Mcfadden, Robert - Interview master file / Witness to Guantanamo / Duke Digital Repository

Interviewer

Johnny, you got a voice check?

0:05

Johny

Yeah.

0:07

Interviewer

Okay.

0:08

-

As far as my...

0:09

Where I look, my stair, my gaze?

0:10

Interviewer

Just look at me.

0:12

-

Look at you, okay.

0:13

Interviewer

That's the way Johny's filming it.

0:14

-

Okay.

0:15

Interviewer

Okay.

0:17

Good afternoon.

0:18

-

Good afternoon.

0:19

Interviewer

We're very grateful for you

0:20

to participate in the witness to Guantanamo--

0:21

-

My pleasure.

0:25

-

We'd like you to speak of your experiences

0:26

with what you had with Guantanamo

0:29

and also overseas with the USS Cole.

0:33

And we are collecting a sequence of these stories so

0:36

that people in America and around the world will have

0:41

a better understanding of what you and others have

0:45

experienced and observed over these years.

0:47

And we feel that future generations must know happened

0:51

in Guantanamo and your story will help make that so

0:54

and we're very grateful for that.

1:02

-

Thank you.

1:03

It's an honor.

1:04

Interviewer

Thank you very much.

1:05

-

It really is.

1:06

Interviewer

If...

1:07

I appreciate it if you want to take a break,

1:09

just let us know.

1:11

And if something you say you want to pull back

1:12

you can let us know and we can remove it.

1:13

-

Sure, will do.

1:14

Interviewer

So I have an extra water too if you...

1:15

I'm wondering again, if you wouldn't mind telling us

1:18

your name and your hometown and birthday and age and...

1:22

-

Robert McFadden born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,

1:28

July, 1958.

1:31

So I just hit my 56th birthday, not too long ago.

1:32

Interviewer

Happy birthday.

1:36

-

Thank you.

1:37

(laughs)

1:38

Interviewer

And a little bit about the education

1:40

and...

1:42

-

I started out my undergraduate studies

1:43

at a Westchester University in Southeast Pennsylvania

1:46

and received my bachelor's degree

1:49

in political science and government from the University

1:51

of Maryland.

1:54

Minor in Arabic, Middle Eastern studies

1:54

as well as Modern Standard Arabic

1:57

and a Business Administration minor.

2:01

I did when I was in the air force.

2:03

I studied formerly at the Defense Language Institute,

2:04

Presidio of Monterey.

2:06

And then later I had to follow on academic training

2:09

in North African dialects at Brigham young university.

2:14

In fact, it was a whole semester, eight hours a day

2:18

five days a week of Moroccan Libyan

2:21

and Western Egypt dialect.

2:23

Interviewer

You know, it's not what I was planning

2:26

to ask, but I will.

2:28

What made you think of setting Arabic back?

2:30

And what year are we talking about when you went to College?

2:32

-

I was...

2:35

I started college in the early '80s

2:36

then went in, pursued some opportunities in the air force

2:39

and it really fit hand in glove with my acute interest

2:43

in the Middle East.

2:47

Many times I've been asked that and it's still

2:48

kind of tough to put my thumb on it.

2:50

But from early on in high school, I just had a

2:53

really an interest in a fascination with Middle Eastern

2:55

and particularly Arab Arabic speaking

2:58

middle Eastern history, culture, anthropology

3:01

and some books I read were an influence on these...

3:04

You know, Almar Sadat's biography and autobiography

3:08

of Malcolm X and, and other histories

3:12

contemporary histories of the Middle East.

3:14

But the air force though, and this was just

3:16

purely happenstance, but you have to be so thankful

3:21

for these opportunities.

3:22

I took the language aptitude test and then was

3:24

offered the opportunity to pick different languages

3:27

I wanted to study.

3:32

So it was Arabic, Hebrew, Russian.

3:33

And at that time as the Middle East became more of

3:35

an every day geopolitical concern for the United

3:38

States talking about the earlier part of the 1980s

3:41

I received the opportunity to study at the DLI

3:44

for almost a year of what's called modern standard

3:47

or classical Arabic is actually

3:51

the Arabic that comes from the core on.

3:53

Interviewer

What's interesting is we interviewed someone

3:55

who said that when he had a similar opportunity to you

3:58

it was pretty much the Cold War.

4:01

He just studied Russian

4:03

and everybody else didn't know how to be anybody.

4:04

I mean the Arabic.

4:06

So I'm surprised that you went into that.

4:07

-

Absolutely.

4:09

In fact, you know, in 1982, when I started

4:10

at the Defense Language Institute, the Russian school

4:14

there was probably upwards of 10 times the size

4:20

of the Arabic program, as well as Persian Farsi.

4:23

We were still right dab in the middle of the Cold War.

4:27

And in fact it was still so big for the language program.

4:31

There was an annex in San Antonio for, for Arabic

4:34

for government and military people.

4:38

So that's kind of where you saw

4:39

the bell curves crossing each other, let's say

4:42

in that part of the eighties to where, you know

4:45

now the Arabic school at the DLI is

4:47

is massive compared to what it was when I went through.

4:49

But, you know, to your point, I remember someone

4:52

from a national intelligence agency telling me

4:54

after we spoke about my interest in the Middle East,

4:58

he said, you know, we have Middle East experts

5:00

but still the target is always oriented

5:04

toward Russia first, last, and always.

5:06

Interviewer

So did you see a future?

5:08

If in fact there was a Cold War and when

5:10

you were studying Russian, why you were going there?

5:12

-

No, I have to say back at that time, it really...

5:14

That wasn't a motivator for me.

5:17

It was just, I had that opportunity to actually

5:20

study Arabic full-time and get paid for it.

5:22

And then also that was the road to enter

5:25

the signals intelligence part of the intelligence world

5:29

Interviewer

Through the air force?

5:32

-

That's right.

5:36

Interviewer

So could you take us then,

5:36

tell us what happened next then?

5:39

-

Well, after getting through the Arabic training

5:40

and although I have to acknowledge, I'm not a natural,

5:43

some people are just gifted genetically.

5:47

And for me, it was more of a...

5:49

You know we really had to put some effort into it

5:51

but I did graduate with honors

5:53

and then went on to the national cryptologic school

5:55

at Goodfellow air force base

5:58

in Texas for another long training period, followed by...

5:59

Because I was going to the...

6:03

What's called the airborne reconnaissance routes

6:06

for flying reconnaissance missions

6:09

in the Arabic speaking world.

6:10

But even before that, in my first assignment, which was

6:13

to the old Hellinikon air base in Athens, Greece had to get

6:17

through survival training first up in Spokane

6:20

and then water or seaborne survival training in Florida

6:23

which a lot of fun, but also plenty of stress

6:29

but just one anecdote that may tie into something later

6:33

on that became...

6:36

I'd have to say profoundly important.

6:40

I went through a very, very specialized

6:42

part of survival training at the

6:45

at the sear or the air force survival school

6:49

up in Spokane actually taught at the top secret level.

6:51

And this training course was and

6:55

is designed for individuals who are in special units

6:58

whether it's airborne reconnaissance missions to fly into

7:04

you know, the territory where it may be consideration.

7:06

And there's a lot of very, very sensitive material.

7:11

The individual possesses as well

7:13

special operations or special operations forces.

7:16

Type units get this very specialized training

7:19

and sorry to bang on about that.

7:21

But I went through the clinic where you can believe me

7:23

in very certain terms, they put us under very harsh

7:27

physical and mental coecrcion.

7:32

Interviewer

Are you talking about SEA training?

7:34

-

I'm talking about SEA training.

7:36

Sea Air Force coils at Air Force Survival train

7:37

but just SEA Search Evasion Rescue training.

7:39

This is the air force training

7:42

but the course I'm talking about is multi-service.

7:44

What does that mean?

7:47

That all...

7:49

The different services go to it.

7:50

If you have a special or sensitive position

7:52

this training is designed, at least back at that time

7:54

if you're captured either by a state or non-state actor

7:58

how to get yourself home

8:02

with a hope safe and sound as possible

8:04

and without divulging very, very sensitive information.

8:07

So in going through this clinic and I underline clinic,

8:10

and now I'll tell you why later,

8:13

they treated us very harshly and it was filmed.

8:15

And I can't really talk about the details

8:19

even this time later.

8:23

But one thing I can say happened, I was...

8:25

Came within a nanosecond

8:27

of passing out by something they were doing

8:29

to me while I was being screamed

8:31

at to tell me my name, rank, and serial number

8:33

but tell me why you're flying in these missions.

8:36

What's your true mission?

8:39

Why are you involved in clandestine, you know,

8:40

those kinds of things.

8:43

So fast...

8:44

Way fast forward by the better part of 30 years

8:46

to what happened with the EITs for--

8:49

Interviewer

For the public might not know what--

8:57

-

The putative, EITs, Enhanced Interrogation Techniques,

9:00

which...

9:04

And depending on where you're coming from

9:05

in the argument torture or EITS,

9:07

I know from some up close and personal

9:11

behind the scenes, as a practitioner at that time,

9:17

after 9/11, when the us was at the fork

9:20

in the road, the go, no, go, where we are going to

9:23

do the traditional let's say report base, but effective.

9:25

Cause I know I was involved

9:30

in those and Creighton was involved

9:31

in cracking some very tough, nuts, actual Al-Qaida members

9:34

but the fork in the road go no-go where we going to stick

9:37

with that and consider the results?

9:40

Or are we going to go with these things called EITs

9:42

which I I'll say upfront and candid

9:45

I believe it was an earnest attempt

9:48

but it was a junk science and snake oil that was peddled

9:51

by some hucksters and some very

9:55

very influential and powerful people bought into that.

9:57

And so that's where we went down that mistake and road

10:01

of the so-called EITs.

10:03

Now the point I was making, where I went

10:05

through some of that clinical training,

10:08

hey I literally had the snot, excuse me

10:11

in my expression here knocked out of me physically.

10:15

But you know, at the end of the day, I still realized

10:18

that I was going to be sleeping in a comfortable bed.

10:21

I'd have to get back up

10:24

and do it again for another eight to 10 hours the next day

10:26

but still we knew this was training.

10:28

Okay?

10:30

And so there was that part of the...

10:31

And it's a terrible way to look at it, but it's so accurate.

10:33

Reverse engineering of those techniques taught

10:36

by professionals who know their business.

10:39

Then it was pitched to decision-makers

10:41

as the way to get information from very tough characters.

10:45

You know, I and others who were in involved

10:48

with doing interrogations of Al-Qaida members before 9/11

10:52

we said one, were the people advising on that,

10:56

did they know about the culture, the history

10:59

the anthropology of Middle Eastern subjects.

11:02

Okay?

11:06

Two, had they ever, ever conducted an interview

11:07

or an interrogation of any kind?

11:11

And look, I loved to come across new data

11:13

but I've never seen anything so far of the advisors,

11:17

the contractors involved in that aspect of what

11:20

the program became that had ever done interrogations

11:24

let alone have an Arabic speaking person coming

11:26

from Yemen or Saudi Arabia.

11:30

So you have that kind of...

11:32

Well, you're going to make some profound decisions here

11:35

on the go no-go on how we're going to treat people

11:38

with bonafide placement access to very, very

11:40

valuable intelligence.

11:43

And some of that advice is going to come

11:45

from people who never set foot

11:47

in that part of the world, know what really motivates them

11:49

or conducted an interview or interrogation themselves.

11:52

Interviewer

So Bob, for people who watch this

11:55

and don't have the background that you have

11:58

I just want to be clear.

12:00

So maybe you can explain it.

12:02

So the experience that you had back then

12:04

in the eighties were transferred post 9/11

12:06

to be used otherwise on certain captives.

12:11

That's what you're telling us, right?

12:15

-

That's what an awful lot of data...

12:18

Unclassified data out there shows at this point.

12:20

Interviewer

And you questioned that

12:23

because you're saying that the people who did introduce it

12:28

to the high level officials didn't necessarily understand it

12:31

or participa...

12:35

Or have the experience that you had, and if

12:36

they didn't understand what it really does,

12:38

were you saying that?

12:40

-

That's in a sense what I'm saying, yes.

12:42

Those of us who had experience

12:44

with the interview and interrogation

12:46

basic intermediate advanced training, and many

12:48

many hundreds of hours of empirical results

12:51

on interview and interrogation of Arabic speaking

12:54

coming from that country subjects.

12:58

We were...

13:01

Our voices wasn't that we weren't heard,

13:02

there was never any discussion

13:04

or dialogue about that as far as I know.

13:06

Interviewer

Okay.

13:07

So a couple of things on that,

13:08

one is why is it so unique if it's an Arabic subject?

13:11

What does that matter?

13:14

-

Terrific question actually, because one

13:16

of the most valuable things in going

13:19

into a situation where you're eliciting information

13:21

from a subject as knowing that his or her culture

13:24

and the motivators and triggers of behavior.

13:27

See because an interview

13:31

or an interrogation is really about extracting information

13:33

that the interviewee is not likely to give

13:35

up or are going to be motivated to give up.

13:38

So if you know what the things are

13:41

within the history of the culture, the broader culture

13:43

the tribal culture alliances family

13:47

knowing things about shame-based behavior relative to

13:50

to guilt based behavior.

13:55

We in the west generally are from guilt based motivations

13:58

the orient, the Middle East Arabic speaking part

14:01

of the world overwhelmingly motivated

14:05

by shame or avoiding shame.

14:08

Now I'm getting into deep behavioral science type things

14:10

but I, and my colleagues, these are the kinds

14:12

of things that we had training

14:15

in both vocationally in my case

14:16

avocationally because I had such an interest into it.

14:18

Now, I'm never going to suggest that I or

14:21

we had the absolute in the Panacea, but we said, you know

14:24

with, with our chain of command and our compatriots

14:28

and you know, that...

14:32

Look at our results that we've had

14:34

just taking the results of the interviews that related

14:36

to the USS Cole and the aftermath of 9/11.

14:39

So one to be clear, not saying that we had 100% solution,

14:42

but pretty doggone close.

14:46

And back to your question, very apt question about

14:49

okay, why is that important to know about it again

14:51

if you know about what motivates an individual

14:53

and you manipulate and exploit for a higher purpose

14:56

those things, that's how you get results.

15:01

That's how you dislodge information that

15:03

individuals otherwise are not inclined to

15:06

give you.

