Taft, William Howard, IV - Interview master file / Witness to Guantanamo / Duke Digital Repository

Interviewer

Okay, good afternoon.

0:05

We are very grateful to you

0:07

for participating in the witness to Guantanamo project.

0:09

We invite you to speak of your experiences and involvement.

0:13

(indistinct) resolving issues around Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

0:17

We are hoping to provide you

0:21

with an opportunity to tell your story in your own words.

0:22

We are creating an archive of stories

0:27

that people in America and around the world

0:29

will have a better understanding of what you

0:32

and others have observed and experienced.

0:35

If at any time during the interview

0:39

you'd like to take a break, please let us know.

0:41

And it was anything you say

0:44

that you would like as deduct, we can remove that as well.

0:45

And we'd like to begin by asking you your name

0:49

and your hometown and your education and birthday and age.

0:52

-

Yep, my name is William Taft

1:01

and I was born in September of 1945

1:03

and I live in Northern Virginia.

1:11

Let's see how many, what other ones who were there?

1:14

Interviewer

What's your age (indistinct)

1:17

-

I'm 67.

1:19

Interviewer

And your education?

1:21

-

I was educated at Yale as an undergrad

1:23

and then Harvard Law School.

1:28

Interviewer

And a little bit about,

1:31

are you married with children?

1:34

-

I'm married now.

1:36

I was married before and my wife died five years ago,

1:38

four and a half years ago

1:44

and I'm married again and I have children

1:46

and a stepson also.

1:49

Interviewer

Could you tell us a little bit about

1:53

your background after you left law school?

1:55

Just briefly?

2:00

-

Well, I started, pretty much was working in government,

2:02

in the federal government from,

2:07

I got out of law school in 1969.

2:10

And from then until 1977,

2:13

I was working in the federal government

2:22

at the office of management and budget

2:24

at the Department of Health Education and Welfare

2:28

as it then was.

2:31

Then I was in private practice for four years

2:33

and then in 1981, I went back into the administration

2:37

and worked in the Pentagon as the general counsel

2:43

and then later as the deputy secretary.

2:47

And from 1989 to '92, I was the US ambassador to NATO.

2:50

And then went back into private practice

3:02

for eight, nine years in Washington.

3:06

And then I was in the state department

3:11

as the legal advisor from 2001 to 2005.

3:16

After that I did a little bit of law practice

3:22

but then also spent two years

3:27

as a visiting professor at Stanford at the law school.

3:30

And after that, I retired counsel at my law firm

3:34

but I don't do a great deal there.

3:42

Interviewer

We need (indistinct) to, you said 2001,

3:48

you were legal advisor to Colin Powell,

3:51

was that prior to 911, you started?

3:55

-

I started in April of 2001, and so yes.

3:58

Interviewer

Could you describe

4:03

just a little bit about the work that you were doing

4:04

before 911 was working on international law issues

4:07

prior to 911?

4:11

-

Yes, we had a number of normal things

4:14

that we do in the legal advisor's office.

4:19

We had some international litigation

4:25

involving the International Court of Justice

4:29

where we represented the government

4:35

and we had just routine types of questions

4:39

about diplomatic immunity, the normal disputes

4:46

that we have with other countries

5:00

as to the nature of their legal obligations,

5:02

they had a number of treaties that we were negotiating,

5:08

things of that sort.

5:13

Interviewer

And so where were you in 911?

5:16

-

I was in my office.

5:18

Interviewer

And can you tell us what that was like?

5:20

-

Well, I could least in so far as I recall

5:24

it was some years ago,

5:29

but I believe I was in my office actually

5:31

having a meeting with some people also from my office,

5:34

my staff and the news one of them staff came in

5:38

to the meeting, broke into the meeting

5:53

and said that an airplane had crashed

5:54

into World Trade Center.

5:56

And then another, a little bit later,

5:59

not much later than another one had.

6:05

And that was at that point, I guess again

6:08

it was a little bit after that

6:17

that another plane crashed into the Pentagon

6:21

and the order was given to evacuate the building

6:27

which we did, and eventually assisted some people

6:34

in getting home and to where they needed to go.

6:44

It was a lovely day, beautiful, clear 75 degrees.

