Peirce, Gareth - Interview master file / Witness to Guantanamo / Duke Digital Repository

Interviewer

Good afternoon.

0:06

We are very grateful to you for participating

0:08

in the Witness to Guantanamo Project.

0:11

We invite you to speak of your experiences and involvement

0:14

with the detainees from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

0:19

We are hoping to provide you with an opportunity

0:24

to tell your story in your own words.

0:26

We are creating an archive of stories

0:30

so that people in America and around the world

0:32

will have a better understanding of what you and others

0:36

have experienced and observed and contributed.

0:40

Future generations must know what happened at Guantanamo

0:45

and by sharing your story, you're contributing to history.

0:48

We appreciate your willingness to speak with us today.

0:52

And if at any time during the interview,

0:55

you'd like to take a break, please let us know.

0:57

And if there's something that I ask and you'd rather

1:00

not answer, just let us know, that would be fine.

1:02

And I'd like to just begin

1:05

with your name and country of origin.

1:08

If you could just tell us that.

1:11

-

Gareth Pierce, I'm British.

1:13

Interviewer

And could you tell us a little bit

1:16

about your, just your occupation and a little bit

1:17

about your background before, leading to Guantanamo.

1:23

What is your occupation?

1:29

-

I'm a lawyer, a defense lawyer,

1:30

and for many years being a defense lawyer

1:36

has also meant challenging the government

1:41

on the range of issues.

1:46

And perhaps increasingly in the last 12 years,

1:50

when the government of our country,

1:56

as well as the government of your country,

1:59

have perpetrated an extraordinary number

2:04

of incursions into the protections that should pertain

2:09

to every individual in the world.

2:14

Interviewer

So are you saying that your background,

2:19

you've always been involved in that kind of work

2:23

or that's led up to it as you came forward?

2:25

-

My working life as a lawyer has been, in

2:30

some cases, have some relevance,

2:38

I think to what happened in the last 12 years.

2:42

There have been in this country,

2:50

sadly, when the government

2:52

of the day chooses to look at them that way,

2:55

recurrent suspect communities, not just individuals,

2:59

but a blanket,

3:04

suspicion or blanket allegation

3:08

that can overwhelm an entire community.

3:11

And the most well-known example

3:16

is the history of the Irish in Britain,

3:23

throughout many, many, many years of conflict.

3:30

And when that conflict came to an end,

3:34

was coming to an end,

3:40

tragically and stupidly,

3:47

and with no sense of history or lessons learned,

3:50

attention was turned to

3:56

the Muslim community in this country.

3:59

And a new suspect community

4:02

came into being and has suffered

4:06

and still suffers the consequences of that perception.

4:09

Interviewer

Where were you at 9/11?

4:15

Were you in Britain at the time?

4:18

-

Yes.

4:19

Interviewer

Were you contacted

4:20

or how did you get involved in these cases after 9/11?

4:22

-

Two cases almost simultaneously.

4:31

One was Moazzam Begg, who I knew.

4:37

I had known Moazzam for some years,

4:41

as a young man who worked in a bookshop in Birmingham.

4:47

And he moved with his family, his wife and children

4:52

in the first part of 2001, to Afghanistan,

4:58

to set up a school

5:05

for boys and girls, interestingly,

5:09

the Taliban didn't stop him.

5:14

They didn't help him, but they didn't stop him.

5:18

And that's why he and his wife were there.

5:21

And on

5:26

January 31st, 2002

5:30

I had a telephone call

5:36

from a friend of his in Birmingham

5:41

to say that Moazzam had, with his wife,

5:45

managed to escape from the invasion of Afghanistan

5:50

and settle in Pakistan, where they were living.

5:54

And that men had come to his house and kidnapped him.

5:59

And they had not taken his phone.

6:06

And I think from the boot of a car

6:09

he had managed to telephone his father in England.

6:12

And so it was within hours off that,

6:19

that I had heard what had happened,

6:22

and immediately got in touch with the Foreign Office to say

6:27

if a British citizen has been kidnapped in Pakistan

6:33

would you please intervene with the Pakistani authorities?

6:38

And for the next

6:45

nine months to 12 months

6:48

the British authorities steadfastly maintained

6:53

that they could get no information.

6:58

He managed to get a message from the Red Cross

7:01

to say that he was in Bagram Air Base,

7:07

so he had been subject to rendition.

7:11

He had been entirely unlawfully

7:14

kidnapped in Pakistan.

7:19

Habeas corpus proceedings were initiated in Pakistan,

7:22

every ministry, every relevant authority,

7:25

said that they did not have him.

7:29

And then a letter came though the Red Cross

7:32

from Bagram, to his father.

7:37

Throughout that year, I went with his father

7:42

to the Foreign Office here

7:45

to demand that they intervene for him,

7:48

and they maintain, they had no internet information.

7:53

They put that in writing.

7:57

They told it to our face,

7:59

and it was not until

8:03

post Rasul v. Bush in the US Supreme court,

8:08

post the ability

8:13

of lawyers to go into Guantanamo

8:18

and find out from the detainees,

8:20

something of their history.

