Supervielle, Manuel - Interview master file / Witness to Guantanamo / Duke Digital Repository

Cameraman

We're rolling.

0:05

Peter

Okay. Good morning.

0:06

-

Good morning, Peter.

0:08

-

And we are very grateful to you

0:10

for participating in the Witness to Guantanamo project.

0:11

And we invite you to speak of your experiences

0:15

and involvement in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

0:17

We are hoping to provide you an opportunity

0:23

to tell your story in your own words.

0:25

We are creating an archive of stories

0:28

that people in America and around the world

0:30

will have a better opportunity and understanding

0:33

of what you and others have observed and experienced.

0:35

Future generations must know what happened in Guantanamo,

0:40

and by telling your story, you are contributing to history

0:43

and we are very grateful to you

0:47

for participating and willing to participate

0:49

and speaking with us today.

0:52

If anytime, during the interview you want to take a break,

0:55

just let us know.

0:57

-

Okay.

0:59

Peter

And if there's anything you say

0:59

that you would rather have us removed, we can remove it.

1:01

And I'd like to begin with just some general background

1:04

including your name and country of origin and hometown.

1:08

Maybe we can start with that

1:12

and then we'll go into birth date and age.

1:13

-

Sure.

1:15

My full name is Manuel Enrique Fernandez, Supervielle.

1:16

I was born in Havana, Cuba

1:22

and I currently reside in Miami Beach, Florida.

1:24

Peter

And your birth date and your age?

1:28

-

7 October, 1956.

1:31

I am 55 years old.

1:33

Peter

And your languages and nationality

1:36

and marital status.

1:40

-

I speak English and Spanish.

1:42

I am married.

1:45

And what was the other question?

1:47

Peter

Nationality?

1:49

-

I'm a U.S. citizen.

1:50

Peter

And education, details about your education?

1:52

-

I have a Undergraduate in International Relations

1:56

from St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas,

2:00

a Law degree, JD from the University of Texas, Austin,

2:03

a Masters in International, I'm sorry,

2:07

in Military Law from the U.S. Army

2:10

Judge Advocate General School in Charlottesville, Virginia,

2:12

a Masters in International Law

2:15

from the University of Miami, Florida

2:16

and a Masters in National Security

2:19

from the National War College in Washington, DC.

2:21

Peter

And your current occupation?

2:25

-

Independent Consultant, yeah.

2:27

Peter

Well, let's talk a little bit about

2:30

how you got here, and maybe you could begin

2:33

by how you joined the military?

2:35

Why you joined the military?

2:37

And when that was.

2:38

-

Sure.

2:39

You know, as a Cuban refugee,

2:41

we lived for only a year in Miami, Florida

2:44

when we first came out in 1961.

2:48

And then after that, we lived four years in Indiana

2:50

where I learned English more or less.

2:53

And then Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

2:55

where I became a big Pirate Steeler fan, still am.

2:58

And then Tallahassee, Florida.

3:01

This is all while my dad was getting his education

3:05

in the United States or reeducation.

3:08

He already had a Law degree in Cuba

3:09

but he got a Doctorate in Education.

3:11

And then ultimately we landed in,

3:13

we settled in Laredo, Texas,

3:15

where I did four years of high school.

3:17

And we did not, I did not have,

3:20

nor did my parents for that matter have money

3:23

really for me to go to college.

3:26

And so I applied for an Army ROTC Scholarship,

3:28

which I was very fortunate to get.

3:33

And then I chose to use that at St. Mary's University.

3:36

I applied for that scholarship for two reasons.

3:41

One was financial as I indicated

3:43

but I was also looking to do something of public service

3:46

in sort of payback, if you will, for the U.S.

3:49

taking me and my family in.

3:53

To be perfectly honest with you,

3:55

I was actually looking at the Peace Corps,

3:57

but they were only taking people with college degrees.

3:59

And obviously I was just coming out of high school

4:03

and they offered no money.

4:06

So then the army said, hey, you know, we can offer you money

4:07

and you can still serve your country that way.

4:10

So that's why I decided to go ahead

4:12

and take the ROTC Scholarship.

4:14

Peter

And when you graduated from college,

4:17

what happened then?

4:18

-

From Undergraduate,

4:20

well before graduating, I had spent...

4:21

I was gonna be commissioned as an Armor Officer at tanks.

4:23

And so I spent the Summer between my Junior and Senior year

4:27

at Fort Bliss, Texas with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

4:30

in charge of a platoon, 2nd Squadron,

4:34

second heavy company there.

4:37

Anyway, I spent that Summer there

4:40

and that's when I thought, maybe going to law school

4:42

wouldn't be such a bad idea.

4:43

So I took the LSAT and did well on it.

4:45

And so I asked the army for an educational delay

4:50

before I started my active duty time.

4:52

So I went to law school at my own expense,

4:55

married my sweetheart from college Margie,

4:58

and then when I graduated from law school

5:04

I branch transferred from Armor to JAG,

5:06

Judge Advocate, General School.

5:11

Peter

Did the army pay for your law school?

5:14

-

No, not at that time,

5:16

because I was the one asking to go to law school.

5:19

So no.

5:20

Peter

And after law school,

5:22

then you entered the military?

5:24

-

Yes.

5:25

After law school, well, I mean, I was already in the army

5:26

I mean at that point, you know,

5:29

when I was first commissioned out of St. Mary's,

5:31

I came out as a Second Lieutenant,

5:33

and then while I was in law school, you know,

5:35

I got promoted to First Lieutenant only on paper.

5:37

And so all the time counted as reserve time

5:41

but not active duty.

5:44

So then when I came on active duty in January of '82,

5:45

January 7th of '82 to be precise,

5:50

as a Judge Advocate then you go

5:55

and you did a three-month schooling

5:56

for new judge advocates, basically coming out of law school.

5:59

First assignment was with the 24th Infantry Division

6:03

mechanized at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

6:06

And I wanted to be in the trial room.

6:08

I wanted to be an oral advocate.

6:10

So I was very fortunate once again

6:13

and I was made a prosecutor for the Division Artillery.

6:15

I did that for a year,

6:20

prosecuted about 45 courts martials,

6:22

everything from murder to mostly drug sales,

6:26

but assaults, arsons, disrespect, that kind of...

6:31

And then I was a Defense Counsel for two more years

6:35

there at Fort Stewart.

6:37

Then we did about another 70 trials as a Defense Counsel.

6:39

Again, same kind of cases.

6:45

Then we went to Korea for two years.

6:47

While we were at Fort Stewart, we had two children,

6:49

Christine, the oldest and Joe.

6:52

They were born in Fort Stewart.

6:55

And then we moved to Korea,

6:57

where we were there for two years.

6:59

I was the Senior Prosecutor for pretty much everything,

7:01

South of Seoul.

7:04

We lived in Taegu Korea.

7:05

Again, more courts martials,

7:07

but I was doing other stuff as well, administrative law,

7:09

and it was a lot of interesting things.

7:12

Then a year of study to get the first Masters in Law,

7:16

in Charlottesville,

7:19

then Hawaii for four years.

7:20

And when I went to Hawaii,

7:22

that was an International Operational Law

7:24

position basically.

7:27

So it was no longer the courtroom stuff.

7:29

Now it was my first exposure

7:31

to practicing International Operational Law.

7:35

So I did a lot of traveling with our deployed forces,

7:38

when our forces would go on exercises to various places,

7:42

I would go with the force and deal with host nation

7:47

on issues that would come up or soldiers doing stupid things

7:50

or customs issues, tax issues,

7:53

all kinds of things.

7:57

I was also involved in Disaster Relief Mission to Bangladesh

7:59

as the Judge Advocate for Task Force Sea Angel, we called it

8:06

Madagascar to sort of open relations

8:11

with the Madagascan military,

8:14

when they were still somewhat under the Soviet influence.

8:16

Samoa, like I said, Bangladesh

8:19

Western Samoa, Thailand,

8:22

Philippines to help with human rights programs

8:23

as they were fighting the insurgency there

8:27

in the late eighties.

8:29

Peter

Were you trained in international law issues

8:32

or along the way?

8:34

-

When I did that first Masters in international...

8:36

When I did that first Masters in Military Law,

8:40

we had a fairly heavy dose of International Law

8:43

as part of that.

8:45

And of course, even in the basic course, back in '82

8:46

we had a smaller dose, but yes.

8:49

So even though it was not something

8:52

that I had focused on in law school,

8:54

but you know, the military is very, very good

8:56

at providing you a support system.

8:59

And so even I had a lot of questions

9:00

as I was brand new at this stuff, you know,

9:03

and I was telling, for example,

9:06

I was telling the captain, the skipper of an army ship

9:08

that had taken into port in the Solomon Islands,

9:13

that I didn't see a problem with, you know,

9:16

customs officials boarding the ship and inspecting it.

9:18

I found out later that the Navy frowns on that.

9:20

The U.S. Navy doesn't like that.

9:22

So, you know, I learned the hard way

9:24

and that was not the only example,

9:26

but I also had a lot of folks

9:27

that I could call back and say, hey, I got this issue.

9:28

And, you know, either back at the Pentagon,

9:31

or colleagues.

9:33

I never felt over my head because I knew

9:37

that there was always this support group out there

9:41

that--

9:44

Peter

And were you well versed

9:45

in the Geneva Conventions during this time?

9:46

-

Not well-versed, I mean, I'd studied them

9:49

and I knew what they were,

9:50

and I knew what the theory was behind them.

9:52

Like I said, in the Philippines,

9:55

I was actually trying to talk to them about, you know,

9:58

Common Article 3 type of issues,

10:01

but really in many of these foreign countries,

10:05

especially when it's an internal armed conflict,

10:07

they don't look at so much the Geneva Conventions

10:10

as much as the rubric of human rights,

10:13

and that whole paradigm, you know, it's not,

10:17

they don't look at it so much

10:21

in the way of the Geneva Conventions.

10:22

Peter

So what year are we at now when you were there?

10:26

-

Left, did a Y from '88 to '92,

10:28

then the army sent me to get my Masters in International Law

10:33

at the University of Miami.

10:36

Did that for a year,

10:39

wrote a paper on Status of Forces Agreements,

10:42

because that was something that I was doing

10:45

a lot of in the Pacific.

10:47

And then I went to the Pentagon, to be the Deputy

10:50

of the Army's International Operation Law Division.

10:53

And I did that for three years from '93 to '96.

10:57

There, I began traveling a lot to Latin America,

11:03

mostly because just happenstance,

11:07

but I met some very senior people, commanders,

11:09

the Commander of the Uruguayan Army, for example,

11:13

and Uruguayans, the Argentines and the Chileans

11:16

were all heavily engaged in peacekeeping operations

11:18

around the world, in Africa,

11:21

and in the Balkans.

11:24

And their legal system, their military legal system,

11:27

the photo Taegu that they have,

11:31

did not really contemplate having forces

11:33

outside of their home nation in a non-combat operation.

11:38

And so there was this legal gap that had occurred

11:43

where the host nation wasn't going to be prosecuting

11:46

or investigating Argentines for example,

11:50

and the Argentine code didn't contemplate that,

11:52

it was not extra territorial in peace time.

11:55

And so you had this gap,

11:59

and so I was trying to help these various countries

12:00

close that gap through legislative measures and training

12:03

and things of that nature.

12:10

So I did a lot of that during that period of time

12:10

traveling other places as well, but there was that.

12:14

And then Peru also with the Sendero Luminoso, you know,

12:18

counterinsurgency trying to help the Peruvian military

12:20

conduct their operations in a manner

12:23

that would be more consistent again with their own laws

12:25

and human rights laws.

12:28

They were having also the trials,

12:31

where they would cover up the identity

12:33

of the judges and the prosecutors.

12:35

And so I sort of advised a little bit on that as well.

12:37

So let's see, I was '93 to '96,

12:43

then '96 to '98, we moved to Panama

12:44

and I was assigned as the Senior Judge Advocate

12:49

for U.S. Army South.

12:54

The way the military is structured,

12:56

we have combatant commands, which are geographic

12:57

and they are joint in nature.

13:01

So that that's where you have Central Command,

13:02

Southern Command, Pacific Command, et cetera.

13:05

They're joined in the sense that they have all four services

13:09

underneath them in terms of Army, Navy, Air Force

13:12

and Marine Corps.

13:14

So U.S. Army South would be the army component

13:16

to U.S. Southern Command, which is the joint component.

13:19

At that time, when we moved down there in '96,

13:22

U.S. Southern Command was still physically in Panama

13:25

as was U.S. Army South.

13:29

I was sent down there because a lot of the work that I...

13:32

While I was at the Pentagon from '93 to '96,

13:34

I spent a lot of time working

13:37

on the Panama Canal turnover issues.

13:38

And so the Judge Advocate General of the army at the time

13:41

thought it would be a good idea to have me go down there.

13:44

I was a Lieutenant Colonel,

13:47

brand new Lieutenant Colonel at the time,

13:49

office of about 21, 22 attorneys,

13:51

and about 30-some support staff,

13:54

covering the wide range of issues.

13:59

A lot of young captains, right out of law school,

14:01

lieutenants right out of law school.

14:03

I had a very good deputy,

14:05

and they focused on pretty much a lot of the heavy lifting

14:07

all of the day-to-day kinds of things.

14:11

Myself and one of my civilian attorneys

14:14

focused more on the Panama Canal turnover issues.

14:16

You know, termination of contracts,

14:18

a lot of environmental law questions,

14:21

negotiations for a post 1999 presence.

14:24

So it was a very interesting time.

14:28

Plus all the normal operational stuff,

14:30

we kept doing exercises with foreign countries.

14:32

'98 to 2000, for a year and a half only,

14:35

actually Summer of '98 to January of 2000,

14:41

I was the Chair of the army...

14:45

I was the Chair of the International Operational

14:47

Law Division at the Army JAG School,

14:50

at the Army Judge Advocate General School

14:52

in Charlottesville,

14:53

where we taught the Geneva Conventions

14:56

and other rules of engagement and all those kinds of things.

14:58

Contractors on the battlefield, human rights,

15:04

I did that for a year and a half,

15:08

and then the Commander General Wilhelm, Charles Wilhelm,

15:10

who's a Marine four-star Commander at SOUTHCOM,

15:15

U.S. Southern Command hired me to...

15:18

There was a nomination, I mean, there was a vacancy,

15:24

and so each service nominates a judge advocate,

15:25

all four services.

15:28

And I was selected to be his judge advocate by him

15:30

starting in I guess it was the very beginning

15:34

of February of 2000.

15:37

The initial big marquee item was the implementation

15:39

of Plan Colombia and the creation

15:44

of an Army Judge Advocates Corps for the Colombian military

15:47

to help them with dealing with human rights,

15:51

abuses, accusations, things like that,

15:55

and we did that.

15:59

We working with the Colombians,

16:00

we helped them to create a JAG Corps.

16:01

And then that takes us then to obviously

16:05

September 11th of 2001,

16:07

and then shortly thereafter--

16:12

Peter

Where were you then?

16:15

-

I had just pinned on actually as a Colonel and--

16:17

Peter

Were you in DC?

16:22

-

No, no, no.

16:24

I was the Southern Command Judge Advocate.

16:24

I got there in 2000, February of 2000,

16:27

and then a year and a half later,

16:30

when 9/11 happened, I was still there.

16:32

I was at SOUTHCOM for three and a half years

16:34

from February of 2000 to July of 2003.

16:37

Peter

So when the planes hit,

16:43

what were you thinking?

16:46

What were you seeing?

16:48

What was going on at that day?

16:49

-

I was literally on an airplane heading to Columbia

16:51

to celebrate the first anniversary

16:54

of the Colombian JAG Corp,

16:56

and the pilot diverted to Panama,

16:59

didn't tell us why.

17:02

We landed in Panama.

17:05

There were no customs officials.

17:06

There were no immigration officials.

17:09

It was absolute chaotic scene

17:10

at the Panamanian airport there.

17:14

And, you know, no one had told us what had happened.

17:17

So when I got off and I saw

17:22

one of the Panamanian local people that are working

17:23

at the airport running around,

17:27

I said, what's going on?

17:28

I assumed that there had been a terrorist attack

17:30

in Columbia, which was not that uncommon at the time.

17:32

So that's what I thought had happened.

17:36

But then when they told me what had happened,

17:38

and then I saw it on the TV, I was stunned.

17:41

And then it was a question,

17:47

well, how do I get Columbia from here?

17:48

And they took us to a hotel and they just dumped us off

17:52

at the American airlines.

17:55

And they pretty much said, you know, you're on your own.

17:57

And I having lived in Panama before,

18:00

I knew where the American airlines office was.

18:03

And so I immediately went there and managed to get a flight.

18:06

It was almost like the last seat available

18:11

to get to Columbia that day,

18:13

or that late that night.

18:15

But I'll tell you that, you know,

18:17

sitting there briefly, you know,

18:18

when I got to the hotel the first thing I did

18:20

was put it on a TV.

18:21

And aside like every other, you know,

18:24

300 million Americans feeling the shock

18:26

of what just happened, you know,

18:29

I kind of figured that, you know,

18:35

that our lives were not, as a nation,

18:37

our lives we're not gonna be the same

18:40

and our life as a family was in particular

18:41

not going to be the same.

18:44

I made it to Columbia.

18:46

Peter

Why did you still feel the need to go Columbia

18:48

with that current...?

18:50

-

Well, I mean, a couple of things.

18:53

I mean, number one is that was the mission.

18:55

We were gonna have this big deal down there.

18:57

This was the first year anniversary.

18:59

There was some pride,

19:01

there were certain elements in Columbia

19:03

that didn't really like having a JAG Corp.

19:05

And so it was really important to be there

19:07

to show the flag, if you will,

19:11

and provide support to those Colombians

19:14

who very courageously were pushing forward

19:16

with this JAG Corp.

19:18

And I will tell you that they have, you know,

19:21

the Colombian side have suffered so much,

19:23

from war and from acts of terror,

19:26

that they were extraordinarily empathetic

19:29

to what was happening.

19:31

And it actually was in many ways comforting to get

19:33

that kind of empathy from them,

19:38

when I showed up finally, you know, very late at night

19:41

I managed to find my way to the, you know,

19:44

to the military hotel that we were staying at.

19:45

And then they had a very moving ceremony,

19:49

in memorial of the victims of 9/11.

19:51

And, you know, it was very difficult.

20:00

I mean, if you recall, all the planes were grounded

20:01

so it's not like I was gonna be able to go anywhere anyway,

20:04

other than, you know, I was stuck there in Columbia

20:06

for about 10 days or so,

20:09

which should have only been...

20:12

And all the other Americans

20:13

that were supposed to be coming in for the conference,

20:14

I was showing up a couple of days early

20:16

because I was helping to organize it.

20:18

Nobody else got there.

20:20

So it was quite a challenge to sort of

20:22

fill administratively, you know,

20:25

to make the presentations

20:28

for some of the people who were not able to show up.

20:29

Peter

So after those 10 days,

20:35

were you given a new charge,

20:36

or were you given new responsibilities?

20:37

-

I went back to...

20:39

Now keep in mind, you know,

20:41

this was still....

20:45

The president at the time had not yet, you know,

20:47

he did shoot, I believe, you know,

20:50

some sort of declarations in terms of, you know,

20:52

who we thought was responsible for this and all that.

20:55

But no, I went back to SOUTHCOM, you know,

20:58

at that point, my mission was still focused on

21:00

Plan Colombia and all the other stuff

21:03

having to do with the war against drugs.

21:05

That was a big part of our mission at the time.

21:08

It still is, you know,

21:09

all the counter-narcotics intercept at sea,

21:11

kind of things that we were doing.

21:15

That was all a big deal.

21:17

So I was still focused on that.

21:19

And then just to finish out, you know,

21:22

I did the three year and a half years at SOUTHCOM,

21:24

from there another year to get

21:27

the Masters in National Security

21:28

at the National War College in Washington, DC.

21:30

And then I was the Executive Officer

21:34

to the Army General Counsel, political appointee.

21:36

So I'm kind of like his military aid, if you will,

21:39

just to advise on military things

21:41

that as a civilian he might not otherwise be aware of.

21:44

Did that for a year, and then I was asked to go serve

21:50

as the Senior Judge Advocate for all U.S.

21:53

and coalition forces in Afghanistan for a year.

21:56

So that would be '05 to '06.

21:59

And then I came back from that,

22:01

and then I was selected to be on a faculty

22:03

at the National War College.

22:06

And so that was from '06 to when I retired

22:08

at the beginning of '08.