6:51

And I eventually went back to my house

7:01

and was there with my wife and one of my kids was in town

7:05

and came over and we spent the rest of the day there.

7:16

Interviewer

Did you think your life

7:21

working for Colin Powell was gonna change the next morning?

7:25

Did you know,

7:28

or what do you expect (indistinct) the incidents?

7:29

-

Well, it was, this was going to be an event

7:35

that would change the lives of of many people

7:39

working in the government.

7:45

I would remain doing legal work

7:48

but I did couldn't exactly foresee at that stage

7:52

what specifically it would be.

7:58

We, I know very promptly worked on some resolutions

8:05

that were passed by the UN security council

8:15

probably the next day, condemning the attack.

8:19

And then we worked also on some legislation

8:22

that would authorize the president to take steps

8:31

to deal with the people responsible.

8:36

Interviewer

You worked at UN?

8:41

-

Yeah, we would, have been part of that my office

8:44

and I would have supervised their work

8:48

but then obviously we were not alone.

8:51

The White House was taking the lead

8:53

in the justice department

8:55

and the defense department we're all involved.

8:57

Interviewer

And at that time

9:00

it was quite well coordinated to I mean.

9:01

-

Yeah, I think so, yeah.

9:05

Interviewer

And then could you take us along

9:07

and how that evolved over the next few months?

9:08

Did any thing change before you heard about Guantanamo?

9:14

I'm just curious as to what work you were working on

9:18

through the fall.

9:22

-

I can't really recall.

9:24

I mean, we had many other things to work on

9:26

but obviously this was added to the usual diet.

9:32

Interviewer

So when did you first hear about Guantanamo?

9:37

Would you know that?

9:39

-

Well, I had known about Guantanamo

9:41

for some years as a place that had been used

9:43

among other things to house Haitian refugees.

9:51

So I was aware of it as a place

9:58

during the course of the fall,

10:03

particularly after we invaded Afghanistan

10:07

which took place I think in late October,

10:10

then the question arose as to what we would be doing

10:18

with people that we captured there.

10:25

And that was a question that was one that we discussed

10:29

with people in the justice department

10:36

and the White House and the defense department

10:38

and Guantanamo figured as a one option to be used.

10:42

Interviewer

Do you know who came up with that idea?

10:50

-

No, I don't.

10:55

Interviewer

Did people respond to it?

10:59

I think that was initially a good idea over the other.

11:00

-

I think it seemed like a good idea.

11:04

There were not too many options that seemed attractive

11:07

as the numbers of people

11:14

who were being detained in Afghanistan grew.

11:17

The question became more pressing

11:25

as to whether they should stay there

11:29

or be moved to the United States

11:31

or to a third country or possibly to

11:34

I think Wake Island was mentioned as a possibility

11:47

or Guantanamo, and Guantanamo certainly had many features

11:52

that made it a candidate.

12:03

Interviewer

Were you on board for Guantanamo,

12:06

do you think that was the most suitable?

12:09

-

Yeah, I think of the places that were looked at

12:10

logistically, it made very good sense.

12:18

There were facilities, it was secure

12:22

and it could be expanded to accommodate more people.

12:27

Those were all called points in its favor.

12:36

They had experienced down there of receiving

12:39

with the Haitian refugees,

12:45

receiving people who they wanted to keep an eye on

12:46

and keep there.

12:52

Interviewer

I know John Yoo was quoted as saying

12:55

that he was advocating Guantanamo and other people agreed

12:57

because it might be a place where the law didn't apply.

13:01

Had you heard those kinds of statements at the time?

13:06

-

It's not clear what law didn't apply,

13:10

but there was a memo done not as to whether any law applied

13:12

but the question of judicial jurisdiction

13:21

to hear complaints about, or that might be raised

13:31

by people who were detained there

13:35

certainly came up in a memo, was written in December,

13:38

as I recall, which went into the question

13:41

of whether they would have the ability

13:46

to seek habeas corpus in US courts.

13:48

The answer that the memo gave as I recall

13:55

was that they would not.

14:02

And that seemed actually to me to be correct

14:05

but it wasn't to my mind a significant reason

14:09

to put them there or not put them there.

14:17

Interviewer

Is that because you believed in the laws

14:22

of one (indistinct) and you didn't see that as a problem,

14:26

or what were you thinking

14:31

that you didn't consider that an issue?