15:08

Interviewer

And your belief is that

15:08

the people who introduced this program

15:11

to the higher senior level officials did not

15:13

understand that there's a different audience

15:16

depending on who you impose this on?

15:19

-

Look, I would love to hear differently

15:21

but that's my understanding.

15:23

Not only did they not know about it or have experience

15:25

about it, it doesn't seem it was even considered.

15:27

It was really a profound sense of ativism

15:29

that if you carry out extreme physical and mental coercion,

15:33

and this thing about learn helplessness

15:41

I would just refer people to a very good book

15:44

by Jane Mayer called "The Dark Side."

15:47

Terrific account of...

15:51

I don't know about that personally

15:52

or professionally, but reading it from Jane Mayer

15:54

and then hearing others who were somewhat

15:56

at least peripherally involved with the program.

16:00

So, yeah, that was one theory from a professor,

16:02

from the University of Pennsylvania

16:04

that would work on these subjects.

16:06

Well, our reaction was wait a second

16:09

there's this more junk science here.

16:11

What's the proof on that, but I've not mentioned

16:13

and you know, shame on me,

16:16

but what about the moral implications

16:19

and the legal implications?

16:21

Okay?

16:24

Well that should have been a major, major consideration.

16:25

Okay.

16:29

But I must...

16:31

In being intellectually honest caveat

16:32

that though I have to say, after working at places

16:35

like Khobar Towers in the aftermath in 1996, and seeing

16:40

what happened to the 19 air force members

16:42

I did the preliminary examination of the bodies

16:47

before the Vanguard of the FBI came in.

16:50

I was in Bahrain at the time and was working

16:53

with the air force for the initial crime scene.

16:56

Having seen that carnage, having been

16:58

on the USS Cole after the attack in October, 2000

17:00

having been to some other places

17:04

of terrorism, that's something

17:06

that doesn't leave you forever.

17:08

So I have to say at the time there is that sight Geist

17:10

that you can understand why it was.

17:14

We need to get this information.

17:15

These are hard bitten killers, and we have to extract

17:18

out of them by these extreme methods.

17:20

Now, the part I'm admitting here on camera is that,

17:24

look, if there was data that that worked

17:29

and that was the quickest, the only way

17:30

and it was a ticking time bomb, which we should touch upon

17:34

I'd have to admit, I'd probably be, you know

17:37

one of the ones that's saying, sure, we should do it

17:41

but it'll say like, but I had enough data background

17:44

from being able get information from some very

17:46

very tough actors that no,

17:50

there's better quicker ways to do this.

17:53

Plus any of those who may not be considering a legal

17:55

or moral implications here

17:58

you don't have to worry about that.

18:00

Interviewer

So was your voice heard?

18:02

-

Well, as I said, we was never really outside

18:05

of our circles meaning NCIS, FBI,

18:08

Federal Law Enforcement,

18:12

Federal Law Enforcement Counter Terrorism, special agents.

18:13

No, I mean, I'm not even aware of that

18:19

there was any question, any debate

18:21

any request for the voice to be heard,

18:24

with one exception where I was involved

18:27

in a meeting that was just quite remarkable.

18:30

Interviewer

Can you tell us?

18:34

-

I thought you would ask that. (laughs)

18:36

On one of my trips back from Yemenites,

18:38

I spent an extensive period there

18:41

and I would never...

18:43

I wouldn't give this up for anything because what a...

18:45

Really a life and profession changing opportunity

18:47

after a tragedy that it was for me to be sent to Yemen

18:51

to work on the USS Cole attack investigation

18:56

but ultimately be named as one of the co-case agents

18:59

with my friend and partner Ali Soufan from the FBI,

19:02

the case agent or lead agent for FBI.

19:05

for MCIs spent an extensive amount

19:09

of time from right after the attack of October

19:12

of 2000 clear on up until September 11, 2001.

19:16

With one break, we actually had to be evacuated

19:21

the investigative team, because very, very high threat level

19:24

in Yemen, actually the threat coming after us.

19:27

On one of the trips in the period

19:30

back to the United States, probably for briefings

19:33

I can't recall what it was exactly

19:37

but it would have been

19:39

in the probably later 2002 to maybe 2003.

19:41

And what it was is the department of defense was...

19:46

Had a working group

19:52

at a fairly high level that was established to

19:53

advise the secretary of defense

19:59

Mr. Rumsfeld, on so-called techniques

20:02

putative techniques to use in interrogation.

20:04

On my trip home, I was completely

20:07

in the blind about this group, but a couple

20:10

of my seniors who had been part of the working group

20:13

but were among the officials who were shunned

20:16

by this working group, because they were saying, no, no, no.

20:18

What are you talking about?

20:22

This technique, that technique we don't use techniques.

20:23

We go in with, with volumes in information

20:25

and then we're building rapport, not T in disc it's rapport.

20:29

It does...

20:33

It's not always that way, if it is, it's great.

20:34

But most of the time it's a different kind of rapport, more

20:35

of an accord and this is a very quick, role-play,

20:38

"Look, Ahmed, you and I both know what the quid pro quo is.

20:42

So we're working together to get to that accord

20:46

or what's good for me is going to be good

20:49

for you and vice versa."

20:52

But again, that's a super quick role-play

20:53

of what usually takes place over hours.

20:56

But my point there, some of the officials

20:58

in my chain of command, they were...

21:00

I just got the sense

21:03

that they were being shunned by this Pentagon working group.

21:04

So they sent me in pretty much blind with not

21:07

too much pre-briefing, which was a smart thing to do.

21:10

Interviewer

Who's they?

21:13

-

In this case it was Mark Fallon and Michael Gallus.

21:15

Interviewer

They sent you to--

21:20

-

A working...

21:22

In this working group meeting

21:23

and then in Britta mallow who Colonel Britt Mallow

21:24

great guy who was the...

21:27

At the time, the commander

21:28

of the CITF criminal investigation task force.

21:30

So the idea was to send me practitioner who had just, again

21:34

returned from Yemen after conducting hundreds and hundreds

21:40

of hours of interviews and interrogations, not

21:44

only subjects or detainees, but witnesses, potential sources

21:47

for operations, counter-intelligence operations

21:53

and other types of counter-intelligence operations.

21:56

So when I went to the meeting,

21:59

there were at least 11 other individuals in the meeting.

22:01

Some were Lieutenant colonels and colonels at that level.

22:07

Some were a senior civil service

22:10

from the intelligence agencies inside the DOD, but I was

22:13

as far as I could tell, the only practitioner because again

22:19

at this 2002, 2003, the US really didn't have any frame

22:22

of reference for a situation like this

22:29

where you had hundreds of terrorists and non-state actors

22:30

in a situa...

22:35

Iraq war did not provide that Vietnam

22:35

maybe in some senses with the gorilla side of it

22:38

but all those, you know, practitioners long since retired.

22:40

And...

22:45

But even that context wasn't this ideologically driven

22:47

by an extreme form of Islam actor.

22:50

Okay.

22:54

So that was the scene setter

22:55

for me to go in there and you know

22:57

explain to the group how we do it, how it was effective

23:01

and then try to counterbalance these techniques

23:05

these EITs that DOD was considering.

23:09

Well, I can tell you,

23:12

I was the Martian in the group when I started, you know

23:14

trying to explain that, not banging my fist on the table

23:16

that this is the way we go, gentlemen,

23:22

just let me tell you what kind

23:25

of intelligence this produce.

23:27

What kind of IRS

23:29

as they're called intelligence information reports

23:30

how were we able to make breakthroughs with inner circle

23:33

Osama bin Ladin, Al-Qaida members

23:36

with bonafide placement and access.

23:39

Let me explain to you the nuances of how you work

23:41

with these guys, get them to give up information.

23:44

It may not be directly about them.

23:47

Rarely is their breakthrough.

23:50

Like you have me, but I use the metaphor of look like

23:51

a Wolf or a helicopter circling a target.

23:55

That's how you keep going back in probing.

23:59

And then...

24:01

So after I had my half a chance to give my spiel

24:02

because I was cut off, it was...

24:06

One of the gentlemen in the group is paraphrasing.

24:08

He said to me, look, we're not here to debate this.

24:11

We're here to advise the secretary on what's

24:14

the tier one to tier two, the tier three techniques.

24:16

So one other anecdote from that,

24:19

really quite remarkable meetings

24:22

almost like a was in some ways yesterday

24:24

one of the intelligence officers

24:26

in the group that had already been down

24:29

to Guantanamo and a more of a leadership

24:31

at a leadership level was recounting story of one

24:34

of the detainees in Guantanamo, who was a...

24:38

He was an Imam, he had religious credentials,

24:43

but still a member of one of the organizations,

24:46

either Al-Qaida or affiliated.

24:49

And this intelligence officer

24:51

from DOD was recounting with glee.

24:53

How by doing things like sexual teasing, even lap dances

24:55

I think at the time, and putting rosewater with cotton balls

25:02

or with a female interrogator on the Imam's hand,

25:10

how as he said it was driving him crazy.

25:13

And so I said, "Okay, well, that's interesting.

25:15

So what about the intelligence take?"

25:19

And he said, "No, you don't understand.

25:20

It just drives them crazy."

25:22

And so I said, okay, so then what happened next?

25:24

He said, you won't believe it

25:27

because the Imam wanted to pray.

25:29

It was time from him to pray, but he couldn't

25:30

because you can't do the evolution with this.

25:32

The rituals are extremely important.

25:35

And that's one of the things very,

25:36

very important know about to manipulate in a good way.

25:38

He said when he wanted to pray the female interrogator

25:40

put more rose water on his hand.

25:43

And the next thing you know, the Imam threw himself

25:45

down on the floor and was banging his head

25:48

on the cement in the interrogation room.

25:50

And that the rest of the gentlemen in the room were

25:53

"Yeah"

25:55

(laughs)

And so I was left with like

25:57

I don't understand why...

25:59

Isn't that just wasting time?

26:01

So it didn't really go anywhere from there.

26:04

So that was my one and only time where I was

26:07

in a group where there was some discussion

26:10

about what techniques should be--

26:12

Interviewer

And when you left, what were you thinking?

26:13

-

I was thinking like, they are so ill informed

26:16

and ill advised on what works or what doesn't work

26:20

with this clientele that...

26:24

I said, "Hey, boss I can see where your frustration is.

26:25

And that was part of the

26:28

behind the scenes that I wasn't aware of

26:30

that people like Mark Fallon, Mike Gellis, Day Brent,

26:32

and then ultimately a general counsel,

26:35

Mr. Maura, they did their part

26:37

with their senior positions to try to advise

26:40

and influence the chain of command.

26:42

-

I mean, given where you're coming from

26:45

we haven't gotten it yet with your work with the USS Cole.

26:46

I'm wondering if you saw America change before your eyes

26:49

from that experience, if you were naive and

26:54

didn't know what you were walking into, and now you

26:58

left something that must've been a hundred degrees different

27:01

from what you have been doing yourself and experiencing it.

27:04

-

Yeah, it was...

27:07

For me professionally, I'd have to say personally,

27:09

because, you know, understand one,

27:12

I was somewhat isolated at times

27:15

very isolated in Yemen and other places.

27:17

And so other than work and watching CNN international

27:20

at times, I didn't have a big sense of what was going on

27:23

but the other part of it at that time too

27:26

we were talking the 2002 to early 2003.

27:28

What was going on with the EITs was still very,

27:32

very compartmented.

27:35

And I had little to no idea about that

27:37

other than this one meeting and getting a very limited scope

27:40

briefing from the gentlemen I was just talking about,

27:44

and...

27:47

-

You can tell us his name.

27:48

Well, it...

27:50

Yeah, it was mark, as I mentioned, Mark Fallon,

27:52

because he was a deputy director under Britt mallow.

27:54

So they had an awareness of what was going

27:57

on by the level of access they had.

28:00

But for me, it was just a very limited scope briefing

28:02

because I had no need to know.

28:05

But as to your question, what kind of a market left on me?

28:07

I was just really surprised because I know some

28:09

of the people that it sounds like

28:13

I'm in that camp, that all...

28:16

Is it about...

28:17

That all it's about now

28:18

his rear view mirror and gratuitous criticism

28:20

but really wasn't that, I mean, it's not that.

28:23

I know some of the people later on that I found

28:26

out were involved in the program are extraordinarily bright

28:29

and great Americans, terrifically patriotic.

28:32

It's just that I was then

28:36

and I am now in the camp that says that we

28:41

we just should not have done it.

28:43

It was a mistake.

28:45

Did it produce information?

28:46

I know it produced information

28:48

and some of the valuable information

28:50

but you have the part of the equation

28:52

at what cost and were there better ways to go.

28:55

I'm here to tell you

28:57

I know there were better ways to go as far as effectiveness.

28:59

Interviewer

How do you know

29:01

it produced information well?

29:02

-

Well, and no, no intention to tease here.

29:04

But I later on was a part of the program, the HVD program.

29:10

So...

29:14

Interviewer

Just tell viewers what--

29:16

-

Yeah, the high value detainee program

29:17

but the so-called a white, white side of the program when

29:19

President Bush disestablished the program in September

29:23

of 2006, then the 14 original high-value detainees

29:27

were brought to Guantanamo.

29:31

And then I was detailed to that program where

29:33

I did interviews of two of the 14 high value detainees

29:38

at Guantanamo.

29:42

So thus having been in that program and actually before

29:43

because I was reading the intelligence, particularly

29:48

for some characters that were the US detained, brought

29:50

into a detention and were involved intimately with 9/11

29:54

USS Cole.

29:59

So I was following the intelligence reporting from them.

30:00

And then once I was in the program had a bird's-eye view

30:04

sorry, that's really banging on about that.

30:07

You can't say if you were had access to the program, that it

30:11

didn't produce information, it did produce information.

30:16

But here's the part that

30:19

I know about professionally empirically.

30:21

At what cost, for what it is did to us and our reputation

30:23

as a country and for the interrogator side of me,

30:28

the time it wasted.

30:33

How much extended periods of all these hi-jinks

30:36

and nonsense that was going on,

30:41

how much quicker and more effectively could a seasoned

30:43

trained interrogator get, moreover

30:45

someone who knows the subjects, knows the case.

30:50

I'll give you one quick example.