8:24

It was only then that we discovered

8:26

that the British had been there throughout,

8:29

the British, had tipped off the Americans

8:32

where he was living in Pakistan.

8:35

British had been there when he was first interrogated,

8:40

still in Pakistan with the Americans,

8:43

British were there in Bagram,

8:47

the British were there in Guantanamo.

8:50

Interviewer

Why would the British play a part

8:54

in his capture and the kidnapping?

8:56

-

The British have been involved,

9:02

complicit throughout

9:06

in tipping off,

9:11

in ensuring unlawful detention, rendition,

9:13

of providing information that torturers will

9:20

use to interrogate obtaining the product

9:27

of the interrogations under torture.

9:31

And defiantly maintaining throughout that

9:39

they will have no truck with torture.

9:45

They will have no truck with illegality.

9:48

And so we, we have a particular view

9:52

of the behavior of our country in this.

9:56

And in many ways, we make our judgments

10:01

through that prison.

10:08

We look at what we did,

10:10

what we were complicit in and what we should answer for.

10:13

Interviewer

Did the British ever explain

10:19

to you why they lied to you?

10:20

-

I don't know that explanation is appropriate.

10:26

There's been condemnation since by

10:35

authorities appointed to monitor what the

10:43

Foreign Office does, what the security services do

10:49

insofar as there has been criticism, there's been criticism

10:53

that we were like to, nobody has ever apologized.

10:57

Nobody has ever conceded

11:03

that these were lies.

11:09

And certainly nobody has conceded

11:12

that they were complicit consciously,

11:16

deliberately in rendition and torture.

11:18

Interviewer

How did you feel

11:23

when you kept hitting a brick wall

11:24

in those early days, when you went to the British

11:27

and they kept telling you they had no power

11:30

and no authority to intercede?

11:33

-

I think the knowledge grew

11:39

of what was going on and perhaps it's relevant

11:45

to mention the second person at the same time,

11:51

just about the same time as learning about Moazzam.

11:56

Shafiq Rasul was one of three young men

12:02

from the Midlands

12:07

who were sold by the Northern Alliance to the Americans

12:10

after surviving a horrific experience

12:16

in which they'd been packed into a container, transported,

12:22

and the majority of the

12:27

several hundred people in the container

12:31

had suffocated to death,

12:33

and they were lying amongst dead bodies and

12:36

a soldier outside had fired

12:43

shots into the container to get air in,

12:49

so one of the young men was wounded by a bullet.

12:52

And they had then in Kandahar,

12:57

been shipped to Guantanamo.

13:02

They were the first,

13:05

the first men to arrive in Guantanamo, Shafiq.

13:09

So what happened in this country was that the

13:16

British authorities

13:25

tipped off a newspaper,

13:29

the newspaper's favorite recipient of information

13:34

from the security services.

13:40

They arrived at Shafiq Rasul's house with a photographer

13:43

at the same time that his family was being informed

13:48

that he was in Guantanamo.

13:52

Now, insofar as the lessons of history are learned,

13:56

in fact, Shafiq's brother Habib,

14:01

had studied at university

14:06

the history of what happened

14:11

to a number of Irish men in this country,

14:13

innocent Irish men who'd been wrongly convicted.

14:17

And so he thought he would go to a lawyer

14:22

to get help for Shafiq,

14:26

and not knowing lawyers,

14:29

he found a lawyer who'd acted for those Irishmen.

14:31

And

14:38

that was a different trajectory of endeavor in a way

14:42

because he was someone

14:49

who was being held by the Americans.

14:53

He would have a right to habeas corpus

14:57

and therefore the urgent imperative

15:01

was to litigate in America on his behalf.

15:05

And fortuitously,

15:14

as I was desperately trying

15:19

to find lawyers in America who would take his case on,

15:21

there were lawyers in America desperately

15:27

trying to find a named detainee in Guantanamo.

15:29

And there had been an attempt, I think it was by the ACLU

15:34

to bring a class action, but with no names,

15:39

knowing no names and it had fallen

15:43

foul of the that at the first hurdle.

15:45

So that's how Rasul v. Bush came about.

15:48

And through the next,

15:56

so all of this was in January, February, 2002,

16:01

then his case went through the courts in America

16:09

until it got to the Supreme Court in 2004.

16:15

And by which time Shafiq had been in Guantanamo

16:24

all that time

16:29

The whole,

16:33

all the initiatives were

16:37

bouncing off brick walls,

16:45

either legal brick walls or political brick walls.

16:48

And

16:54

with Moazzam, who was in Afghanistan,

16:58

by the end of 2002,

17:06

before the end of 2002

17:13

there was information coming out, of torture.

17:17

It wasn't, it wasn't solid,

17:23

but remembering these were secret sites

17:27

intended to remain so.

17:31

Guantanamo, Bagram, Kandahar,

17:33

it was never intended that anyone

17:36

would know, would have access,

17:41

would know what was going on.

17:44

But there were a number of blunders

17:47

from that point of view, the Americans made.

17:51

One was when they transported the first men to Guantanamo,

17:56

Shafiq and a few others.

18:03

It was very much the triumphalism of victors.

18:08

They displayed pictures of men in orange suits, shackled

18:12

and bowed to the ground

18:17

as a mechanism of humiliation.