22:10

Peter

So can we go back to SOUTHCOM,

22:13

if you were focusing still on Columbia

22:16

and intersecting drugs, and did that continue?

22:19

How long did that continue?

22:23

-

It still goes on today.

22:25

Peter

No, you, you.

22:26

-

Until the day I left.

22:27

Peter

So they never changed your role in spite of 9/11.

22:29

-

Oh, no of course it did,

22:32

once they said on December 17th

22:34

or somewhere in the middle of December,

22:37

Secretary of Defense said,

22:40

we're sending all these people

22:41

that we've captured in Afghanistan,

22:44

to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo,

22:46

the least worst place that we can put them

22:49

or something to that effect.

22:51

And I knew at that point that, you know,

22:53

once again, you know, our world was going to get

22:56

turned upside down because Guantanamo was in our area

22:59

of responsibility.

23:03

The way the military works is these combatant commands

23:04

have geographic responsibility.

23:06

And if something's happening in your area,

23:08

then you have to deal with it.

23:10

And so I knew right away,

23:12

that we were going to be charged with the responsibility

23:14

of dealing with these people coming over.

23:16

Peter

And what did you know about those people

23:20

on December 17th?

23:22

-

Nothing.

23:24

I mean, other than the fact that they'd been captured

23:24

on the battlefield in Afghanistan.

23:26

Beyond that, you know, I was not focused on that.

23:28

Peter

And were you, and from December 17th

23:33

moving forward what was your role

23:36

and did you go to Guantanamo

23:39

to see them when they were brought to Guantanamo

23:40

or did you know who these people were?

23:43

Or how they would treat in Afghanistan?

23:47

What did you know along those lines?

23:49

-

Okay, well, shortly, well,

23:52

I was actually on vacation,

23:57

because it was right before Christmas,

23:59

and so I had agreed...

24:00

I had a staff at SOUTHCOM,

24:02

let me give you a little bit of context.

24:03

I had one senior officer from each service.

24:05

So had an Air force, Colonel Terry Farrell.

24:08

I had a Navy Captain, Marty Evans.

24:11

I had a Marine Lieutenant Colonel, Wendy Stafford

24:14

and I had an Army,

24:18

I think, I'm not sure if he was a Major at the time

24:20

or if he was a Lieutenant Colonel.

24:22

I know he got promoted to Lieutenant Colonel

24:24

but Mark Jinglers.

24:25

And then I had a Senior Civilian,

24:28

but he did engagement programs, legal engagement stuff

24:29

with folks down in the theater in South America,

24:33

Central America and Caribbean.

24:38

So, but those four military officers,

24:40

that was the entire staff that I had there.

24:43

Granted, they were all very senior,

24:47

but it was very small staff.

24:48

The same as all the other combatant commands.

24:51

And on December 17th, I was on vacation

24:53

because the plan was that during Christmas,

24:59

they were all gonna take off,

25:02

and then I would come back before they left.

25:04

That turned out to be a really bad plan

25:06

because when I got back, some days later,

25:10

I think like maybe on the 19th or the 20th,

25:13

something like that, they were all gone,

25:14

you know, scattered to California and Montana and, you know,

25:17

wherever Washington State.

25:22

So that was a very challenging time,

25:25

because I was essentially there when I got back.

25:31

It was all very intense as far as, you know, what do we do?

25:34

And so the immediate priority,

25:41

the immediate priority was, okay,

25:43

we're gonna be getting all these guys,

25:45

where are we going to put them?

25:46

Where we're going to put them?

25:48

And so, you know, we would have, you know

25:50

we were working really long hours

25:55

and it was the entire staff.

25:57

The engineer, the command surgeon, the chaplain,

25:59

the chief of operations, the chief of intelligence,

26:03

the JAG communications, everybody just trying to figure out

26:06

what are we gonna do with these guys?

26:10

And so we contemplated a number of different options

26:11

and the most reasonable option,

26:14

this went on for like, I don't know a week or 10 days,

26:19

all the way through Christmas basically

26:23

up until it beginning of--

26:26

Peter

January.

26:29

-

Yeah, or maybe right after Christmas, before the New Year,

26:30

somewhere in there.

26:32

I mean, we were contemplating things like, you know

26:33

do we bring a ship in, for example,

26:35

and, you know, and just park it

26:38

and then put these people on board the ship?

26:39

I mean, that was sort of like a quick solution.

26:41

You know, they were actually in one

26:43

of the Geneva Conventions, not the third,

26:45

but, you know, it talks about not doing that kind of thing.

26:46

We contemplated tents.

26:52

I mean, this and that and another thing.

26:54

At the end of the day, you know,

26:56

as obviously history proved out,

26:57

we settled on building up Camp X-Ray

26:59

which is essentially a place where

27:02

during the days of the Haitian Migrant

27:04

work issues back in the mid nineties,

27:08

was sort of the temporary detention place

27:11

for people who were misbehaving

27:13

and needed to be separated or segregated from the main camp.

27:16

And so all it was, was just basically,

27:20

there weren't many there,

27:22

I don't remember the numbers but you know,

27:23

less than 30 or not many less than that.

27:26

I mean, it was just a very small footprint there,

27:29

as far as how many people you could hold,

27:33

somewhere in the number of maybe 30, something like that.

27:35

But the thing is with, you know,

27:37

seven, eight years of non-use,

27:40

it had been completely overgrown and was really not usable.

27:42

Nevertheless, our engineers did a fabulously great job

27:47

of getting in there, clearing it out,

27:52

and then just creating that initial space

27:54

that could be used to detain people.

27:57

The first plane load, I don't remember the exact date

28:00

but I want to say it was like 10th, 11th, 12th of January

28:02

or something like that.

28:05

Peter

11th.

28:06

-

11th.

28:07

And so they had precious little time

28:09

to get that place up and going.

28:11

And we were getting, we were on an operations tempo,

28:14

an op tempo of about a plane every other day.

28:16

And each plane was bringing, I don't know, 30, 35 people.

28:20

And so these guys were having to build literally

28:23

and as soon as it was built,

28:27

the particular cage, if you will,

28:32

it was filled up and then they build the next one

28:35

and the next thing, you know,

28:38

it'd be filled up the next day.

28:39

Peter

So the idea of where has these men came from

28:40

SOUTHCOM from, essentially your team.

28:44

I mean, basically the people in DC said,

28:46

you take care of it.

28:50

You find a place for them, that's not our job.

28:51

-

Oh yeah.

28:53

And by my team, of course it was,

28:54

let me continue to context.

28:55

The commander at the time was an acting commander,

28:57

Major General Gary Spear,

28:59

because our commander had been Peter Pace, General Pace,

29:03

who then had been promoted up position-wise

29:07

to be the Vice Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff.

29:09

The new incoming commander was delayed in his arrival

29:13

for a long period of time for about a year, I think.

29:16

And so that left us with our Deputy Commander,

29:20

Major General Gary Spear, as the acting commander.

29:22

You know, SOUTHCOM as compared

29:29

to the other combatant commands was relatively junior

29:30

in terms of its staff.

29:33

Like, you know, our Chief of Operations

29:36

was a one-star General.

29:40

Chief of Intelligence was a one-star General.

29:41

These are positions that Pay Comm, Pacific Command,

29:44

or European Command or Central Command would be, you know,

29:47

two-star Generals, maybe even three, depending.

29:50

So, you know, we found ourselves,

29:52

and General Spear found himself all of a sudden

29:56

thrust into this very difficult situation

29:58

and being one down, basically, you know,

30:02

without an actual commander, but with an acting commander.

30:05

And, you know, he did a, I thought incredibly marvelous job.

30:09

Peter

But I just wanted to confirm,

30:15

so it was his responsibility with--

30:16

-

Yes, you know, in the military,

30:18

we break things down into basically three strata.

30:21

You have the national or strategic level authority,

30:24

I should say,

30:28

and that would be the joint staff,

30:29

and the department of defense and the president basically

30:33

and the inter-agency, that's strategic level.

30:37

And then the operational level are those combatant commands.

30:40

And then at the tactical level

30:44

would be whatever joint task force

30:45

or whatever maneuver units are actually part of the thing.

30:47

So, yes, we were the ones that were basically told

30:51

you know, deal with these guys.

30:55

Find where you're gonna put these guys.

30:58

Peter

And did you don't know anything more

31:02

about these guys a long way before January 11th

31:03

just as between that time when you first heard about them

31:09

and January 11th did you know anything more about them

31:11

or what was going on?

31:14

-

Okay.

31:16

I called a friend of mine who had been the staff

31:19

to judge advocate at U.S. Central Command,

31:23

but was now retired from his Air Force career,

31:25

but was still serving as a civilian at U.S. Central Command,

31:29

retired Colonel Barry Hammel.

31:33

And so I called him up.

31:36

Shortly, you know, shortly once I got back to SOUTHCOM,

31:37

to Miami right before Christmas,

31:42

and I called him up,

31:45

and because, I mean, you know, I knew that

31:47

the first thing is all right, so like, what are these guys?

31:50

Because people weren't even,

31:52

they didn't know what the call them,

31:53

on the news or the...

31:55

And so I called him up and I said, Hey Barry,

31:57

I understand you guys are going to be sending us

32:01

all these guys.

32:02

He goes, yep.

32:03

And I said, so what's their legal status ?

32:04

He says, I don't know.

32:07

I said, what do you mean you don't know?

32:10

He says, I can't answer that.

32:11

I don't know. I've asked the question.

32:13

I've asked Washington, I've asked Jane,

32:14

referring to Jane Dalton, who is a dear friend

32:16

of both his and mine,

32:18

Navy Captain, she was the Chairman's Legal Advisor.

32:20

I've asked and so far I have not been given

32:23

any kind of clear answer.

32:26

I was just told that, you know, we're working on it.

32:27

We will get back to you.

32:30

So, you know, he said, I suggest you call her.

32:32

And I did.

32:39

So I called her up. I called Jane.

32:41

She and I had served together in the Pacific

32:44

when I was at Pacific Command.

32:47

She was at CINCPAC Fleet which is the Navy component

32:49

to Pacific Command.

32:52

So we had met and I knew her husband who's a Navy Captain.

32:54

She was at the time a Navy Commander.

32:58

I was an Army Captain, or I guess Lieutenant Commander.

33:00

And she pretty much told me what Barry had already said

33:04

which was, you know, we're working on it, man.

33:08

You know, we'll get back to you.

33:09

So I went to go see my boss, General Spear.

33:13

And I told him, I said, you know,

33:16

I can't answer for you because how we treat these guys.

33:19

And a lot of the questions that are being asked now

33:23

in terms of, you know, at the tactical level,

33:25

how do we actually conduct this mission,

33:29

depends on what their status is.

33:30

And, you know, I'm not getting an answer to that,

33:33

and so we drafted a letter, a memo,

33:35

that he signed, going up to the Chairman,

33:40

basically asking the question.

33:45

Because, you know, after a few days of this

33:47

it was apparent that my asking the question, you know,

33:50

was probably not gonna get it answered.

33:53

So we decided it would be better to have him

33:56

ask the question of the Chairman.

33:58

Peter

As the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff.

34:01

-

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

34:02

So I drafted a memo for him and, you know, he sent it on up.

34:04

It was that memo...

34:08

I think this was late December.

34:10

I can't remember if was late December or very early January

34:12

when this went out, but it was around that timeframe,

34:14

right around the New Year.

34:17

It was that memo that I believe it was on February 7th,

34:18

the president actually answered,

34:22

with his memo basically saying these guys are detainees

34:24

and, you know, they are, well, I'm sure you've seen the memo

34:28

but that memo was in response to the one--

34:35

-

That Bush's memo was the response

34:37

to that memo that General Spear sent.

34:39

-

Well, yeah, because I mean,

34:42

when it went from General Spear to the chairman,

34:44

then the chairman sent it up the chain

34:47

to the Secretary of Defense who,

34:50

and then up in Washington, they, you know, but yeah

34:52

I mean, sooner or later, they were gonna have to come up

34:56

with an answer anyway,

34:58

but hopefully, you know, this memo from us was intended

34:59

to get an answer quicker or sooner rather than later.

35:03

What it did do though, is in the meantime,

35:07

we got sort of a...

35:11

Without going into too much of the details here,

35:14

but part of the way the communications,

35:17

the official communications work

35:19

when you're being tasked by superior to as a military unit

35:21

to go do something, you know,

35:26

oftentimes you're given a warning order

35:27

which is basically a memo that says,

35:29

hey we're about to give you a task to go do this.

35:31

You are here by warned,

35:34

and start getting yourself ready basically.

35:35

And so we got one of those saying,

35:39

hey, you're about to get these detainees

35:40

or these people from...

35:42

They weren't calling them detainees at the time,

35:43

you're about to get these guys from Afghanistan, you know,

35:44

start working on it.

35:47

That's what we got around the 17th, 18th,

35:48

you know, middle of December.

35:51

Well, as we kept asking questions,

35:53

there would be changes to that warning order basically

35:57

saying, okay, you know,

36:00

change number one, change number two,

36:02

and each one kind of massaged the original one,

36:03

the original warning order a little bit.

36:07

We never actually...

36:10

What we were hoping for was the actual tasking order

36:11

telling us, okay here's your exact mission,

36:14

but we kept getting a, I seem to recall,

36:17

that we kept getting a series of these modifications.

36:20

And on one of those in response to our insistence

36:23

on asking for the status,

36:26

this has been a really long time,

36:32

so I don't remember,

36:33

and I haven't seen it.

36:34

I have not looked at this stuff,

36:35

but what it said was something to the effect of

36:36

that, you know, you shall treat these people

36:39

in a manner consistent with the principles

36:43

of the Geneva Convention, but not the Geneva Convention.

36:47

Peter

This will be before February 7th.

36:51

-

Yes. Oh, yes.

36:52

Yeah, yeah.

36:53

This was either very late December or early January.

36:54

And that's what it said.

36:57

Treat them in a manner consistent with the principles,

36:59

but you do not apply the actual Geneva Convention

37:01

as a matter of law.

37:05

It didn't say that, but that's the way I took.

37:05

It was you're not applying the Geneva Convention

37:07

as a matter of law, but follow the principles.

37:11

I don't know who came up with that.

37:13

I have no idea where the genesis of that came from,

37:14

but that's what we got back.

37:18

Now, if you're a military commander, as you know,

37:22

you can imagine that that is not the kind of clear guidance

37:27

that you would prefer.

37:30

So I talked to my boss and, you know,

37:33

he wanted me to explain what that meant.

37:36

And I said, well, you know,

37:39

this is as good as it's gonna get for a while,

37:42

so, you know, we need to do what we can with this.

37:45

And I believe that, you know, within our JAG community,

37:48

we can ascertain, and there's been articles written

37:54

in fact from when I was at the Army JAG School,

37:57

one of the fellows that worked for me

37:59

who I believe you've met Jeff Corn,

38:01

he and another fellow Mike Smit,

38:05

Major Mike Smit had published some articles

38:08

precisely on the subject of principles

38:11

of the Geneva Convention.

38:12

So I say, you know, there's something out there,

38:15

so let's take a look at it.

38:17

And, you know, we were having daily,

38:19

my staff, by the way had come back

38:22

when I started calling them up, saying,

38:25

everybody, get back here.

38:26

It took three or four or five days,

38:27

but eventually everybody got back.

38:29

So by, you know, sometime right after Christmas

38:30

but before the New Year's, we had everybody back.

38:33

I sent Wendy Stafford up to be...

38:36

She's a Marine.

38:39

And I sent her to go support the Marine Commander,

38:41

who had been tasked to be the Joint Task Force Commander

38:46

for this thing.

38:49

Mike Leonard was a Brigadier General, Mike Leonard,

38:50

and so Wendy went up there

38:53

and I think they were camped in June

38:55

and spent like a week or so there with him

38:58

before they deployed to Guantanamo.

39:01

Peter

She was supposed to inform him

39:04

on what you told her?

39:05

-

Yeah, she was our liaison, if you will,

39:07

to make sure that on all these various legal issues

39:10

and whatnot that I had somebody

39:13

that actually worked for me there with General Leonard

39:14

to facilitate communications.

39:17

Peter

So what were you thinking

39:23

in terms of since this was somewhat ambiguous,

39:24

since you knew something about Geneva conventions

39:28

and you knew the law probably better than many people,

39:30

did you think this was strange

39:33

or did you figure this was a new paradigm?

39:35

You know, as Gonzales had said,

39:36

maybe I don't know if he had set up by this point,

39:39

but what was your own thoughts

39:41

in terms of what was going on?

39:43

-

Well, you know, that's a good question.

39:47

I mean, I think that there was so much

39:48

chaotic confusion going on,

39:52

and I mean, every day was just everything's

39:54

you know, everything from, you know, how high of a gap

39:57

does there have to be between the chain link

40:01

and the base cement floor, and, you know

40:03

just a lot of that kind of stuff.

40:07

And all the whirlwind of, you know why we can't use a ship

40:11

or why we shouldn't be using a ship out there.

40:15

And if we did and those kinds of things,

40:17

and by the way, I mean, this, you know,

40:19

all this stuff with Columbia was still going on,

40:21

the peacekeeping initiatives with the Argentina,

40:23

all that stuff's going on.

40:27

It's not like that just stops the war against drugs.

40:28

In fact, how that interplays,

40:30

how the war on drugs now is gonna be,

40:33

how all these things are taking resources away from us

40:34

that we need to devote to Guantanamo.

40:38

So all this stuff is going on.

40:41

So to answer your question, I guess,

40:42

it was very it was certainly unsettling,

40:45

because we were not getting sort of clear guidance,

40:47

but, you know, every time ever since you were a cadet,

40:50

as in ROTC, or one of the academies,

40:54

you are taught and trained to work through the very fluid,

40:58

constantly changing, rapidly changing, chaotic situations

41:04

to accomplish the mission

41:07

in a way that you've been...

41:09

Where you are trying to do that in a manner

41:11

that is consistent with the values and the principles

41:13

that you've been taught all along the way.

41:15

And so, you know, there's an expression in the military

41:19

that is, that it is better to ask for forgiveness

41:22

than to ask for permission.

41:26

That assumes that the person that is acting,

41:29

is gonna be acting consistent

41:32

with all their training, education and values

41:33

that they've received over the years.

41:35

And so we got to a point here where I thought

41:39

we had pushed this thing as far as we were going to push it

41:44

and we had gotten a response,

41:45

which was, you know, follow the principles,

41:47

but not the convention.

41:50

And so when I went to go talk to my staff,

41:52

I mean I wasn't doing this on my own obviously.

41:55

I had my staff and I had a big conference table.

41:57

And every day, several times a day,

42:00

we'd sit down and say, okay, here's the issue of the hour

42:01

not even the issue of the day, but the issue of the hour.

42:04

And on this one, you know,

42:07

we thought about it pretty hard,

42:09

but, you know, we came to a consensus that, you know,

42:10

above all, when you look at

42:14

the 3rd Geneva convention particular on POW's,

42:16

there is a very clear and explicit theme

42:19

and value if you will, of transparency.

42:23

And because that's what's going to ensure,

42:26

I mean that's what we were doing with the Colombians,

42:30

basically trying to create a JAG Corps

42:31

to create transparency.

42:33

It's the same thing here.

42:34

So, you know, the easiest way to do that

42:36

would be to have the International Committee

42:39

for the Red Cross which is very specifically mentioned

42:42

in the Geneva Convention,

42:44

and have them be physically there to help us.

42:46

And, oh by the way, you know,

42:49

I speak Spanish and I understand Latin America,

42:50

but I knew that these guys that were coming

42:54

did not speak Spanish and were not Latin.

42:55

And so we needed some help, cultural help

42:58

and many other things.

43:01

And so I went and spoke with with our Chief of Intelligence,

43:03

General Burgess, Chief of Operations General Jackman,

43:07

with our chaplain, with our doc medical officer

43:11

and Public Affairs and others,

43:16

and everybody was consistently saying,

43:18

yeah it would be a good idea to have the ICRC.

43:21

Peter

When was this?

43:24

-

This was taking place again,

43:26

I think before the New Year, late December.

43:28

Peter

So that early, you thought the ICRC

43:31

the Red Cross should be present?

43:33

-

Well, yeah.

43:35

I mean, like I said, we had already gotten back

43:36

the answer of treat them in a manner consistent

43:40

with the principles, but not the Convention.

43:42

And so, you know, the short answer is, okay well,

43:46

one of the big, most important principles

43:49

is transparency ICRC, let's do it.

43:51

And so, you know, we didn't operate in a vacuum.

43:54

We're talked internally within my office,

43:58

then we talk with Wendy who talked to General Leonard.