30:52

One really notorious member involved in the inner circle

30:54

of the USS Cole attack, and the attempt on the USS

31:00

the Sullivan's in January of 2000

31:04

this individual also headed up Al-Qaida,

31:06

a cell that was in charge of all of the Arabian peninsula

31:09

from the Red Sea to the Arabian or Persian Gulf.

31:13

When he was brought into a captivity, both

31:16

my headquarters of MCIs

31:19

and the headquarters of FBI had petitioned

31:23

at the national level to let me and my partner

31:26

from the FBI Ali Soufan to get in with this detainee

31:29

because other than his mother, no two individuals

31:33

on the face of the earth knew more about him.

31:37

So I know to let's say someone watching your documentary

31:39

and he say, well, okay, what's the big deal of that?

31:45

Or are you saying, you know

31:47

because you two were the case agents that

31:49

besides skills and experience in interrogation,

31:51

the most valuable thing in getting information

31:54

from someone is information that you have

31:57

about that individual.

32:01

We knew what motivated him, where he hung out, who he hung

32:02

out with, what his habits were, what his traits were.

32:06

We both had dreams about him

32:09

and almost obsessed about him and his behavior

32:11

and his role with Al-Qaida going into an interview

32:16

with that kind of information is just absolutely dynamite

32:18

in the hands of skilled interviewers.

32:21

Interviewer

Can you tell us his name?

32:23

-

I cannot at this point,

32:25

because he's in the proceedings for ultimate trial

32:26

either at Guantanamo or perhaps somewhere else.

32:32

Interviewer

And were you well-trained

32:36

before you started your work?

32:38

-

Yes.

32:41

Interviewer

By whom?

32:42

By the air force?

32:43

-

Well, no, with NIS Naval Investigative Service.

32:44

And then what became the NCIS in the early '90s.

32:46

I have to say I'm always proud of my old outfit

32:50

because it was one...

32:53

Not exclusively, but one among

32:56

federal law enforcement agencies

32:58

that emphasize interview skills very, very early on

32:59

and it starts with the base of training.

33:01

And then I know in my basic training course,

33:05

which had ad-ons was the better part of 20 weeks of training

33:07

within those 20 weeks or beginning to intermediate

33:11

to even advance methodology and interview in interrogation

33:17

not just interrogation, but how to work

33:21

and build people's skills with potential sources

33:24

of information, witnesses, witnesses, to crimes, how to

33:26

how to leverage a relationship

33:29

with someone who let's say might be involved

33:34

in a drug cell or burglary conspiracy

33:37

and then use the information that individual has to

33:39

to work to a greater, good to take down the cell.

33:42

So, but then not only that formal training that happens

33:45

on a recurring basis, when I first became a special agent

33:49

in my probationary period, I was matched up

33:56

with a mentor who watched me

33:59

and work with me doing many, many,

34:02

many hours of interviews and interrogation.

34:06

You start with the lower level, lower risk

34:08

then work your way up to homicides, violent sexual assaults.

34:10

And then later I worked in a foreign counter-intelligence.

34:14

So that became more of the source handling type skills

34:18

which again are all about building an acord

34:23

with an individual working toward a higher purpose.

34:25

And then I like to say on my head hybrid

34:28

a training and a career path

34:30

some may have another name for it, but I went to a very

34:33

very advanced, specialized intelligence operations

34:36

training that further hone skills in working with people.

34:40

So I like to say going in for an interrogation

34:44

of an Al-Qaida member

34:47

I had both the federal law enforcement interview

34:48

and interrogation skills, but then I had the people going

34:50

for prime motivation skills of a case

34:53

officer married up to get best results.

34:57

And I know there's some still criticism, let's say

35:01

from folks on the so-called intelligence side of the house

35:05

in the 9/11 era that the cops, you know

35:09

they just want to build cases for trial.

35:13

I'm here to tell you that the two intelligence fresh

35:15

and actionable intelligence is perfectly compatible

35:19

with the elements of the crime, because I've found

35:22

from my experience primarily after the USS Cole attack

35:25

and having access to these individuals that look, it's not

35:28

about the elements of the crime and building it's

35:32

about actionable intelligence, but we found in the course

35:35

of having these conversations and extracting information,

35:38

the elements of the crime, you know,

35:42

material support to terrorism

35:45

using a weapons of mass destruction that took care of itself

35:47

in the course of getting first, that important intelligence

35:51

information.

35:54

Interviewer

Can you explain to the audience

35:56

why it really helped you to be very familiar

35:57

with the person you were going to interview?

36:00

You know, as much about him as his mother did.

36:02

Why is that important?

36:05

-

Well, as I mentioned before

36:06

besides confidence training experience

36:08

having as much information

36:10

about the individual is extremely important to

36:13

give you a few examples.

36:16

By design and training, you can employ some

36:20

let's say test questions early on.

36:26

As you're building rapport, getting to know the personality

36:28

of the individual, does he have a sense of humor?

36:30

If you don't already know that, is he going to

36:34

be a standoffish that is first 15 to 30 seconds

36:35

really fascinating within an interview

36:38

with someone you didn't met before,

36:40

that you had not met before.

36:41

Not because that's going to be, you know, how he is

36:43

for the whole course, but it gives you a good indication

36:46

of informing your road ahead.

36:49

So in those tests, questions

36:51

or probing questions that I mentioned, having this

36:53

sometimes if you're fortunate voluminous dossier about him

36:55

about his cohorts, we can have some probing questions

37:00

to find out if he's going to go

37:04

down the path of truth, or he's going to deceive.

37:06

So knowing about him

37:08

knowing about what others have said about him

37:11

it really helps you to gauge where you're going

37:13

with the interview and an effective interview,

37:16

you have to be able to change on a dime.

37:18

You must be very, very dynamic.

37:20

You can go in with your plan, but you have to be ready

37:22

to change that plan right away, depending on how

37:25

results are going or not going.

37:27

So as I mentioned before, the one individual where

37:29

we were just thirsting to get in with, we knew as much

37:34

about him as maybe his mother.

37:36

We probably knew more about him than his mother.

37:39

Besides the probing questions, which that's the

37:43

the test questions that's early on, what happens

37:46

with an individual and you find this cross-culturally, it

37:49

it holds to be true that you may have yourself in

37:52

let's say a comfort of circle of your story, sticking

37:58

with your story, where you might deceive, where

38:02

you obfuscate, where you misdirect.

38:05

But if every one of those turns, I and my partner

38:07

have a sitting, no, no, no Ahmed.

38:12

It didn't happen that way.

38:14

You start to build up an atmospheric of omnipotence almost

38:15

where you can see it in their faces.

38:18

And sometimes I actually remarked, oh my God,

38:21

like you guys are...

38:24

Were you there?

38:25

Did...

38:27

were you in Kandahar?

38:28

You know, and in some...

38:30

You know, you see them run the tapes back at times,

38:32

and this is where you really

38:35

start to make a breakthrough where they never come out

38:37

right out and say, but you get the sense

38:40

that they're saying like, "Man, I better come up

38:42

with something else because I'm out of my comfort zone."

38:44

And you can...

38:48

And then for us on our part, yeah

38:49

you can continue to lie Ahmed, but it's not going to...

38:51

It's not going to get you to where you want to be.

38:54

For example, you mentioned that you're fatigued

38:57

with the Jetta had life and you haven't seen baby Habib

39:00

and your daughter Habiba for any of their two or four years.

39:03

Now, we know and we believe you're a warrior for God.

39:07

So Beal the law for the sake of God.

39:11

There's no reason to believe otherwise.

39:13

But Ahmed, at the same time, though

39:15

you mentioned your duty as a father.

39:17

You haven't seen your children...

39:19

But I mean, I'm just in a very quick role-play

39:22

talking about how in their mind

39:24

we're trying to create that quid pro quo.

39:28

How can I still fulfill my righteous obligation?

39:30

And I believe in with every ounce of blood

39:35

but at the same time, how do I get to see Habib and Habiba?

39:36

Maybe it's through some kind of an accord here.

39:40

Okay.

39:44

So here comes a decision point

39:45

and I'm just kind of really paraphrasing in many

39:47

many interviews Ahmed thinks about it overnight.

39:49

And then he makes that intellectual decision.

39:53

I know there's some things I can give up

39:58

but still keep my honor and keep faith with the cause.

40:00

Then he makes that decision to go for it.

40:03

And it becomes, let's say exponentially more difficult

40:06

for the door not just to be cracked open,

40:10

but to become wider and wider.

40:12

Interviewer

So if you didn't know that much

40:15

about the person you're interviewing, what happens then?

40:17

-

Then it's going to come down to more

40:20

of the interview skills, cunning, guile, and proportionally

40:22

more information or time and spending to build rapport

40:28

get to know the individual, excuse me.

40:32

But, you know, from my experience

40:34

if we're talking about the USS Cole conspiracy,

40:37

some work I'd have been involved with before the Cole

40:41

and then 9/11, my time in Guantanamo, Yemen

40:43

Saudi Arabia, and some other places, you know

40:47

and this is, you know, praise

40:53

to the fantastic US intelligence system and all sources

40:56

and sometimes allied sources of information.

41:00

Very rarely do we have someone that we went in that was cold

41:04

or next to cold and not knowing anything.

41:07

Very rarely.

41:10

Interviewer

I want to go into your work

41:12

in USS Cole and then 9/11 and Guantanamo

41:15

but I just want to just have you explain

41:18

cause you started talking about this man's motivation

41:21

which you suggest it might be a warrior for God.

41:24

What other motivations did these people have?

41:27

-

Yeah, that's a great question because I can see

41:29

where let's say the popular conception

41:32

that it's all about this extreme form

41:36

of religious motivation and inculcation

41:37

in the selfie tech theory brand of Islam.

41:41

That was what Osama bin Laden was all about.

41:47

And now this thing known

41:51

as the Islamic state philosophically with that's very

41:53

very extraordinarily rigid form of beacon, bizarre Islam

41:57

as they believe it

42:01

Overarching of the detainees from Al-Qaida members

42:03

that that was the...

42:10

At face value, the motivation of why they were involved in

42:12

in doing very bad acts because of things

42:18

this form of religion that they believed in.

42:21

Okay.

42:23

And it's...

42:25

Forgive the academics here that minute

42:25

and logic that the extremely linear that

42:28

if it's not black, it's white, if it's not good, it's bad.

42:31

I've had many individuals explained to me in the course of

42:34

of hours over tea and lying

42:39

on the floor and having conversations

42:41

explaining how the width of a razorblade

42:44

is too wide for the straight path of Islam,

42:46

just to illustrate where the thought process is.

42:49

Okay, here's the big, however, when you peel the onion

42:52

at the individual level, a percentage

42:56

from my experience really, truly believe that way.

43:00

And a percentage it's more

43:03

of a facade and there are other motivators of behavior.

43:05

It could be something like one

43:08

of the high value detainees that I mentioned in particular.

43:12

I have no doubt that for him, it was all about body count

43:15

and being the most wily operator within Al-Qaida.

43:18

I mean, he even had a remark greatly paraphrasing here

43:22

(in foreign language)

43:25

That was a lucky shot.

43:26

It was a sucker punch.

43:28

I was involved in going after

43:29

and hitting some very, very hard military targets.

43:31

So my illustration there is his motivation

43:34

at the individual level, after you build that rapport

43:37

and peel the onion was something much different

43:39

than this extreme form of Islam.

43:42

Was that a factor?

43:44

Of course, you couldn't be a member of the group.

43:45

If there wasn't a belief

43:47

by the other brothers that you had bought in,

43:48

but there was that motivation for him.

43:51

Others in the spectrum, outside of that true believer Islam

43:54

wanting to be part of the group,

43:57

wanting to be an effective member of the group,

43:59

wanting to have a reputation amongst the Shabaab

44:02

the young guys, the brothers in the group that you were part

44:05

of a cause that was bigger than you

44:08

others were motivated by...

44:10

It could have been initially that didn't really

44:12

have too much of an alternative in my miserable country

44:16

of Oregon, no jobs, no say no political system, no nothing.

44:19

So it may have essentially been sucked

44:23

in to that life and then bought into it.

44:27

And then you have others

44:29

in between all matters of motivation.

44:30

So my point there is by far, they all motivated

44:32

by their messianic form of hell fire and brimstone?

44:36

Is it important?

44:40

Absolutely.

44:41

Is it Aberdeen for Muslims?

44:42

Absolutely.

44:44

But to say it's not about religion in some very, very

44:45

significant degree would be really speaking from ignorance.

44:49

Interviewer

Okay.

44:55

What title did you have when you were

44:56

in Yemen with the USS Cole?

44:57

What was the title?

44:59

-

A special agent in that point in my career

45:01

I had just transitioned to a supervisory special agent

45:04

but something that important where I was tapped

45:07

on the shoulder to go over to Yemen that, you know

45:12

set aside the supervisory going up the management chain.

45:15

Interviewer

And is that because you spoke Arabic

45:19

or because you had skilled experience working

45:21

with so many interviews at the time, or what...

45:23

Why did they tap your shoulder?

45:27

-

Well, as...

45:29

That was all part of it

45:31

and at the risk of sounding both boastful

45:32

it was kind of a very unique set of circumstances for me.

45:34

I had just finished my assignment in the console...

45:38

US consulate in Dubai, United Arab Emirates

45:44

where I was assigned a two man NCIIS office prior to that

45:47

I'd spent four years in Bahrain in our Middle East office

45:51

in Managua and consequently, because that's the hub

45:54

for the Middle East for NCIS and department of defense.

45:57

In large part, I had spent many, many months in Yemen

46:01

on temporary assignments, sometimes as short as a few days

46:06

but sometimes as long as upwards of two months.

46:10

So I had the formal training in Arabic.

46:12

I had a pretty good handle on various Arabic dialects

46:14

and actually the Yemeni dialect is quite poor.

46:18

I'm sorry, quite pure, quite pure form of Arabic.

46:20

So for a non-native like me

46:24

in urban areas like Sanai and Aiden among urban population.

46:27

And let's say more educated, good handle on Arabic

46:30

and locations like that had spent a lot of time in Jordan

46:34

a lot of time in Egypt

46:37

and various countries and had experienced

46:39

and following non-state actors, terrorism

46:42

the Intifada in Bahrain, like my counterparts

46:44

in our Middle East to field office in Bahrain.

