:02

in my 30 plus years in government service.

1:38:04

The whole of government approach that I spoke to

1:38:06

and using six agencies and all the information available

1:38:09

and just collecting all the information.

1:38:11

I mean, just imagine the amount of effort that goes

1:38:13

into asking every agency to go through their files and over

1:38:15

you know, some files, a decade old or more

1:38:19

depending on if there had been intelligence reporting

1:38:22

about an individual even before 9/11

1:38:25

and to bring all that information forward

1:38:27

so that it's available for this.

1:38:28

And to make that information

1:38:30

some of which is extremely high classified

1:38:31

some of which is operational

1:38:33

in nature to make all that information available

1:38:35

so that it can be reviewed

1:38:37

by a group of abstract brokers to make recommendations

1:38:40

to their superiors.

1:38:43

And then their superiors who are all cabinet level

1:38:44

officers are reviewing the cases individually

1:38:47

to make a determination as to whether they go or not.

1:38:49

I don't know another country

1:38:51

in the world that spends that type of time,

1:38:53

effort, or energy to make sure

1:38:55

that they're doing it as comprehensively as we're doing it

1:38:57

and to ensure they're doing it as well as we're doing it.

1:38:59

And I take great pride in that.

1:39:01

I think that we have, we have crafted a system

1:39:03

born out of necessity that established the best whole

1:39:05

of government approach that could be that's

1:39:09

unparalleled anywhere else in across the globe.

1:39:12

Interviewer

Do you credit Obama for that.

1:39:14

Or do you credit someone else for that.

1:39:16

-

Well, I mean the process he started that the whole

1:39:17

of government approach started before Obama president Obama.

1:39:20

But what I do give him credit

1:39:23

for is that the effort that he put in to ensure

1:39:25

that the totality of the information

1:39:27

and the totality of the review was unparalleled

1:39:30

because I do believe that that's true that the

1:39:32

the level of effort that's been put in

1:39:34

and the level of review that's been given, and the level

1:39:36

of information that's been assessed was far greater

1:39:39

than was ever done under the Bush administration

1:39:41

Interviewer

The six to eight months,

1:39:43

the process didn't begin till he became president.

1:39:46

Is that true?

1:39:48

Or was it there before

1:39:49

-

It was there, but more informally?

1:39:50

And it was primarily four agencies, really.

1:39:51

Joint chiefs of staff and Homeland security

1:39:53

Homeland security didn't really exist

1:39:55

and the joint chiefs of staff didn't really play.

1:39:58

So they weren't really involved in the process

1:40:01

and the intelligence community as a whole wasn't

1:40:03

wasn't involved in the process.

1:40:05

Those were all brought on by his changes

1:40:07

Interviewer

But I'm not trying to blow smoke

1:40:09

in and make you look good, but I just want it...

1:40:11

But it's...

1:40:13

But I think you said, I just want to have it for history.

1:40:14

You were instrumental in creating the four agency process.

1:40:17

Is that fair to say?

1:40:20

-

Yes, I would think that's fair.

1:40:22

In fact, that's what I was recognized by the president for.

1:40:25

Interviewer

That was the...

1:40:27

And that had then expanded to the associated disease.

1:40:28

But essentially this price is largely

1:40:32

because of I'm one of your 368 changes.

1:40:34

-

Yes, it is.

1:40:38

Right.

1:40:39

Interviewer

And who brought in the other two agencies?

1:40:41

-

The president did.

1:40:45

I mean, there...

1:40:46

While the Homeland screen was not involved,

1:40:47

but the joint chiefs of staff and the agency,

1:40:49

the intelligence community, they were involved

1:40:53

in the process anyhow, but more informally.

1:40:54

And what president Obama did was codified all that

1:40:56

and to get all the right players in the room together

1:41:00

so that they would have that total approach.

1:41:01

Interviewer

So we can look to you.

1:41:04

And I'm really glad you came as a President who kind of

1:41:06

started cleaning this up

1:41:08

and having a reasonable approach to looking at these men

1:41:10

and releasing them and--

1:41:14

-

Not just me.

1:41:15

I mean, there's Matt Waxman.

1:41:17

And many of the people that you interviewed

1:41:18

that you've talked to have been involved in the process

1:41:20

no one person runs the United States government

1:41:23

no matter how hard they might try.

1:41:25

It's effort that puts a lot of people working together.