18:21

But in fact, that pictorial representation,

18:28

and then there were pictures of men in chains,

18:34

similarly dressed in cargo planes

18:38

being taken to Guantanamo.

18:43

And the resonance was, this was like slaves

18:46

and slave ships being taken across the Atlantic.

18:50

It was transportation of human beings

18:54

without any lawful justification.

18:59

And so that foolishness of the Americans

19:05

to give pictorial depiction of what they were doing

19:09

had an enduring impact,

19:16

and curiously

19:23

I think the rest of the world got it

19:28

more than Americans do.

19:32

And what I've come to realize since,

19:34

is the way America treats its prisoners,

19:42

is horrific

19:47

and it's across the board.

19:51

So it's no surprise to Americans,

19:53

including, maybe especially defense lawyers

19:56

that the people they represent are shackled,

20:01

that they are kept in isolation.

20:04

It's no surprise, and they're not,

20:07

nobody thinks it's wrong, or very few people,

20:10

there's very little resistance.

20:15

So in that sense, Guantanamo

20:17

represented what was the norm.

20:22

What was different was that it was

20:24

beyond the reach of the law in terms of access.

20:27

Moazzam Begg was transferred to Guantanamo in

20:35

early 2003,

20:42

he was a year in Bagram.

20:44

And as just

20:48

basic information began to come out of torture.

20:53

I asked the British government to initiate

21:02

legal proceedings in Afghanistan,

21:07

that being the country in which they were held,

21:10

which they refused to do.

21:16

I asked them to register a complaint

21:18

with the UN committee against torture,

21:22

a state to state complaint,

21:25

because neither of our country allows

21:27

for individual petition.

21:30

So Moazzam could not,

21:32

ask the British, they refused,

21:36

their constant reply was we believe diplomacy

21:38

is the best way,

21:42

claiming that they were importuning

21:46

constantly with the Americans

21:50

on behalf of British nationals, or British residents.

21:52

That's what they claimed.

22:00

However,

22:04

years later,

22:07

when the men had returned,

22:11

and some of them before they returned,

22:13

we initiated the litigation

22:18

against the Home Office, Foreign Office, MI5 and MI6

22:23

for their complicity in torture rendition.

22:29

And for two years

22:36

that litigation barely moved forward.

22:41

But by the end of the two years

22:46

there was the beginning of grudging disclosure,

22:47

which part is litigation obliged

22:56

to provide one party to the other.

22:59

And very soon after the new incoming coalition government,

23:05

following the election,

23:12

said that they wanted to bring an end to the litigation.

23:14

They said, this was part of our history

23:17

they wanted to draw a line under.

23:18

They wanted to get to the bottom of what had happened.

23:23

They wanted to mediate and negotiate these claims.

23:26

Unsurprisingly, when one saw the disclosure

23:33

that was beginning to happen.

23:37

So at the very moment that the first man, Shafiq Rasul,

23:39

and others were being taken to Guantanamo

23:46

and we were being told,

23:50

Shafiq's brother and I, just like Moazzam's father and I,

23:54

went to the Foreign Office.

23:58

We're told we can do nothing.

23:59

That very moment the minutes of the cabinet,

24:02

the ministerial exchanges that we were now

24:06

seeing years later, disclosed to us, were saying,

24:11

get them to Guantanamo the longer they're there the better,

24:12

Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, for my purposes

24:19

I'd be happy if they never come back.

24:22

All of them across the board,

24:24

as for their investigation

24:27

of reports of torture, ill treatment,

24:30

there is a delegation goes, Foreign Office, MI5,

24:37

go and participate in interrogation of Shafiq Rasul

24:41

and give a report back, all's fine.

24:45

However you see in the cabinet minutes

24:47

the draft report saying, this is all fine,

24:52

the Americans assure us nobody's being ill treated

24:58

we've been there, we've seen it's fine.

25:01

And then one cabinet member writes

25:04

across the bottom, very odd.

25:08

This is prepared in advance of going.

25:11

And then there's a comment saying

25:15

this will be signed off by the Americans.

25:17

So the degree of

25:21

deliberate conscious mendacious involvement

25:27

is one of the most shocking

25:33

events or continuing events in our history,

25:39

in the history of this country.

25:44

Interviewer

And the way you're talking,

25:48

I assume this was a surprise to you,

25:50

you did not expect your country would participate

25:52

at this level of behavior?

25:56

-

Perhaps naively, yes, but...

26:02

Yeah.

26:09

Interviewer

And did you know when Moazzam

26:11

was transferred to Guantanamo,

26:13

were you informed or was his father informed?

26:15

-

His father was informed

26:17

that he was transferred there

26:21

and occasional letters came out.

26:24

And

26:32

what happened was the

26:37

Tipton lads, the three, Rasul, Iqbal, came back

26:45

-

And here were these three young men, very young,

26:56

two of them had been teenagers,

27:03

came back, and in the most

27:07

innocent way, without contrivance, without

27:16

(door bangs)

27:23

Woman

Sorry, Gareth,

27:27

this is the interruption that you.

27:29

Interviewer

We're good to go, okay.