46:48

I just had a permanent change of station

46:50

to San Diego where I was beginning the what's

46:53

called a special agent of float tour.

46:55

And I was really quite happy to get that assignment

46:57

because it meant that I was going to be the...

47:01

In effect, a staff counter-intelligence officer for the crew

47:04

for the command of the ship, and

47:09

for the command of the Marine Corps that were part

47:11

of the a what's called an amphibious readiness

47:14

group Marine expeditionary unit, at the time.

47:18

I was there roughly 10 days

47:19

it was very early morning, probably

47:22

between three and four o'clock in the morning

47:25

on the 12th of October, 2000, received a telephone call

47:28

from one of my best friends, Randy Hughes, who was assigned

47:30

in the at the Consulate in Dubai, where I had just left.

47:34

And he said, that brother turned on TV, CNN.

47:37

I said, Randy, it's a four o'clock in the morning.

47:40

He said, quick, quick turn on the TV.

47:44

It was breaking news, a US...

47:47

United States, Navy destroyer

47:48

important aid in Yemen explosion of unknown origins.

47:50

And we both said, oh my God, we know what that is,

47:54

that it had to be a terrorist attack.

47:57

I mean, that was the gut instinct, the intuition speaking

47:59

where there's a part of you hope that it's wrong

48:03

but we knew from, you know, the actors out there

48:05

that it almost certainly was that thanks for indulging me

48:07

my walk down memory lane here, but within the day

48:13

then Mark Fallon, who was the division chief

48:16

for the Middle East and Europe called me and said,

48:20

"Hey, you better pack a bag for maybe seven to 10 days

48:23

to meet up with a Vanguard from the NCIS office

48:25

who traveled down from Minama into Yemen...

48:29

Minima, Bahrain into Yemen."

48:33

They were securing the scene aboard the coal, just a handful

48:35

of special agents, but some very good forensic specialists.

48:38

They were going to meet up from

48:41

the major crime scene incident response team coming

48:44

from Naples Europe

48:51

with some very good forensic experts meeting

48:53

up with the FBI forensic experts

48:55

and then the big group of FBI still on its way.

48:57

So it was standby here in San Diego, new assignment

49:00

don't get ahead of yourself that you're Mr.

49:04

Airbus expert, but just in case.

49:06

So I kind of said, okay, boss

49:09

whatever I can do to help, but at the same time

49:11

really kind of pining to do whatever I could to help

49:14

but there are plenty of very, very talented

49:17

and smart agents that know that part of the world.

49:19

But then the next morning I did receive the call

49:22

from headquarters said, get to Yemen as quickly as you can

49:24

from San Diego, which was no mean feat took the better part

49:28

of a two and a half days.

49:31

So my long answer to your question,

49:33

the reason I and anyone who had experience,

49:35

particularly in Yemen that had liaison contacts

49:38

knew the security military and intelligence

49:41

counterpart officers, and knew that part

49:44

of the world go over and join up with the investigation.

49:48

That was the idea.

49:51

But then as one event led to another,

49:52

I received a tap on the shoulder to stay there at first.

49:55

It was with a little bit disappointment

49:57

because that meant my assignment was going

50:00

to someone else, but I thanked the good Lord

50:03

that I had that opportunity

50:06

to receive that sort of assignment, that kind of work.

50:07

And I wound up being the case agent for the Cole.

50:11

Interviewer

Did you...

50:15

was there someone enlighten on your radar during that time?

50:17

-

Yes, sir.

50:21

Absolutely.

50:22

Interviewer

And did us government no where he was

50:23

and was there a strong movement to try to find him

50:29

or was he put on the back burner?

50:34

-

Let me try to put this in quick context here,

50:37

you know, and and give you a sense of what it was

50:39

at the time and guard against the revisionist history.

50:44

Okay.

50:47

If you're talking about October of 2000

50:49

the United States government absolutely knew

50:50

about Osama bin Laden

50:52

that his organization Al-Qaida was a threat.

50:53

I mean, East Africa had been conducted by them.

50:56

And that was in August of 1998

51:00

more than two years before.

51:03

The United States and allied intelligence were also aware

51:05

of other attempts that the Al-Qaida organization had made

51:09

but for one reason or another with authorities.

51:14

So in October of 2000, certainly known

51:16

to be a lethal threat beyond rhetoric.

51:19

Let me just go a little bit before then in the period

51:22

before August of 1998, I can remember very vividly that

51:25

within the broader US intelligence and security community,

51:28

there was very passionate debate about this character

51:33

of Osama Bin Laden, who was well-known his...

51:37

You know being forced out of his native native,

51:40

Saudi Arabia, 1992 exile in Sudan

51:43

after he had already spent time in Afghanistan

51:45

and other short stint in Afghanistan, then back to Sudan

51:48

and then ultimately 1996, exiled again, once and for all

51:51

to Afghanistan.

51:56

There was debate in that period of the mid '90s,

51:57

up until August of 1998, that one one major camp said,

52:00

it's rhetoric, it's rhetorical yet

52:03

can it be lethal sure?

52:06

But right now it's more

52:08

about the rhetoric and fundraising and recruiting.

52:10

Another camp said, no, you better be careful

52:13

about this Bin Ladin and his organization.

52:16

They see themselves as men of action, and there

52:19

is ample enough information that they're plotting and

52:24

they say what they mean the '96 Fatwah.

52:26

And in particularly the 98 Fatwah in February

52:30

where he formed the international front for the

52:33

the war against the crusaders in the Jews

52:36

I always recommend to people, look

52:38

if you want to know the essence of a Osama bin Laden

52:40

and Al-Qaidaism read the English translation

52:42

of that five page Fatwah in very,,

52:45

very cold blooded and chilling language

52:47

he explains using sacred religious texts that he

52:51

cherry picked why it's not only a duty

52:55

but it's a religious command to kill Americans

52:58

wherever they be men, women, and children.

53:01

Okay.

53:04

So again, my extended answer to your question

53:06

did the United States know about bin Laden?

53:07

Yes.

53:10

Did they know where he was?

53:11

Yes.

53:12

In exile in places, whether it was camps

53:14

in the Khandahar area, Koble, in Jalalabad.

53:15

That was the triangle where his Al-Qaida

53:17

and their camps were.

53:20

But the part about, you know...

53:21

The broader question and implication, well

53:23

why didn't the United States do anything to

53:26

to take care of that before it became 9/11?

53:30

Well, one, that's a question for much,

53:32

much higher policymakers than me as a practitioner

53:37

but I have to say in living in at that time, the

53:41

the real wake up call didn't come until 9/11 happened.

53:44

Interviewer

Were you in Yemen at the time of the 9/11?

53:50

-

I was in Yemen.

53:53

I was in Sanai Yemen when 9/11 happened

53:54

actually watching it on CNN, internet and--

53:57

Interviewer

Was 9/11 a shock to you,

53:59

or were you saying, well I can see this coming.

54:00

-

Nah, I mean, I don't know of anyone.

54:02

I never...

54:06

Any of those I work with said, you know

54:07

we could see something on the scale coming, but, you know

54:08

with my colleagues and working with great Americans

54:12

like John O'Neill, who was the senile deceased died

54:16

9/11, retired had just retired from the FBI.

54:20

He was the on ground commander

54:22

for all of the investigative task force.

54:24

John O'Neill was one official that

54:26

I certainly listened to and respected that he was one

54:29

of the ones banging his fist, saying more is coming.

54:31

The guy...

54:34

These guys are lethal.

54:36

They mean what they say.

54:37

And it's only a matter of time.

54:38

Now on the scale of 9/11,

54:40

who would have known, but I will say those, sir, that

54:42

that walking it backwards, looking at the intelligence

54:46

looking at the pieces of the mosaic,

54:50

some indicators did come up that,

54:51

that there was a planning on a very

54:54

very vast scale that senior leaders like Richard Clark

54:57

former national security advisor had talked

55:00

about around the time before 9/11

55:03

and then right after 9/11.

55:06

And then there was a...

55:09

(sighs)

55:10

And you please give me the signal.

55:11

If this is just too much,

55:13

up close and personal for me and Ali Soufan,

55:15

we had an opportunity by virtue of access to Al-Qaida

55:18

members who are part of both the Cole and 9/11 plot

55:24

that we had access to them

55:28

in an interrogation setting months before 9/11 happened.

55:30

If some information had been available

55:34

about Al-Qaida activities in Southeast Asia.

55:36

When I mentioned before

55:38

about how important it is to have information to go

55:40

into ask questions, because, you know, an error

55:43

of omission is no foul on the part

55:45

of the person you're interrogating.

55:47

So if you don't ask the right question,

55:50

he's certainly not going to fill in the blank.

55:52

Particularly in that culture, if we had known

55:54

about Al Qaeda activity in Southeast Asia

55:56

that was happening in Malaysia, it boggles the mind

55:59

that if we had that information going into interrogate

56:01

one of the persons of Al Qaeda

56:05

who was party to that gathering Southeast Asia,

56:09

the possibilities are really quite profound.

56:12

Interviewer

So do the men you interviewed

56:15

or interrogate in Yemen, did some of them...

56:18

Are you saying knew about 9/11?

56:21

They knew...

56:23

They were involved or at least they were aware of it coming.

56:25

Like in other words, had you asked them the right questions

56:28

you would have known about 9/11 before 9/11--

56:30

-

Real important point, the way you asked that question,

56:33

did they know from what I know about,

56:36

Al-Qaida absolutely not because Al-Qaida,

56:38

and this is, and we're we're talking here

56:40

is how it shaped Mohammad

56:44

sell what they called the airplane plots need to know.

56:45

And compartmentalization, let me tell you

56:49

those guys are the master of it.

56:52

In fact, US intelligence could learn from them,

56:53

how closely held they kept bits and pieces of the plot.

56:56

So not at all suggesting that one Al-Qaida

57:00

member that we had access to in Yemen who had been

57:04

to Southeast Asia, would he knew, have known

57:07

about the greater airplane plots, highly unlikely

57:09

because it would have violated all manner of

57:12

compartmentalization.

57:14

However, what he knew

57:15

that we didn't know is the people he was meeting with

57:18

it just came from Kuala Lumpur that were involved

57:22

in the airplanes plot.

57:24

If we had that bits of information

57:26

from National Intelligence,

57:29

not about the airplanes plot, because that wasn't known,

57:30

but they were meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

57:33

We would have, let's say, had many, many happy hours

57:36

of a chord and rapport building about what was that meeting

57:41

about.

57:44

And I can tell you where we...

57:46

He may have denied not fuskated for hours,

57:48

but we wouldn't have left Yemen until we knew what...

57:51

That's just the nature of how you make breakthroughs

57:53

with these.

57:58

Because, you know, we would know at the end of the day

57:59

he's probably not going to have any more details

58:01

of the plot, but he can tell us which brother he met

58:04

and where that brother came from.

58:05

And what did the brother say he was up to in Kuala Lumpur.

58:07

What other brother traveled with that brother?

58:11

Because in three...

58:12

This case, three of them traveled

58:14

from Kuala Lumpur and later they were intimately involved

58:15

in 9/11.

58:18

So we would have talked about money.

58:20

We would have talked about, if you wanted to write a letter

58:22

to brother Ahmed, let's say email, telephone

58:26

how do you do it?

58:30

Well, of course, you know, there's going to be all kinds

58:31

of dancing around, but ultimately we would find out how...

58:33

And then you would marry that up with other bits

58:36

of the intelligence to build the mosaic.

58:40

Interviewer

At 9/11, did that change your life

58:43

or do they...

58:47

Did the government keep Yemen in you having

58:48

to keep working on the USS Cole.

58:51

-

Kept us working on the USS Cole in 9/11

58:53

because we knew almost immediately they were joined

58:54

at the hip inextricably tied together.

58:58

Interviewer

So your interrogation changed then

58:59

to stop focusing 9/11 issues as well?

59:01

-

Absolutely.

59:03

And would you like...

59:04

You know, a brief history,

59:05

I promise brief as possible, but you know,

59:08

it was such a big part of our life.

59:11

And again, it was a great honor to work

59:14

on something that was so much bigger than all of us.

59:18

After 9/11 happened, and we were the investigative crew

59:21

which at that point was probably no more

59:24

than 14, including myself, Ali Soufan.

59:27

We had SWAT protectors

59:30

because there was a high threat wouldn't want to

59:32

be anywhere dangerous without guys like that from the FBI.

59:34

Our two supervisors in some forensic support.

59:38

So very, very modest crew.

59:42

About 14.

59:44

After 9/11 happened, we we were going

59:45

to meet our counterparts

59:48

from the Yemen security service to continue our interviews

59:49

of in-custody individuals call from back home

59:52

and had respective headquarters said, pack your bags

59:55

drag your bags to the airport

59:58

and get the next flight out of there.

1:00:00

And know what you would call kind of a sympathetic board

1:00:01

of the mission because US couldn't tell are

1:00:04

are more tax coming for people...

1:00:08

US who were vulnerable.

1:00:11

So we dragged our bags to the airport very early morning

1:00:13

on the 12th of September.

1:00:17

And then a call came in

1:00:18

from FBI headquarters from a very senior analyst.

1:00:20

And she...

1:00:22

They handed the phone to Ali Soufan

1:00:25

and he said, "Hey, they just said, Soufan McFadden

1:00:27

pull your bags off the plane, head back

1:00:31

to the embassy in standby for a secure fax."

1:00:33

So my supervisor, Steve Corbett, MCIs Ali supervisor

1:00:35

Tommy Donlin from FBI, who were the seniors on ground

1:00:40

the four of us plus a couple

1:00:43

of our best buddy SWAT protectors

1:00:45

all dragged bags and headed to the embassy.

1:00:48

At that point early morning of the 12th of September

1:00:50

the secure facts were surveillance photographs

1:00:53

of that fateful meeting that happened in Southeast Asia.

1:00:57

And it was our first indication

1:01:01

that anything like that had happened.

1:01:04

One of the individuals in the surveillance photograph

1:01:05

was a striking similarity to one guy

1:01:08

I mentioned that we had access

1:01:14

to in Yemen who went out to Southeast Asia.

1:01:16

We...

1:01:19

Another part of the story actually wasn't him

1:01:21

but looked very much like him

1:01:23

but for us right away, the alarm bells went off.

1:01:24

Holy mother of God, you telling me this happened

1:01:26

in January of 2000, even before the Cole

1:01:29

and we had access to some

1:01:33

of the people involved in the meeting.