44:02

He said, for sure, that's, you know, it's a great idea.

44:05

And the rest of the SOUTHCOM staff

44:09

thought it was a good idea.

44:11

So then I went to go see my boss General Spear.

44:12

And he says, all right, you know.

44:16

Peter

Anybody say, it's not a good idea?

44:19

-

Not anybody that we talked to.

44:20

Peter

And you didn't think you need to go up the chain

44:22

beyond General Spear, before you made that decision?

44:25

-

Well, what do you mean by, did I think?

44:30

Peter

Well, I think, were you nervous

44:33

about making that kind of decision

44:35

and thinking that maybe someone above, you know

44:37

who wouldn't apply to Geneva's as such

44:40

might be concerned about sending the Red Cross

44:43

and you should worry about them

44:45

at that higher level before you--

44:48

-

I don't think that I gave that much thought

44:51

to be honest with you.

44:54

I mean, I think there was just a lot of stuff happening

44:54

and it, you know, my staff and I thought

44:57

it was the right thing.

45:00

The SOUTHCOM staff thought it was the right thing.

45:01

The JTF Commander thought it was the right thing.

45:03

And then my boss thought it was the right thing.

45:06

So maybe if I had stopped to actually think about, you know,

45:10

consequences and stuff like that,

45:13

but the bottom line is I didn't.

45:14

And so when I talked to my boss, he said,

45:16

all right go ahead and do it, then I did.

45:18

Peter

How'd you do it?

45:20

-

Well, I didn't have a phone number, obviously.

45:22

So I went to somebody else on our staff

45:23

in the J-5, which is policy.

45:26

And there was some people there that I knew

45:31

dealt with the ICRC.

45:33

So they gave me a number,

45:36

but it was like to the ICRC person in Latin America,

45:37

in Mexico or someplace.

45:39

I called them up and they gave me the number

45:40

to the ICRC folks in Washington,

45:42

and then they gave me the number of the ones in Geneva.

45:44

So eventually I got ahold of the Geneva office

45:47

and I called them up.

45:49

Peter

And what'd you say to them?

45:50

-

Well, I introduce myself, you know, Colonel Supervielle,

45:52

I'm the Senior Judge Advocate at JAG lawyer

45:58

at U.S Southern Command.

46:00

You may have heard that in a few weeks,

46:01

we're going to be receiving these people

46:04

that were captured on the battlefield from Afghanistan

46:05

at Guantanamo, and were responsible

46:08

for the operational planning

46:09

of the detention of these people.

46:11

Would you all be interested in having representation there?

46:14

Peter

And to which they said?

46:18

-

There was a long pause.

46:21

And the guy asked me, he says, who are you again?

46:23

I said, I'm Colonel Supervielle.

46:26

And he says, and so you're inviting us to come

46:28

and be at Guantanamo?

46:32

And I said, yes.

46:33

He says, well, yes, we would very much like to be there.

46:35

Thank you very much. That's very kind of you.

46:38

And I said, well, you know, just,

46:41

that was pretty much it.

46:43

And then it became a question of,

46:45

then he says, I need to put you in contact,

46:47

please call Mr. Urs Boegli,

46:50

who is our Chief Representative for the Americans

46:52

in Washington,

46:55

and you can coordinate the details with him.

46:57

So I did.

46:59

I think right after that phone call,

47:00

I called Mr. Boegli up,

47:01

and he was also very kind and, you know,

47:04

very appreciative and everything.

47:07

And then I went to talk to our Chief of Operations

47:09

General Jackman,

47:12

and I said, these are the ICRC folks,

47:13

this is an opera...

47:15

At this point, you know, getting them there

47:16

and everything is operational in nature.

47:18

So I put them in contact and I believe that they spoke,

47:20

in fact, I'm sure they did.

47:24

Peter

Did they come before the detainees?

47:28

-

No, no.

47:31

This conversation had to have taken place

47:32

I guess now that I think about it

47:36

I guess sometime in January,

47:37

because if you're saying that

47:39

the first detainees arrived when?

47:41

Peter

January 11th.

47:43

-

Okay.

47:44

And these fellows...

47:45

I went on a flight there, I don't know,

47:47

I think it was like the middle of the month,

47:51

like a few days after that first flight of detainees,

47:53

like maybe on the 15th,

47:55

and I think maybe two plane loads that arrived or something.

47:57

And the ICRC showed up like two days after I showed up.

47:59

So they didn't arrive probably until like January,

48:03

I don't know, 17, 18, something like that.

48:07

Peter

And were you there when they showed up?

48:10

-

Oh, yes.

48:12

Peter

And when you there deliberately to be there

48:13

so you could greet them or it just so happened

48:14

you were there?

48:16

-

No, well I was there deliberately,

48:17

it wasn't so much so I can greet them.

48:21

Yeah, what happened next there, going back to the invite

48:24

and getting the ball rolling and all that,

48:28

is it wasn't that same day or maybe a day later,

48:31

two days later, something like that.

48:36

I was having three or four phone conversations

48:38

with Captain Dalton, the Chairman's Legal Advisor

48:42

and so the next phone call of these

48:45

and we were talking about number of different issues.

48:47

I mentioned to her that, you know,

48:51

we had invited the ICRC.

48:53

And, you know, she was surprised.

48:57

And initially I believe, you know,

49:02

she basically said that she didn't think that the folks

49:05

within the DOD were going to be very pleased about that.

49:09

Peter

What did you think, when she said that to you?

49:16

-

Well, I said, you know, you all told us

49:19

we asked and we kept asking about status.

49:25

And then finally you all told us that

49:28

to apply the principles.

49:31

And I can't think of a principle that's more important

49:32

than having transparency and having the ICRC there.

49:35

So, you know, we were basically just complying

49:39

with what you all told us to do.

49:42

You know, it was a little bit of a tense conversation,

49:46

but I mean, like I said,

49:50

she's a really good friend, so it was certainly not

49:52

you know, hostile, but, you know, it was tense.

49:55

And I was I guess I just had not given it enough thought

49:59

in terms of thinking about what the reaction was gonna be.

50:06

I mean, I'm not going to say,

50:09

I didn't think about it at all,

50:10

but she made it clear that it was not

50:12

gonna be well received.

50:15

So then we were told that in a couple of days,

50:18

or the next day or two, three days later

50:23

that there was going to be a delegation of senior lawyers

50:27

from Washington flying down to Guantanamo.

50:31

And, you know, my boss General Spear said,

50:34

I would like for you to be there for that.

50:39

And I don't honestly recall how it was,

50:43

that, you know, if it was one of somebody

50:47

within the DOD General Counsel's office,

50:51

or it was Captain Dalton or somebody up in DC said,

50:53

you know, fly up here and then you fly down with them.

50:56

I just don't recall the details

51:05

of how that coordination happened.

51:06

But the point was that it was clear that I needed

51:08

to get to DC and then fly with that group of folks.

51:10

And so I flew up, spent one night at a hotel there,

51:14

and then the next morning they came by to pick me up,

51:18

and by one of the lawyers that worked for

51:21

the General Counsel of DOD.

51:24

And so we went out to Andrews Air Force Base

51:28

and boarded a small plane.

51:32

There were not very many military people.

51:34

Besides myself, I think Mr. Haynes

51:39

is the General Counsel of DOD.

51:40

I think his military aid was military.

51:43

I just don't recall.

51:49

There may have been others, but I don't recall.

51:50

There was primarily the DOD General count...

51:52

Well, first of all, the White House Counsel,

51:54

the Deputy Solicitor General, the Vice-President's Counsel.

51:58

Peter

Were on this plane?

52:04

Gonzalez was on this plane?

52:05

-

Yes, Mr. Gonzales was on the plane.

52:06

Mr. Thompson, I think was the Deputy Solicitor General.

52:11

I think Mr. Addington was the Vice-President's Counsel.

52:14

Mr. Haynes was the host, if you will.

52:20

It was his airplane,

52:22

Mr. Rumsfeld's lawyer.

52:24

Peter

Was he on the plane too?

52:26

-

Yes, it was his plane.

52:27

And he's the one that organized the trip.

52:28

Mr. Taft, who was the Secretary of State's Counsel.

52:31

Whit Cobb, who worked for Mr. Haynes,

52:40

the Air Force General Counsel was on the plane

52:46

and a couple of other folks that who worked at...

52:52

Mr. Chuck Allen, who worked for Mr. Haynes.

52:56

So it was primarily the DOD General Counsel's office,

52:58

the General Counsel,

53:01

some of his people and then the senior lawyers

53:02

from some of the other departments were on this plane,

53:04

and myself.

53:10

And we, you know, it was a small plane.

53:12

Peter

What was the reason

53:16

for all these people to go down there?

53:18

-

Well none of us had been down there,

53:21

and know the detainees had...

53:23

We already had at least two plane loads of people

53:26

down there, detainees,

53:28

and I think they wanted to get some...

53:29

Oh, Mr. Will was on the plane,

53:33

John Will was on this plane as well.

53:34

Yeah, it was to get, I guess, you know,

53:36

situational awareness of the situation of the facility

53:41

so that they would be better informed

53:44

when making policy determinations.

53:47

I'm assuming I wasn't part of that group,

53:50

I was just told by my boss to go, because they're going.

53:52

I want to make sure that you get situational awareness

53:54

and you're aware of what's, you know, what's happening.

53:57

Peter

Any of these people talk to you

53:59

about the Red Cross on the plane?

54:00

-

Yes, they did.

54:03

Peter

To what--

54:06

-

But I think you knew the...

54:07

Halfway down after about an hour on the plane or so

54:10

I was asked to, by Mr. Haynes, if I could

54:14

very nicely, very politely asked

54:18

if I could come talk to them.

54:21

So it, like I said, it's a small plane.

54:23

I went up to the front of the plane

54:25

and he asked me, you know, they were all sitting up.

54:27

It was only like two seats and two seats.

54:31

And maybe, I don't know, five rows back each.

54:33

So probably not, you know,

54:36

not more than 20, 25 seats on the plane.

54:39

And so I came up to the front and Mr. Haynes said,

54:41

I understand you invited the ICRC to Guantanamo.

54:46

Is that right?

54:49

And I said, yes, sir.

54:50

And he asked, you know, why?

54:52

And I said, well,

54:54

basically what I had already just told you,

54:56

which was, we were told to follow the principles.

54:57

It is an important principle to have transparency

55:00

and to have the ICRC there.

55:03

And so, you know, that's why, and...

55:07

Peter

And their response?

55:15

-

Well, we had a discussion for, I don't know,

55:16

I don't know, in reality what it was.

55:26

I know it felt a lot longer, I guess,

55:27

but in reality it was probably like 15, 20 minutes.

55:29

You know, comments were made about, well, you know,

55:36

having these guys here is...

55:40

You know, we'll expose everything

55:45

that we're trying to do down there to outsiders.

55:48

And I said, well, you know, the ICRC is not going to...

55:52

The ICRC does not report externally.

55:57

They only report to the detaining power, which would be us.

56:00

And I was asked, well, how do you know that?

56:03

And I said, well, you know, they've been around

56:05

for over a hundred years,

56:08

and they still haven't, you know,

56:08

they've been pretty consistent about that.

56:10

So I'm pretty sure they're not gonna, you know,

56:11

start violating their own policies now.

56:13

And besides, I mean, you know, I asked,

56:16

or I added I should say, you know,

56:18

we're not gonna be doing anything

56:23

that we were really should care

56:26

what anybody sees or not anyway.

56:27

Peter

You said that?

56:30

-

I did.

56:31

You know, I honestly believe that.

56:32

I mean, obviously when I said it.

56:35

There was some more discussion about them

56:39

and opening up, you know, a can of worms

56:42

that there would be every other NGO,

56:46

non-governmental organization would want to go down there

56:49

and all that.

56:52

And, you know, we'd be setting a precedent and all that.

56:53

And I said, well, no, not really, because just the opposite.

56:55

The ICRC is the only one that is mentioned by name

56:58

in the Convention.

57:02

So if we get them in there, then that provides,

57:04

I think a very legitimate reason

57:08

because we would not want, I mean,

57:11

from an operational reason,

57:12

we wouldn't want to have dozens of organizations

57:13

run around where we'd have to take our limited manpower

57:16

to deal with that logistically and everything else.

57:19

So if we get the guys who are the actual legally

57:22

by convention, supposed to be there,

57:25

for the time being it should give us a good reason

57:28

to tell everybody else to just wait,

57:30

you know, because we have these guys.

57:32

I also mentioned that again,

57:36

I highlighted we are U.S. Southern Command

57:38

and we know a lot about Latin America,

57:41

but we don't know squat about, you know,

57:42

Yemen or Afghanistan or Syria

57:45

or anywhere else in that part of the world.

57:48

So having...

57:50

And the ICRC guys had told us they were bringing in

57:51

people from that part of the world.

57:53

So as it, having their expertise on the ground

57:55

will be very helpful to our Task Force Commander

57:57

as he has told us,

58:01

that he wants them there for among other reasons that.

58:02

They would serve as a means or a channel of communication

58:07

between us and the trainees,

58:11

in a way where, you know hopefully we can try

58:14

and conduct this mission in a way that is consistent

58:18

with the principles of Geneva Convention.

58:21

All these things that it made kind of sense.

58:22

I was asked, well, asked, told, whatever

58:26

to, you know we need to hold off on these guys, on the ICRC.

58:32

And I said, you know, it's the ICRC.

58:35

You don't really tell them what to do.

58:37

They do whatever they're gonna do,

58:39

and they're on their way.

58:41

They're literally on their way.

58:42

They're there they're coming in from, you know,

58:44

I don't know, I think it was like Sudan

58:47

or Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

58:48

So they're physically on their way.

58:53

Their team is coming.

58:55

And then there was some more discussion about

58:57

telling them to not come.

58:59

And I said, well, you know,

59:01

my boss General Spear is the one who authorized me

59:03

to make the invitation,

59:06

so he would have to be the one to cancel it.

59:07

And I mean, obviously you all can talk to his bosses,

59:11

which in this case, the Secretary of Defense.

59:16

Some more discussion, and then it was like,

59:20

well, have them come through Washington first

59:22

so we can talk to them and postpone it.

59:25

And I said, again, I can't,

59:27

you know they're not gonna necessarily do what we want.

59:30

I said it would...

59:34

I told them, I said, I believe that, you know,

59:35

General Jackman has invited them come through SOUTHCOM.

59:36

So I believe that they are gonna be coming through SOUTHCOM.

59:39

So at that point, that discussion was tabled

59:43

for the time being.

59:46

And then Mr. Haynes asked one of his fellows there Whit Cobb

59:49

for this list,

59:56

and he produced a single sheet of paper that had,

59:57

I don't remember exactly a number 10, 12 different,

1:00:01

I think it was 10 rights of...

1:00:04

Not rights but conditions that we would meet

1:00:10

for the detainees.

1:00:12

And it was very basic stuff in terms of, you know,

1:00:15

providing food and water, shelter,

1:00:18

you know, ability to pray, you know,

1:00:24

It was really very fundamental and very, very, very basic.

1:00:31

Now, and so they, he handed that to me, he says

1:00:36

what do you think of this?

1:00:38

This is still in front of the group there, you know

1:00:40

this is what we've come.

1:00:42

This is what we have come up with in terms of how

1:00:44

we believe that these people should be treated.

1:00:46

And what I had done prior to getting up,

1:00:51

prior to going up to Washington

1:00:57

is since we were getting such little guidance

1:00:59

in terms of you know, principles versus the convention,

1:01:03

okay we're not gonna play the convention

1:01:07

and so on and so forth.

1:01:08

Let me also say that as we were putting together,

1:01:12

the manning document,

1:01:16

this is the document that when you come up

1:01:17

with an operation, you you start filling in personnel,

1:01:19

the people that are going to actually do stuff, right?

1:01:22

And so the entire SOUTHCOMM staff is doing this.

1:01:26

And the J-1, which is our personnel chief

1:01:30

was responsible for,

1:01:32

and he sends it out to all the staff people saying, okay

1:01:34

you know, tell us who you think you need.

1:01:38

You know, you're typically talking about,

1:01:39

I need whatever, you know 50 military policemen,

1:01:41

and I need, you know five intelligence officers,

1:01:44

so on and so forth.

1:01:47

And since we were getting, this is late December,

1:01:50

since we were getting no clear guidance

1:01:51

in terms of their status,

1:01:53

we thought in my office that, well, you know,

1:01:56

the fifth article, the article five

1:01:59

of the third Geneva convention says,

1:02:02

you know, if you don't know, if you have doubts,

1:02:03

well then hold the tribunal.

1:02:06

Have three guys sit around and ask questions

1:02:08

and get documents or whatever,

1:02:10

get evidence, and then make a determination on their status.

1:02:11

And so we thought, all right,

1:02:15

well we need to do article five tribunals

1:02:17

because obviously, we don't know what their status is

1:02:18

because we keep asking them.

1:02:19

So on the manning document I put down,

1:02:22

we needed I believe it was 10 maybe even 12,

1:02:24

but 10 or 12 JAGs,

1:02:26

made them 12.

1:02:29

I wanted 14, you know, we wanted four teams

1:02:30

of three main tribunals,

1:02:32

and then about 10 enlisted guys

1:02:34

to support that administratively.

1:02:36

So we put that in the manning document.

1:02:40

The manning document went up to the joint staff.

1:02:42

And then I got a call from the joint staff,

1:02:44

legal office saying, you know, we're taking that out.

1:02:47

We're not going to have any article five tribunals.

1:02:51

And I said, so, do we know their status?

1:02:54

Have you determined this?

1:02:57

Said no, still working on it.

1:02:58

I said, well, then we're not doing article five tribunals,

1:02:59

we're taking it out.

1:03:03

Okay, I mean, you know, what are you gonna do?

1:03:04

So we still don't know the status.

1:03:06

So at that point, then I went to my JAG staff and said look,

1:03:09

let's talk about this.

1:03:12

And so we all sat around and we talked about

1:03:13

different ways to deal with this

1:03:15

because you got to have something.

1:03:16

I mean, you can't just tell a commander,

1:03:19

well, you know deal with the principals

1:03:21

because that commander will not want to hear that.

1:03:22

So you want to give them something more specific.

1:03:25

So we ultimately decided that it would be best

1:03:28

to take the third Geneva convention

1:03:31

and look, putting this in context,

1:03:35

you know, this was the very beginning.

1:03:37

We didn't know, we didn't know who these guys were.

1:03:40

And even the guys who captured them

1:03:41

didn't really know who these people were.

1:03:43

And you're dealing with the concept of people

1:03:44

who are willing to kill themselves in suicide bombing,

1:03:48

and flying airplanes into buildings and that kind of thing.

1:03:52

And so the, you know, for people listening to this,

1:03:54

it's, you know, hindsight is 2020,

1:03:58

and the emotions and the lack of certainty

1:04:00

and the chaotic situation is lost on us.

1:04:03

And for a lot of people,

1:04:07

they didn't even live through this.

1:04:08

So it really was like that.

1:04:09

And so we were taking very very cautious measures

1:04:12

where we were going to act on the side

1:04:18

of security and safety.

1:04:21

And that was really what we were trying to do.

1:04:22

Not only safety for our guys

1:04:24

but safety for the detainees as well.

1:04:26

This was not the, you know,

1:04:31

the insurgencies that I had experienced

1:04:33

with in the Philippines and in Peru, and in Colombia,

1:04:35

those guys were not generally suicide bombers.

1:04:40

You know, they were going to plant the bomb,

1:04:44

but then they were gonna run away.

1:04:45

And so this was an entirely new paradigm

1:04:47

that we just didn't know really what to expect,

1:04:49

what to deal with.

1:04:51

And so ultra conservatism, ultra security,

1:04:52

safety consciousness, all right.

1:04:55

But that doesn't mean that

1:04:58

if those elements of security and operational security

1:05:00

or safety are not involved in something,

1:05:04

then our view was, well, then go ahead and give it to them

1:05:07

because you know, why not?

1:05:10

We're supposed to be trying to follow the principles.

1:05:12

That was our approach.

1:05:15

And so we took the third Geneva Convention

1:05:16

and broke it down into four or five segments,

1:05:17

just randomly by numbers, because I had five people,

1:05:21

you know, four people and said, you know,

1:05:25

like whatever when do you take one through

1:05:27

you know, 30, 35, whatever.

1:05:30

And so we each took...

1:05:32

I didn't, they did.

1:05:33

I mean, and the idea was talk,

1:05:35

first of all common sense approach,

1:05:40

but then also talk to the Intel guys,

1:05:41

talk to the JTF people.