27:30

So you were talking about when they came back,

27:34

the three men.

27:36

-

Okay.

27:38

Very, very young in their ways

27:48

and their attitude and

27:51

quite bizarre in a way to,

27:56

because they were where they lived in the West Midlands,

28:04

there had been

28:11

effigies hung on lamp posts

28:15

and much far right activity,

28:17

threats to their families.

28:23

They weren't safe right away to go home.

28:25

So they were staying here in London.

28:29

And so when they get back,

28:36

just the normality,

28:40

in which they were describing the abnormality.

28:44

So there'd be the three of them sitting around

28:48

the kitchen table for breakfast,

28:53

talking about

28:57

things that one couldn't even believe they'd experienced,

29:02

but at the same time looking at

29:07

a new mobile phone their brother brought them.

29:11

And it was the youth,

29:14

the striking-ness of the youth

29:19

and the horror that the youth had gone through.

29:23

And so probably,

29:30

with greater understanding now of

29:33

the enduring effects on an individual, of torture.

29:38

So apologetically an ignorance of that.

29:45

It seemed urgently necessary to do,

29:53

was to get from them an account of what happened,

29:56

because nobody knew, nobody had been into Guantanamo.

30:01

Nobody had been into Bagram.

30:05

From the outside, no one had the slightest idea

30:09

of the enormity of what had gone on.

30:14

And it was exactly the time that Abu Ghraib,

30:19

happened, revelation of Abu Ghraib, which was photographs.

30:25

And that's what shocked the world.

30:28

But there was no possibility of photographs.

30:33

And so for about a month,

30:38

they came for periods of time to this office

30:44

and someone who worked in the office

30:50

had been an art student.

30:52

So in the absence of photographs

30:56

-

She tried to depict what they showed,

31:01

which was torture, how the torture had been.

31:06

So for instance,

31:10

that is Shafiq Rasul,

31:14

is being short shackled.

31:20

That means-

31:23

Interviewer

Could you hold it up for a little bit?

31:24

-

Yes, of course, yeah.

31:25

He's short shackled.

31:27

And that means crouched down

31:31

in the most uncomfortable position, shackled to the ground.

31:34

And that's how they were held,

31:40

not just for minutes,

31:43

but for hours and for days,

31:45

and with freezing cold temperatures,

31:49

to force from the three of them, all three,

31:55

a completely false confession.

31:59

So subjected to this torture,

32:03

they all admitted that they were in a video with Bin Laden.

32:11

They said, "Yes, yes, that is me" finally.

32:17

And it was only later,

32:20

because the video had a date on it.

32:23

That it was possible for the authorities

32:27

from England to say,

32:33

well Shafiq was always working in a shop.

32:35

And Asif,

32:39

for his sins was on probation.

32:44

So I suppose,

32:48

in a way it helped,

32:54

because we become so callous, don't we?

32:55

So subjected to information overload.

33:00

That's arriving at Guantanamo,

33:06

having been transported

33:13

-

Can you hold that one up?

33:15

-

Across the Atlantic.

Yeah.

33:18

But this was the first time anyone knew

33:26

actually what had happened.

33:30

This is the first time.

33:33

And they came back, as we saw later from disclosure,

33:35

that one is called softening a detainee for interrogation.

33:43

That's what that one's entitled.

33:49

But up to then, you see, nobody knew.

33:57

And

34:03

ironically, they came back before

34:07

the victory in the Supreme Court,

34:12

Rasul was back before he found out

34:15

that Bush had lost and he had won,

34:18

But that meant there was an opportunity.

34:23

This is pacification.

34:29

So this account, for what it's worth,

34:46

was the first information

34:49

as to what was happening to everyone else there.

34:53

And that could give

34:59

an informed energy to pressure, further pressure.

35:03

And there came a point,

35:11

interestingly, in this country,

35:16

it was announced that Moazzam and Feroz Abbasi

35:20

were amongst the first five

35:24

going to be put before military commission.

35:26

And they were building a death chamber.

35:29

It carried death sentence, what they were charged with,

35:33

and across the board in England,

35:40

right-wing press, left-wing press,

35:45

there was an acknowledgement

35:49

that these were British man and that the Americans had them,

35:54

in circumstances that were not subject

35:59

to any legal scrutiny and it might be executing them.

36:02

We had abolished the death penalty

36:09

in this country decades ago.

36:12

And suddenly the government

36:17

got energized and realized it had to do something.

36:22

So again, when you see the hypocritical, contradictory,

36:25

internal statements, you find at the same time

36:30

as we had sent a telegram saying, we have no objection

36:33

to them being put in front of a military commission.

36:38

No objection to them being tried.

36:42

The attorney general was going back and forth

36:45

across the Atlantic, back and forth,

36:47

back and forth, trying to get them back.

36:50

And so

36:52

And interestingly, again,

36:56

when you read some of the internal documentation,

36:58

you can see the efficacy

37:04

or otherwise of litigation.

37:07

So you could read their internal

37:12

commentary at the time.

37:17

Moazzam Begg's lawyers are talking about

37:20

further litigation in this country.

37:24

If they do this, we will do that.