14:32

-

Well, I was actually, I had quite a lot of experience

14:36

in the defense department and my experience told me

14:40

that the military would treat these people properly

14:47

and that they need to have access to courts

14:53

to dispute their treatment

15:03

whether they were being detained at all

15:06

or how they were being treated when they were detained.

15:08

This was, customarily we detained a lot of people

15:12

in conflicts.

15:19

Most of them overseas,

15:21

and most of them never saw the United States

15:24

or United States judge

15:26

whether it was in Germany or Japan or Iraq.

15:31

And there was good, I thought good law supporting that.

15:38

I signed on the brief to the Supreme Court

15:44

that argued that there was no judicial review

15:47

or no habeas corpus right there.

15:50

But it didn't seem to me to be an important factor

15:52

in the discussion.

15:58

Interviewer

Well, as things evolved,

16:00

you wrote a memo that seemed to think otherwise.

16:03

So can you give us a little background

16:07

as to how that happened?

16:09

-

I don't think I did write a memo that was otherwise

16:13

on that narrow point.

16:21

Interviewer

No, it wasn't on that point, right.

16:23

It was on the point of giving them.

16:25

-

I wrote a memo on how they should be treated.

16:28

Interviewer

And how did that (indistinct)

16:32

-

And as to whether the Geneva laws

16:35

convention applied to them

16:39

or should be applied to them, whether it did or not.

16:41

And they argued that it should be

16:47

which was actually our practice in Vietnam

16:51

was where everybody agreed

16:55

that the Vietcong detainees were not entitled

16:58

to the protections of the Geneva convention

17:03

but we gave it to them anyway.

17:07

And I think that was basically the argument that we made

17:08

was we thought it did apply

17:12

in certain circumstances in the conflict.

17:15

And I'm sure you have the memo.

17:24

So no point in my trying to remember it wrong

17:27

but I don't remember it fully,

17:31

but we argued that vis-a-vis the Taliban in Afghanistan

17:36

that the Geneva convention applied.

17:52

I not sure what we argued on Al-Qaeda

17:56

but so there was, but we have the memo, so.

18:02

Interviewer

What prompted you to write that memo?

18:07

Could you show a background and how that happened?

18:10

-

Well, we got a memorandum from the draft memorandum

18:12

from the justice department, which came in,

18:15

this is a memo that I think was in January

18:18

or mid January of 2002, is the memo we're talking about.

18:22

And the memo, a draft memo came over

18:31

from the department of justice,

18:39

which said that basically argued

18:43

that the Geneva convention did not apply

18:55

or that in any case, the president wasn't bound to follow it

18:59

because he could suspend it and that so he should not feel

19:05

that he was in any way constrained by the convention.

19:13

We wrote a memo disagreeing with this,

19:19

with the conclusion first of all

19:22

on whether the Geneva convention applied

19:24

at least as regards to the Taliban.

19:26

And I think originally we argued that it was,

19:28

it applied also to Al-Qaeda, but, and then that in any case

19:30

he couldn't suspend it as a matter of international law.

19:40

And there was a question as to whether they argued

19:45

that Afghanistan was a failed state

19:48

and we argued that it was not.

19:51

And that in fact, it was rather important

19:55

that there was no real such concept

19:58

in international law that operated in any way

20:02

that the justice department was saying it did.

20:11

So we argued that too.

20:16

And that was why we wrote the memo.

20:17

Interviewer

You might not wanna answer this

20:20

but were you taking direction from Colin Powell

20:21

or did he come to you and ask you for advice

20:27

because you were the expert on this area.

20:29

How did that happen to you?

20:31

You had a pop and wrote the memo.

20:33

-

We wrote it

20:36

because we got the memo from the justice department.

20:37

They send it over to us for comment,

20:41

and it would be normal for us to comment on it.

20:44

I don't think I even needed to, not sure.

20:48

I talked with Colin about it at all.

20:51

It was just seemed to me to be a lawyer stuff.

20:54

And as a matter of fact, I think he wasn't in the country.

21:00

Not that I mean, I could have reached him if I wanted to

21:05

but I knew what I needed to do.

21:07

Interviewer

So I guess on your own direction

21:10

you decided what was right as you saw it

21:13

and didn't really need counsel with other people.