1:05:43

Wendy had come back by now.

1:05:45

Talk to all the people who were actually going

1:05:49

to have to do this and figure out

1:05:50

if it's something that we can clearly give them,

1:05:51

like you know,

1:05:54

you know whatever, food and water and stuff like that.

1:05:56

I mean, that's easy.

1:05:59

But a Quran, medical treatment, so on and so forth.

1:06:01

And if it's something we can give them

1:06:05

and do it in a secure way

1:06:06

that's not going to compromise operational security

1:06:08

then put a green bubble next to it.

1:06:11

We had three options, you know,

1:06:13

like a traffic light.

1:06:14

You got to keep this very simple.

1:06:15

If it's something that makes no sense whatsoever,

1:06:18

like for example, they can have their own canteen

1:06:20

where they can have their own little kitchen

1:06:22

and sell their own products and stuff like that

1:06:24

where they can have sharp instruments, that's red,

1:06:26

you know, we're not going to do that.

1:06:28

And if it's something in between like, you know, exercise,

1:06:31

yeah, they need to exercise,

1:06:33

but it's not going to be, you know,

1:06:35

just open air kind of thing.

1:06:38

I mean, where they're unsupervised or we're not, you know

1:06:39

where they're not under some sort of control,

1:06:43

positive control.

1:06:44

So we'd put that in yellow saying, yeah, they can exercise

1:06:45

but under certain circumstances.

1:06:48

And so these guys, you know,

1:06:51

I'm very grateful to these wonderful folks

1:06:52

that were in my office there,

1:06:56

because they worked on this for like a day straight.

1:06:57

You know, they stopped everything else that they were doing

1:07:00

and focused on this

1:07:02

and worked on it for like 24 hours straight,

1:07:04

and then I got it just in time to go up to DC.

1:07:07

So that takes us back to when Mr. Cobb

1:07:12

handed that piece of paper with the 10 items on it.

1:07:15

And they said, what do you think?

1:07:17

And I said, all right, well, you know,

1:07:19

this takes an approach of, you know,

1:07:20

what is the minimum, basically.

1:07:23

We've taken a different approach,

1:07:26

and then I literally had it in my pocket of my uniform.

1:07:27

I pulled it out and I said, this is what we're thinking.

1:07:29

And, you know, I showed it to him

1:07:33

and I explained everything I just explained to you.

1:07:34

And there was some discussion about it,

1:07:36

you know, well, essentially there was some concern about,

1:07:38

well, if there is...

1:07:42

And I said, look, you know, even at South Common Miami,

1:07:46

we can't execute this.

1:07:50

This has to be executed.

1:07:51

This is sort of a start point for the JTF Commander.

1:07:52

Just something to get him started.

1:07:56

These colors are going to change for sure.

1:07:58

Things that are red might turn to yellow

1:08:01

might even turn to green,

1:08:03

things that are green, we might say, well,

1:08:04

we shouldn't be doing that,

1:08:05

turn it to yellow or red, I don't know.

1:08:06

We don't know, but you got to start somewhere.

1:08:08

And this is sort of a starting point of specific things

1:08:11

that the, you know the law requires to some degree.

1:08:15

And even though we're not applying

1:08:19

the Geneva convention per se,

1:08:20

the principle is we ought to try and give as much as we can.

1:08:22

So I said, you know, and you gotta have faith

1:08:25

that the people that you have assigned,

1:08:32

your subordinates that you've assigned

1:08:34

in this case specifically the JTF Commander,

1:08:35

JTF 160 Commander, General Leonard knows what he's doing.

1:08:37

He's a General officer in the United States, Marine Corps.

1:08:40

You know, he'll know how to deal with this.

1:08:43

And it's just something,

1:08:45

it's a tool that will help him get started.

1:08:46

That's it.

1:08:49

And, you know, the question was, well,

1:08:50

what happens if he runs across some issue

1:08:53

that's really strategically important?

1:08:56

And I said, well, then he'll recognize it as such, I'm sure.

1:08:59

Let us know, and then we'll let you know,

1:09:01

and then you all can make the decision,

1:09:03

and we'll stand by for your decision.

1:09:05

But that discussion didn't take us long.

1:09:06

That was maybe only like 10 minutes.

1:09:09

And there wasn't really a lot of consternation over that.

1:09:12

It seemed to make--

1:09:18

Peter

They were willing to let you substitute

1:09:19

your program over theirs?

1:09:20

-

Well, yeah, I mean, their program was basically,

1:09:23

like I said just the list with 10 things on it.

1:09:24

And ours was the entire third Geneva convention,

1:09:26

with you know, with an indication

1:09:29

that we were being conscious of operational security,

1:09:32

safety, and those kinds of things

1:09:35

that were not going to compromise the mission.

1:09:37

So, you know, we landed in Guantanamo,

1:09:42

We spent the day...

1:09:47

Mr. Maura, Alberta, Maura who was the Navy General Counsel

1:09:49

had flown in from some other location on his own airplane,

1:09:51

met us there,

1:09:54

and we were being taken around on a yellow school bus

1:09:56

to the various places.

1:09:59

We went to X-Ray, and we saw the detainees,

1:10:00

we walked through, we went to the hospital,

1:10:04

because they were at the time,

1:10:07

we were using the Naval hospital there on Guantanamo

1:10:08

to treat the detainees.

1:10:10

Like I said there was only like maybe two planeloads

1:10:14

that had arrived at this time.

1:10:15

We went in, initially, very first thing is we got a briefing

1:10:18

from General Leonard, who explained everything.

1:10:21

I thought it was an excellent briefing

1:10:24

in terms of laying out what his plans were

1:10:25

and everything else.

1:10:27

And then we got the tour, where we walked around

1:10:29

and saw the various things that they had done

1:10:32

to get things ready for the rest of the people coming.

1:10:34

And then at the very end of the day,

1:10:38

it was just like all day thing,

1:10:42

we left very early in the morning.

1:10:43

So we were on the ground for, by now,

1:10:45

I guess, six hours or something.

1:10:46

And I already knew my boss had already told me

1:10:49

that he wanted me to stay anyway.

1:10:51

But, you know, Mr. Haynes suggested when we were on this,

1:10:54

we were taking them all back to the flight,

1:10:59

to the dock, because we were on the windward side

1:11:03

and we were taking them back to the dock

1:11:07

where they were going to get on a boat

1:11:09

to go across to the side to the leeward side,

1:11:11

where the airstrip was, the runway.

1:11:12

And, you know, Mr. Haynes, you know, told me to...

1:11:15

And we knew the ICRC was coming,

1:11:20

so he basically said, look, you know,

1:11:22

look, it doesn't look like we're going to be able to

1:11:23

you know, they're going to come.

1:11:27

And so, you know, we're counting on you

1:11:29

where I'm expecting you to handle this.

1:11:32

And I said, okay.

1:11:36

And they all got on the plane.

1:11:38

They left.

1:11:41

Mr. Maura stayed because he had his own plane.

1:11:43

He left the next day.

1:11:45

And then I stayed for, I dunno like 10 days or so.

1:11:46

The ICRC showed up.

1:11:51

I think it was two days later.

1:11:53

Peter

Before we'd get to your visit with the ICRC,

1:11:56

I just want to confirm that you had no more pushback

1:11:58

on the Red Cross after they left.

1:12:01

Other than that discussion you had on the plane

1:12:03

it sounds like you had no more pushback

1:12:08

on the Red Cross after that.

1:12:10

They kind of just reconciled themselves that they're coming

1:12:11

and they're gonna let it go.

1:12:14

-

You know, I guess you'd have to ask them

1:12:17

in terms of where they had reconciled or not.

1:12:19

But I mean, essentially other than that last conversation,

1:12:21

just as we literally walked to the back of the school bus

1:12:26

Mr. Haynes, and I, he asked me to go with him

1:12:30

and we went to the back and, you know,

1:12:33

he expressed that he was not happy about the situation,

1:12:35

but that there was really,

1:12:39

didn't look like there was anything

1:12:42

they were gonna be able to do about it.

1:12:44

If we withdraw the invitation now it's going to look bad.

1:12:46

It's going to, so, you know, deal with it.

1:12:49

Peter

Did he say the Red Cross clear

1:12:53

from certain parts of the camp?

1:12:55

-

No, no.

1:12:58

I mean, they were gone by the time the ICRC showed up.

1:12:59

Peter

And what did he advise you to do?

1:13:02

-

No, no.

1:13:03

He gave no specific guidance other than, you know,

1:13:05

deal with it and handle the situation.

1:13:07

Peter

Could I just, before we go on

1:13:15

to your meeting with the Red Cross,

1:13:17

I just want to confirm, why did you not choose the ship

1:13:20

as a place instead of the Camp X-Ray?

1:13:26

What was the logic?

1:13:30

And then you said there Jim Francis don't approve of that.

1:13:32

Is that the reason why, or was it logistically--

1:13:35

-

No, it was all kinds of real,

1:13:37

I mean, it was,

1:13:38

that was just one more factor,

1:13:40

but, you know where are we gonna get a ship, literally,

1:13:42

that would...

1:13:45

Where are we gonna get a ship that would be able to

1:13:47

be structured and configured in a way to do the mission?

1:13:50

I mean, you know, the Navy doesn't have anything like that.

1:13:54

You know, I mean, in these meetings, you know,

1:13:58

you throw everything out there.

1:14:01

It's like, well, maybe we can, you know, hire,

1:14:02

you know, borrow or buy, or somehow get a, you know

1:14:04

a cruise ship and then secure the doors

1:14:08

or we make each cabinet, you know, a cell.

1:14:10

And it was just, it was not a good idea.

1:14:12

Peter

And when you first landed in Guantanamo

1:14:17

and you went around with the other people,

1:14:19

what were your impressions of what you saw

1:14:23

and came back straight?

1:14:26

And then I assume there was no real,

1:14:27

I mean camps out there hadn't yet been built,

1:14:29

so there was nothing else there,

1:14:30

essentially Camp X-Ray and the detainees.

1:14:32

Were there any impressions you recall of seeing the men

1:14:35

and seeing the camp that might be worth of recording?

1:14:38

-

Well, I think that there was probably no more

1:14:44

than like 60 because like I said,

1:14:47

it was like maybe two plane loads.

1:14:48

And, you know they had their orange jumpsuits on

1:14:51

and the way Camp X-Ray was set up

1:14:54

was they were fairly large cages essentially

1:14:58

where there would be several detainees in each cage.

1:15:02

And there was a lot of construction going on

1:15:05

because as I indicated,

1:15:07

we were building new cages continuously.

1:15:09

And I guess from a personal level, you know,

1:15:12

looking at these guys and thinking,

1:15:20

these are the ones or perhaps they are, perhaps not.

1:15:26

But I mean, at that time I was assuming

1:15:29

that these were people who were, you know,

1:15:31

should have been there basically,

1:15:34

and had done these things.

1:15:39

And so there was, you know, a fair amount of mixed,

1:15:41

all kinds of emotions about it,

1:15:46

some negative emotion, I guess, towards these people.

1:15:49

But by the same token, many of them anyway

1:15:52

looked very, you know, physically small,

1:15:55

frail, disheveled if you will,

1:15:59

not abused or anything like that

1:16:02

I'm just talking physically, because I'm just saying,

1:16:03

and thinking, boy, you know, so much destruction,

1:16:06

you know, from this kind of folks.

1:16:13

I mean, when you see somebody face to face, you know,

1:16:18

they were all, most of them were looking at us,

1:16:21

but they didn't say anything.

1:16:24

I think maybe one or two may have yelled

1:16:26

a few things, whatever,

1:16:28

but most of them were just sitting there

1:16:28

very stoically kind of looking at us.

1:16:30

They'd only been there for a couple of days themselves

1:16:34

you know, and they were still I'm sure in shock,

1:16:36

but yes I guess to your point is that

1:16:39

there were all kinds of, you know, mixed emotions

1:16:41

that run through your head

1:16:44

in a very quick fashion as you see this.

1:16:46

But then again, I didn't have time to dwell on it

1:16:48

because we're working back and forth.

1:16:51

We're getting briefings and we're getting tours

1:16:53

and I'm thinking of what needs to happen next.

1:16:55

And I did not have the luxury of time to sit there

1:16:58

and philosophize about all this or contemplate,

1:17:01

you know, the...

1:17:04

Peter

Well, did you have any expectations

1:17:06

before you came down there, what you would see or do--

1:17:08

-

Well, you know, in the briefings at SOUTHCOM

1:17:11

before I left and all that,

1:17:13

the engineer would be showing us slides

1:17:15

pretty much every day in terms of the construction.

1:17:17

So yeah, I had some idea of that, you know,

1:17:19

but it's very much one thing to see it

1:17:23

in pictures or in bars and charts and graphs

1:17:25

than it is to physically be there.

1:17:28

And, you know, the dryness of the place

1:17:30

and the dust and the dirt

1:17:33

and the sound from the construction going on

1:17:34

and to actually see eye to eye with, you know,

1:17:38

one of the the people sitting there.

1:17:43

It's a very different thing.

1:17:45

Peter

And did you speak to the prison guards

1:17:47

at all while you walking through?

1:17:49

-

No, not, not at all, no.

1:17:51

We were in a big gaggle of just moving, you know

1:17:54

from point to point where we were supposed to go

1:17:56

very rapidly.

1:17:58

It was, you know, it was all happening very quickly.

1:17:59

Peter

Just one more thing, going back to the plane

1:18:02

when they spoke to you about the Jim mentions,

1:18:04

did John, you or David Addington have opinions

1:18:07

when you had that conversation, do you remember,

1:18:10

beside Jim Haynes, as to whether the Red Cross applies,

1:18:13

whether do Kansas apply, did you hear any of that?

1:18:18

-

Well, first of all,

1:18:22

I don't remember Mr. Willis saying anything.

1:18:24

Mr. Addington was sitting up at the very front

1:18:27

with across the aisle from Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Taft

1:18:29

was on the other side of him.

1:18:35

And Mr. Thomas, I think was another side of Mr. Gonzales

1:18:36

and Mr. Haynes was standing up next to me

1:18:39

actually kind of crouched over,

1:18:41

because of the small airplane,

1:18:43

but, you know, I made it clear,

1:18:46

that it we were not applying the Geneva Conventions.

1:18:50

We were applying the principles of Geneva Convention

1:18:56

which is what you told us to do.

1:18:58

So I was very careful not to get into...

1:19:00

I did not create an opening to have a discussion

1:19:04

about the applicability or not of the Geneva Conventions

1:19:07

because I already took it as a given

1:19:09

that they had decided that it didn't apply,

1:19:11

but you said to apply the principles.

1:19:13

And so on that, you know, here's what we did.

1:19:16

Peter

Just one more thing.

1:19:22

Did you feel after that conversation kind of,

1:19:25

I don't know how to put it somewhat uncomfortable,

1:19:28

you know just that maybe, you know,

1:19:37

you were put in a position that you couldn't defend

1:19:39

and, you know maybe made the wrong decision

1:19:41

or did you still feel he made the right decision?

1:19:43

-

Well, no, I never felt like I made the wrong decision.

1:19:47

Clearly I was uncomfortable.

1:19:50

I could tell,

1:19:52

you know, that my adrenaline was flowing.

1:19:53

I remember I had been a prosecutor and defense counsel.

1:19:56

I had been a trial advocate for five years.

1:19:59

And as most people who know me would tell you that

1:20:02

you know, when I get into a certain mode, you know

1:20:06

advocacy mode or whatever you want to call it

1:20:11

adversarial mode, not adversarial, but you know,

1:20:15

when you're having to defend yourself,

1:20:18

you know, kind of thing,

1:20:19

that I engage in that.

1:20:22

I don't...

1:20:27

So no, I never thought that it was the wrong decision

1:20:28

or anything else,

1:20:30

I felt very comfortable with and very sure

1:20:31

about the decisions that we had made,

1:20:35

the fact that they were supported by the JTF Commander

1:20:38

by my commander at SOUTHCOM,

1:20:41

by my legal staff, by the rest of the SOUTHCOM staff.

1:20:42

And we were doing exactly what they told us to do,

1:20:48

was apply the principles.

1:20:50

So if anything, if I regret anything I suppose,

1:20:51

is that I may have been perhaps a little bit

1:20:57

overly aggressive in my tone.

1:20:59

And that I was, you know, as a Colonel,

1:21:06

I should not have been,

1:21:08

I probably should have been more,

1:21:09

not backing down from what I was saying, per se,

1:21:11

but maybe how I was saying it.

1:21:14

I don't know.

1:21:15

Fortunately, I have no way of remembering

1:21:17

exactly what happened.

1:21:20

I was on a different side,

1:21:21

but I know that my adrenaline and everything

1:21:22

had kicked in, a lot.

1:21:24

Peter

Well, I'm sure.

1:21:28

I mean, do you think you were intimidated by these people,

1:21:29

you know all essentially crabbing you,

1:21:36

you know, pushing against you?

1:21:37

-

You know, they were very polite

1:21:41

and no one raised their voice.

1:21:43

No one said anything mean or anything like that.

1:21:45

And there was, I mean, clearly they were very upset.

1:21:50

Body language and everything else, and, you know,

1:21:54

certain tone perhaps, but it was all very professional

1:21:58

and I didn't feel intimidated.

1:22:01

Like I said, I think that just tends to, you know,

1:22:08

bring out other qualities.

1:22:12

Peter

Okay, let's go on.

1:22:16

Then, when the Red Cross arrived,

1:22:17

were you there to greet them or?

1:22:21

-

Well, right.

1:22:23

But before they arrived, I mean,

1:22:24

General Leonard and his principal staff,

1:22:25

his deputy and myself,

1:22:28

we all got together and said, okay, you know,

1:22:31

what's the game plan?

1:22:33

Are we gonna deal with these guys?

1:22:34

And, you know, obviously the ICRC

1:22:36

bases their ability to do their job on being independent.

1:22:41

And so, you know, we were gonna make sure

1:22:48

that they got nice quarters to live in,

1:22:52

and that they had a rental car to drive around in

1:22:54

but they're gonna have to pay for it,

1:22:56

to maintain their independence,

1:22:58

if we gave them that, if we offered it to them for free,

1:22:59

then that would compromise that.

1:23:01

So, you know, did that, access to the detainees,

1:23:02

we were talking, you know,

1:23:07

in terms of how are we going to do that?

1:23:08

You know, so we...

1:23:11

The point is that General Leonard made it very clear

1:23:13

as the commander that he supported the idea

1:23:16

of being as cooperative as possible with the ICRC.

1:23:18

They're here to help us quite frankly,

1:23:24

that was the whole point, you know,

1:23:26

and to help us do our mission better.

1:23:29

So welcome.

1:23:31

I don't remember whose idea it was.

1:23:36

It certainly wasn't mine, but somebody had the idea

1:23:37

which I think was brilliant,

1:23:40

to actually have a...

1:23:42

When they showed up you know,

1:23:44

we went in for the initial briefing,

1:23:45

and we kind of set out the terms of reference

1:23:47

the rules of engagement, if you will, between us and them

1:23:50

and how they were going to interact with.

1:23:52

And we went straight from the tarmac,

1:23:55

we picked them up got them into vans.

1:23:57

You know, I sat in one of the vehicles with them

1:23:59

and we, all the principal, you know,

1:24:00

they split up a little bit, but when we got back,

1:24:02

we had this briefing.

1:24:05

I don't think it took that long, an hour maybe

1:24:06

something like that, maybe a little bit more.

1:24:09

They all spoke English very well.

1:24:13

Peter

How many were there?

1:24:14

-

Four.

1:24:15

Urs Boegli and three others.

1:24:17

And the three others, Urs I think was Swiss

1:24:19

and the three others were, you know, Lebanese or,

1:24:21

Peter

Middle Eastern.

1:24:25

-

Yeah.

1:24:27

And so I think Egyptian may be, I don't recall,

1:24:28

but afterwards, one of the ideas that somebody came up with

1:24:32

was to have a little welcome reception event,

1:24:37

probably social.

1:24:42

And the Navy Captain who was the base commander,

1:24:43

hosted it at his house.

1:24:47

And the spouses of the senior Navy staff on the base

1:24:49

you know, had baked, you know,

1:24:56

had prepared hors d'oeuvres and some food and, you know,

1:24:58

so on and so forth.

1:25:01

And we had, you know, sodas and some wine.

1:25:02

I think there was, you know, one of the guys was French.

1:25:05

And so after the briefing, we took them,

1:25:09

they went back to their hotel and all that kind of thing.

1:25:12

Or I say hotel, I mean that the quarters

1:25:14

that we had on the base there.

