Gelles, Michael - short clip - RiskAssessmentDuringDetaineeReleaseProcess
MP4
Loading the media player...
Transcript
- Download transcript as:
-
Text
-
PDF
-
WebVTT (includes timecodes)
Transcripts may contain inaccuracies.
| - | We used based on risk models used in violence. | 0:00 |
| I mean, I've written books | 0:04 | |
| a book on workplace violence and articles. | 0:05 | |
| And my team had people who are well studied | 0:08 | |
| in assassination and other types of risks. | 0:11 | |
| And so what was their potential for violence? | 0:14 | |
| And, you know, if you released them | 0:16 | |
| what was the chance that they'd be, you know, a recidivist. | 0:18 | |
| And so we would look at the individuals | 0:22 | |
| based on the materials that we had. | 0:24 | |
| And often there were many holes in the case files | 0:25 | |
| and categorize them one, two, three, four. | 0:28 | |
| And if they were really considered a serious risk | 0:31 | |
| and that they had been, we used a number of factors, | 0:34 | |
| the level of commitment. | 0:37 | |
| So how committed were they to the radical Islam? | 0:39 | |
| What was their capability? | 0:44 | |
| So were they trained in an organized training camp | 0:45 | |
| or did they just sort of get some training in a safe house? | 0:48 | |
| What were their associations? | 0:53 | |
| So were they affiliated with their affiliations | 0:55 | |
| with those people who are known to have done really | 0:59 | |
| bad things and what were their articulated intentions? | 1:00 | |
| So there would be people who were very radical | 1:04 | |
| who had been trained in the camps who had known other | 1:06 | |
| and affiliated with other significant Al-Qaeda members who | 1:10 | |
| engaged in violent acts against the United States who | 1:14 | |
| sat there and said to you, as soon as you let me go | 1:16 | |
| I'm going to become a suicide bomber. | 1:19 | |
| Well, thanks very much, | 1:20 | |
| I think we'll just keep you here for a while | 1:21 | |
| or individuals who said, yeah, this doesn't make any sense. | 1:23 | |
| There's no real commitment. | 1:27 | |
| And you could look at their behavior. | 1:28 | |
| And then of course, you know, over years it became a sort | 1:29 | |
| of a cauldron in there where people were self, | 1:31 | |
| were being radicalized by the group, | 1:33 | |
| had no capabilities, their affiliations | 1:36 | |
| and who they knew were really limited to people who really, | 1:39 | |
| if anything were pretty low level | 1:43 | |
| and they were remorseful and like didn't mean to be there. | 1:44 | |
| And it was a mistake | 1:49 | |
| and you'd rate them as pretty low level. | 1:51 | |
| And I think there was based on the, I don't have the stats | 1:54 | |
| in my head, but the recidivism was probably no different | 1:57 | |
| than the recidivism coming out of US prisons. | 2:00 | |
| There were people that went back and fought. | 2:03 | |
| The question was, was it because we missed it? | 2:04 | |
| Or they were so pissed from having been in Guantanamo | 2:07 | |
| and around people who were radicalized | 2:10 | |
| that they joined the cause. | 2:12 | |
| Nobody knew nobody's done any followup. | 2:13 | |
| Interviewer | Did you personally interview | 2:15 |
| a detainee in this process? | 2:17 | |
| - | No. It was all case file review. | 2:20 |
| You couldn't interview because they didn't speak English, so | 2:22 | |
| Interviewer | Some do | 2:24 |
| - | Some, but very few. | 2:25 |
| Interviewer | But you never spoke | 2:27 |
| to a detainee personally? | 2:28 | |
| - | No, For a risk assessment? | 2:35 |
| No, we wouldn't. | 2:37 | |
| Interviewer | For another reason. | 2:38 |
| - | I mean, I remember chatting with a few, you know | 2:42 |
| who were going to be run as sources | 2:44 | |
| - | Meaning they were going to go back against the Al-Qaeda. | 2:47 |
| Interviewer | You mean you released, the US government | 2:52 |
| released some people knowing | 2:53 | |
| that they would then work for us? | 2:54 | |
| - | Well, we didn't release them, | 2:57 |
| It's a long story and I probably shouldn't go that on there | 2:59 | |
| but there were people who agreed to work for us. | 3:02 | |
| Yeah, who were not necessarily in Guantanamo Bay | 3:05 | |
| but we had captured them. | 3:09 | |
| Much like you would, so that no, | 3:10 | |
| they weren't Guantanamo Bay. | 3:13 | |
| But in terms of Guantanamo Bay, | 3:15 | |
| you had an investigator who was doing the interviews | 3:18 | |
| talking to the person. | 3:21 | |
| And then we would use case file material | 3:22 | |
| to make a determination. | 3:25 |
Item Info
The preservation of the Duke University Libraries Digital Collections and the Duke Digital Repository programs are supported in part by the Lowell and Eileen Aptman Digital Preservation Fund