1:41:27

I'm proud of the fact of the role that I played

1:41:29

in bringing people together

1:41:31

and providing a whole government approach

1:41:32

that really was unparalleled

1:41:34

to anything else I'd ever seen

1:41:36

in my government career that persist today.

1:41:37

And that I believe will carry us into.

1:41:39

I mean, we, you know, we were also asking the question

1:41:41

what about the next conflict?

1:41:42

What about the next war?

1:41:45

Whether it's in North Korea or someplace else, you know

1:41:46

how do we take a command command like Pacific command?

1:41:48

That's had no involvement in this really whatsoever

1:41:52

except maybe tangentially with plow

1:41:54

and have really no involvement in this question at all

1:41:56

but never even really thinks about the tension.

1:41:58

I wanted to make sure that they were thinking

1:42:01

about the tension today, so that they've got policies

1:42:03

and procedures in place that when detention...

1:42:05

And then they've got guidance from Washington to follow

1:42:07

and that they're training their people

1:42:10

so that when the balloon goes up, if it ever goes up

1:42:11

but when the balloon goes up

1:42:14

they don't have to go reinvent the wheel.

1:42:16

They've got it there.

1:42:17

The department of defense has got them

1:42:19

in place and they know how to conduct attention operations

1:42:21

in the best possible manner possible.

1:42:23

Interviewer

Was that also considering

1:42:24

sending men mentored Guantanamo?

1:42:27

Cause since 2008, no one has been sent there.

1:42:29

So was that also one of the processes that it was

1:42:31

considered?

1:42:34

-

So it's different both by the administrations.

1:42:35

I mean the Bush administration, they look to see

1:42:38

if there are other countries that could handle the threat

1:42:40

of the individual

1:42:43

whether we had to send them to Guantanamo.

1:42:44

And they ultimately only sent a couple, but really no more.

1:42:45

And then president Obama, he made it clear.

1:42:47

He was closing. So he was not going to send anybody there.

1:42:49

And he came up with a new process, right?

1:42:51

Which is to really focus on prosecution

1:42:52

to try to nab the culprit at where he is

1:42:54

and then use that apprehension in an illegal way

1:42:58

and use clean teams and things like that.

1:43:01

So they could do that.

1:43:03

And that's now being tested in the courts.

1:43:05

It'll be very interesting to see what happens

1:43:07

if the courts determined that we violated the due process

1:43:08

when we violated the person whose criminal,

1:43:12

their rights in that regard

1:43:14

then that whole process could get thrown out

1:43:15

and then we'd be left with only other option is, you know...

1:43:18

And we didn't get into this really

1:43:22

cause I left it for others.

1:43:24

But I mean I think the one thing that people forget about

1:43:25

on detention and capturing people is what's the alternative

1:43:27

and the alternative is to kill them.

1:43:29

Right?

1:43:30

You have to give your forces

1:43:32

the capability to capture people,

1:43:33

because if you don't give them the capability

1:43:34

to capture people, you're going to result

1:43:36

in many more killings happened on the battlefield.

1:43:37

And so if you capture them

1:43:39

you can't expect them to capture them.

1:43:41

And then they go through a legal process.

1:43:43

They captured them operating under the laws of war

1:43:44

in a war time, kinetic activity.

1:43:46

And it's going down from there.

1:43:48

So people, sometimes it's easy to say

1:43:49

we can just get rid of detention

1:43:52

and we could just get rid of this, but there's consequences

1:43:53

to that, serious consequences to that.

1:43:55

And beliefs on others can wax more eloquently

1:43:57

than I on that.

1:43:59

But it's a very serious concern

1:44:00

that we've looked at and been very concerned about that.

1:44:02

Look at that.

1:44:04

We want to make sure

1:44:05

that we never take away the detention aspect

1:44:06

from a commander, his ability to conduct his operation

1:44:08

because otherwise we could put him in his units

1:44:10

at risk of committing more crimes and other things.

1:44:12

Interviewer

Well, the drones would follow up

1:44:15

on what you just described.

1:44:17

-

Right, and I won't go into...

1:44:19

I mean, that's not my scope

1:44:20

but I mean, the fact is that under the Obama administration

1:44:22

we had many more people killed

1:44:26

by drones and that possibly could have been captured

1:44:27

and held in detention.

1:44:30

And if we had captured them and held them detention

1:44:31

is that more of a human rights violation

1:44:33

than killing them with a drone

1:44:35

while they're cars driving down the road?