1:25:15

And, you know, they freshened up and all that.`

1:25:17

And then that evening, we all went to the captain's house

1:25:19

for this dinner party.

1:25:22

And, you know, it was the four of them.

1:25:24

And I don't know, maybe a dozen of us and spouses,

1:25:27

so maybe altogether, whatever, 15, 20, 30,

1:25:34

no, not that many, but around 20 people or so.

1:25:37

And it was very, very nice event

1:25:40

where we started talking a little bit about

1:25:42

and getting to know them and them to know us

1:25:44

on a more personal basis,

1:25:46

you know where you're from and so on and so forth.

1:25:48

And it was not Urs, but it was one of the other guys,

1:25:50

that at one point, you know, we went out,

1:25:54

and the Navy Captain, his house was up on a big bluff

1:25:58

on a cliff overlooking Guantanamo Bay, beautiful view.

1:26:01

And at night you can see the lights of the city

1:26:05

of Guantanamo, Cuba off in the distance very clearly.

1:26:08

And so, you know, we went out on the balcony,

1:26:14

this guy and I outside over overlooking the bay

1:26:16

and, you know, by this time, somehow it had already come out

1:26:24

that I was originally from Cuba,

1:26:27

and this is my first time back to Cuba since I left in 1961.

1:26:28

And even though it was an American base,

1:26:33

it's still technically Cuba

1:26:35

and it's physically, geographically, flora fauna Cuba.

1:26:37

So for me, it was an emotional thing

1:26:41

just to be on Cuban soil, if you will.

1:26:43

But anyway, the guy knew about this.

1:26:46

And so, as we were sitting there,

1:26:48

we were looking in the city of Guantanamo, I asked him

1:26:49

do you all have a mission here in Cuba?

1:26:54

And he said, no.

1:26:56

We've been trying to gain access to Cuba for decades,

1:26:58

but without success.

1:27:02

And I said, well, ironic then isn't it,

1:27:06

that your first visit of the ICRC to Cuba

1:27:09

is at the invitation of the United States.

1:27:13

And his response was, well,

1:27:16

I wouldn't expect anything different from the United States.

1:27:18

So I said, okay, fair enough.

1:27:21

Peter

Any of them ask you

1:27:25

what the status of the detainees was?

1:27:26

Were they concerned,

1:27:29

since there was no clear status at that time?

1:27:30

-

Yes, and we told them, I said, you know,

1:27:32

I don't know.

1:27:34

I didn't know what the column, I mean,

1:27:35

other than the fact that they are, you know

1:27:37

I don't believe that we had actually capped it,

1:27:39

that we weren't calling detainees yet, but I said, you know

1:27:41

our guidance has been that we were treating them

1:27:43

in a manner consistent with the principles,

1:27:45

but we have been told that we are not applying

1:27:47

as a matter of law, the Geneva Conventions.

1:27:50

And I showed him the bubble chart and the whole thing

1:27:53

and them, I mean, not, you know--

1:27:56

Peter

Did anyone challenge you and say, well,

1:27:59

that makes no sense, you need to--

1:28:01

-

Not quite the contrary.

1:28:02

They said that sounds like a very reasonable approach.

1:28:04

Peter

Really?

1:28:06

-

Yes.

1:28:08

Peter

Is that surprising that the ICRC would accept

1:28:10

unclear status for the people that were captured?

1:28:13

-

At that point in time, they understood the situation.

1:28:18

They understood that these guys had just gotten there

1:28:21

and that...

1:28:23

These are very smart people.

1:28:24

And their real mission is to minimize

1:28:26

unnecessary pain and suffering and damage during war

1:28:29

and protect innocent people as much as they can.

1:28:35

And they take a very rational approach to things

1:28:38

if they take, that's been...

1:28:44

That was my experience with dealing with them

1:28:47

in other parts of the world.

1:28:48

And so I really did not expect anything different here.

1:28:50

And as long as we can articulate a rationale

1:28:53

for why we were doing things,

1:28:55

with a view that the more we learn about these guys

1:28:57

and the more that the things develop

1:29:01

and the more that the chaotic situation

1:29:03

begins to settle down into some sort of a routine,

1:29:04

which would give us then the opportunity

1:29:08

to find ways to increase benefits if you will,

1:29:09

for these guys, assuming they deserve it.

1:29:14

I mean, assuming that they're not actually...

1:29:16

Then that's what we're gonna do,

1:29:18

but for right now, today, these guys just got here.

1:29:21

And so, you know, the guidance I've been given

1:29:24

is principles.

1:29:28

Now, so the guys on the ground were actually very like

1:29:30

okay, you know, this makes sense.

1:29:34

We'll work with you.

1:29:35

That's not to say that ICRC in Geneva

1:29:36

wasn't already engaged with, or trying to engage with,

1:29:39

you know, DOD on the issue of status.

1:29:44

But that was at the, as I mentioned before,

1:29:48

that was at the strategic level of debate

1:29:50

and I was at the operational level.

1:29:52

And so I was aware that that was happening,

1:29:53

but I was not engaged or involved in that discussion.

1:29:56

But that was happening parallel to--

1:29:59

Peter

Were they having a discussion

1:30:01

on article five hearings, you think?

1:30:02

-

I don't know.

1:30:04

I mean, at the DC level I have no idea,

1:30:05

but like I said, I had already been, you know, told--

1:30:08

Peter

And no one brought that up to you

1:30:10

when you went down there.

1:30:11

-

Well, the ICRC guys on the ground,

1:30:13

there at the operational level, within the ICRC community.

1:30:18

So, you know, we were just dealing with

1:30:20

what can we do within our sphere of influence here

1:30:22

from their standpoint to maximize

1:30:25

the benefits for these guys.

1:30:29

And I'm saying, we will try to maximize

1:30:31

within the constraints of operational security and safety.

1:30:33

Peter

Good.

1:30:37

-

And then just look, we'll just deal with that.

1:30:38

And so, you know, some anecdotes or some things,

1:30:40

it's like, well, you know, these guys,

1:30:42

they can't sleep at night,

1:30:44

because you guys have these bright floodlights

1:30:45

and sound of machinery, building new cages.

1:30:47

All right, well,

1:30:52

how about if we give them some earplugs

1:30:54

and some eyeshade things, you know,

1:30:55

to try and help minimize the light and the sound?

1:30:58

All right, well that would help.

1:31:01

That's what we did.

1:31:03

These guys, you know, based on their cultural norms,

1:31:05

they do not get naked in front of other guys

1:31:10

because what we were doing is

1:31:12

we were taking them to take their showers,

1:31:12

but we had literally a guard with a detainee all the time.

1:31:14

And so there was an issue about,

1:31:19

that they were objecting to having our guards

1:31:21

watch them while they were taking a shower being naked.

1:31:23

And so what we did is, there were only men out there.

1:31:27

We did not have any women escorting these guys

1:31:31

to take their showers obviously.

1:31:34

What we did is we, you know, we had the shower stall

1:31:36

and we closed in like three sides of it.

1:31:39

But the four, one side was left open.

1:31:42

It was like a little cage essentially.

1:31:44

And then our guard could keep an eye on him,

1:31:47

but then we got all these gym shorts

1:31:49

that had been left over from the Haitian,

1:31:51

you know refugee thing back in the nineties.

1:31:54

And so we would give them the shorts

1:31:57

so that they could take their shower

1:31:58

with their shorts on and still wash up, but not be exposed.

1:31:59

There was an issue with regards to privacy.

1:32:06

You know, the ICRC really insisted on maintaining privacy

1:32:07

whenever they would have communications with the detainees.

1:32:11

That's reasonable,

1:32:13

but by the same token, you know, we wanted to make sure

1:32:16

that the ICRC reps would be safe.

1:32:20

Again we're thinking these guys could do something

1:32:23

to harm them, so we came up with...

1:32:26

And well, and the thing was that the ICRC reps

1:32:29

did not want them shackled or handcuffed

1:32:31

while they were talking to them.

1:32:34

Those are right.

1:32:37

Either they're going to be sitting, you know

1:32:38

either they're sitting down and they are you know,

1:32:39

somehow shackled to the floor

1:32:42

or handcuffed or something to where their movements

1:32:44

are restricted.

1:32:46

And then we can have our military policemen

1:32:48

standing you know, like 40 feet away,

1:32:51

or if you really insist on them not being shackled

1:32:54

then we're gonna put our guy 20 feet away.

1:32:57

And then you can whisper to them, you know,

1:33:00

but I mean we have to find some sort of compromise here

1:33:03

to where your safety is not going to be endangered.

1:33:05

And at the same time, we can offer you

1:33:09

some sort of privacy in your communications with them.

1:33:12

Peter

How was it resolved?

1:33:15

-

If I recall, they agreed that we would have

1:33:17

our MP at a distant distance where they could not hear.

1:33:21

This was all the initial intake,

1:33:27

because the ICRC, you know, was registering everybody.

1:33:29

And then there was questions about, you know,

1:33:31

we would like to see whatever documents you have

1:33:34

that pertain to these guys.

1:33:36

Initially it was just a lot of little issues

1:33:38

that were coming up all the time

1:33:42

that during those 10 days that I was there,

1:33:44

we were able to get through a lot of them.

1:33:45

But then I had to get back

1:33:48

and continue dealing with this issue.

1:33:50

But at the operational level, not at the...

1:33:52

Now I'm really at the tactical level

1:33:54

and decided to get back to it

1:33:56

and then also get back to dealing with, you know

1:33:57

Colombia and Argentina and other things.

1:34:00

So when, when I left, you know,

1:34:02

we had resolved a lot of initial issues,

1:34:06

but there were still many, many, many more

1:34:12

to come Obviously.

1:34:14

Peter

When the reports were written by the ICRC,

1:34:16

were you allowed to read them?

1:34:18

Were they sent to you?

1:34:20

-

Yes.

1:34:21

And in fact, you, I think you were,

1:34:23

at some point gonna ask me if I ever went back

1:34:25

to Guantanamo, and I will tell you that,

1:34:26

Yes, I went back twice more, I think maybe three times,

1:34:29

I can think at least twice for sure.

1:34:32

And one of the things that I dealt with when I'd go back

1:34:34

but for shorter periods of time, like three or four days

1:34:38

was to talk to the ICRC about their,

1:34:41

as they call them interventions,

1:34:44

where they write a report saying,

1:34:45

you know, here's the latest list of issues

1:34:47

and complaints or things that we think

1:34:50

you guys can do better.

1:34:52

And that was sort of the approach.

1:34:54

I mean, it was like here, we think you can improve

1:34:55

on these issues.

1:34:57

Peter

And you would talk to them about those issues?

1:34:59

-

Yeah, the vast majority of stuff I wasn't dealing with.

1:35:02

Again, they would talk to the JTF staff

1:35:04

and I don't know, but the majority of those issues

1:35:09

would be resolved at that level.

1:35:12

And then if the issue was not resolved at that level,

1:35:14

then you know, people on my staff

1:35:17

would get involved in it.

1:35:21

And then eventually at some point I might get involved.

1:35:23

I mean, I was only seeing the very few things

1:35:24

that were not getting resolved at you know,

1:35:28

two or three layers lower.

1:35:32

And if there was something, by the way,

1:35:36

that was at again at the strategic slash political level,

1:35:39

then I'd say, you know you've got to take this up

1:35:42

with the folks in DC.

1:35:44

Peter

Was the ICRC there constantly, continually?

1:35:46

-

Yeah, they were there constantly, continuously

1:35:49

for a fairly lengthy period of time.

1:35:52

While I was still at SOUTHCOM, in other words, through '03

1:35:56

because we're now talking beginning of '02.

1:36:00

I left in July of '03.

1:36:03

So basically for the 18 months

1:36:05

because I had to deal with this.

1:36:07

At some point, I don't remember when,

1:36:09

but at some point they did leave

1:36:12

without leaving anybody on the ground.

1:36:15

They were rotating people for quite some time

1:36:18

but I know that there was some gap

1:36:22

where they didn't have anybody there,

1:36:25

but then they would send somebody back again.

1:36:28

So, I don't know how long those gaps lasted.

1:36:30

And I don't even remember when the first one occurred,

1:36:32

but they were there on the ground continuously

1:36:35

I would say pretty well for sure

1:36:37

for at least the first three, four months.

1:36:40

Peter

We had heard from some of the detainees

1:36:42

we interviewed that they couldn't get,

1:36:44

either they couldn't get mail through the ICRC.

1:36:47

Or if they got it, it was redacted heavily by the U.S.

1:36:51

and so they didn't have much to read,

1:36:54

or similarly they sent it out.

1:36:57

Sometimes it wouldn't be sent out or if it was sent out,

1:36:58

it was just heavily redacted.

1:37:00

Did that issue come up in the reports?

1:37:02

-

Yeah.

1:37:05

Peter

Was that your job to respond to that,

1:37:06

or is that...

1:37:09

-

You know, first of all, our Intel guys

1:37:11

were the ones who were looking at this correspondence.

1:37:13

And, you know, under the circumstances,

1:37:21

I mean we were literally thinking

1:37:24

that there was a high probability,

1:37:25

a high possibility of an attack on the base

1:37:27

by terrorists to make a point,

1:37:32

interesting things like, you know,

1:37:36

coordinating with the Cubans on air defense,

1:37:37

you know, stuff like that.

1:37:39

I mean, this was serious.

1:37:41

So now I have no problem in redacting information

1:37:42

that our intelligence guys thought

1:37:46

should not be going out or coming in.

1:37:48

I mean, that's common sense.

1:37:50

Is that not?

1:37:53

Peter

But did the Red Cross ever say to you

1:37:54

there's too much being redacted here?

1:37:55

-

No, I don't recall that.

1:37:58

I do recall that there were issues

1:38:01

about just sometimes, you know, letters not getting to,

1:38:02

not getting there at all or something like that.

1:38:06

But in terms of what is, or what is not being redacted

1:38:08

I honestly don't remember having that discussion with them

1:38:11

other than the fact that what I just told you

1:38:15

of course, we're going to redact stuff.

1:38:16

If we think that if it's anything that could aid,

1:38:18

if somebody who might want to conduct an attack on the base

1:38:23

then of course we're going to redact it.

1:38:28

Peter

So that was the motivation, interestingly,

1:38:30

that was the much motivation for redacting

1:38:34

as any other thing?

1:38:37

-

Why else would you redact?

1:38:38

I mean--

1:38:39

Peter

Well, I don't know,

1:38:40

but I mean people thought there were reductions

1:38:41

for other reasons.

1:38:42

-

Like?

1:38:44

Peter

One person we interviewed said

1:38:45

that she thought everything was redacted.

1:38:47

So that the detainee would not know

1:38:49

that someone cared about him on the outside.

1:38:51

-

Well, you know, I don't know the answer to that

1:38:56

because I wasn't the one making the decisions

1:38:58

on what to redact or not redact.

1:39:00

If the intelligence folks were telling me

1:39:01

we're redacting information that is of operational security

1:39:05

or something like that, I have no problem with that.

1:39:08

If they're telling me that they're and they didn't,

1:39:11

and if that happened, it would have been later on

1:39:15

at this stage, you know,

1:39:17

the first three months of this thing.

1:39:18

We did not yet have an interrogation mission

1:39:21

that didn't come until much later.

1:39:25

And of course, no, I mean,

1:39:27

well, I mean, an official,

1:39:29

hey we're creating JTF 170 to do interrogations.

1:39:31

That didn't happen until I think

1:39:34

I think March or thereabouts.

1:39:35

Peter

March of '02.

1:39:39

-

Yeah.

1:39:40

Peter

So that's one month later.

1:39:41

-

Yeah well, they got there at the beginning of two months

1:39:41

and I'll tell you that every month there

1:39:43

seemed like, you know, half a year.

1:39:45

So, and emotionally in my mind

1:39:47

two months is a long time,

1:39:50

but the initial interrogation was completely ad hoc,

1:39:53

you know, very helter-skelter in terms of, you know,

1:39:58

we had intelligence people trying to get intelligence

1:40:02

for the war.

1:40:05

We had, you know, FBI and others

1:40:06

looking at it more from a prosecutorial standpoint

1:40:10

to build cases to prosecute these guys.

1:40:13

And so it was all over the place and, you know,

1:40:15

it created, you know, the confusion

1:40:18

was certainly not programmed.

1:40:22

It was natural.

1:40:25

And if it confused the detainees, well, you know

1:40:27

it confused us as well.

1:40:30

And, you know, there were times when intelligence guys

1:40:36

would come in and you know, ask a lot of questions

1:40:38

and certainly not in any kind of abusive way,

1:40:43

but in a kind of heavy handed

1:40:46

sort of interrogation intelligence way.

1:40:48

And then they would leave,

1:40:51

and later in the afternoon, or next day

1:40:52

the same detainee would be seen by law enforcement people

1:40:53

who at first they would actually start off

1:40:57

by reading them the rights.

1:41:00

Yeah, and you know, when we found out it was like,

1:41:02

you know, time out, this makes no sense.

1:41:05

And so there was a lot of work,

1:41:09

by General Leonard and his staff

1:41:11

to bring some sort of, you know,

1:41:13

uniform way of approaching this.

1:41:15

I mean, that was obviously insane to be doing that.

1:41:17

Peter

Why does it make no sense

1:41:20

to read them their rights?

1:41:22

And just so that people who are watching this

1:41:24

will understand?

1:41:25

-

I'm not saying that doesn't make...

1:41:28

I'm saying it makes no sense to have the same person

1:41:28

interviewed for intelligence purposes,

1:41:32

and then later that same person be interviewed

1:41:36

for potential criminal investigative purposes

1:41:38

and have their rights read,

1:41:41

because you're creating a dysfunctional situation,

1:41:42

the next day then the intelligent guy comes up,

1:41:47

he says, well, I've been told,

1:41:49

I have a right not to tell you anything.

1:41:50

And then the intelligence guys go, who's told you that?

1:41:53

Well the FBI guy who was here yesterday,

1:41:55

you know, so-and-so.

1:41:57

So, I mean, that's crazy.

1:41:58

That's why it makes it...

1:42:00

And the reason you don't get your rights read to you

1:42:01

when you are in an interrogation

1:42:03

for military intelligence combat war purposes

1:42:05

is because it doesn't apply.

1:42:09

The constitution doesn't apply to that kind of environment

1:42:12

nor does article 31 (b) of the Uniform Code

1:42:14

of Military Justice.

1:42:17

Peter

So, I mean, you've said it several times

1:42:19

and other people have said it as well

1:42:22

that everything was chaotic in the beginning.

1:42:24

And it was almost like the seat of your pants.

1:42:26

People were just day to day--

1:42:28

-

We were building cages that were being filled up

1:42:30

the next day as people were flying in.

1:42:33

-

Right.

1:42:36

-

We went from zero to,

1:42:37

I don't even know what the number was,

1:42:39

500 or something like this.

1:42:40

Peter

Why do you think your interrogations

1:42:44

didn't start until March?

1:42:45

-

Like I said, there was questioning by intelligence people

1:42:47

as soon as they arrived,

1:42:53

there was questioning by law enforcement people,

1:42:54

as soon as they arrived,

1:42:56

but like I said, there was a...

1:42:57

It was not coordinated.

1:43:00

It was not uniform in matter.

1:43:01

It didn't take long.

1:43:04

I mean, again, that may have only been going on

1:43:05

I don't know, for two weeks, something like that,

1:43:08

but it just seemed like a long time

1:43:09

because in my life that was a lot of hours

1:43:11

I spent on that issue.

1:43:14

And so we worked hard with General Leonard and his staff

1:43:16

and our staff at SOUTHCOM to figure out a way

1:43:18

to have combined teams

1:43:21

to where there would be representation

1:43:23

of both law enforcement, as well as intelligence people

1:43:25

on the same team so that you're doing it

1:43:28

in a coordinated fashion.

1:43:30

Peter

And just because you were down there so often,

1:43:33

-

I was only down there three times.

1:43:37

Peter

Three times, but you were so in touch with it

1:43:39

obviously rumors were coming out about mistreatment.

1:43:42

Did you hear those rumors?

1:43:44

Was that something that you were in charge to look into?

1:43:46

-

You said obviously,

1:43:51

but it wasn't obvious.

1:43:52

And I would tell you that any concerns about mistreatment

1:43:54

I don't recall any of those kinds of concerns

1:43:57

until you know, March, April, May, June timeframe of 2002.

1:44:02

That's when they first started surfing it.

1:44:08

At this point in time, we had not...

1:44:09

And General Leonard had made it very clear

1:44:12

to the military police who were doing the detention mission

1:44:13

that, you know, there will be none of that.