1:01:35

And we didn't know about it.

1:01:36

How could that be?

1:01:38

And it's a very vividly portrayed and Ali Soufan book

1:01:39

the black banners that both of us had a physical reaction.

1:01:41

I turned white and you know

1:01:45

could just almost feel like a mix between rage

1:01:46

and like utter, you know, dumbfounded that this happened.

1:01:52

And actually Ali got sick, physically sick,

1:01:58

right there in the embassy.

1:02:00

So the shorter part of the story we switched

1:02:02

shifted immediately into using that information

1:02:05

having meeting that night with actually the very head

1:02:09

the general that ran at that time, the Yemen, yes

1:02:12

the Yemen intelligence service known

1:02:14

as the political security and our marching orders

1:02:18

from Washington were look, get hold of this individual.

1:02:20

And his name is Fadhi Husso.

1:02:26

He was the one that had went

1:02:28

out to the meeting and was involved

1:02:31

in the local USS Cole plot Fadhi Husso is dead now.

1:02:33

He was drone strike cause he stuck with the program

1:02:37

and paid the ultimate price.

1:02:41

Our marching orders were to get access to Husso

1:02:43

no matter what it takes and bring him

1:02:46

in and interview him about the meeting and Kuala Lumpar.

1:02:48

And the idea was at that point, we needed a tally ho

1:02:51

on individuals among the 19 on the manifest

1:02:55

because it was believed that two those individuals

1:03:00

among the 19 were part of that meeting

1:03:03

in Southeast Asia and wound up being the case.

1:03:05

Talk to Husso and get a validation of that.

1:03:08

And then other information that might pertain

1:03:10

to the broader plot when that meeting

1:03:13

with the general that night understand the scene setter

1:03:15

for the prior better part

1:03:18

of 18 months was a pulling teeth expedition

1:03:19

of explaining why we needed access

1:03:23

why it was good for Yemen, why it pertained to terrorism

1:03:26

why it pertain to terrorism in Yemen

1:03:30

and almost always it was no, no, no, no, no.

1:03:32

God willing, no.

1:03:34

In this case, though, I'm here to tell you

1:03:36

there was an instant sea change in attitude that night.

1:03:39

And I have to say, especially after Ali explained

1:03:43

to the general that John O'Neill who had just retired

1:03:47

from the FBI and was the director of security

1:03:51

for the world trade center complex at that point

1:03:53

on the evening of the 12th of September was missing

1:03:55

and presumed dead, very emotional for us.

1:03:59

At that point, we were on pins and needles

1:04:02

and other dear colleague Leonie Haddon

1:04:04

from the FBI missing and presumed dead as well.

1:04:08

So in explaining this to the general.

1:04:11

Interviewer

Was this the general in Condor?

1:04:14

-

Yes, the general's name is Calib Comish.

1:04:16

Recently retired as the head of the security service

1:04:17

a very powerful position in a system like Yemen.

1:04:22

So what the general says happens immediately.

1:04:26

So when Ali was speaking Arabic to the general

1:04:30

I was interpreting for Steve and Tommy

1:04:35

and he was explaining that brother John...

1:04:38

That's what the General Calib who had a very close rapport

1:04:40

with John O'Neill was explaining, look, we're

1:04:43

we're hoping and praying for the best, but he's missing.

1:04:46

And we fear the worst.

1:04:49

Ali choked up.

1:04:50

Then he turned to me and said, you continue do

1:04:51

the interpretation with the general, translate.

1:04:54

I looked up at the general and he had tears in his eyes.

1:04:56

And so then we all kind of, you know, choked up a bit.

1:05:00

This was one of these stories where if I wasn't there

1:05:04

myself, I might think it may not have quite

1:05:08

happened this way.

1:05:10

But I was in that room.

1:05:12

The general said, after we all got our composure, he said

1:05:14

what do you need?

1:05:18

And we say general, we need fed up here immediately.

1:05:19

The general picked up the phone called Dan to the head

1:05:23

of the intelligence service for all of south of Yemen

1:05:26

in Aden where COSO was in the prison, federal COSO.

1:05:29

And that that individual is a Colonel Hussein.

1:05:32

Alansi was a, a constant thorn in our side.

1:05:35

The entire time during the investigation,

1:05:39

you couldn't hear the host side, but we heard the general

1:05:41

telling him, did you hear what I just said, paraphrasing

1:05:45

get fed on that plane.

1:05:49

And then the general actually called and was patched

1:05:52

through the control tower to the front end of the aircraft

1:05:56

and told the Arabic speaking, I think it was

1:05:58

the a purser tell the front end, not to move the plane

1:06:02

until a very special passenger.

1:06:05

Cause it was the last flight from Aiden to Sonata at night.

1:06:09

They put...

1:06:13

They held off the flight, put Coso on the flight

1:06:13

and we interviewed Coso

1:06:15

So with a great temerity into the very early morning where

1:06:17

he identified who they were in those photos.

1:06:20

And we got that tally ho

1:06:23

that it was Kyle DonMc Wasoo.

1:06:26

Interviewer

Who had that photo?

1:06:28

The CIA?

1:06:29

I mean, why did they look at that photo after 9/11?

1:06:31

Or did they know that bypass photo before 9/11?

1:06:34

Or did they...

1:06:36

They must've known it before.

1:06:38

-

Yeah, that's one of those things

1:06:40

where I have to say even at this point

1:06:44

and even though I'm not still in government, that I'm

1:06:46

I'm reluctant to really talk about because I'm

1:06:49

not absolutely sure what's was cleared for the public realm.

1:06:51

So a somewhat euphemistically, I say intelligence

1:06:56

at the national level, but you know, needless to say

1:07:00

of course it was an allied intelligence operation

1:07:03

surveilling these known and suspected Al-Qaida members.

1:07:08

Don't know what they knew at the national level completely,

1:07:11

but still it left us flabbergasted

1:07:15

because we were debriefing at the national level

1:07:18

every result of the investigation as it went along.

1:07:22

So you would think there could have been

1:07:24

at least without revealing sources and methods,

1:07:28

a marrying up of look, when you get

1:07:31

in with Federal Coso and some of these other characters

1:07:34

you need to ask them about this,

1:07:38

but that never happened because

1:07:40

of whatever else was going on at the time.

1:07:42

Interviewer

So how much longer were you

1:07:44

in Yemen before you came back to the states?

1:07:48

-

We...

1:07:50

From the period of

1:07:52

from the attack on the 11th of September

1:07:54

as part of that sea change, I mentioned, we had access

1:07:56

to bonafide Alcaide members that were in detention

1:08:00

in Yemen that previously the government would not allow us

1:08:04

the investigators from FBI and NCIS to have access to

1:08:07

but General Gamish made it happen.

1:08:10

And we had among others, very important inner circle

1:08:13

Bin Laden, security detail, senior member

1:08:17

who was also an Amir of multiple guest houses for Al-Qaida.

1:08:20

Now that may seem like a big deal, but it's a very big deal

1:08:24

because the Emir or leader of a guest house,

1:08:28

that's the clearing house for the inflow and the outflow

1:08:31

of all the fighters, but both the, the Gulf Arabs

1:08:34

and the other foreign fighters, their passports

1:08:37

their true names, their Warrior Kuhnian names,

1:08:39

all that kind of information.

1:08:41

And so we had access to him and some other

1:08:44

a little bit lesser, but still members of Al-Qaida.

1:08:46

That was a veritable factory of information

1:08:49

during that time.

1:08:56

I mean, among other things we were able to with this very

1:08:57

very tough nut and another interesting story by itself

1:09:00

how we...

1:09:04

It took us the better part of a two and a half to

1:09:05

three days to where he went from spitting

1:09:07

in our direction turning his back, which is a big insult

1:09:09

in the culture and absolutely refusing to talk to us

1:09:12

in any way, except to give us endless soliloquies

1:09:15

and lectures about the US being involved in Holocaust

1:09:19

and genocide and things like that to making a breakthrough

1:09:23

not like a, "It got me breakthrough," but an accord

1:09:26

that developed over two and three days to the point

1:09:31

within a week, we had him actually going over

1:09:34

Jane's all the world's small arms, Jane's all the

1:09:36

world's artillery and telling us which units

1:09:39

in the Al-Qaida had proficiency,

1:09:42

which Taliban units had proficiency,

1:09:45

where were they integrated,

1:09:48

gave us intimate insider details and filled in the holes

1:09:49

of the shore council of Al-Qaida as to who or who

1:09:54

what were the relationships and provide us some very

1:09:57

very sensitive information as to how they conducted

1:10:00

secure communications and what software and hardware.

1:10:02

Interviewer

And why did he quote Greg?

1:10:04

Why did he...

1:10:07

-

Yeah, see that's that's the term where

1:10:09

it never really applies in that sense, there was a break

1:10:12

if someday have there's a chance to interview him and talk

1:10:15

to him about, you know, what it was about us and him.

1:10:20

And why did he give this information?

1:10:23

One, he'll probably say I never gave that information

1:10:25

up because I don't think to this day

1:10:28

he really realized that it was anything, really of value.

1:10:30

And I know that sounds preposterous.

1:10:33

I mean, this brief time explaining it

1:10:35

but it was all interwoven into the fabric of rapport,

1:10:37

a chord, conversation, us demonstrating that.

1:10:41

Look, we're not going to go into say we agree

1:10:45

with Al-Qaida philosophy, but we have a lot of empathy.

1:10:48

We can understand where he's coming

1:10:51

from as a warrior for God, and never,

1:10:54

never going to buy into his very vivid

1:10:56

and profound expectation that we're going to insult him

1:11:00

his religion, his family, his culture.

1:11:02

Now did that mean we were doormats?

1:11:04

No, it meant that we were guys talking

1:11:06

with guys and appreciated his intellect, and we really built

1:11:09

up this atmosphere because we, we gathered

1:11:12

that he was in isolation in detention, there in Yemen.

1:11:15

Otherwise well-treated never any kind

1:11:18

of sign whatsoever of physical abuse because

1:11:20

we went over that in great detail every day to

1:11:23

make sure he was okay, physically, mentally.

1:11:25

But what I was getting to, we built

1:11:28

up this atmosphere and worked very hard

1:11:31

to where we can tell after let's say a week

1:11:33

he couldn't wait to see us every night.

1:11:36

So we can engage in this intellectual discourse

1:11:38

hear his views of history, and then

1:11:40

without giving away too much of the trade secrets

1:11:42

he had a personality trait that say that's more

1:11:47

of the professorial type who wanted to

1:11:51

demonstrate his deep knowledge.

1:11:53

Well, we helped prop that

1:11:55

up to the sense we're gave him a chance to

1:11:57

be the big man to explain which Al-Qaida units

1:12:00

were effective in fighting with Tali bond units

1:12:04

as an example.

1:12:06

Interviewer

So how much longer were you in Yemen before?

1:12:08

-

I'm sorry for your question there.

1:12:11

Because things were going so well with a

1:12:17

about a dozen different either Al-Qaida members

1:12:21

or associated with Al-Qaida, for example, the father who...

1:12:25

Or you could call him the grandfather

1:12:30

of the Yemeni Mujahideen, who had been involved

1:12:32

in Afghanistan, his sons were well known

1:12:34

for fighting and dying in Afghanistan.

1:12:38

He married off a three and probably the fourth one by now

1:12:42

three daughters to some very prominent Al-Qaida members

1:12:44

including one of the 9/11 hijackers.

1:12:47

And this granddaddy who I'm talking about, he actually...

1:12:49

His home was a so-called

1:12:53

Al-Qaida communication center that you can read about

1:12:55

in a lot of literature out there that a lot

1:12:59

of debate about that, but that communication

1:13:01

center was actually the family's home.

1:13:04

Again, to answer your question

1:13:06

he was the type of individual that we had access to.

1:13:08

And that old man was one tough nut to crack

1:13:11

but where we were from 9/11 to where

1:13:14

when we next left Yemen at the start of Ramadan

1:13:18

which was mid November, because at that point,

1:13:20

our friends from the Yemeni security service said that

1:13:23

you know, we realized this is going very well

1:13:27

but you may kind of hit the point

1:13:30

of diminishing returns once Ramadan started.

1:13:32

So at that point, we felt that just

1:13:35

about everything for actionable intelligence had been rung

1:13:38

from the proverbial rag and thought that was the best move.

1:13:42

And that's leadership decided, take a break

1:13:45

come back at Ramadan, and then go back after it.

1:13:47

Didn't go back to the evidence did go back.

1:13:50

Numerous times, numerous times.

1:13:52

Interviewer

So other than the fact--

1:13:53

-

I was over there when the USS Limburg,

1:13:55

or I'm sorry, the MV Limburg was attacked.

1:13:58

The French oil tanker that was attacked a year later

1:14:02

off the coast of Yemen.

1:14:04

Interviewer

So your focus, except for that one trip

1:14:06

one term that you told us earlier

1:14:09

did you have any working core title?

1:14:11

And most of it was really more tied into Yemen?

1:14:13

-

No, I multiple trips to Guantanamo.

1:14:15

Yeah, extensive time in Guantanamo

1:14:18

Interviewer

Why was that?

1:14:20

-

Just part of interviewing some of

1:14:22

the higher valued Al-Qaida membership.

1:14:24

I was involved with the, the Saddam ham done inter interview

1:14:27

and the trial.

1:14:31

Ali who received a life sentence

1:14:38

who was Bin Laden's one of his personal secretaries.

1:14:39

And part of a Sahad, their propaganda immediate production.

1:14:42

It was involved with the interview of Ebrahimi Closey

1:14:45

Sudanese member of Al-Qaida, who was convicted

1:14:49

pleaded guilty, but actually back now in Sudan

1:14:52

and a number of other interviews and interrogations.

1:14:55

Interviewer

So this...

1:14:58

So often, would you be at some other place

1:15:00

like perhaps Yemen or some other place, then they

1:15:03

bring you back to one time interviewed these men?

1:15:04

-

That's right.

1:15:07

Now, typically the way it would happen is when I

1:15:08

or Ali were back from Yemen to brief

1:15:10

at our respective headquarters, then the office

1:15:14

of military commissions will call

1:15:17

see if we're available and then send us down to

1:15:19

Guantanamo.