21:17

-

Well, I had a lot of staff who I was talking with

21:20

and I think the memo speaks for itself

21:24

that no one person could have written it.

21:27

We had a lot of people working on it.

21:31

Interviewer

And what kind of reaction did you get

21:33

after you wrote the draft for the DOD

21:35

and DOJ to see, how did they respond to you?

21:39

-

As I recall, they didn't agree with it

21:42

and they went ahead or the justice department,

21:46

went ahead and forwarded a memo that was very close

21:52

to what their original memo had been

21:57

to the president for his decision.

22:04

Interviewer

And did you have any thoughts

22:09

about watching that occur?

22:12

Did you think of?

22:14

-

I wasn't aware that it was happening actually, they.

22:15

Interviewer

So how did you become aware of that?

22:21

-

We were told that the president had decided

22:24

that the justice department approach was correct

22:28

and that he would adopt that approach,

22:33

namely that the Geneva convention did not apply

22:36

to the conflict either with the Al Qaeda

22:40

or with the Taliban.

22:48

Interviewer

Did you follow up (indistinct)

22:51

-

Yeah, we objected, we said, wait a minute,

22:52

we didn't agree with that.

22:57

And I went to the secretary who was back from his trip

22:59

and he said that he didn't agree with it either

23:04

and that he wanted an opportunity to discuss the subject

23:08

with the president.

23:11

And so they got a national security council process going

23:13

which would lead ultimately to a meeting

23:20

where the president would decide or decide later

23:28

whether he would continue to adopt the approach

23:33

that the justice department had given or not.

23:36

And that took place at the end of January.

23:41

Interviewer

Were you present at that meeting?

23:44

-

I was present at one meeting

23:46

but there were probably many meetings.

23:47

Interviewer

Do you remember that one meeting?

23:50

Is there something (indistinct)

23:51

-

Just that, I guess not, I don't remember much detail

23:55

but all of the arguments were presented.

24:01

We presented, or we being me and the secretary,

24:15

the secretary would have spoken for us.

24:18

So I was not us, didn't have a speaking part

24:21

but the justice department explained their legal rationale

24:26

pretty much as it was in their memo.

24:35

We didn't argue so much the law

24:38

at that point at that meeting.

24:44

In fact, don't think we argued at all

24:46

because there didn't seem to be any point

24:49

in arguing that the attorney general who was in the meeting

24:51

didn't know what the law was

24:59

or I'd gotten that wrong.

25:03

But we did argue that as a matter of policy,

25:05

the president ought to direct that the Geneva Conventions

25:08

be complied with

25:15

whether they were required to be complied with or not.

25:17

And the positioning I have taken as in Vietnam

25:23

and as in every other conflict that we had

25:28

and the secretary made that point

25:30

and he was actually supported in that

25:32

by the chairman of the joint chiefs

25:35

and by secretary Rumsfeld.

25:37

But it was a policy argument, not a legal argument.

25:41

Interviewer

Well then why didn't it prevail,

25:45

do you think?

25:46

-

That I couldn't tell you, and in a way it did prevail

25:48

or we thought it had prevailed

25:54

because later the decision was announced

25:56

that we would follow the conventions

25:59

or the spirit of the conventions

26:03

or something along those lines as appropriate.

26:05

And I think there was another qualifier necessary

26:11

or something, I don't know what it was.

26:18

There was some qualifications,

26:21

but basically the announcement

26:22

which came out in early February

26:25

which the press, there was a press release and so forth

26:26

said that we would be following him.

26:31

Interviewer

Who was the strong advocate

26:39

for the administration's policy?

26:41

-

For the what?

26:44

Interviewer

For the administration's policy.

26:45

Who was seemingly the strongest

26:46

and one of the strong advocates and got the presidency here.

26:50

-

Well, this would have been the department of justice

26:56

and the White House counsel's office,

26:58

I think agreed with them.

27:00

And no, I don't know where the lawyers

27:03

from the defense department were on that subject

27:06

because their secretary was arguing in any event

27:11

that as a matter of policy,

27:16

he thought we ought to follow them.

27:18

Interviewer

Did the vice-president have a voice

27:20

at this meeting?