1:44:17

And if anybody does, they would be investigated.

1:44:19

Peter

But you were still there.

1:44:23

So in April, May, June, when it started coming out,

1:44:25

were you responsible to looking into it?

1:44:28

-

Okay, I mean, yes.

1:44:32

I had a level of responsibility,

1:44:33

but everybody has a level of responsibility.

1:44:34

Again this is the military.

1:44:36

So that at each layer, whether you're at the tactical layer

1:44:37

at the tactical level or at the operational level

1:44:41

where I was or at the strategic level,

1:44:44

everybody has a responsibility obviously.

1:44:45

So yes.

1:44:48

Any concerns about, you know, mistreatment

1:44:49

or something along those lines, if it wasn't resolved,

1:44:52

in terms of coming up with some, you know,

1:44:55

if the ICRC, for example had a concern or whatever,

1:44:57

and brought it up,

1:45:00

if it wasn't resolved at a tactical level,

1:45:01

it would eventually get to our level.

1:45:02

And then we would look into it.

1:45:04

To put this in context,

1:45:10

we started off with JTF 160, General Leonard,

1:45:12

Marine one-star,

1:45:15

who I believe his background was engineering.

1:45:18

And yeah, because it was an engineering unit,

1:45:22

actually a logistics engineering unit

1:45:25

that went down there to do this mission.

1:45:28

And we had a lot of MPs who,

1:45:29

military police from the army

1:45:30

and air force communicators and all kinds of peoples.

1:45:34

It was a joint operation, but his charter,

1:45:38

and the charter of JTF 160 was detention operations.

1:45:43

That's why, you know, intelligence people coming in

1:45:48

to talk to them or law enforcement people coming in

1:45:51

to talk to them.

1:45:53

We're not really a part of that JTF,

1:45:54

nor their mission.

1:45:57

He kind of brought it in or some sort of control

1:46:00

to kind of have it be coordinated.

1:46:02

You know, there were concerns about, you know,

1:46:07

what do we do to protect our own troops

1:46:10

so that the detainees don't make false accusations

1:46:13

of being mistreated.

1:46:16

And so, you know, but logistically it became very difficult.

1:46:17

We had these little wooden huts basically

1:46:21

where the detainees were being taken from Camp X-Ray.

1:46:24

I mean, they were adjacent to Camp X-Ray,

1:46:27

it was literally just walked out the gate,

1:46:29

and, you know, for these interviews, you know,

1:46:30

eventually when Camp Delta was built,

1:46:34

you know, they put cameras in all the interview rooms

1:46:37

so that there would be a visual record

1:46:39

of whatever was going on.

1:46:42

We were, you know, we were concerned about that as well

1:46:44

for the protection of our own troops

1:46:45

so that they wouldn't be accused of something.

1:46:48

Or, and for the protection of the detainee

1:46:50

in case one of our guys, you know,

1:46:52

got angry or lost control, and then did abuse somebody.

1:46:55

So it was really for everybody's protection.

1:46:59

JTF 170, I don't know.

1:47:04

I can't recall exactly when that was created.

1:47:06

I want to say that again,

1:47:09

it seems like it was much further down the road.

1:47:10

It was probably March, you know,

1:47:13

and that had the specific mission

1:47:16

of intelligence collection.

1:47:18

And that was the guy in charge of that

1:47:21

was a Major General Dunn Levy, Army Reservist

1:47:24

and a lawyer from New York and military intelligence officer

1:47:28

and all that kind of thing.

1:47:33

There were a number of issues,

1:47:37

a lot of issues, but basically, you know,

1:47:41

the mission of 160 to detain.

1:47:45

General Leonard was basically trying to sort of

1:47:48

keep the peace and just keep, you know,

1:47:51

keep things under control, if you will.

1:47:52

And General Dunn Levy,

1:47:54

who was trying to extract information.

1:47:56

Now, I am not an intelligence officer.

1:47:59

I trust that our intelligence officers

1:48:01

know what they're doing and are going to follow

1:48:05

our own U.S. military policies and regulations

1:48:08

and so on and so forth,

1:48:13

whatever was current at the time.

1:48:14

And I know that over the last 11 years, you know,

1:48:16

there've been a lot of changes

1:48:18

to those policies and those regulations,

1:48:20

but at the time that's what we had,

1:48:22

which by the way was still essentially focused

1:48:24

on a more conventional traditional kind of

1:48:28

combat environment,

1:48:30

fighting the military of a foreign nation

1:48:32

for an enemy nation,

1:48:35

like something similar to what we had

1:48:37

during the first Gulf War or something like that.

1:48:38

So it did not take long before there were some clear

1:48:42

friction between the two task forces

1:48:49

because the mission in many ways

1:48:52

was perceived to be, you know, naturally,

1:48:55

to some degree in conflict with each other.

1:48:59

When you're trying to do this, you know,

1:49:05

when you're you're trying to stir things up,

1:49:07

and all that kind of thing.

1:49:10

So, you know, we had each one of those task forces

1:49:11

had their own JAGs,

1:49:14

you know, at lower level.

1:49:17

And the way the JAG Corps in the military works

1:49:18

is they report to their commander, that's their boss.

1:49:21

I am their operational boss,

1:49:24

technical boss, let me put it that way.

1:49:27

I'm the technical boss.

1:49:28

He is there, or she is their actual boss.

1:49:29

So for any kind of legal issues and stuff like that

1:49:33

they're supposed to go up the technical, the chain,

1:49:36

the same way that their commander

1:49:40

would go up to our commander at SOUTHCOM.

1:49:42

And, you know, the friction between the missions,

1:49:45

which then translated into friction

1:49:50

between the two commanders,

1:49:51

which then translate into friction between the JAGs,

1:49:53

and everybody else,

1:49:55

caused a great deal of angst at SOUTHCOM

1:50:00

because both those task forces in theory anyway,

1:50:06

reported to SOUTHCOM.

1:50:08

And so, you know, on these trips,

1:50:11

I would go down there and literally have the two JAGs,

1:50:14

one from each, one from 160, one from 170,

1:50:16

and we sit in a room and say,

1:50:18

okay how are we going to resolve this issue?

1:50:19

And I can't even remember right now,

1:50:22

there was many.

1:50:25

And when I'd go down, we would hit, you know,

1:50:27

five, six, seven a dozen issues all at once,

1:50:30

of things that had popped up,

1:50:33

where I'd be getting a call from one

1:50:35

complaining about the other one or vice versa.

1:50:36

So it was really a frustrating time.

1:50:39

Peter

But when you heard,

1:50:46

I don't want to go into too much more,

1:50:47

when you heard about mistreatment,

1:50:49

because you obviously did,

1:50:50

you didn't have much...

1:50:53

That wasn't really your responsibility.

1:50:55

You said everyone has a responsibility.

1:50:57

-

Well yeah.

1:50:58

If I heard about it and you know,

1:50:59

if the ICRC or somebody's came or something had popped up

1:51:03

then I would go back to the JAG on the ground

1:51:08

and say, what the hell is going on?

1:51:10

What is this about?

1:51:11

What have you done?

1:51:12

Have you done investigation?

1:51:13

Have you interviewed these people?

1:51:14

Would, you know, what's going on

1:51:15

Because those are the questions I'm going to get

1:51:17

from the joint staff.

1:51:18

Jane's going to call me up and say,

1:51:19

what's going on about this?

1:51:20

Because it's hit the media, it's on the press or whatever,

1:51:21

what's going on?

1:51:23

So yeah, I mean, I certainly,

1:51:24

if my boss or even if my boss didn't ask me,

1:51:27

if I heard about something, I didn't want to get blindsided.

1:51:31

So I would try and find out what was going on

1:51:33

and I would go back.

1:51:35

I'm not there, so I have to go back to the people

1:51:37

that I have on the ground to say, tell me what's going on.

1:51:38

Peter

And have they told you, we did this,

1:51:41

we actually did this?

1:51:44

Did they acknowledge it, is it?

1:51:45

-

Well, yeah.

1:51:48

There was no case where I recall,

1:51:51

where other than for example, you know,

1:51:55

some guard maybe, and I don't recall.

1:51:58

I actually do not recall any case

1:52:02

where something like that came up,

1:52:04

but I suspect that it is probable,

1:52:04

that at some point somebody said,

1:52:07

hey, this guard you know lost his temper

1:52:09

and he, you know, pushed this guy or knocked him down

1:52:11

or something like that, you know,

1:52:14

in sort of a non-systemic way,

1:52:16

it's just somebody losing their temper kind of thing.

1:52:21

or just because he's a bad soldier,

1:52:23

who maybe has done this more than once.

1:52:28

I'm like, all right, get him out of there.

1:52:30

I mean, but in terms of the systemic government policy

1:52:32

of abusing detainees,

1:52:39

and mean I'll jump to that,

1:52:42

but that was later on in '02,

1:52:45

I think we were still in '02

1:52:52

I think it was either late Summer or Fall

1:52:53

or something like that, where a memo came up

1:52:56

from the joint staff legal, I'm sorry, from the JTF.

1:52:58

Well, by now there have been changes.

1:53:03

I mean, they had replaced General Leonard at some point.

1:53:05

I remember when, I wanna say maybe March or thereabouts

1:53:10

and they put in a General Bacchus, a one-star in charge.

1:53:14

That did not help, or that did not solve matters.

1:53:18

So, because General Bacchus is a national guardsman one-star

1:53:22

and General Dunn levy were having many problems

1:53:26

and issues with each other.

1:53:31

In continuation, and actually in my view,

1:53:33

it was even more aggravated than before

1:53:36

the friction became worse.

1:53:42

And so at some point General Bacchus

1:53:44

was also relieved of command.

1:53:48

And I believe that, I can't remember well,

1:53:53

at some point that they combined the two joint task force

1:53:59

in just to one, but I don't remember if that was...

1:54:03

At this point, this was still two separate task forces.

1:54:06

And so, the 170, General Dunn Levy's lawyer, sent this memo

1:54:09

Peter

That's Colonel Beaver.

1:54:17

-

Yes.

1:54:18

Lieutenant Colonel Beaver sent the memo that up

1:54:19

for our review, that had a a sort of

1:54:21

three different categories.

1:54:25

I'm sure I know this is all been declassified now,

1:54:26

at the time it was classified.

1:54:29

Three different categories of what they were calling

1:54:31

"enhanced interrogation techniques."

1:54:34

And, you know, I got it.

1:54:37

I gave it to my staff to look at.

1:54:40

Colonel Farrell, Captain Evans,

1:54:41

Mark Gengras, Wendy, Stafford.

1:54:44

They all looked at it.

1:54:47

We all got together and talked about it.

1:54:48

And, you know, the consensus amongst us was that,

1:54:51

you know there was stuff in the first category,

1:54:57

and I don't remember what they called it,

1:54:59

but whatever that first category was,

1:55:00

that quite frankly we really didn't object to.

1:55:02

And if the intelligence guys were saying

1:55:04

that this would help, then, you know, so be it.

1:55:07

Then in the second grouping of things,

1:55:11

there were some things in there

1:55:13

that were maybe caused more for concern.

1:55:15

And, we're past February 7th now.

1:55:20

Remember that was a magic date,

1:55:23

when the memo came out from the president saying,

1:55:24

they are detainees, the Geneva Conventions do not apply.

1:55:26

And I'm sure you've had people explain to the details

1:55:30

of that memo in terms of how they arrived at that

1:55:31

but nevertheless, I may personally disagree

1:55:34

with that conclusion,

1:55:37

but it is a reasonable legal interpretation.

1:55:39

One that I didn't share at the time.

1:55:45

And no one on my staff shared.

1:55:47

No one, but you can't say this is clearly illegal.

1:55:49

Who's to say?

1:55:54

I mean, this was all

1:55:55

where we were in uncharted territory here.

1:55:56

There was no case law.

1:55:58

There was no precedence, there was nothing.

1:56:00

And so it was based on some rational argument

1:56:02

even though, you know, maybe not the best one.

1:56:05

Alright so fine.

1:56:07

They're not POW's.

1:56:09

So if they're not POW's,

1:56:12

then these enhanced interrogation techniques

1:56:14

in category number two,

1:56:16

which would probably be violative of the Geneva convention

1:56:18

for a POW, well, you know,

1:56:22

I've already been told they're not POWs.

1:56:25

So legally then these things don't apply.

1:56:28

And that whole thing about, you know,

1:56:31

principles of Geneva.

1:56:34

We were past that now because the president said

1:56:36

here's actually what they are.

1:56:38

All right.

1:56:40

Then that got us to category three.

1:56:42

And within category three,

1:56:43

there were some things in there that,

1:56:44

we're a lot like category two stuff.

1:56:50

In other words, that, yeah, they were POW's

1:56:52

I'd say this is definitely not good,

1:56:54

but otherwise I can't say it's illegal, in my view.

1:56:56

But there were other things in category three

1:57:00

that I thought, hey, you know

1:57:02

forget the Geneva conventions.

1:57:04

Let's just talk about U.S. law.

1:57:06

You know, this violates U.S. law.

1:57:08

So we, you know,

1:57:13

I expressed that opinion to RJ2,

1:57:17

to our chief of intelligence,

1:57:21

and I expressed it to our commander

1:57:24

who by now, we had gotten...

1:57:26

So I guess timing wise,

1:57:31

while General Hill was now in command.

1:57:32

So whenever General Hill got there

1:57:35

and I think it was late Summer.

1:57:36

So this had to be sometime in the late Summer, early Fall,

1:57:39

this event,

1:57:41

maybe you could help me out with the date,

1:57:44

but whatever it was.

1:57:45

So I expressed it to him.

1:57:47

He looked at it and said,

1:57:50

yeah, I agree that, I'm troubled by some of these things.

1:57:52

I think, I don't remember exactly

1:57:58

which one kind of jumped out,

1:58:00

but I remember he even said I'm particularly troubled,

1:58:01

maybe it was the, you know, using dogs,

1:58:03

military dogs, you know, tact dogs to intimidate

1:58:05

obviously not to actually turn them loose, but to intimidate

1:58:08

with the barking and growling and all that.

1:58:10

I don't know.

1:58:12

But this was the list that contained that,

1:58:14

and it contained the waterboarding,

1:58:16

it contained a number of other threats to life

1:58:17

the rest of the lives of your family, things like that.

1:58:19

And so he asked me to put a memo together, which I did,

1:58:22

and you know, the way you work on that stuff,

1:58:28

is you put the memo,

1:58:29

and in those days you use a floppy disc

1:58:30

so that they can make, so that his staff,

1:58:32

his immediate, you know personal staff

1:58:35

can make whatever edits he wanted to the thing.

1:58:37

So I put the hard copy in there.

1:58:39

I put the floppy disc in there and send it up.

1:58:41

And then he ultimately sent a memo.

1:58:44

It had been modified somewhat from what we gave him

1:58:47

but basically he sent it back to the chairman saying

1:58:49

I am concerned with some of the interrogation techniques

1:58:52

that are enhanced interrogation techniques.

1:58:57

And, you know, it left the operational,

1:59:00

it left the task force level to us,

1:59:06

it left the operational level

1:59:08

went up to the strategic level.

1:59:09

And then that's where it got into the realm

1:59:10

of you know, the politics of it to some degree.

1:59:13

Now, as I mentioned to you

1:59:16

we have the different levels,

1:59:18

and so I feel confident that I could go

1:59:20

to the judge advocate general of the army,

1:59:23

and at the time was Major General Tom Romig

1:59:25

and the deputy judge advocate general of the army,

1:59:31

General Marshawn.

1:59:38

And to one of my mentors that I had known

1:59:40

for a very long time in the army JAG Corps,

1:59:42

who was really a real knowledgeable

1:59:44

experienced international law guy,

1:59:49

who've been doing it for many, many decades actually

1:59:51

and go to them and say, hey I just sent this memo up

1:59:56

on this issue, which is really troubling.

1:59:59

So, you know, heads up be on the lookout.

2:00:02

And here's what I said.

2:00:06

Or here's what we said, here's what the boss said.

2:00:08

I mean, I may have dropped.

2:00:12

And they said, okay, you know,

2:00:13

we'll be on the lookout for it.

2:00:17

And it was, I was actually more concerned about that

2:00:19

than the whole thing about inviting ICRC.

2:00:26

Because when that happened, it was all,

2:00:27

it was also fast, first of all,

2:00:30

and second I did to some degree I guess,

2:00:31

I was ignorant of what was happening back in Washington

2:00:34

in terms of what people were thinking and planning.

2:00:38

And I didn't know.

2:00:40

So, but this, by this time,

2:00:42

I was very concerned because it was obvious

2:00:45

what they wanted to do.

2:00:47

And, you know, I went home, you know, my wife is here,

2:00:48

and I went home and I told her, I said, you know

2:00:53

I didn't go into any details obviously

2:00:56

because it was classified information.

2:00:57

But I just said, you know, today, you know,

2:00:59

an issue came up having to do

2:01:00

with the treatment of these guys

2:01:01

and you know, we sent a memo forward,

2:01:02

but you know, my point to her was, you know,

2:01:06

I don't know how this is going to play out,

2:01:11

but if it plays out the bad way, then you know

2:01:12

I think it's time to retire and, you know,

2:01:18

find something else to do.

2:01:21

You know, fortunately, fortunately,

2:01:23

it took a long time and I was not privy

2:01:26

to what was happening in Washington,

2:01:29

but I do know that the uniformed judge advocate generals

2:01:31

not just the army one, but the Air Force

2:01:35

and the Navy and the Marine,

2:01:36

you know, the senior uniformed lawyers

2:01:38

as well as Mr. Maura,

2:01:41

who was the Navy General Counsel at the time,

2:01:45

all engaged with the DOD General Counsel's office

2:01:49

and with the inter-agency with justice,

2:01:53

with state department

2:01:55

and ultimately whatever was happening,

2:01:57

which I was not privy to in Guantanamo,

2:02:02

they I believe were successful at ultimately, you know

2:02:09

putting a stop to it,

2:02:13

at least by the military people, you know,

2:02:15

whatever the military forces were were being ordered to do.

2:02:18

I certainly don't know what was being done

2:02:23

by any other agencies or what was being done.

2:02:25

You know, there were some detainees

2:02:28

that were transferred out of Guantanamo,

2:02:31

that I know because, you know,

2:02:33

we were concerned about...

2:02:38

We weren't told where they're going,

2:02:41

but we were concerned,

2:02:42

I mean, in my staff, we were concerned about,

2:02:43

well what if they're going someplace where, you know,

2:02:45

they may not be treated well or something like that.

2:02:48

I mean, tortured.

2:02:50

And so we actually developed a document that you know,

2:02:53

when we the military were handing custody over,

2:02:58

it's like a chain of custody, if you will,

2:03:01

for these people, that whoever,

2:03:03

to whatever, you know, other U.S. government agency

2:03:07

or foreign government, whatever,

2:03:12

anybody that was taking physical custody

2:03:13

and responsibility for these people, you know,

2:03:17

that we prepared a document that basically said

2:03:20

you understand that there's a responsibility

2:03:23

to maintain these people and you know, protect them

2:03:26

and so on and so forth.

2:03:28

So, yeah.

2:03:31

Peter

Two quick questions.

2:03:33

One is, do you know if John you worked on that memo

2:03:34

with Diane Beaver?

2:03:37

Do you know if she was influenced?

2:03:37

-

I do not know.

2:03:39

That's a very good question. I don't know.

2:03:41

Peter

And with General Miller, when did he come down?

2:03:42

Did you interact with him?

2:03:46

-

A little, not as much as with General Dunn Levy,

2:03:47

General Leonard or General Bacchus,

2:03:51

but General Miller showed up.

2:03:53

If I recall the sequence, I think General Bacchus left

2:03:55

and then shortly thereafter, I don't know,

2:03:59

two weeks, something like that,

2:04:03

but at some point then General Dunn Levy left

2:04:05

and then General Miller came in

2:04:07

and he took unitary command so that the two task forces

2:04:09

were blended into one.

2:04:12

Before he went down there, I know he came by SOUTHCOM

2:04:14

and I remember he came by my office and we talked

2:04:19

and I basically tried to explain to him, you know

2:04:23

everything I've been telling you now

2:04:26

in terms of some of the frictions that had occurred

2:04:27

and competing interests and so on and so forth

2:04:29

and that, you know, you'll have your own lawyer

2:04:33

but we're here obviously to support you.

2:04:35

And clearly, I mean, this is come out quite a lot

2:04:38

that one of the issues with JTF 170

2:04:44

which under General Dunn Levy,

2:04:47

is that he had direct access to DOD

2:04:48

and you know, in the military,

2:04:53

we're very much about following the chain of command.