1:15:21

Interviewer

What do they want from you evaded

1:15:22

if they didn't...

1:15:24

If the military was more in favor of what you call the ITSN

1:15:26

and hush interrogation, why would they invite you

1:15:29

down to do your rapport based interrogation?

1:15:32

-

Well, you see there was a bifurcated system

1:15:36

within Guantanamo.

1:15:38

Okay.

1:15:41

And it's really, you could say in a lot of ways,

1:15:42

extraordinarily complex and data rich history

1:15:44

but in brief, there was the joint task force.

1:15:48

Okay?

1:15:51

That was the so-called...

1:15:53

And I still hate this term in this concept

1:15:55

the intelligence side of the house that was answering

1:15:57

to an up through South Com.

1:16:01

Southern Command to the Pentagon.

1:16:04

The other side of the two houses was the office

1:16:06

of military commissions, where it had parallel interviews

1:16:09

interrogations for building cases, for trial.

1:16:13

Then the JTF side, getting information intelligence

1:16:17

that was used for, you know, informing decisions.

1:16:22

One person here to tell you that there never needed to

1:16:26

be the two sides of the house, but in fact, there were.

1:16:29

So I was charged with going over to the building

1:16:32

the case side of the house, nonetheless, there was always

1:16:37

some new tidbit of information that was important

1:16:40

intelligence, regardless of it, you know, coming

1:16:43

as a result of that pipeline for building the

1:16:46

cases.

1:16:49

Interviewer

But your intelligence also

1:16:50

would go to the military

1:16:51

to help them even though it was trying to build a case

1:16:53

if there was something that he discovered that was helpful

1:16:56

to the military.

1:16:59

Absolutely.

1:17:00

Absolutely.

1:17:01

It'd be shade route.

1:17:02

Both.

1:17:04

Yeah.

1:17:05

-

Undoubtedly.

1:17:06

Yeah.

1:17:07

I mean, actually, that's one of the great lessons learned

1:17:08

of... From that period of the USS Cole to 9/11,

1:17:09

to where before I have to say

1:17:11

that the two sides were almost hermetically sealed,

1:17:13

the federal law enforcement investigations

1:17:15

and the intelligence side rarely touched each other

1:17:18

but there was a realization.

1:17:20

And now it's part of the...

1:17:23

Really part of doctrine that look pursuant

1:17:24

to an investigation.

1:17:28

If there's actionable intelligence,

1:17:31

it must get into the intelligence reporting stream.

1:17:32

Interviewer

Other than the incident you told us before,

1:17:37

where you was somewhat taken aback

1:17:40

by the fact that everyone else

1:17:43

in this meeting was in favor of, harsh interrogations

1:17:46

except you, you come upon that in other trips to Guantanamo,

1:17:48

or pretty much you were left alone to just do your work?

1:17:53

-

In brief, yes, it did come up in trips to a Guantanamo.

1:17:56

Where I and some of my colleagues had an awareness

1:18:00

that there were harsh things going on.

1:18:06

And sometimes, you know,

1:18:10

outside the interrogation facilities

1:18:13

we we'd have passionate debates about these kinds of things.

1:18:15

And in brief, our counterparts,

1:18:18

on the so-called intelligence side would say, listen, you

1:18:21

you guys are coppers.

1:18:24

You don't know about intelligence.

1:18:25

So then we get into this all the whoa, time out.

1:18:27

Let me tell you a story my friend were where I'm coming from

1:18:30

or where Ali Soufan is coming from.

1:18:33

Our training, our background, and what we know about it.

1:18:36

You know, we were

1:18:39

at the operational operator practitioner level.

1:18:40

So that was, that was policy and policy level things.

1:18:43

Interviewer

Was Ali also sent to Guantanamo

1:18:47

with you to do some of these investigations?

1:18:49

So you guys go in tandem or you came with...

1:18:51

-

Not always, he went many times by himself

1:18:54

and I went many times by himself, but I would say most

1:18:57

of the trips, at least for my part, we were together.

1:19:01

And I have to say with a little bit of a pride

1:19:04

and admiration here, that Ali was in high, high demand

1:19:11

because he was such a terrific interrogator and interviewer.

1:19:16

And in fact, before I met him

1:19:19

I thought I was the world's best.

1:19:21

But then he, yeah...

1:19:23

Because he...

1:19:24

Again back to that point

1:19:26

about how information is so important

1:19:28

with this kind of target and all targets, but this kind

1:19:30

of detainee, Ali who's a born raised a Muslim was very, very

1:19:34

very well versed in the religious doctrine

1:19:38

and knowing the Quran, the Hadith of the prophet Muhammad

1:19:42

and is one of the few professionals where he could get

1:19:45

into a polemic or tit

1:19:48

for tat debate and actually steer in some respect the

1:19:50

way of thinking of the subject of the interview.

1:19:54

But we... And we did a lot of training together

1:19:57

for the newly initiated

1:20:00

going into those interviews, interrogation

1:20:02

and almost always recommend don't do that

1:20:04

because you're just going to fall into their traps

1:20:07

rhetorical and otherwise, if you try to debate religion

1:20:09

Interviewer

Did they ever send you

1:20:12

to see a black sites to do interpretation?

1:20:14

-

No, sir, not me.

1:20:16

Interviewer

And Guantanamo, this story

1:20:17

and I believe the center report will confirm this

1:20:19

that there were some high-level detainees in Guantanamo.

1:20:25

And one time I went in, '03 and then

1:20:28

they were sent back out in '04, and then they came back

1:20:32

in '06, do you go in oh three and interview some of them

1:20:35

at that time when maybe you don't want to talk to that?

1:20:37

-

I did not.

1:20:40

I was not sent at '03 to Guantanamo for that.

1:20:41

And I don't know whether that's true or not

1:20:44

about some of the high value detainees going to

1:20:48

Guantanamo.

1:20:52

Interviewer

Did you interview them post '06?

1:20:53

-

Yes, sir.

1:20:55

Yeah, I was as part of the established part

1:20:56

of the program, the black side of the program

1:21:00

then president Bush made that announcement than I

1:21:02

and some other colleagues from FBI and OSI and CIS

1:21:05

and army CID were brought into conduct, fresh interviews

1:21:08

of the 14 and I, and a partner conducted two of the 14 HPDs.

1:21:13

Interviewer

And you always spoken Arabic

1:21:20

when you interviewed?

1:21:21

-

Yes, now I will say in doing, in your interview

1:21:23

in the absence of a partner like Ali Soufan

1:21:27

who's native proficiency in Arabic, there...

1:21:31

For the Guantanamo interviews of the HPDs because

1:21:34

neither I or my partner were native level proficiency.

1:21:37

We had a language specialist in there because

1:21:40

it's incredibly, critically important not to miss any nuance

1:21:44

and capture everything accurately.

1:21:47

Interviewer

And you were probably a more professional

1:21:49

in some dialects of Arabic, then another is

1:21:53

that's kind of what you told us earlier.

1:21:56

-

Yeah, yeah.

1:21:58

So it was...

1:21:59

Yeah, well more experience with, actually in this

1:22:01

this tends to happen for non-native studying language.

1:22:04

I had a lot of experience with the Egyptian dialect

1:22:06

but it wasn't really of that much use, you know, for

1:22:09

for Gulf Arabs, although they understand it.

1:22:12

But I had probably most experience

1:22:14

with the Arabic of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen

1:22:16

but nonetheless though, you know, for non native speaker

1:22:20

and someone who's not a natural linguist like me

1:22:24

after extended periods away from the language, you know

1:22:27

one becomes rusty very quickly.

1:22:31

So it's a matter of getting

1:22:33

your legs back with the language, but that's where

1:22:34

the professional language specialists were indispensable

1:22:37

for filling in the blanks.

1:22:40

Interviewer

What were you doing when you won't go

1:22:41

into Guantanamo interviewing these men?

1:22:44

Were you back in Yemen

1:22:47

or were you...

1:22:48

What were we doing during that time?

1:22:49

-

During that period of...

1:22:51

Usually I would spend a period

1:22:52

at my headquarters in Washington DC

1:22:55

and worked often as well from there with the JTTF

1:22:57

the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York.

1:23:03

So there was traveling back and forth

1:23:05

and then trips to Yemen and other places in the Middle East.

1:23:07

So I call that my Bedouin period, you know,

1:23:09

no real fixed address, lots of travel, but really

1:23:13

fantastic work--

1:23:16

Interviewer

And CIS work?

1:23:17

-

That's right.

1:23:20

And CIS, but, you know, and this is one of the other

1:23:22

other aspects of the environment after 9/11.

1:23:25

So many things are done

1:23:29

as a joint task force or an inter-agency task force.

1:23:32

So in the bigger international cases, almost always

1:23:36

there are multiple agencies involved.

1:23:38

Interviewer

You have a theory called phenomenon

1:23:40

of Volvo breed over brief?

1:23:43

-

Yes.

1:23:44

Interviewer

Can you explain that to us?

1:23:45

-

Yeah, it's the term I applied the...

1:23:48

Have applied the over brief syndrome and where that comes

1:23:51

from over the course of my 20 plus years

1:23:55

in government, in federal law enforcement

1:23:59

counter-intelligence. intelligence, there

1:24:03

there is this pressure that comes from working

1:24:04

in a project where there's pressure naturally from the chain

1:24:12

of command to produce results, produce results efficiently.

1:24:16

So after you're vested in a project, say yourself as a case

1:24:19

agent or colleagues working a case

1:24:24

or working in operation, there is

1:24:26

a kind of a natural pressure builds

1:24:28

that emphasizes the positive when it comes

1:24:31

to upper Ashland briefings.

1:24:35

So after a while, this type of pressure feeds

1:24:37

upon itself from top driven to come

1:24:39

up with more positive results quickly and keep that going.

1:24:42

Now, it doesn't always result

1:24:46

in inaccurate or exaggerated briefings

1:24:49

but sometimes that does creep into the process.

1:24:54

So as part of my theory, I believe

1:24:57

that some of our most senior officials during the time

1:25:00

of post 9/11 and for the buildup of toward Iraq

1:25:06

and regime change that some senior officials

1:25:11

completely sincere and earnest

1:25:17

but I think they were very ill-served by some

1:25:19

of the briefings that they were receiving on a daily

1:25:22

or near daily basis about the results of say a program

1:25:25

like the EITs or the pitch for that snake oil

1:25:31

that I referred to about learned helplessness

1:25:37

and reverse engineering SERE techniques to do interviews

1:25:40

and interrogations of Arabic speakers involved in Al-Qaida.

1:25:44

I think that there probably was that element

1:25:48

of the over brief to deciders

1:25:51

of senior administration officials and

1:25:53

in the Pentagon for concurring with the program,

1:25:56

when they had that kind of an over brief and over results

1:25:59

and Neri, would there be a contrarian that say, well

1:26:03

maybe we consider that.

1:26:10

For example, have any of those were pitching's proposal

1:26:12

had much experience with the near and Middle East

1:26:15

with the Arabic language, with Koranic

1:26:18

and Islamic history, have any...

1:26:20

They, or any of those who work

1:26:22

for them ever interrogated anybody in any setting?

1:26:24

Interviewer

When did you come up with this theory?

1:26:27

-

Well, I think I'm living

1:26:30

through the era and inheriting things

1:26:34

both when inside the government, you know, that were

1:26:38

within classified channels and then histories written

1:26:41

during the period in unclassified open settings.

1:26:46

And then afterwards

1:26:49

that it's just a conclusion I've come to that

1:26:51

I think that some of the most senior officials

1:26:53

thought it was the right thing to do, as they say, based

1:26:56

on the briefings and the intelligence they were receiving.

1:26:59

So I can't really come

1:27:02

to any other conclusion because these are otherwise very

1:27:03

very formidable, senior leaders, men, and women

1:27:06

that they would have concurred

1:27:10

and approved doing these kinds of things when

1:27:13

there was absolutely no science or basis for it to work.

1:27:16

And with that, I didn't even talk about the legal

1:27:20

or moral implications of doing things that

1:27:23

if they were done by enemies to the United States.

1:27:26

So our people, what we would consider that

1:27:30

but if I can go full circle and full disclosure and honesty

1:27:31

I would have to say again,

1:27:35

if I sold data that there was some science

1:27:37

behind it, not the extreme, not torture, but some

1:27:43

of the extreme mental coercion let's say that it worked,

1:27:45

that it worked quickly, that it was much more effective

1:27:49

than our building the rapport and an

1:27:52

a core and getting to the intelligence.

1:27:55

I probably would have said, "Hey boss

1:27:57

can you sign me up so that I can learn that and do that."

1:27:59

But, but we knew there

1:28:02

there was no such thing in involved in that whatsoever.

1:28:03

It was a reaction when it trickled out there doing what?

1:28:06

Interviewer

So what advice

1:28:09

would you give future policymakers

1:28:13

going forward in terms of, you know, what...

1:28:14

If something like 9/11 happens again

1:28:17

-

God forbid, and that's, you know, one

1:28:20

of the great things about our country after tragedies

1:28:24

the history shows that we learn

1:28:27

but it's a matter of asking the right questions.

1:28:29

It's a matter of considering

1:28:32

contrary opinions, bringing in those who may have a

1:28:33

let's say a quieter voice, but have deep experience

1:28:38

with a subject and can contribute to informing the decision.

1:28:43

Absolutely.

1:28:48

That's the way to go.

1:28:49

And that's almost always the way it does go

1:28:50

but that's a great lesson learned.

1:28:53

Interviewer

Why didn't you go after 9/11?

1:28:55

-

Why didn't that happen right after?

1:28:57

Well, I mean, in the period up until president Bush

1:29:00

this established that part of the EIT program, there

1:29:02

there were still considerable leadership that

1:29:05

believed that was the right way to go.

1:29:09

And we're receiving briefings that boss it's working

1:29:11

this is what it's producing.

1:29:13

This is who we're taking down

1:29:16

what cells were, are being neutralized.

1:29:17

And so from that sense, having some empathy

1:29:20

you could see why some leaders

1:29:24

from the administration bought into it and thought

1:29:26

and still think to today

1:29:28

it was the right thing to do.

1:29:30

Johny

You got 10 minutes in the cut.

1:29:32

-

Okay.

1:29:33

Did you...

1:29:34

Were you still...

1:29:36

Did you continue the same position throughout your career

1:29:37

the counter-terrorism

1:29:40

or did you move into some other positions?