27:22

-

I don't recall his speaking

27:23

but I'm sure he had some opportunity, whatever opportunity

27:25

for presenting his views either then, or some other time.

27:30

I wouldn't doubt it.

27:35

Interviewer

Did the president present his views?

27:36

-

No, not at that meeting, then none of the meeting of that.

27:40

Interviewer

How did you feel about watching this unfold

27:44

and then the result as an expert in international law?

27:48

What were your thoughts about what just happened?

27:53

-

Well, I actually, as I mentioned

27:56

I thought we did rather well,

27:58

since we did get the policy

28:01

of adhering to the Geneva Conventions

28:08

announced in the press statement that was put out.

28:12

Interviewer

And then when you saw that,

28:17

it wasn't really followed

28:18

the way it presumably was presented,

28:21

what were you thinking then?

28:25

-

Well, I didn't know that it wasn't being

28:28

for many months, many years.

28:30

Interviewer

Really, you had no one on the ground

28:32

to inform you as to what was going on.

28:37

I mean, people didn't know that on your level.

28:40

-

No, I don't, not for a long time.

28:45

Interviewer

There were no rumors going around

28:52

other from what you recall.

28:55

I mean, I know you at a high level

28:56

so it could be, you never heard any movements

28:58

but there were no rumors going on from what you recall

29:00

as to what was really happening on the ground?

29:03

-

No, well, that's not quite the case.

29:06

There were things that we heard about

29:08

that were happening that were not consistent

29:13

with the conventions.

29:17

There were people being beaten up in Afghanistan in bogroom.

29:21

Some of them died.

29:27

There were reports

29:30

from the international committee of the Red Cross

29:33

which said that the people were being abused in Guantanamo.

29:37

And whenever we heard these, we would report them.

29:42

We would raise them with the defense department

29:47

and bring them to their attention

29:52

and they would go and look into them.

29:57

Interviewer

Would they report back to you?

30:00

-

Rarely, yeah.

30:04

Not as a common practice, no.

30:05

Interviewer

Would you expect them to report back to you?

30:09

-

Not really, no.

30:13

Interviewer

Would you trust

30:16

that they would have taken care of the issue of

30:17

in fact there was a problem?

30:20

-

Yeah, that would be, it would have been normal.

30:21

And I think they didn't initiate

30:24

in the case of the bogroom deaths.

30:27

They did initiate an investigation

30:31

which took a long time,

30:33

but I think that was their answer was,

30:35

we are investigating it which would be normal,

30:39

I mean, just because there are instances

30:42

of non-compliance with the Geneva Conventions

30:50

in all of our conflicts.

30:55

It doesn't mean

30:58

that we don't think that they ought to be applied.

30:59

It means that somebody is out of line

31:03

and later different subject

31:05

but same issue at Abu Ghraib where everybody agreed

31:09

that Geneva Conventions applied.

31:17

It was, it emerged that they were not being complied with.

31:19

Well, that didn't mean that they didn't apply,

31:26

it meant that some people were not applying them

31:29

and that happens.

31:33

Interviewer

Were you still working

31:35

with the administration in time to have a great?

31:36

-

Yes.

31:39

Interviewer

Did you went on with your work

31:44

and I assume that you didn't do much work in Guantanamo then

31:46

during this period to writing the memo

31:50

I assume pretty much she then moved on

31:54

to other kind of work, right,

31:56

there wasn't much you do in Guantanamo

31:58

where you're describing Guantanamo was running itself.

32:00

And if you heard (indistinct) then you checked into it.

32:04

-

Yeah ICRC would go down there

32:05

for a week at a time or more, or they would,

32:10

they spent time looking into how it was operating

32:13

and they would come back and always report to us.

32:18

And I would, and in fact, they would,

32:20

the head of the ICRC, Dr. Kellenberger

32:23

would meet with the secretary

32:26

and tell him what had been found.

32:29

And then he would also go over

32:32

and meet with the secretary of defense and tell him.

32:33

Interviewer

But then you're probably

32:38

beginning to see patterns, right.

32:40

That it's not one or two incidents.

32:41

If every time you'd been in the IRS, ICRC

32:43

they're reporting violations of the Geneva Convention to you

32:46

are going to see patterns

32:51

and are you wondering if anything's actually

32:52

really being resolved

32:54

in terms of adhering to the (indistinct)

32:57

-

No, it didn't, it wouldn't have emerged

32:59

quite so obviously.