1:44:37

There are a lot of lawyers that can answer that question.

1:44:38

Interviewer

That was another question

1:44:40

that you dealt with.

1:44:41

And you probably don't want to say anything

1:44:43

about the Trump administration

1:44:45

but do you, before we shut down, is there...

1:44:47

-

No, there's not enough of a track record.

1:44:50

And I, you know...

1:44:51

My view is not just to the traumatization

1:44:52

but with any of you, you can't...

1:44:55

When a candidate campaigns on and what a campaign can...

1:44:58

A governance on once elected oftentimes are very different.

1:45:01

And then they, they learn those lessons one way or another.

1:45:03

Interviewer

So are you saying

1:45:05

that you don't necessarily see a value

1:45:06

in closing down Guantanamo?

1:45:07

Cause we need a detention center to hold people

1:45:09

that we capture in whatever battles

1:45:11

we might fight in the future?

1:45:14

-

So I never opined on whether

1:45:16

or not I thought it was valuable to close Guantanamo

1:45:17

or not, what I did say was that I do believe we

1:45:19

need a facility that allows us to hold people

1:45:22

from the battlefield whose threat otherwise

1:45:24

cannot be mitigated by anybody else.

1:45:29

My own personal view.

1:45:31

Again, not that any way government policy.

1:45:32

And again, my personal view is it's what I call

1:45:35

the Elba island solution.

1:45:38

If you remember.

1:45:39

The Elba island solution, right?

1:45:41

Where Napoleon was put...

1:45:43

When no country wanted to hold Napoleon

1:45:44

and where they sent Napoleon.

1:45:45

We a international agreement international

1:45:46

facility that countries can come to terms

1:45:49

and have a understanding of who could be detained

1:45:51

there, what's a threat they represent,

1:45:55

who's that threat against

1:45:56

and you have to...

1:45:58

And that will be very difficult, right?

1:46:00

Cause you've got...

1:46:01

Some people will want Tamil tigers in there

1:46:02

and some people will want Slovaks in there.

1:46:03

And some people will want Chechens in there.

1:46:04

I mean, it's going to be very difficult. I understand that.

1:46:05

But ideally, if you could establish a universal definition

1:46:07

of a threat that can't be mitigated

1:46:10

by anybody else and then establish the conditions

1:46:11

of detention that everybody would abide by

1:46:14

and then establish a review process

1:46:16

for reviewing individuals there.

1:46:18

So they're just not put someplace

1:46:19

and never thought of again.

1:46:21

And you could do that at an international level.

1:46:22

Then I think the world would actually comprehensively

1:46:24

address this problem

1:46:27

which doesn't have a global answer right now

1:46:29

and the United States is the only country that truly

1:46:30

stepped up to that responsibility.

1:46:32

Despite all the criticism about it, to doing that

1:46:34

Interviewer

What is your mission?

1:46:36

What are you doing that--

1:46:37

-

I'll leave that for someone else, but--

1:46:39

Interviewer

Are you doing anything

1:46:40

that we might be interested in during you're retire, or...

1:46:42

-

Just traveling with my wife.

1:46:44

Interviewer

Well, there you are get some funding.

1:46:47

And...

1:46:49

-

My wife always complained that the place

1:46:50

is not for camera.

1:46:52

My wife always complained that the places that I always

1:46:54

went where the places that she had no desire to go Yemen

1:46:56

Saudi Arabia and similar.

1:46:58

So despite and getting lots

1:46:59

of invitations to accompany you go to those places.

1:47:01

She never wanted to go.

1:47:03

So she's happy now to name places that we can go together.

1:47:05

So...

1:47:07

Right.

1:47:08

Exactly.

1:47:09

Interviewer

Did you have anything else

1:47:10

before we shut down?

1:47:11

Interviewer

No...

1:47:12

(sound drowns in the background)

1:47:13

Interviewer

Okay.

1:47:14

So we need 20 seconds of room tone where

1:47:15

we just sit here with no quiet and then we'll skip that.

1:47:16

So...

1:47:18

-

All right.

1:47:19

Okay, great.

1:47:20

I can drink right now--

1:47:21

Interviewer

Absolutely.

1:47:22

Man

Yeah, you can drink.

1:47:23

Interviewer

Okay.

1:47:35

Who's next?

1:47:37

Liotta, Alan - Interview master file

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