37:29

And then further, we wonder why they're not doing it.

37:32

And in fact, there was a psychology

37:36

that not wanting to go to a court here

37:40

and have a defeat, which would strengthen

37:45

the arm of the executive.

37:48

But to mount up the political informed campaigning pressure,

37:51

increase the embarrassment and play a waiting game.

37:59

And so, through a combination

38:02

of growing indignation, British citizens,

38:08

then the final British citizens came back.

38:14

But that left the non British citizens.

38:19

And the government had resolutely said,

38:24

they're not our business.

38:28

We're not going to do anything, we have no obligation.

38:31

They should look to their own countries.

38:34

Well, one of them was Bisher,

38:37

whose country, Iraq,

38:42

had recently been invaded and had no government whatsoever.

38:46

Jamil al Banna was a stateless Palestinian.

38:53

Who does he look to?

38:56

And so a new wave of litigation

39:01

had to be entered into for the,

39:05

for the non-British residents.

39:08

And for Bisher and Jamil,

39:14

that litigation produced

39:21

more revelation of more stupidity, more criminality

39:26

and a misjudgment by the authorities.

39:33

So the litigation was for

39:36

British complicity in their unlawful seizure,

39:41

in Gambia, in Africa,

39:45

that's nowhere near Afghanistan,

39:49

it's nothing to do with any war zone.

39:51

So we said that the British were responsible

39:55

for that, businessman gone set up a business.

40:01

And in entering their defense in the court,

40:06

the Home Office, the Foreign Office denied

40:17

MI5, MI6, didn't put anything in.

40:20

And the judge said to us, "Well, that's probably good enough

40:25

for your purposes for litigation,

40:28

they haven't said anything."

40:29

So they then put in some telegrams

40:32

because they stupidly thought the telegrams

40:36

don't actually say, please arrest these men.

40:40

However, what the telegrams showed was that

40:47

we had sent telegrams to the CIA

40:52

saying that two men were traveling,

40:57

who were Islamic extremists,

40:59

who were involved in financing,

41:02

terrorist affiliated activity in this country,

41:07

and that they were carrying in their baggage

41:12

an improvised explosive device,

41:14

every single word of which was untrue.

41:17

And so we were able to show to the court

41:23

that this was a lie, that there was other parallel evidence

41:27

that the baggage had been investigated,

41:33

and it wasn't, it was a battery charger.

41:36

they were carrying that had been adapted

41:40

to make it water proof.

41:42

And that they knew this before they sent the telegrams.

41:43

So inch by inch,

41:48

slowly, but the way was paved for them to come back.

41:55

Once that barrier had been overcome,

42:00

non nationals

42:06

could be brought back.

42:09

The government had a duty to do something.

42:12

Then there were

42:15

further revelations,

42:18

one of which was Benyam Mohammad,

42:23

who this country has been complicit in

42:26

detention in Pakistan,

42:30

leading to his torture in Morocco before Guantanamo.

42:32

And the litigation in this country about Benyam Mohammed

42:39

led to the court saying

42:42

that we had played a part in his torture

42:45

and directing there be

42:48

a criminal police investigation into MI5s role.

42:50

So this is the tragedy,

42:58

Benyam came back,

43:03

and there should have come on the same plane, Shaker Aamer.

43:06

He was the last British resident,

43:12

and who's still in Guantanamo

43:16

and who may die there.

43:19

Things are so terrible

43:26

in Guantanamo.

43:31

The lengths of time men have had to endure being there

43:33

is so appalling.

43:37

The desperation of the men in Guantanamo is so great.

43:40

That there has been now an ongoing hunger strike,

43:45

which will lead to deaths.

43:49

And yet, with all of the history.

43:55

What is this country doing?

44:00

Nothing.

44:03

Claims it's taken steps

44:06

but when we've talked to the highest level

44:11

of American officials,

44:15

they've said, "You know when the Brits want something,

44:22

and you know when they're just going through the motions."

44:29

And until very recently

44:34

all they've done, is at most,

44:38

go through the motions with Shaker.

44:41

But at the same time

44:48

with weasel words saying, "We deplore torture.

44:54

We have made it clear to the Americans

45:00

that we do not agree with the continuing of Guantanamo."

45:04

But when we've asked, I've met the foreign secretary,

45:09

I've met the senior Foreign Office officials.

45:13

I have asked in one single encounter with the Americans.

45:17

"Have you ever said to them

45:23

that what's going on is torture?"

45:26

The answer is no, we have never ever

45:30

ever confronted them with criminality.

45:33

Have you ever said to them

45:37

arbitrary detention, detention, indefinite detention

45:40

without trial is entirely unlawful

45:44

and can, after an extended period,

45:48

constitute torture in itself,

45:52

have you ever said that to them?

45:54

Have you ever said to the Americans

45:55

we want to say to you, this is unlawful.

45:58

And they say, no, they say in our view

46:02

what would work would be diplomacy.

46:07

And what you're suggesting is counterproductive.

46:11

Interviewer

Do you know why they didn't advocate

46:16

for Shaker the way they did for the others?