1:29:43

-

Well, from that period from

1:29:45

before the U S coal up until the, the mid two thousands?

1:29:49

Yes, I actually, I did go into the supervisory chain

1:29:52

and received the promotion to become a division chief

1:29:56

within the newly established counter-terrorism director

1:29:59

at an NCIS and then was assigned to the NCI field office.

1:30:02

One of the biggest field offices in San Diego

1:30:07

where I was an assistant special agent

1:30:09

in charge for CT matters

1:30:11

largely enforced what was called force protection

1:30:16

and then ultimately became the special agent

1:30:18

in charge for an operational support unit before I retired.

1:30:20

So, although it wasn't exclusively, even

1:30:23

if you weren't in a specific counter terrorism bill

1:30:26

it most divine and colleagues at some time would work

1:30:31

counter-terrorism combating terrorism issues.

1:30:35

Interviewer

And when did you retire?

1:30:38

-

I retired in August of 2011.

1:30:39

Interviewer

So when president Obama was elected

1:30:41

did you think that something would change?

1:30:44

-

Yes, absolutely.

1:30:48

Interviewer

Why?

1:30:49

-

And again and being

1:30:51

in the right place at the right time and having some good

1:30:53

very good fortune for assignments and temporary assignments.

1:30:56

I was nominated and selected to be part

1:30:59

of a practitioners advisory group

1:31:03

to the executive order study of interrogation,

1:31:06

detention, and retention.

1:31:11

I may not have the order of...

1:31:13

I was...

1:31:14

I think it was I'm sorry

1:31:16

rendition, detention, and interrogation.

1:31:17

I don't know if you recall this,

1:31:19

but actually that was one of the first executive orders

1:31:22

if not the executive order, which is akin to law

1:31:25

to US law, that the president established this

1:31:29

working group to advise the administration

1:31:32

on rendition detention interrogation.

1:31:34

I was part of the practitioner group that was

1:31:36

in the working group for interrogation.

1:31:39

So at an offsite in a very...

1:31:42

In a classified facility,

1:31:49

we had numerous meetings and discussions

1:31:50

and briefings and debate sometimes very passionate debate

1:31:53

about interrogation methodology.

1:31:59

And so it was really somewhat of a fait accompli

1:32:03

because the administration was on record saying

1:32:08

that it would never...

1:32:10

It would not approve

1:32:12

a so-called enhanced interrogation techniques

1:32:13

you know, the extremely harsh physical and mental coercion.

1:32:15

So within that working group, to your question

1:32:19

did I know things, were they going to change well

1:32:22

within that work in group, you could see where the tide

1:32:26

in the final report that went to the white house talked

1:32:28

about and greatly paraphrasing very,

1:32:31

very voluminous classified report.

1:32:35

That though there are some indication

1:32:36

and information was produced.

1:32:38

There are much more effective,

1:32:40

better legal, domestically, and internationally

1:32:42

accepted ways to go about getting information

1:32:45

from some very tough interrogations.

1:32:49

And during some of those meetings, there were some very

1:32:51

very emotional and passionate discussions

1:32:56

by some terrific officers in the intelligence community

1:33:00

in the US that argued clearly quite forcefully

1:33:05

that they thought it was the way to go

1:33:09

for certain individuals where nothing works.

1:33:11

And we had many hours

1:33:14

it's the debates about the ticking time bomb scenario.

1:33:16

But on the other side, there was a group of us

1:33:20

a small group that said, look,

1:33:23

we conversely had some individuals where it seemed

1:33:25

like nothing was working, but using our skills, methodology

1:33:29

other bits of information,

1:33:33

we're able to dislodge information

1:33:35

and we feel here's the record

1:33:37

in an effective and efficient way.

1:33:39

And then when it came to the ticking time bomb,

1:33:42

let's say in the discussion, that was kind of the ultimate.

1:33:44

And then you had very smart men legal scholars

1:33:47

like Alan Dershowitz talking about, you know

1:33:50

should the executive have something

1:33:52

at his disposal where you have a ticking time bomb?

1:33:54

Well, interestingly enough, in the bait

1:33:57

among all those practitioners in

1:33:59

in the pre and post 9/11, well, over a dozen people

1:34:02

maybe better part of two dozen people, CIA, FBI

1:34:04

myself from NCIIS, department of defense

1:34:10

special operations command, department

1:34:14

of Homeland security state department.

1:34:16

No one or part of the group come up with

1:34:17

a single ticking time bomb scenario, where there

1:34:20

wasn't some other form of information where

1:34:24

there wasn't some other individual that would fill

1:34:27

in the blank where there was a sole

1:34:30

and singular source of intelligence that would stop a plot.

1:34:33

Now, you know, we would talk

1:34:35

in the meeting and outside the meeting

1:34:39

that the profound influence of the TV program, 24

1:34:42

that often depicted a ticking time bomb scenario.

1:34:44

The report that went to the white house actually noted

1:34:47

that outside of scripts for four fictional programs

1:34:50

the group was hard pressed to come

1:34:54

up with a ticking time bomb scenario.

1:34:57

Interviewer

That's really interesting, Johnny

1:35:00

I think we'll take a short break to switch to Cod

1:35:01

and then just a few more minutes I wanted to follow up.

1:35:04

And that's really interesting when we are rolling.

1:35:07

So could you, who was the chair

1:35:10

of that committee that talked

1:35:13

about the practitioners committee?

1:35:15

-

The...

1:35:17

Well, actually the chair of the interrogation

1:35:19

committee was a...

1:35:23

I cannot recall his name, a terrific gentleman.

1:35:24

He was a United States attorney, but I can't

1:35:28

probably come to me later, but yeah, he was

1:35:32

he was a us attorney and had an excellent

1:35:34

staff with him because of the report was you know

1:35:39

really complex material.

1:35:42

The report was very well done.

1:35:44

Interviewer

And from that experience, did you feel

1:35:46

that Obama was going to take a different path than Bush?

1:35:48

Is that--

1:35:50

-

I did.

1:35:52

I...

1:35:53

And I have to say in going in with that bias

1:35:54

from my background and experience that I saw it as a very

1:35:57

very positive step because the president campaigned

1:36:00

as one of the very, the many aspects of his campaign that

1:36:04

you know, he was not going to be a proponent

1:36:08

for these kinds of things.

1:36:11

It's hurt our country, but nonetheless, he

1:36:12

through executive order established this commission to look

1:36:16

at the problems and, you know, better inform

1:36:19

the white house decisions and the administration where to go

1:36:20

for not only interrogation

1:36:23

but the rendition and detention policy.

1:36:25

Interviewer

So after that, since you continued till 2011

1:36:28

with any other policy groups that you worked with

1:36:33

anything else that you were involved in with Obama

1:36:36

-

Let me think after that time, no, not

1:36:39

not anything at that level or that magnitude

1:36:42

but within my organization was a part of...

1:36:44

And actually in one assignment at the Pentagon

1:36:48

I was detailed to the staff of the deputy

1:36:51

under secretary of the Navy for special operations,

1:36:56

sensitive operations in low visibility activities.

1:37:01

And that that's a policy shop for the department

1:37:04

of the Navy, but tied in with the rest of the community

1:37:09

both at the national level and DOD level

1:37:12

for how to best conduct interviews, interrogations conduct

1:37:13

counter-intelligence operations intelligence collection.

1:37:18

that was a privilege to be a part of that

1:37:21

to see how the policy process works.

1:37:24

Interviewer

Can you see yourself realistically

1:37:26

being brought back in if there were,

1:37:29

God forbid another 9/11?

1:37:32

Do you think that's...

1:37:34

-

I...

1:37:36

And God forbid we have anything even remotely

1:37:37

resembling that, you know,

1:37:40

I guess the prideful part of me would like to say

1:37:42

but I've retired and lots of subordinates and protegees.

1:37:45

So if I can say in a very, very many smart enabled,

1:37:51

I think the degree in breadth of expertise that's developed

1:37:55

in the 9/11 terrorism era is really quite, quite good.

1:37:59

You know, I used to say in some of the mobile training teams

1:38:03

and lectures and training I was involved in

1:38:09

about the Middle East

1:38:12

about Islamic history, comparative religions

1:38:14

counter-terrorism and terrorism history

1:38:16

from the 1980s up to the present that

1:38:21

that it was important to realize that, you know

1:38:25

from world war two, up until the

1:38:29

let's say the Cold War ended at the end of the 1980s

1:38:32

it took really long time

1:38:35

for the US and allies to develop a deep, deep bench

1:38:37

of Sovietologists and experts that help inform very

1:38:40

important decisions when it came to the Cold War.

1:38:44

Well, and in the terrorism era,

1:38:47

we haven't had that luxury of a Cold War non-kinetic period.

1:38:49

So we had to have a crash course in developing expertise

1:38:55

not just in how to kinetically address violent extremists

1:38:58

but everything from the anthropology

1:39:01

to understanding the culture, the history

1:39:05

and the motivators, the drivers

1:39:08

in the incubators of terrorism.

1:39:10

And I think we've done a terrific, terrific job

1:39:12

both for the intelligence security community

1:39:15

the behavioral science

1:39:17

and the academic community in a collaborative effort.

1:39:19

I mean, my company, if I might say the Soufan group

1:39:22

in some studies, we've been commissioned to

1:39:25

conduct involved the counter narrative

1:39:27

to violent extremism and soft or cerebral approaches

1:39:30

to countering the violent extremist ethos, and narrative.

1:39:33

And those things are very, very, very important.

1:39:38

And now we're just really beginning to scratch the surface.

1:39:40

There are some government clients that have

1:39:43

had commissioned us and a contract

1:39:46

with us to conduct those studies.

1:39:51

And we have a two volumes so far on that effect.

1:39:53

In fact, the most recent volume on the counter narrative

1:39:56

to violent extremism, we conducted studies

1:39:58

in 11 different countries, Europe, Southeast Asia Africa

1:40:02

and for the Somali diaspora community in Minneapolis,

1:40:06

St. Paul, as to how those locations go about through NGOs

1:40:10

through government support, sometimes

1:40:16

without government support to get in front of

1:40:17

let's say young men who are somewhere between thinking

1:40:21

about taking a constructive act to violence and actually

1:40:24

doing it and how are the ways to counter that narrative.

1:40:27

Like, for example, in Somali, among the diaspora community

1:40:30

you have a significant percentage of young men that have a

1:40:33

a romantic notion about the motherland that he

1:40:36

probably never was in, or was a baby.

1:40:41

And so you have these feelings of nationalism mixed

1:40:44

with the influence of, of a violent narrative that

1:40:47

that can motivate young men go to places

1:40:51

like Somalian, unfortunately, usually doesn't end well.

1:40:54

So that part of the program

1:40:57

I feel a lot of pride in being involved

1:41:00

in the private sector that can help inform decisions.

1:41:02

Interviewer

Well, how would you just,

1:41:05

wait, are you trying to

1:41:06

dissuade these men from getting involved in Somalia?

1:41:09

-

From the company study?

1:41:11

It's more about how have there been effective approaches

1:41:14

in dissuading young men?

1:41:20

Whether it's the community approach?

1:41:22

The family, the immediate family approach,

1:41:24

the friends approach, other alternatives,

1:41:26

whether it's education jobs

1:41:29

how does Northern Ireland deal with its problem of lest

1:41:31

we not forget had a very, very serious terrorism problem

1:41:34

from the mid 1960s up and through the 1990s

1:41:39

Northern Ireland has a sophisticated

1:41:43

and well-developed program that goes

1:41:46

among other terms of prevent, which is largely

1:41:50

a community engagement, community policing program

1:41:53

of getting in front of terrorism.

1:41:57

Now that may not apply to let's say Yemen

1:41:59

but for a country like Yemen

1:42:02

there may be bits and pieces of that are effective

1:42:04

that would fit into the fabric of the culture of Yemen.

1:42:07

The same thing, the way Singapore, Malaysia

1:42:09

Indonesia do it.

1:42:12

Each one of those programs though

1:42:13

tailored for its society and culture

1:42:15

at culture may work in other places where they

1:42:18

have no established countering violent extremism program.

1:42:21

Interviewer

And what about the young man,

1:42:24

they say climb from all over the world to Syria

1:42:27

to fight on behalf of ISIS?

1:42:28

-

Extraordinary problem there.

1:42:31

And, you know, part of our study speaks to look

1:42:33

no one would suggest from a policy perspective

1:42:37

that the security, the kinetic the military

1:42:43

and the police response would not be a part of it is.

1:42:46

And it will be unfortunately, that that will go on.

1:42:50

But here's the really, really challenging part right now.

1:42:52

How, how does the country of Belgium

1:42:56

which by percentage of its population, our most recent study

1:42:58

on foreign fighters shows is extraordinary.

1:43:01

The percentage of young Belgium men that have gone

1:43:04

to Syria or Iraq.

1:43:07

Yes, yeah.

1:43:08

As far as European countries,

1:43:10

it's near, it's at the top.

1:43:11

Not necessarily some are recent converts,

1:43:14

some had converted before,

1:43:17

but there is a significant percentage that either first

1:43:21

or second generation from predominantly Muslim countries.

1:43:23

So...

1:43:28

And not just talking about Europe,

1:43:29

where France has numbers of 700 or above.

1:43:32

And that was as of the spring

1:43:35

of 2014 are known to have been in Syria or Iraq.

1:43:37

How does Tunisia, which

1:43:41

of all the Arab countries, besides Syria and Iraq,

1:43:43

the battlefield has the highest number

1:43:46

of young men that have gone to those places.

1:43:49

Libya, it's very high.

1:43:51

Those countries are looking for are

1:43:53

are striving to work with with allies

1:43:57

and those outside the security intelligence community

1:43:59

or in addition to, I should say

1:44:02

on how do we counter this narrative?

1:44:05

How do we find out about these young men?

1:44:07

How do we tap into their community?

1:44:09

These are families to see where the young men

1:44:12

and it's not just exclusively

1:44:15

but overwhelmingly the young men.

1:44:17

And that's why I use that term, but how do we

1:44:18

how do we know, how do we learn who's at risk?

1:44:21

And what approaches can we take to get in front of that?

1:44:24

Nigeria is a whole nother matter with that.

1:44:26

That's part of what our, our, our company is involved

1:44:29

in, yes.