33:03

I mean, you're dealing with a lot of people

33:05

and we're not alert to the fact

33:11

that they were not complying with or attempting to comply

33:23

with the conventions or with the army field manual,

33:30

as it would operate there

33:40

which was consistent with the conventions.

33:42

Interviewer

Did you think also I assume

33:47

his stories about bogroom in condor hall

33:48

from the same ICRC officials?

33:52

-

I don't know what our sources were for those.

33:56

I'm not sure that ICRC got into bogroom.

34:03

I don't know.

34:07

They may have been, if they did,

34:09

they would have told us what they found.

34:11

I just I'm not sure what the source

34:15

for our information on what later were ruled to be homicides

34:19

in bogroom was, I don't recall.

34:29

Interviewer

Did the secretary ever think

34:34

that he was being misled by the administration

34:36

as to what was going on?

34:39

-

I never heard him say that.

34:42

Interviewer

Did you visit Guantanamo?

34:48

-

Just one time?

34:51

Interviewer

Could you tell us please?

34:52

-

That was very early.

34:53

That was actually even, probably the first week in January.

34:55

Right at the same time as the first prisoners were arriving.

34:59

Interviewer

What was the purpose of your visit?

35:03

-

We wanted to see what was, well we were invited

35:07

by the general counsel at the department of defense

35:11

and went down and saw the facilities that were being used

35:17

to house the detainees at that time.

35:25

And they were just getting started.

35:31

I think maybe the people that we saw

35:34

had only been there a couple of days.

35:39

And there weren't very many of them.

35:43

Interviewer

Who was with you on the flight?

35:46

-

Well, the general counsel of the department

35:49

of defense was there.

35:54

I think John Yoo was there, probably Judge Gonzalez.

35:57

And let's see who else?

36:09

The counsel to the vice-president,

36:15

Dave Addington was there.

36:17

A couple of people from the military,

36:20

and there may have been some other people

36:25

from the justice department, I'm not sure.

36:33

Interviewer

What were your impressions?

36:35

-

Well, when we got there,

36:39

we went over to look at where the people were being housed.

36:43

You might call it housed.

36:54

They were in these cages, essentially under roof

36:57

but very austere and I think they were maybe eight by 15

37:05

and they were all there.

37:15

They could talk to each other if they wanted to I guess.

37:17

Maybe they weren't allowed to talk to each other

37:20

but they could see each other and through the wire.

37:22

And that was, seemed to be a temporary arrangement

37:31

that was set up.

37:43

And in the circumstances, it seemed the best

37:45

that that could be done for these arrivals.

37:49

And we looked at it and I think felt that it was okay

37:57

as a temporary thing, but that it shouldn't last very long.

38:04

And they were getting on to build other facilities

38:07

to put them in.

38:11

We heard about other things that aspects of their treatment,

38:13

which were actually rather reassuring.

38:25

They were getting a good diet.

38:28

They were getting medical treatment

38:32

which many of them needed and things of that sort.

38:35

Interviewer

Were you under the impression,

38:41

these were the worst of the worst of that early time?

38:43

Do you recall if that's how they were presented to.

38:46

-

They were identified as being people

38:50

who had been selected out in Afghanistan

38:54

for detention out of the country as being more dangerous

39:00

than people who were just taken in and released, yes.

39:11

Interviewer

Did you speak to any of them?

39:15

-

No.

39:17

Interviewer

Did you have any impressions

39:18

on your own as to whether these men were that dangerous?

39:19

-

You couldn't tell.

39:23

Interviewer

I couldn't tell.

39:24

Were they wearing the orange jumpsuits?

39:26

Do you recall that?

39:27

-

I think they were, yes.

39:28

Interviewer

Did you go to bogroom

39:33

or kinda had to (indistinct)

39:35

-

No, I have never been to Afghanistan.

39:36

Interviewer

And did.

39:43

-

My wife went there, but that was in 1999.

39:44

Interviewer

Before.

39:51

Did you get the impression that David Addington

39:53

might have been a strong advocate

39:57

of not adhering to Geneva Conventions

40:06

given his knowledge of the Geneva Conventions?