2:04:56

And so by going directly to DOD

2:04:59

he was bypassing the operational command of SOUTHCOM

2:05:01

and he was bypassing joint staff

2:05:05

because we then sent stuff up to the joint staff.

2:05:06

So that created enormous angst and consternation

2:05:09

and problems all the way around.

2:05:15

And so that was, I think one of the things that General Hill

2:05:18

made it a very strong point to General Miller is, you know,

2:05:24

you got to follow down,

2:05:27

Now General Hill has got four stars.

2:05:27

It was a very different dynamic, you know,

2:05:29

when he got there,

2:05:32

in terms of being able to have more influence, I guess

2:05:34

directly over General Dunn Levy.

2:05:38

And then, you know, the General Miller...

2:05:42

I'll be honest with you,

2:05:44

I didn't have much interaction with General Miller

2:05:46

personally, other than like I said

2:05:48

that particular visit to my office

2:05:51

and then maybe a few others here and there.

2:05:52

I think I may have gone down to Guantanamo once

2:05:56

when he was down there.

2:05:57

I don't recall exactly,

2:05:58

but his lawyer who I can't remember right now, the name,

2:05:59

but he replaced...

2:06:04

I mean, General Diane Beaver left,

2:06:08

and then somebody else came in and, you know,

2:06:09

we communicated fairly well with that lawyer.

2:06:13

Peter

Were you still in SOUTHCOM

2:06:19

when the information came out about our detainee 63,

2:06:23

the person who is considered the 20th highjacker

2:06:32

and how he was treated?

2:06:35

Do you know that Time Magazine issued the log

2:06:37

to show his treatment?

2:06:40

And I can't remember what exactly when that was

2:06:42

if you were so present then?

2:06:44

-

I was not personally involved in any kind of discussions

2:06:47

about, you know, this particular detainee.

2:06:51

I will tell you that within my staff, Mark Gengras,

2:06:53

Lieutenant Colonel by now, Mark Gengras,

2:06:57

I kind of made him...

2:07:00

Because like I said, we had other stuff going on

2:07:02

and we could not all focus on Guantanamo.

2:07:04

So Mark became sort of the lead within our office

2:07:07

for Guantanamo issues.

2:07:10

And he developed a very close relationship with RJ2,

2:07:12

our intelligence people.

2:07:16

There are certain classifications

2:07:19

of intelligence information, you know,

2:07:21

that are on a need to know basis, a top secret.

2:07:25

Now I hold, or at the time I held

2:07:26

a top secret security clearance that doesn't...

2:07:30

But that just means that I was eligible

2:07:32

to be read into certain activities and certain programs.

2:07:34

In order to not diffuse that kind of information too much,

2:07:39

our policy or the intelligence policy was that, you know,

2:07:43

within the JAG, you only needed one person to do this.

2:07:48

So I had other programs that had nothing to do

2:07:52

with Guantanamo, that I had to do

2:07:54

because it required somebody of a more senior rank

2:07:57

or required the staff judge advocate.

2:08:00

But for this, you know, Mark had developed

2:08:03

a very good relationship with RJ2 at SOUTHCOM.

2:08:06

And I trusted him and I still do that, you know

2:08:11

that he was going to do the right thing.

2:08:13

And so he had a lot of interaction with them.

2:08:15

With regard to detainees 63 or what may have happened.

2:08:17

Like I said, I feel, I don't know for a fact

2:08:21

but I feel pretty comfortable in thinking that

2:08:25

at some point once that,

2:08:29

when that enhanced interrogation technique memo came up

2:08:30

and we sent it up, my boss ended up basically saying,

2:08:36

Hey I have problems with this, you know,

2:08:39

I think from what I have been told,

2:08:42

not that I know firsthand

2:08:44

but from what I've been told them, what I've read that.

2:08:45

In fact, somebody up there made a decision

2:08:47

to begin to implement that.

2:08:50

I know there was a lot of pressure to begin,

2:08:53

even though we were being,

2:08:55

and I was being specifically pointed out

2:08:57

for being a roadblock on some of this stuff,

2:08:59

but that some of this stuff I've subsequently learned,

2:09:02

you know, were started.

2:09:06

And the judge advocate generals as well as Mr. Maura,

2:09:07

and I don't know who else,

2:09:14

but we're also led to believe

2:09:15

that there was going to be a commission

2:09:17

or some sort of study or working group or something

2:09:20

to figure out what we were going to do.

2:09:23

And in the meantime,

2:09:25

none of this was going to be implemented,

2:09:27

when in fact I think, the order had been given

2:09:29

to begin to implement it.

2:09:32

And maybe it was on this guy, on detainees 63,

2:09:33

whereas the rest of us all thought that,

2:09:36

that it wasn't happening.

2:09:39

And then it somehow came out that,

2:09:40

Hey, you know this really is happening.

2:09:43

And then those guys with all the stars on their shoulders

2:09:45

and Mr. Mauro as the senior Navy counsel all said,

2:09:48

Hey, timeout, you know, this is...

2:09:52

And then that's when things...

2:09:55

At least from the military uniform

2:09:58

interrogation thing changed.

2:09:59

So what that time period was, I don't know.

2:10:03

I don't think it was very long where,

2:10:05

and whatever, you know, whatever was going on,

2:10:07

this guy, if it's what I think you're thinking about it

2:10:12

and I've read the same articles you have with regards to,

2:10:15

you know, waterboarding or something like that,

2:10:17

you know, we were not made privy to that.

2:10:20

And you know what I've learned,

2:10:27

I've learned after the fact that, you know

2:10:28

when I read about it in the press.

2:10:30

Peter

Yeah, so I mean, I think,

2:10:34

I don't know how much more we have,

2:10:36

but looking back from your perspective today

2:10:37

I mean, you probably see a very different picture

2:10:40

of Guantanamo from what you were in,

2:10:42

when you were so involved in other items too,

2:10:45

like you said, Columbia and such,

2:10:49

and so much chaos was going on and things are moving so fast

2:10:51

and it's a need to know as well.

2:10:54

So at some level, now you have a much better view

2:10:57

of what happened and then you did there.

2:11:01

-

In all honesty, I have not made it a point to become

2:11:04

like a, you know, by reading a lot on this,

2:11:07

or, you know, some of it is I suppose,

2:11:11

I mean, obviously it's by choice,

2:11:21

but from there, I got very busy, as I said, you know,

2:11:23

going to school or being a XO of the Army General Counsel

2:11:26

or being a senior lawyer in Afghanistan

2:11:31

where I had other detainees issues to deal with

2:11:32

at Bagram and other places.

2:11:35

And where we did have some instances of abuse,

2:11:37

well we did prosecute the people who were involved

2:11:39

in that abuse, abuses if it happened more than once,

2:11:41

but then you know, but then when I retired,

2:11:45

you know I did not make it sort of a point in my life

2:11:49

to stay informed if you will.

2:11:57

So to answer your question, I guess is,

2:12:00

in the 18 months basically from January of '02

2:12:03

until the time I left in July of '03,

2:12:08

there was a lot of change that took place.

2:12:13

I mean, already within that timeframe

2:12:15

from absolute chaotic,

2:12:17

oh my God, all these people are coming,

2:12:19

where are we going to put them, you know

2:12:21

to at the end, one of the things that,

2:12:23

my legal staff was pushing for,

2:12:28

and that I was lobbying for,

2:12:30

not in concert with,

2:12:36

but certainly with the support of the ICRC,

2:12:37

with the support of others was

2:12:39

look, it became obvious after some time

2:12:42

after a few months, actually, not even weeks

2:12:45

that some of these guys shouldn't be there, you know,

2:12:48

that they just shouldn't be there.

2:12:50

They had no business being there.

2:12:51

They were at the wrong place at the wrong time,

2:12:55

and it ended up there.

2:12:56

Or somebody ratted them out,

2:12:57

because they had a vendetta against them, or God knows what

2:12:58

but the point is they shouldn't be there.

2:13:00

All right.

2:13:03

Well, you know, once you have these guys

2:13:04

under these circumstances,

2:13:05

it's not so easy to put them back

2:13:06

depending on the nation they're coming from.

2:13:08

And, you know, the wiggers was a huge mess, you know

2:13:12

what are you gonna do with them?

2:13:13

And so now we had built Camp Delta,

2:13:14

which was the, you know,

2:13:22

we went from X-Ray fairly quickly into Camp Delta

2:13:23

which was a kind of a maximum security prison,

2:13:24

essentially were each detainee had their own cell,

2:13:31

which, you know had their own bunk and toilet

2:13:32

and running water and stuff like that.

2:13:36

And there were some cells that were, you know

2:13:39

isolation cells where they couldn't communicate with others

2:13:40

but most of them were open where they could talk to

2:13:41

at least the guy at the next cell and the guy and the other

2:13:47

on the other side, but they were individual.

2:13:50

And, but it was still very, very manpower intensive

2:13:51

because to get anybody out of the cell to go exercise

2:13:52

for example, or to go take a shower,

2:14:00

was always, you know two guards was the protocol

2:14:01

and the handcuffs and the whole thing.

2:14:01

And then one guy, one on each side and you escort him down

2:14:05

and blah, blah, blah.

2:14:08

Very manpower intensive.

2:14:09

And it limited the amount of time they could exercise

2:14:10

or shower or anything,

2:14:15

and the food was brought to them,

2:14:16

so it was intensive to...

2:14:18

All right, now from a legal standpoint,

2:14:20

the intelligence people, the criteria was,

2:14:23

if they no longer have intelligence value,

2:14:27

and if they're no longer a threat to the United States

2:14:29

I.e, we don't really believe that these guys

2:14:32

are going to go back on the battlefield

2:14:34

based on everything.

2:14:36

Again not my call, Intel guys.

2:14:37

If they meet those two criteria, then it's like,

2:14:40

all right, how do we get them out of here?

2:14:42

How do we get them home?

2:14:43

And in many cases, like I said, it was very difficult

2:14:45

to get them home and it was gonna take a long time.

2:14:48

So I talked to,

2:14:51

I think General Dunn Levy was certainly still there,

2:14:54

maybe General Bacchus was there still.

2:14:58

So this would have been sometime still in late '02

2:15:00

or mid '02, something like that.

2:15:03

I think it was mid '02,

2:15:07

because we had already started to figure out

2:15:08

that all of these guys shouldn't be here.

2:15:09

Well,

2:15:12

remember the bubble chart with the green, yellow, red?

2:15:14

Well, if these guys really are not a threat to us anymore

2:15:16

and if they don't have any intelligence value anymore

2:15:19

then why don't we build a traditional, more traditional,

2:15:22

not entirely, not exactly,

2:15:26

but much more traditional facility for them

2:15:27

that they could be in

2:15:31

because that would be more consistent

2:15:34

with Geneva Conventions and all that.

2:15:36

We pushed that for,

2:15:37

or we argued that for a while

2:15:40

and didn't make much headway.

2:15:43

I have all the documentation on this.

2:15:45

I mean, not somewhere, I guess, I don't know,

2:15:47

but eventually, sometime by early '03, I changed approach

2:15:52

or I changed the way that I was advocating for this

2:15:58

from a, you know,

2:16:02

I should've put a legal principle position,

2:16:05

which it is,

2:16:10

but more from the practical standpoint of look,

2:16:11

if we build a facility where they can basically, you know,

2:16:14

where they live, like in a barracks, you know,

2:16:19

kinda like things tall, like 17,

2:16:21

if they live in a barracks, you know,

2:16:22

you put a big wire around it

2:16:24

so that if they want to be outside, they can be outside.

2:16:26

If you want to be inside, they're inside.

2:16:28

Think of it, and at this point, you know,

2:16:30

we were pretty...

2:16:32

Everybody knew we were going to kick...

2:16:35

The war was going to start in Iraq

2:16:36

and we were going to be really short of people

2:16:39

because last time we fought in Iraq

2:16:41

the one thing we didn't have was enough MPs,

2:16:42

so they're real limited commodity.

2:16:45

So think about how much of a savings that is,

2:16:47

if you can just have these guys basically on mingling around

2:16:50

and say, and you put a little boho, a little hut,

2:16:53

you know where they can sit under the shade,

2:16:56

play backgammon and kick a soccer ball around,

2:16:57

we don't care.

2:16:58

We're still not going to give them a kitchen.

2:17:01

We're still not going to give them knives.

2:17:03

But when we bring the food, we bring in one big pot

2:17:04

and just later lay it all out, it's a lot faster

2:17:07

than making individual little airplane meals,

2:17:09

you know for these guys.

2:17:11

So I made the argument that

2:17:13

it was going to be saving a huge amount of manpower.

2:17:15

And that was, that was big.

2:17:18

That got a lot of attention.

2:17:21

And then the other one was,

2:17:23

if you guys are going to...

2:17:25

If these guys are still in the same location

2:17:26

with everybody else in their same individual little cells

2:17:29

and they talk amongst themselves, so they know,

2:17:31

and they know why the hell is this guy here?

2:17:34

He's not really with us.

2:17:37

I mean, you know, he's wrong place at the wrong time.

2:17:40

Why is he still with us and all that?

2:17:43

Or the guy who's marginal

2:17:45

who was just maybe a trigger puller and really,

2:17:46

yeah, okay, he was involved with the Taliban

2:17:49

or he was involved with, but he was a very low guy.

2:17:51

And if you don't give them some sort of a goal

2:17:54

some sort of a, hey there's a light

2:17:58

at the end of the tunnel kind of thing,

2:18:01

then what's the incentive to talk?

2:18:04

So the Intel guys agreed that,

2:18:06

all right if we create this other facility

2:18:08

which is clearly better and more comfortable to be in

2:18:10

and it's seen as sort of a halfway house

2:18:14

to being released,

2:18:17

then that might actually incentivize some of these guys

2:18:20

with not a stick, but with a carrot that, you know

2:18:23

it behooves you to cooperate.

2:18:27

Ultimately the bottom line is they built Camp Four,

2:18:30

that's what's what they called it.

2:18:32

And that was basically one big wire

2:18:36

and they had four, you know,

2:18:38

four barracks like at each corner.

2:18:40

And then it was like subdivided

2:18:42

so that people would stay in their barracks,

2:18:43

but each barrack would have a time

2:18:46

that where they could be outside and all that kind of stuff.

2:18:47

And, you know, from what they were told me

2:18:50

I never actually witnessed this happening.

2:18:53

But from what I was told is that

2:18:54

when somebody had sort of crossed the threshold

2:18:57

to where we're going to put them in Camp Four,

2:18:59

it became like a ceremony where they would take, you know,

2:19:01

they would change their orange jumpsuit to a white robe.

2:19:03

And all the other detainees would applaud

2:19:08

as this person would be escorted by just one MP, you know

2:19:11

to the new facility and all that kind of thing.

2:19:16

Peter

And so it was your idea.

2:19:21

-

Well, you know, our idea in my office was

2:19:24

why are we still keeping these people here,

2:19:29

when all along we were going

2:19:31

with the green, yellow, red thing.

2:19:33

If these guys should be basically having

2:19:35

a bunch of green bubbles all the way across the board

2:19:37

because they don't belong here anymore,

2:19:38

or it was a mistake they have them here in the first place

2:19:40

or whatever,

2:19:42

not our call, their call.

2:19:43

Our Intel guys are saying,

2:19:44

we don't want this guy here anymore.

2:19:46

Then, why not grant them the kind of benefits and privileges

2:19:47

that are as similar as possible to the Geneva conventions.

2:19:53

So it started with kind of a principled legal view,

2:19:58

but in order to to have it resonate to some degree,

2:20:04

there had to be some sort of practical advantages

2:20:06

to it as well.

2:20:10

Not because people were resistant to it,

2:20:11

it was just like, you know,

2:20:13

everybody's busy and there's stuff going on.

2:20:14

And it's like, no, don't...

2:20:16

Peter

Did you deal with people

2:20:19

who on hunger strikes and the force feeding ?

2:20:21

-

Yeah, I mean, you know,

2:20:25

I didn't go down there and do it myself,

2:20:27

but I mean, the issue came up to us.

2:20:28

What are we gonna do with these guys?

2:20:29

And so the legal question came up

2:20:31

can we do force feeding?

2:20:33

And our answer was, yes.

2:20:36

Peter

Did you know about the Tokyo convention

2:20:38

which kind of said what it is,

2:20:43

I don't think the years of salary

2:20:45

but which we says that maybe you can't force feed people

2:20:47

if they want to choose to die by not eating that's okay?

2:20:51

-

Well, like, as you mentioned,

2:20:55

we were not signatories to that, number one,

2:20:57

number two, you know what, again,

2:20:59

from if the intelligence guy is telling me

2:21:01

this guy is important and we need to have his information,

2:21:05

you know, can we keep you know,

2:21:08

no I'm talking about torturing him, basically.

2:21:11

Can we keep him from killing himself?

2:21:13

From you know, intelligence, operational perspective,

2:21:16

this this isn't about just a normal prison someplace.

2:21:20

That's not what we're talking about here.

2:21:24

It's not, you know, it's not San Quentin, it's not Alcatraz.

2:21:26

These are people that our intelligence people

2:21:32

believed had valuable information

2:21:36

vital to the national security of the United States.

2:21:38

So, no, we were not gonna let these guys die.

2:21:42

Peter

Did you ever speak to a detainee on your own?

2:21:48

-

No.

2:21:51

I mean, not in Guantanamo,

2:21:56

I mean, in Afghanistan, I did.

2:21:58

Peter

And I guess I'll just ask you the EARTH program.

2:21:59

Was that also through your position

2:22:05

in terms of you have to approve that or is that a term

2:22:08

where they would, if some detainee didn't act in a way

2:22:11

that some military person wanted them too,

2:22:16

they would bring in six men in riot gear

2:22:19

and pull them out of their cell?

2:22:23

Mason, pull them out of the cell and apparently beat him.

2:22:26

At least that's what we were told by detainees

2:22:29

what happened if they didn't do

2:22:31

whatever they were asked to do.

2:22:34

The emergency reaction force.

2:22:37

-

Yeah,

2:22:39

but an emergency reaction force, is there to,

2:22:40

like if there was some sort of riot,

2:22:43

if there was some sort of physical altercation

2:22:45

where a detainee could not be controlled

2:22:47

let's say by one or two of the Mps,

2:22:50

then yeah, these guys go in.

2:22:53

But to say that they were then to be beaten,

2:22:54

no, I totally disagree with that.

2:22:58

If you have any evidence of then show it to me.

2:22:59

Because I'm not aware that the policy

2:23:02

now that's not to say that people weren't,

2:23:04

if a scuffle took place,

2:23:06

but you're implying, which I totally disagree with that.

2:23:08

There was a policy in place.

2:23:12

Peter

I don't know if there was policy

2:23:14

I know detainees told us that what happened to them.

2:23:15

And I was just asking if--

2:23:17

-

Did you ask them if they kicked any of the MPS

2:23:19

in the groin?

2:23:22

Or did you ask him if they tried to choke anybody?

2:23:24

I mean--

2:23:27

Peter

Well they said no.

2:23:28

I mean, right.

2:23:29

-

Okay.

2:23:30

-

But, okay.

2:23:31

So yeah, I just,

2:23:32

I thought I'd get it from your viewpoint because clearly--

2:23:33

-

I was aware that there was a quick reaction force

2:23:35

as you would have at any such facility, you know

2:23:37

but there're rules of engagement or like anybody else's,

2:23:42

it's basically to come in with overwhelming force

2:23:45

to quickly put down any kind of disturbance

2:23:49

that might be starting to happen.

2:23:51

And, you know, to say that then, okay.

2:23:55

So I mean, that's what their purpose is.

2:24:00

If they went beyond that or if there's any particular case

2:24:01

where anything went beyond that was not justified,

2:24:03

then I would presume that there was, you know

2:24:07

some sort of witnesses or video or something of that,

2:24:11

and then we would have done something about it.

2:24:13

During my watch when I was there,

2:24:15

I don't recall ever having any accusation,

2:24:17

And again, I'm not saying that it didn't happen.

2:24:22

I'm just saying, it never got to our level

2:24:24

where there was an accusation made

2:24:26

that this quick reaction force was going in

2:24:28

and somehow designed to beat or abuse of anybody.

2:24:31

Peter

Good.

2:24:37

You know, I have to say you've been incredibly valuable

2:24:40

and just in what you've been giving us

2:24:43

because we haven't gotten

2:24:45

a lot of what you've been telling us.

2:24:47

This has been great.