1:44:32

Interviewer

So you feel your work today is as fulfilling

1:44:34

as it was while you were working with the government.

1:44:37

-

Well, a relative comparison,

1:44:40

maybe a little bit tough to do

1:44:43

because in a sense it's different.

1:44:46

I have to say I do miss knowing what's going

1:44:48

on in the inside since I retired.

1:44:52

And sometimes, like, for example

1:44:55

when a high value detainee is captured somewhere

1:44:58

let's say in Libya, I find myself just really

1:45:01

thirsting to find out what's going on, but I know some

1:45:04

of the guys and gals involved and they're doing great stuff

1:45:08

but nonetheless, you do miss that.

1:45:12

But as far as a sense of fulfillment, I find myself very

1:45:14

very fortunate to work in the kind

1:45:17

of work from a different aspect, but nonetheless important

1:45:22

and battling violent extremism, very fulfilling.

1:45:25

Interviewer

Are there some...

1:45:28

This is something I didn't ask you

1:45:31

that you would like to share with the audience

1:45:32

especially since this is for history in that people 50 years

1:45:35

from now will be watching this hopefully as well.

1:45:38

-

You know, there was one thing I was thinking

1:45:41

before having the privilege to meet you

1:45:45

that another story from early on, where I just

1:45:48

happened to be in the right place at the right time

1:45:51

but it was really pivotal

1:45:53

in the early decision days on what became Guantanamo.

1:45:56

And for one reason or another,

1:46:01

I was in between trips to Yemen and the Middle East.

1:46:04

And this would have been early 2002 very early.

1:46:06

And perhaps it may have been even December

1:46:09

of 2001 when the United States government

1:46:12

and Pentagon trying to figure out, okay

1:46:16

what are we going to do

1:46:18

with the detainees from the battlefield in Afghanistan?

1:46:20

So I was sent

1:46:22

by my headquarters to a planning meeting down to

1:46:24

I believe it was Miami, Florida, and the US Southern command

1:46:28

of course, would have responsibility

1:46:32

once the decision was made

1:46:34

that Guantanamo Naval air station would be the place

1:46:36

for the detainees from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1:46:39

So in one of these very, very early planning meetings,

1:46:42

you had officers from Southern command officials

1:46:46

and officers from the US central command,

1:46:50

which of course engaged

1:46:53

and had responsibility over in CENTCOM area of operations.

1:46:56

You had Pentagon officials

1:46:59

you had the Seabees, you know, with the Seabees

1:47:03

the mobile construction battalion that was going to

1:47:07

build the facility, what would become the facilities

1:47:09

the bare base facilities you had counterparts

1:47:12

from the defense intelligence agency

1:47:15

army criminal army criminal investigation division,

1:47:17

and others officials, military, and civilian like that

1:47:22

talking about the nuts and bolts

1:47:25

of what the processing would be for the detainees.

1:47:28

And in one of those early meetings, I was

1:47:31

among just maybe one or two of us who had actually come

1:47:34

from in theater and doing an interview and interrogation.

1:47:38

And this particular meeting was okay

1:47:42

you're going to have joint

1:47:45

and even inter agency approach here, the detainees.

1:47:47

And so what that means is it wouldn't just

1:47:51

be DOD joint where DIA was say an CIS and

1:47:53

or air force counterpart office of special investigations.

1:47:56

You would also have FBI.

1:48:01

You would also have at the national level CIA.

1:48:03

So that's where the inter agency comes into.

1:48:05

It's not just DOD, but it's joint across the federal level.

1:48:08

So we were trying to figure out in this meeting

1:48:12

what reporting mechanisms would be used to

1:48:15

capture the results of the interview.

1:48:18

So the good guys from the defense intelligence agency said,

1:48:20

oh, well, that's easy.

1:48:24

We would, we would use the intelligence information report,

1:48:26

the IIR now understand the IIR is, is the vehicle in black

1:48:28

and white and electronically for reporting the results

1:48:33

of intelligence take of use usable information

1:48:37

about a subject that goes through the intelligence stream.

1:48:41

It can be tactical, operational level lever strategic

1:48:44

but it's the results of information coming from a source.

1:48:47

So I said, well, gentlemen, that would make sense

1:48:51

when it comes to reporting

1:48:58

whether it's going to come from the law enforcement side

1:49:00

or the intelligence side, but I said

1:49:02

what about the results of the interview?

1:49:05

They said, well, we'll use the IIR.

1:49:07

And I said, no, no, I'm not, I'm not being clear.

1:49:09

It's my fault.

1:49:11

You know, in the course of conducting interviews

1:49:12

let's say using Ahmed Abu Ahmed over in Yemen

1:49:15

we had access to him for the better part of say

1:49:21

140 hours over the course of a month.

1:49:26

And in the course of that 140 hours, we may have a dozen

1:49:28

or more intelligence information reports

1:49:33

but then they're absolute volumes of covering hundreds

1:49:36

of pages that we use a reporting vehicle to

1:49:41

capture the results of the interview, our intelligence.

1:49:43

And they said, well, what?

1:49:46

I said, well, you know, the

1:49:48

what motivates him, the quirks

1:49:50

of his personality is likes his dislikes, who

1:49:51

some other people who might motivate them.

1:49:54

And it was kind of that glaze look where you can tell

1:49:57

we just weren't communicating witch each other.

1:50:01

Or I wasn't doing a very good job of articulating it.

1:50:03

They just kept coming back to no, we'll use the IRR.

1:50:05

So that was a little bit of a Eureka moment that, wow

1:50:08

this is...

1:50:12

It's going to be a work in progress

1:50:14

because otherwise really good

1:50:16

and experienced and professionals who had never

1:50:18

conducted interviews or interrogation, especially not

1:50:20

of Al-Qaida types are going to have to realize

1:50:23

that you need something much beyond the IR

1:50:27

and there's going to have to be a meeting

1:50:32

of the minds on how you capture the results of energy

1:50:34

because the intelligence is one thing,

1:50:35

but it's the non-operational intelligence that would go

1:50:37

in the dose.

1:50:41

You know, let's say you and your partner

1:50:42

aren't available to continue with Abdul Alk Ahmed

1:50:44

and you have to hand off to colleagues.

1:50:47

Well, you can brief them.

1:50:49

But that data is so important to pour

1:50:51

over in between interviews to really get

1:50:54

the sense of what makes up that human being,

1:50:57

that may not be all that compelling.

1:50:59

I remember at the time thing, like, wow

1:51:03

this is going to be a problem.

1:51:04

Interviewer

So did you see it become a problem?

1:51:06

Did you feel like it was just ignored for years?

1:51:09

-

In...

1:51:14

A problem, yes, I did.

1:51:15

I see that, that as the beginning, there was a...

1:51:16

There was a natural tension in class of cultures

1:51:19

between the so-called law enforcement side of the house

1:51:22

and the intelligence side of the house.

1:51:26

And if...

1:51:28

To do it all over again.

1:51:29

And if I was still in the government

1:51:31

I do everything in my power to make sure that there

1:51:33

was a completely complete collaborative, seamless approach

1:51:36

between the requirements of both sides of the house.

1:51:40

Interviewer

So at that point

1:51:44

when you were hitting a brick wall

1:51:45

what would you have done if you had more authority where

1:51:46

you just sat him down and said, look

1:51:50

I'm going to teach you what it really takes

1:51:52

-

In essence.

1:51:55

Absolutely. I would have brought in people

1:51:56

with deep experience and expertise and formed

1:51:59

like a joint working group so that they could hash

1:52:02

out the best ways to approach this

1:52:05

and using all resources collectively, you know, for example

1:52:07

there was a different behavioral science

1:52:10

support element for the joint task force side, separate

1:52:14

from the behavioral science element that I had been working

1:52:18

with for years before they had even thought about it.

1:52:21

And again, it wasn't that in any of my colleagues

1:52:26

are saying, look, gentlemen, ladies, we have the answer was

1:52:28

we said, look, look at the results and look at our approach.

1:52:32

When, when you talk about behavioral science, psychologists

1:52:35

other behavioral specialists that help advise in interviews

1:52:38

it's not really in any way, anything nefarious what

1:52:42

they're doing.

1:52:46

If they're watching my interview and helping me to be

1:52:47

let's say more likable or how I might have a different

1:52:50

approach to rapport, or did I miss some indicator

1:52:53

of a motivation, it's all for a really

1:52:56

something very pure and for a higher ideological

1:52:59

purpose.

1:53:02

Whereas we heard on the behavioral approach

1:53:04

on some of the other approaches,

1:53:07

it really wasn't a very well-informed.

1:53:11

It was more about the agitation and coercion

1:53:13

Interviewer

We heard from so many people telling us

1:53:16

that a lot of the...

1:53:19

What you call intelligence military approach was on the fly.

1:53:20

Is that how you, saw it too?

1:53:24

-

Yeah well, from what I heard after the fact

1:53:27

I can't say I was really assault close

1:53:28

and personal was privy to, but after the fact

1:53:30

it certainly did sound like it was on the fly.

1:53:33

You know, there were some books

1:53:38

in the popular literature at the time

1:53:40

for some people, for their crash course in the near

1:53:44

and Middle East that were, that they've been debunked

1:53:49

and refuted as any kind of academic work.

1:53:52

Just to give you an example without we...

1:53:54

You know, because this isn't really about gratuitous

1:53:57

denigration of people, but there there's some books out

1:54:00

there that purport the show

1:54:02

what the Arab mind is or what Arab culture is.

1:54:05

So in a very brief, it's kind of a, "Okay

1:54:08

now let's get this straight."

1:54:12

If you're talking about the Arab mind agriculture

1:54:13

are we talking about Mauritanians

1:54:16

on the far Northwest of Africa

1:54:18

or are we talking about Omanis on the far Southeast

1:54:20

of south Asia when you're Arabian Peninsula?

1:54:23

And then how about all in between?

1:54:27

So there was some of that earnest and well-intended, but

1:54:29

you know, learn, we're not suggesting everyone becomes a

1:54:31

he or she becomes an anthropologist, but learn from those

1:54:37

who've done it and are experienced at whether practitioners

1:54:41

or behavioralists very, very, very important.

1:54:43

Some of the other things on the fly that still to this day

1:54:47

I don't think we know how it came to be

1:54:50

and where these tech so-called techniques came from.

1:54:53

But why would like humiliation of some kind reasonably

1:54:57

would you expect to get good interrogation results

1:55:04

from humiliation, whether it's cultural, religious, sexual

1:55:07

or otherwise, I don't know where that came from.

1:55:12

I have some theories, but I don't know how anybody

1:55:15

could plan to have any degree of experience

1:55:18

in that part of the world would come up with such things.

1:55:21

Interviewer

I mean, what you're really saying is

1:55:23

that if we're going to

1:55:25

do a better job next time around, we need to

1:55:27

be well-educated in understanding the Arab culture

1:55:29

which I'm not sure we still are.

1:55:33

I mean, you would feel you'd want to set up a number...

1:55:36

You want to be convinced that people who are going

1:55:39

to interning in this next time around

1:55:42

are well informed about the culture.

1:55:46

-

Well, two things to that, one, I do believe we...

1:55:48

I know, I believe I know we've come a very,

1:55:51

very long way in just since 9/11, to give you an example

1:55:52

there's an inter-agency process for high value detainees

1:55:55

when they come into US custody.

1:56:00

Now, the individual from Libya,

1:56:02

just a few months ago, Abul katala, the FBI

1:56:05

leads the operation, but there is a complete

1:56:09

across government expertise approach to that.

1:56:13

So that's an example right there where they're tapping

1:56:16

into the case agents who know a ton

1:56:19

of information about Abul katala, then they're going

1:56:21

to deep expertise in behavioral science when it comes

1:56:25

to things that might be particularly important

1:56:28

for Abul Katala who comes from this part of Libyan culture

1:56:31

those things are happening for the high value detainees.

1:56:34

Okay.

1:56:38

The other part of it, though

1:56:39

we're not dealing right now, at least

1:56:40

on such a vast scale of detainees who came

1:56:42

into the system in the post 9/11 era.

1:56:46

So we hope it doesn't come to that.

1:56:49

But if we do, I'm confident that there will be a more

1:56:53

informed approach what, when it comes to

1:56:55

those interviews and interrogations, and even something as

1:56:59

simple as knowing who's who and where

1:57:02

they're coming from, the battlefield in the very

1:57:05

very fast developing and oftentimes chaotic situation

1:57:09

in Afghanistan, I know for myself, and some

1:57:13

of my closest colleagues, we couldn't understand why

1:57:16

for example, so many Afghanis and Pakistanis were coming

1:57:19

to Guantanamo.

1:57:22

I mean, we know they're not Al-Qaida's thoroughly

1:57:24

if not completely Arabs from the Arabian Gulf or from Egypt

1:57:26

maybe some from Jordan, but you had many, many...

1:57:32

It's just a result of the system, the processing catching up

1:57:35

with the need for all processing all these detainees.

1:57:40

So I think the US

1:57:43

and allies learned a lot from those lessons.

1:57:44

Interviewer

So I think, unless you want,

1:57:47

you have something else whenever I think you're saying

1:57:51

that you have a much more positive sense going forward

1:57:52

than you did in the early days,

1:57:57

you think things have really improved

1:57:59

-

Without doubt.

1:58:02

Yeah, and because, you know,

1:58:03

having been a part of the system

1:58:05

and seeing the system, I have a high degree of confidence

1:58:08

that the system continues to learn from the mistakes.

1:58:11

And we improve on that process.

1:58:14

Again, we all hope we don't face such a situation

1:58:15

but if we did, I think there would be a much,

1:58:18

much improved approach.

1:58:21

Interviewer

That's...

1:58:23

Well, that's really comforting.

1:58:26

Is there something else that I didn't ask you

1:58:27

that you also thought about on the way here?

1:58:29

So maybe I just want to share

1:58:32

and then we can dim the lights.

1:58:34

-

I think that's it right now

1:58:37

from experience from Guantanamo and the 9/11 era.

1:58:39

Interviewer

Okay. Well then

1:58:45

we need 20 seconds of room tone

1:58:48

where the silence that Johnny needs to just run the camera

1:58:50

for 20 seconds, and then we'll turn it off.

1:58:56

Please begin room tone.

1:58:59

Mcfadden, Robert - Interview master file

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