46:17

-

I think there's been,

46:25

everything has been a continuum

46:29

there hasn't been, something happens for once, for all,

46:32

it's bit, by bit, by bit,

46:37

everything by accident happens.

46:41

And there is undoubtedly

46:48

an unholy alliance between the US, Saudi Arabia.

46:53

Shaker's a Saudi and this country.

46:59

They know he's done nothing.

47:05

He's been cleared for release twice.

47:08

He's been cleared for release twice in Guantanamo,

47:12

because they accept there is nothing.

47:15

They could bring charges, even if it's the bogus charges

47:17

in a kangaroo court that constitutes Guantanamo justice.

47:22

They can't even scrape that up.

47:27

I understand, I haven't had the privilege of meeting him,

47:33

that he's a strong, powerful, charismatic person

47:37

who fights for the rights of others.

47:42

And it may be by now

47:46

that this has just come down to

47:50

the creation in their minds of a

47:53

somehow, false specter, that if someone fights for rights

47:59

that they're dangerous, maybe they are, in a good way.

48:07

It's partly cowardice.

48:16

If the Americans are determined,

48:18

they want to send him to Saudi,

48:20

the Brits don't stand up to them.

48:24

And it's only when the dynamic has changed.

48:27

The balance of embarrassment or inconvenience has changed,

48:31

as it did earlier on,

48:37

when the whole of the British press said,

48:40

what is going on here,

48:43

and Shaker for many years,

48:46

being an independent minded man,

48:50

didn't have lawyers

48:53

in Guantanamo.

48:58

Didn't see lawyers, didn't have lawyers here.

48:59

I don't think lawyers have ever achieved much

49:05

in all of this.

49:10

I think lawyers have probably more than anything

49:11

managed to demonstrate how ineffective the law is,

49:16

but sometimes there are accidents of

49:23

presence or accidents of opportunity,

49:27

that, in the case of Guantanamo,

49:31

the only efficacy of Rasul v. Bush

49:38

was not to show that habeas corpus existed

49:42

and could get people out, it hasn't,

49:47

the habeas actions have got no one out of Guantanamo,

49:50

constant reversals of direction and stalling, and so on.

49:53

What's got people out is those lawyers who've gone in,

49:58

being able to come out with evidence and information

50:03

of what's being done to people,

50:06

that's their use, and it's important.

50:09

And perhaps at the time that there was

50:14

coordinated information or indignation

50:20

about all the others,

50:24

after all Benyam Mohammed was facing a military commission.

50:26

And yet he comes back

50:31

because the level of embarrassment had had gone sky high.

50:35

Now very, very, very recently, in May of this year,

50:40

we've been trying new initiatives

50:51

with all of the relevant United Nations,

50:54

organizations and committees.

50:58

And so put in a request

51:01

to the UN committee against torture

51:06

which was conducting its review of America,

51:10

questions about Shaker,

51:14

and they asked direct questions of the US contingent.

51:15

of the UK contingent, I'm sorry,

51:23

the UKs time for review.

51:27

The US comes later this year

51:30

before the human rights committee,

51:32

the UN human rights committee,

51:34

asking the UK,

51:36

why haven't you lodged a complaint as requested?

51:38

Why haven't you?

51:42

And they have no answer.

51:43

So there Shaker is still

51:46

Interviewer

You say no answer,

51:49

do you mean they haven't replied at all?

51:50

-

They had to reply, they were there.

51:53

They were having to give evidence

51:55

in response to the committee,

51:57

but the response is no different

51:59

from their presentation over 12 years,

52:02

It's, we use a diplomatic endeavors.

52:08

This country does not condone torture.

52:12

this country is making significant efforts

52:14

to get Shaker on the return to his family here.

52:17

Interviewer

Going back to Rasul,

52:27

were you able to work with the lawyers in the US

52:29

or did you work independently

52:34

on the British detainee's cases here in Britain?

52:37

Or what was your relationship with the lawyers in the US

52:41

and on the Rasul case for example?

52:44

-

They were the ones who had to bring the case.

52:47

It was the US jurisdiction.

52:50

The case was brought in the US courts, of course.

52:53

Of course we worked hand-in-hand with them, yeah.

52:59

Interviewer

Were you permitted to visit Guantanamo?

53:03

-

No, I'm not American.

53:05

You have to be American.

53:08

Interviewer

And what was the

53:11

public's response as,

53:17

I guess you kind of said, I just want to confirm,

53:22

as things began to open up with the three men coming back

53:24

and then the other great photos,

53:28

besides the media do the public itself become very consumed?

53:31

And was that in your favor?

53:35

Were you able to use that

53:36

in pursuing your case?

53:41

-

Yes, I think

53:45

information is essential for understanding

53:50

and so access to very direct information,

53:55

and the public interest,

54:01

however you define it,

54:08

is measured in a very shallow way, isn't it?

54:12

How does one know?

54:16

And for better or for worse,

54:18

one tends to quantify it by level of press interest.

54:22

Which is fickle on passing.

54:27

And so one has to be aware of that and seize the moment.

54:30

So, the Tipton boys

54:35

gave an account

54:39

to a journalist who had significant space

54:42

in two Sunday newspapers in parallel,

54:46

one to the left, one to the right.