2:24:48

This is something I have,

2:24:50

I might have a few more questions

2:24:51

but there's certainly a lot to pull the work

2:24:52

that you want to address before.

2:24:54

Because I kind of...

2:24:57

Excuse me for one minute, Johnny how's that time?

2:24:59

Johnny

We have 25 minutes.

2:25:01

Peter

Okay.

2:25:02

-

No, you know, it was just, again,

2:25:03

just really reiterating what I've said before.

2:25:06

There were a lot of complexities to this.

2:25:10

I mean, even things like, you know,

2:25:13

if an attack is coming from the sea, you know,

2:25:14

then law of the sea questions,

2:25:16

I spent a fair amount of time on the very interesting case

2:25:17

of Guantanamo and the fact that it has

2:25:20

a very different perimeter in terms of, you know

2:25:22

most places you have a 12-mile territorial,

2:25:26

while in Guantanamo it was actually three.

2:25:28

And then because of the treaty with the Cubans

2:25:30

and just dealing with the Cubans and you know,

2:25:32

those kinds of things.

2:25:35

Peter

That's really important that you emphasize that,

2:25:36

I'm glad you did, that in fact,

2:25:39

people were really worried about that.

2:25:41

-

Oh yes.

2:25:43

Oh yeah, you know,

2:25:44

whether it was from airborne or seaborne attack

2:25:45

that was a very serious concern, you know

2:25:49

the issues about what happens if somebody dies, you know

2:25:56

the mortuary affairs, what are we gonna deal?

2:26:00

How are we gonna deal with that?

2:26:03

Peter

Did suicides come up?

2:26:06

-

Yeah, of course.

2:26:07

I mean, the potential suicide to making sure

2:26:08

that they didn't, that's just did.

2:26:10

Keeping them from having a sharp instrument

2:26:12

was not just because of the potential of attacking our guys.

2:26:13

It was potential of attacking each other.

2:26:16

These are people from all different parts of the world

2:26:19

and there was...

2:26:22

Or from just killing themselves.

2:26:24

The suicide was basically, the hunger strike

2:26:26

you know, there was one detainee that was very, very old.

2:26:30

God knows how old he was, but he was very old.

2:26:33

And, you know, we feared,

2:26:35

he might just pass away of natural causes.

2:26:36

I'm sure you've heard that most of them,

2:26:39

the majority of them gained a fair amount of weight

2:26:40

because they weren't doing anything.

2:26:42

And they were getting a lot of, you know, good diet.

2:26:43

We modified the diet to be less, you know,

2:26:46

based on complaints that they were giving the ICRC

2:26:49

we modified the diet to be less, you know, health conscious

2:26:52

and more what they wanted.

2:26:56

You know, the questions about prayer.

2:27:00

And there were a lot of issues concerning

2:27:02

the chaplain, the Muslim chaplain that we had down there.

2:27:05

We had several, but I mean, the first one that came in

2:27:09

and they were, you know, there were issues about that.

2:27:11

Peter

Were you involved in that GMC issues?

2:27:13

-

I'm sorry, what issues?

2:27:15

Peter

GMC, right?

2:27:17

-

Yeah. Yeah.

2:27:18

To some degree, but I mean that quickly became...

2:27:20

That got elevated to to the political level

2:27:22

slash strategic level.

2:27:24

But initially, you know, the questions about confidentiality

2:27:26

between a chaplain and a detainee

2:27:31

and what is his role?

2:27:33

Is he there really as primarily an advisor to the commander

2:27:35

or a religious person for the detainees?

2:27:38

I mean, there were a lot of inherent conflicts and friction

2:27:42

in a lot of this stuff, because it was all new.

2:27:47

This is not, you know, World War II.

2:27:49

This was not even the Gulf War

2:27:54

where we had fairly clear understanding of how you engage

2:27:55

how you deal with prisoners of war

2:28:01

from a nation that is engaged in a war with you.

2:28:03

Peter

I'm sorry, please.

2:28:10

-

No, no, I'll stop there.

2:28:12

Otherwise I could--

2:28:13

Peter

No, yeah.

2:28:14

Well, I'm just thinking about the chaplain.

2:28:15

So what was his role?

2:28:16

-

His primary role was,

2:28:19

he went down there to be an advisor to the commander

2:28:22

on matters concerning Islam and the detainees.

2:28:26

And he was told that,

2:28:31

several times,

2:28:33

by several people

2:28:34

including me,

2:28:36

within bounds, of course,

2:28:41

I mean, you know, don't be getting into stuff with detainees

2:28:43

don't go down that road

2:28:48

if you don't want to have to disclose it.

2:28:50

So it's, you know, use your common sense,

2:28:51

and that's the thing.

2:28:53

These guys were kind of young.

2:28:54

Peter

So interesting.

2:28:57

Okay. Is there something else?

2:28:59

-

No, I'll answer any other questions

2:29:01

but I think that's, you know, those natural frictions

2:29:03

between the military and civilian intelligence

2:29:06

versus the law enforcement community upfront

2:29:09

at the beginning,

2:29:11

and then later on sort of that conflict

2:29:12

between the military legal community,

2:29:14

the senior judge advocate general's

2:29:16

and the civilian legal folks.

2:29:18

Peter

Did you ever sit in on an interrogation?

2:29:23

-

No.

2:29:26

Peter

And when the inches came down,

2:29:29

that you had no control over what agencies would come down

2:29:30

right, I mean, they could--

2:29:33

-

I wouldn't even know.

2:29:34

Peter

You didn't even know.

2:29:35

And when people were transferred, I mean, again

2:29:37

if the people above you did that, you had really no say?

2:29:42

-

That's correct.

2:29:46

At the very beginning, I remember we prepared the document

2:29:47

that was supposed to be executed, that transferred custody

2:29:50

and it, you know, I mean, I was trying to be,

2:29:55

I was trying to the extent that it...

2:29:59

To some extent, and by this time, by this time, you know

2:30:02

whatever potential innocence or naivete I may have had,

2:30:06

you know, had pretty much evaporated.

2:30:10

So this document was intended within what we could

2:30:12

to try and protect the detainee to some degree,

2:30:17

but also it was a matter to protect us as well.

2:30:20

You know, that in bias I mean, U.S. Southern command

2:30:22

my boss saying, look, you know,

2:30:26

you're saying that you're going to take

2:30:30

good care of these guys.

2:30:32

So, you know, but I remember preparing the form

2:30:34

and I think I remember maybe one or two being executed

2:30:39

actually executed, but then after that

2:30:42

it all just, I don't remember any more after that.

2:30:43

I mean, so I don't know if they just stopped doing it,

2:30:46

or if it was at a time when I had left

2:30:48

and moved on to my next assignment, I don't know.

2:30:52

Peter

You ever on any of the flights

2:30:54

that took these men to--

2:30:55

-

No, no.

2:30:57

Peter

And when you mentioned the weakers before

2:30:59

why was that early on?

2:31:01

People realized that weakers are really not--

2:31:05

-

No, that I'll be honest with you

2:31:07

that I didn't really, to me personally,

2:31:08

I didn't realize that it became an issue

2:31:11

until I got to Afghanistan.

2:31:13

Peter

And when now they came that was

2:31:17

you were already up from Guantanamo.,

2:31:18

because that was--

2:31:20

-

I was at the school.

2:31:21

I was at the National War College.

2:31:22

Yeah.

2:31:24

Peter

So looking back, Colonel,

2:31:25

if, you know, did you expect Guantanamo was gonna be closed

2:31:30

at some point?

2:31:33

Did you think that this was a short term operation?

2:31:34

-

No. Short-term no.

2:31:37

Someday closed, yes.

2:31:40

I remember at the very, towards the very beginning

2:31:43

of this thing, back in January of '02,

2:31:46

we were given the mission to design a courthouse

2:31:48

for the the trials.

2:31:52

And so the engineer and I were told, you know,

2:31:55

you're the lawyer you figure out what you need

2:32:01

in a courthouse.

2:32:02

You're the engineer, you figure how to make it happen.

2:32:03

So the two of us, we went to his room and his office

2:32:06

there had a conference table

2:32:08

and we were got a piece of paper

2:32:09

and we started sketching things out.

2:32:10

And I do remember thinking, I said,

2:32:13

I told this guy, I said,

2:32:17

I'll retire before these guys ever get prosecuted.

2:32:19

It turned out to be true.

2:32:22

I mean, actually, you know

2:32:24

to have a final sort of con...

2:32:26

And my point being that, you know,

2:32:29

we're still trying to figure out,

2:32:30

you're still busy building cages

2:32:32

and I'm still busy trying to figure out their status.

2:32:34

And, and we're being tasked to, you know

2:32:36

get ready for the trials.

2:32:39

It just seemed like it was premature a lot by a lot.

2:32:41

We did anyway.

2:32:46

I mean, we drew it out and ultimately, you know

2:32:48

ultimately that was, that's what was built

2:32:50

Peter

But some people were being held early on

2:32:54

for military tribunals.

2:32:57

So there was some thinking

2:32:59

-

Oh yeah, no, from the very beginning,

2:33:00

of course we captured people who we believed

2:33:01

had been responsible for the attacks and so on and so forth.

2:33:04

And so at some point there would be a trial

2:33:08

a military tribunal, whatever, they hadn't even decided

2:33:12

what they were going to do yet.

2:33:14

I mean, I'm talking January of '02.

2:33:15

So it just seemed very premature,

2:33:17

to be talking about building a structure

2:33:19

to conduct these hearings,

2:33:22

but we did.

2:33:24

Peter

Looking back to, I think I know your answer.

2:33:28

I think it'd be interesting for our viewers,

2:33:31

if you were in charge, would you have given them status

2:33:34

or did you think we actually did the best we could

2:33:37

given that it was a new type of war?

2:33:40

-

I would have conducted article five tribunals

2:33:45

and on a case by case basis, you know,

2:33:48

determined whether or not

2:33:51

or what kind of status they would deserve.

2:33:52

I mean, to sort of in a blanket way,

2:33:57

just throw everybody paint everybody

2:34:01

with the same paintbrush

2:34:03

didn't seem at the time.

2:34:06

And, I'm more convinced of it now

2:34:09

to have been the most prudent way to proceed.

2:34:11

I think if we'd had done,

2:34:14

if we'd have taken the time and trouble

2:34:15

to have done the hearings

2:34:17

which ultimately later the Supreme Court said

2:34:18

you got to do them anyway, you know,

2:34:18

but if we'd had done those upfront

2:34:22

then perhaps some of those guys would have,

2:34:25

who clearly shouldn't have been there in the first place

2:34:27

could have immediately been ejected

2:34:28

and sent back home without the difficulty

2:34:30

of having been in Guantanamo for a few months

2:34:33

and then being sent home, which now is much more difficult.

2:34:35

So, and yeah,

2:34:39

I suspect we would've found some that,

2:34:41

Hey, you know what,

2:34:43

this guy was just basically a trigger puller.

2:34:44

You know, he's appealed obviously.

2:34:46

This other guy here, okay,

2:34:47

maybe he is a POW, but he committed, you know

2:34:49

these work he committed,

2:34:52

or he's suspected of having committed these war crimes

2:34:53

while engaged in combat, you know

2:34:57

against the Mujahideen or against the whoever.

2:35:00

I mean, the point is some sort of a triage

2:35:03

kind of initial screening of people

2:35:06

so that you're not throwing them

2:35:09

all into Camp X-Ray initially,

2:35:11

and then into this maximum security cell system

2:35:13

which was, you know, costly

2:35:16

in terms of manpower and resources and everything else

2:35:18

Peter

Any other, did you think Obama

2:35:23

and his team is gonna close Guantanamo,

2:35:24

or if he was going to succeed?

2:35:27

-

I thought it was gonna take him some time,

2:35:30

but yeah, I thought he would.

2:35:32

I was surprised, I guess,

2:35:38

maybe disappointed at the lack of political will

2:35:40

to shut it down and actually put these guys,

2:35:45

bring them into a maximum security facility

2:35:49

in the United States.

2:35:52

I know that there were at the time

2:35:53

that this debate was going on

2:35:55

and there were arguments about,

2:35:57

well these guys are just too dangerous.

2:35:58

I'm thinking really, you know, come on,

2:36:00

I would put, you know,

2:36:05

five of our most regular dangerous people

2:36:07

against the, you know 20 of these guys.

2:36:11

And I mean, that seemed to be somewhat

2:36:14

of a disingenuous argument by both sides.

2:36:16

I'm not saying I'm not picking political sides here.

2:36:19

I'm just saying there was a political consensus

2:36:21

that we're not going to bring these guys

2:36:24

to the United States for many reasons.

2:36:25

And I think that's unfortunate

2:36:29

because the stigma of Guantanamo in and of itself

2:36:31

and here we are talking Guantanamo.

2:36:38

There were many many more issues I think

2:36:41

and many more people at Bagram,

2:36:43

nobody talks Bagram.

2:36:45

You know, it's just that this has become

2:36:48

the you know the cause celeb, if you will, to talk about.

2:36:51

And as a result of that,

2:36:56

I think it would be healthy for the United States

2:36:58

and for the rest of the world,

2:37:00

if we were to in fact be able to just shut it down

2:37:03

entirely and move on.

2:37:05

Peter

You know, Bagram is outside

2:37:08

the scope of this project,

2:37:10

and people do know how much bigger it is and such.

2:37:12

And I'm sure you can compare this to say that ,

2:37:16

but perhaps people could understand why Guantanamo

2:37:20

became the essence since it was right after 9/11.

2:37:22

-

Yes, and I hope people can,

2:37:26

again try and put themselves back in the timeframe

2:37:28

of December '01, January, February March of '02,

2:37:30

in terms of the chaos that we were trying to deal with

2:37:35

never having experienced anything like this

2:37:42

dealing with people.

2:37:44

Yes, we were told that these guys were highly dangerous

2:37:45

and you know what I mean,

2:37:47

there was evidence to believe that

2:37:48

and it took some time to segregate

2:37:50

and put them in a, you know centrifical force machine

2:37:53

that kind of separated them out

2:37:57

into the various different kinds.

2:37:59

And some of them in fact are really dangerous people

2:38:01

and deserve to be prosecuted

2:38:02

to the maximum extent of the law.

2:38:06

And other guys, like I said, were, you know,

2:38:08

the wrong place at the wrong time,

2:38:11

and then there's everybody in between .

2:38:12

But it took some time to get that kind of clarity.

2:38:14

Everything was not in focus.

2:38:17

And when it's not, you would be foolish,

2:38:18

irresponsible and criminally negligent.

2:38:22

If you didn't treat everybody initially

2:38:25

as if though they are a major threat,

2:38:27

and then you have responsibility,

2:38:31

I think to immediately begin to try and speed up the process

2:38:32

of figuring out who's there,

2:38:35

that's where the article five tribunals would have helped.

2:38:37

It should have actually been conducted in Afghanistan

2:38:42

before they even got to Guantanamo, I mean,

2:38:44

the article five tribunals I'm talking about.

2:38:47

It should have been held over there.

2:38:48

Peter

Right.

2:38:50

-

Well, at least under, just common sense, you know,

2:38:53

don't...

2:38:56

Peter

Looking back at, listening to you,

2:38:58

I'm thinking, did you like change

2:39:02

as a result of your experiences in Guantanamo?

2:39:03

What did you change? I should say.

2:39:09

-

I don't know. That's a good question.

2:39:15

I suppose, I'd have to ask my wife.

2:39:16

Peter

Well, do you see the world differently

2:39:20

You think after?

2:39:22

-

I have been very privileged to have, you know

2:39:25

through my military career and just because I

2:39:29

when I was younger traveling and whatnot

2:39:31

but I've been to 61 different countries around the world.

2:39:33

I've been, like I said, I was involved in this,

2:39:35

I was helping the Philippine Army and their insurgency

2:39:38

in the late eighties,

2:39:41

the Peruvian army in the mid nineties,

2:39:42

the Colombians in 2000

2:39:43

and aside from insurgencies and other conflicts

2:39:45

and stuff like that,

2:39:48

disaster relief missions and all over the place.

2:39:49

So my point is, I guess that I don't think that it

2:39:52

I don't think that Guantanamo radically opened my eyes

2:39:55

to something that, oh my God, I'd never...

2:40:00

No, but it certainly gave me additional data points

2:40:02

and a more nuanced approach.

2:40:06

And certainly with regards to the interaction

2:40:09

our civilian political leaders

2:40:12

and their interaction with uniformed leaders

2:40:18

that I had not experienced before.

2:40:22

That was new.

2:40:25

And it became a valuable lesson when I went to Afghanistan,

2:40:27

I had already had that lesson in my belt.

2:40:31

So I believe that it made me more effective

2:40:32

when I got to Afghanistan, having already been through it.

2:40:35

And, oh, by the way

2:40:37

it was the same group of people for the most part

2:40:39

Peter

At least now you knew what

2:40:44

had the lay of the land.

2:40:46

-

I had a better idea of what was happening

2:40:47

Peter

Well, Colonel if there's anything else

2:40:51

that I didn't ask that you want to say,

2:40:53

we'll probably be almost out of tape.

2:40:55

-

Nope. Thank you very much for this opportunity.

2:40:57

I applaud your efforts

2:41:00

and University of San Francisco Law School's efforts

2:41:03

to document all this.

2:41:06

And again, just cautioning that folks need to

2:41:10

listen to all of these interviews

2:41:13

and the context of putting themselves

2:41:15

in the emotional and intellectual frame of mind

2:41:17

that existed back then, and not now,

2:41:21

and you know that that would make it for a more complete

2:41:24

and accurate understanding of what happened.

2:41:30

Peter

And so people, 50 years to now

2:41:34

who are watching this,

2:41:36

do you want to just emphasize

2:41:38

that they might not be aware of how we felt that day or not?

2:41:40

-

I suspect that there are many, many, many more pointed

2:41:46

and emotional evidence that will be preserved forever

2:41:51

far more than mine.

2:41:57

And so I'm not going to try and add to that.

2:41:59

So many of the family members who lost, you know

2:42:03

their husbands wives, children.

2:42:06

So my points are, would pale in comparison to that.

2:42:08

I would say though, that at the end of the day,

2:42:12

you know, having confidence in, and again

2:42:15

in the U.S. military U.s. government, military included

2:42:17

we only swear allegiance to the constitution

2:42:20

of the United States.

2:42:22

That's it.

2:42:23

We don't swear allegiance to a king, queen, flag, a nation.

2:42:24

We don't, it's only the constitution

2:42:29

and the principles in that constitution.

2:42:30

And I would just say that the vast majority,

2:42:33

the vast majority of people who were engaged

2:42:36

in all of this Guantanamo stuff,

2:42:40

even those who did things that maybe I disagree with

2:42:42

believed that they were doing precisely that.

2:42:44

And it's really just a matter of degree.

2:42:48

We all believe in the same thing.

2:42:50

We're all trying to preserve the national security

2:42:51

of the United States and the constitution

2:42:54

and the values and the principles.

2:42:55

And then it boils down to a question of the balance

2:42:57

between tilting too far towards

2:43:00

the security side of it, if you will,

2:43:03

and versus on the other side,

2:43:06

maybe protecting certain values and principles,

2:43:09

knowing that if you degrade them too much,

2:43:12

that creates more of a risk than not.

2:43:15

And that's what we disagreed on.

2:43:19

It wasn't really on the end state,

2:43:21

it was on how to achieve the same common goal.

2:43:23

And so I don't fault any body at all

2:43:27

for things that they did or didn't do

2:43:30

that in retrospect, you know, I may disagree with.

2:43:34

It was their view at the time.

2:43:39

And, you know, mine was different

2:43:41

and, you know, doing certain things like either, you know

2:43:42

calling ICRC or, you know, pushing back on that memo

2:43:47

on the enhanced interrogation memo, you know,

2:43:52

you just do it and, and feel like,

2:43:56

at the end of the day, you got to feel comfortable with it.

2:43:59

You don't want to just roll over

2:44:01

and just do what you're being told.

2:44:03

You have your own individual responsibility to...

2:44:04

I swore allegiance to the constitution.

2:44:08

And when it gets to that point, you know

2:44:10

where you really feel, then that's what you do.

2:44:12

And I think that the vast majority people did exactly that

2:44:14

and would've done the same thing, you know

2:44:17

under the same circumstances.

2:44:19

Peter

That was great.

2:44:22

To be able to end Johnny needs 20 seconds

2:44:23

of quiet time, room tone.

2:44:25

-

Okay.

2:44:29

Johnny

Begin room tone.

2:44:32

End room tone.

2:44:48

Supervielle, Manuel - Interview master file

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