54:50

They made a film,

54:54

a quite eccentric account called "Road to Guantanamo",

54:58

that plays its part in reaching an audience,

55:04

that was a Channel 4 film

55:06

shown on a television channel here and in cinema's.

55:08

Moazzam Begg wrote a book

55:13

and talked endlessly, tirelessly

55:16

to groups of people all over England, middle England.

55:23

He is someone who has great dignity and seriousness

55:30

and talks in a way that middle England can understand,

55:35

all of that plays its part.

55:43

So Moazzam talks

55:46

at the Hay Literary Festival,

55:51

the senior judge of the most

55:55

senior court in England is in the audience,

56:00

comes and talks to Moazzam, all of those things,

56:03

you know, overtly or covertly are educative, aren't they?

56:09

Interviewer

Did you ever get to meet Tony Blair?

56:16

Would he meet with you?

56:19

-

No. I didn't know.

56:21

Interviewer

Did you trust him?

56:22

In terms of his own statements

56:25

about going forward to try to help your British citizens?

56:27

-

Well, we've already seen the evidence

56:33

to show that was totally untrue.

56:36

Interviewer

Going back to when Rasul

56:41

was captured with the other two men

56:43

and they were in the container,

56:45

and you mentioned most of,

56:47

or the majority of men died in that container.

56:48

Were any of the Brits in that container?

56:51

-

I don't think so.

56:54

Interviewer

So as far as you know,

56:56

there are no unaccounted Brits?

56:57

Has the public become more empathetic

57:04

toward the detainees over time?

57:08

Would you say that?

57:11

I know you spoke off camera that you're not sure

57:14

what the lives of the detainees are like now,

57:17

but do you think the public would accept them

57:22

or integrate them into the communities?

57:26

-

I think each person who has returned has,

57:34

has entered or re-entered his own world

57:41

and those worlds

57:49

are difficult for anybody to re-enter.

57:54

I've no idea how,

58:00

how the wider political or social

58:09

entity this country is,

58:14

impossible to know,

58:20

many more people are informed now,

58:24

but the extent to which they

58:27

relate to any of the individuals, I don't know.

58:31

Interviewer

Could you tell us a little bit more

58:35

about the litigation and how it resolved

58:36

and reparations for the men

58:40

and how you feel about that, if in fact that was,

58:43

I know that also blocked certain evidence from surfacing.

58:47

maybe you could talk a little bit about that whole process

58:55

-

I sadly can't,

58:59

because when there is a resolution

59:01

of litigation for individuals,

59:05

if part of,

59:09

whatever is agreed is subject to confidentiality,

59:15

I certainly can't breach that.

59:19

There was a public announcement

59:23

to say that there have been negotiations

59:27

and there have been settlements.

59:30

And that's as far as we're able to say.

59:32

Interviewer

Well, do you think someday

59:36

the settlement will be released and the world will know,

59:38

the participation of MI5 and MI6?

59:42

-

That's a different question.

59:45

That's a very different question.

59:48

Settlement related solely to

59:51

should the litigants be compensated for what had happened?

59:58

The question of a criminal participation

1:00:04

of the intelligence services

1:00:08

was intended to be the subject of a public inquiry.

1:00:10

So the simultaneous announcement

1:00:14

that there was to be negotiation,

1:00:18

was also, there was going to be a public inquiry,

1:00:21

which was appointed and started.

1:00:23

But that came to an end

1:00:28

for two reasons.

1:00:32

First was that

1:00:34

it was unacceptable,

1:00:38

it was to be held completely in secret.

1:00:41

And so the men

1:00:45

and all of the NGOs concerned,

1:00:49

refused to participate in it.

1:00:54

At the same time, it was ongoing,

1:00:58

still is an ongoing criminal investigation into MI5.

1:01:02

And the first investigation was into

1:01:09

what happened Benyam Muhammad,

1:01:13

and there's been a decision,

1:01:15

there won't be a prosecution on that,

1:01:16

but now that has morphed into a different

1:01:19

and even more explicitly shocking revelation,

1:01:25

in that the documents were found in Tripoli,

1:01:30

and after Libya was liberated,

1:01:34

and documents

1:01:39

were there to be found, showing that

1:01:43

from 2002 until the liberation,

1:01:47

across the board, we were party to rendition participation

1:01:54

with Gaddafi's torturers for Libyan dissidents.

1:02:01

And so that has now triggered

1:02:08

a fresh criminal investigation

1:02:13

all into the same Guantanamo issue, our involvement.

1:02:15

And so the litigation

1:02:22

for those Libyan men involved now.

1:02:27

I think nothing has been more explicit

1:02:33

than some of the telegrams that were found ever.

1:02:38

The head of MI6 sending a telegram

1:02:42

to his Libyan counterpart saying

1:02:46

this is where these men are.

1:02:51

This is how you can get them.

1:02:53

They're coming to England to seek asylum from Hong Kong.

1:02:57

They're coming on a direct flight.

1:03:03

This is what's required to intercept them.

1:03:05

And then afterwards saying

1:03:09

we appreciate we didn't provide the transport,

1:03:11

but we did provide the information.

1:03:14

We hope you're grateful, lots of love.

1:03:17

And that's just the tip of the iceberg.

1:03:22

And so, you know,

1:03:25

very simultaneously with Blair meeting with Gaddafi

1:03:30

and saying I know this is someone we can trust.

1:03:34

And just as Gaddafi was opening up

1:03:38

bids for contracts for Libyan oil,

1:03:40

same old story.

1:03:46

Interviewer

Well, it sounds like

1:03:51

over the last 12 years, as you started,

1:03:53

you become more disillusioned with Britain

1:03:57

than you had been in the past.

1:04:01

That, like you said earlier, you were naive.

1:04:03

I mean, it sounds like it's just

1:04:06

the undercurrent is ferociously horrible in there.

1:04:10

-

I think it's well worth,

1:04:15

I highly recommend reading Tony Blair's memoirs.

1:04:18

It actually is extraordinarily revealing.

1:04:23

He, far more than George Bush,

1:04:31

he writes,

1:04:37

he says, "At the moment I heard

1:04:41

the Twin Towers being hit, 9/11."

1:04:43

He said, "It all became clear to me.

1:04:48

I saw it, had a revelation,

1:04:51

that all the different splashes of color

1:04:56

around the world actually joined up."

1:04:59

And what he is referring to is all the different

1:05:03

Islamic movements against dictators.

1:05:07

That's what he's referring to.

1:05:12

So he talks in terms, he said,

1:05:15

"I see this as a virus that has to be eradicated."

1:05:17

And he says, "While the different pieces were in the air,

1:05:22

like a kaleidoscope, I saw that the world

1:05:27

had to be reordered before they settled."

1:05:31

And then he says, "We have to invade Afghanistan."

1:05:34

And then, so on.

1:05:38

I found that,

1:05:43

that's where our foreign policy emanates from,

1:05:49

that's what dictated our actions.

1:05:54

That's what made

1:05:56

someone like him say,

1:06:00

which he says in his memoirs, you know,

1:06:03

that people say there's some things wrong with Guantanamo,

1:06:06

but this is a war and you have to do what you have to do.

1:06:09

Interviewer

I mean, in America they called him

1:06:22

Bush's puppy or something along those lines.

1:06:23

-

Yes, no, I think that's a misnomer.

1:06:26

I think, yes of course we're slavishly

1:06:30

uncritical of the Americans,

1:06:34

but I think he was,

1:06:36

he had his own mad, megalomania, delusion,

1:06:44

it's terrifyingly dangerous.

1:06:51

And we haven't moved away from that path.

1:06:53

Interviewer

When Obama was elected.

1:07:00

Were you heartened by that?

1:07:02

-

Of course.

1:07:04

Interviewer

And since then, what are your thoughts?

1:07:06

-

The opposite.

1:07:10

Interviewer

Do you think any president

1:07:15

will close Guantanamo?

1:07:16

Do you think someone that will happen?

1:07:18

Do you think it matters?

1:07:19

-

Of course it matters.

1:07:23

It matters for the men there.

1:07:28

It matters for any concept of the rule of law.

1:07:30

It matters symbolically, but at the same time,

1:07:37

the way that men who were accused of

1:07:47

similar activities in the United States are treated

1:07:55

is no better, the way people are kept in complete isolation.

1:08:02

The way people are

1:08:09

treated in ways that you wouldn't treat animals.

1:08:14

The length of sentence.

1:08:20

97% of accused

1:08:25

men and women in America plead guilty.

1:08:29

It doesn't mean they're all guilty,

1:08:33

it means they're facing a prospect that is so appalling

1:08:35

that they do what they think they can do to

1:08:40

to minimize the worst of the damage.

1:08:45

Interviewer

I dunno, as a criticism

1:08:56

whether you really know we can predict,

1:08:59

but I know you feel Guantanamo should close.

1:09:02

Do you think someone will close it in our lifetime?

1:09:04

-

I read that there are proposals

1:09:10

to construct

1:09:16

an equivalent place of detention, maybe in Indiana,

1:09:23

perhaps I've got that wrong, but,

1:09:27

there are plenty of other black sites around the world,

1:09:37

including Bagram.

1:09:42

I don't know.

1:09:50

I don't know.

1:09:51

Interviewer

Is there something else

1:09:53

that I haven't asked you that is important for history?

1:09:55

Just for you to share with us in terms of,

1:09:58

especially from the British perspective,

1:10:02

we don't have that naturally.

1:10:03

That's helpful for this.

1:10:05

Is there something that I haven't asked you

1:10:09

that you think you'd like to share?

1:10:11

-

No, I'm sure.

1:10:13

I'm sure I've gone on too long.

1:10:15

Woman

Not at all.

1:10:17

Interviewer

No, I mean, it's been very powerful.

1:10:18

Johnny, is there something you want to ask?

1:10:21

Johnny

No, I think I'm all set.

1:10:23

Interviewer

Well, then we need to take 20 seconds

1:10:28

of just quiet time.

1:10:31

before we close it, we'll do that.

1:10:36

Man

Okay, it's June, 2013, room tone.

1:10:42

And room tone.

1:11:10

Peirce, Gareth - Interview master file

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