40:10

Apparently I understood that he knew them better,

40:12

he knew international better than many people.

40:16

And he might've been involved

40:19

in some of the writing of the memos.

40:20

-

I don't know whether he was involved

40:23

in the writing of the justice department memo,

40:25

but I think he agreed with it

40:28

as did people in the White House counsel's office.

40:29

Interviewer

And when you went back to Washington,

40:34

you see after that visit to Guantanamo,

40:38

did you have any interest in going back

40:41

or there was no reason to return again to?

40:43

-

I didn't see any benefit going back now.

40:46

Interviewer

Did you hear from other countries at all

40:50

that their citizens were being harm by being in Guantanamo?

40:51

Had you, were you involved

41:00

with that in the state department?

41:01

-

Yeah, we did have some contacts from other countries

41:02

whose nationals were there

41:14

and they would be through the state department.

41:18

Now that would have been handled

41:22

by the ambassador for war crimes who was Pierre Prosper

41:24

and he was in charge of the contacts

41:32

with these other countries at a diplomatic level.

41:34

When they found out that some of the people that we had

41:40

were nationals of their countries,

41:44

they would naturally take an interest in them.

41:47

There was not, as far as I can recall much complaint

41:54

about the way they were being treated.

42:01

Mostly, it was a question of them

42:05

because for many months,

42:07

they didn't have any access to them.

42:09

Then there was some arrangement reached where,

42:15

I've forgotten the exact.

42:24

There was some problem

42:26

as to whether there would be consular access to the national

42:28

or whether it would be the perhaps intelligence officers

42:39

of these different countries and the countries were

42:47

and I forget which way it played out

42:53

but the countries were willing to do it either way.

42:55

(coughs)

43:00

And they would make a console

43:03

into an intelligence officer or an intelligence officer

43:04

into a consular officer I think,

43:07

whichever way it was that it was agreed,

43:10

they could have access.

43:12

And I think fairly early on,

43:13

it emerged that there was an Australian there.

43:21

Interviewer

(indistinct)

43:29

-

Was that, yeah, I think that was his name,

43:30

but there may have been two of them.

43:33

And I'm not sure which was which,

43:37

but there were a couple of Australians

43:41

there were after a while,

43:42

but I'm not sure that they were there immediately,

43:49

some breads.

43:50

And then there were a number of people whose nationalities

43:53

didn't emerge maybe for a while.

44:02

And certainly the Saudis and the Yemenis

44:05

were not as concerned or the Libyans

44:13

were not as concerned about their people

44:17

as the Brits and others were.

44:20

Interviewer

Well and the Brits and the Australians

44:23

Were considered, does that mean visits, or does that mean.

44:24

-

They wanted to visit them

44:26

and see how they were being treated

44:27

and to see if they were entitled to anything

44:29

that they were getting it.

44:33

Interviewer

And were you involved in negotiating?

44:35

-

No, this this would have been a Pierre doing.

44:39

Interviewer

And my understanding

44:43

from detainees we interviewed

44:45

is that sometimes when the counselor went out

44:46

and the official showed up, they would interrogate them

44:48

as opposed to really look out for their interests.

44:51

Had you heard anything about what happened

44:54

when they did show up?

44:57

-

No.

44:58

Interviewer

And when the ministers of various countries

45:02

wanted their men released back to their countries,

45:05

were you involved in that part?

45:09

-

No, that would have also been Pierre's work.

45:11

It was clearly possible to release them.

45:14

There was nothing unlawful about that if we want it to.

45:16

We didn't but we also felt that it was pretty clear

45:22

that we didn't have to release them and that's either.

45:28

Interviewer

Well, how did you feel

45:34

when you began to see the US government

45:35

releasing these people to countries

45:37

that supported us in the war,

45:39

it was some of the first people released.

45:41

Do you have any thoughts about (indistinct)

45:44

-

No, I didn't, it seemed a natural.

45:45

And then they also released a lot of people

45:49

back to Afghanistan over time.

45:53

Interviewer

Right.

45:57

And did you think the people

45:58

that they released were innocent,

45:59

do you think they released because (indistinct)

46:02

-

I have no idea.

46:02

They had their reasons whatever they were for each one.

46:07

I mean, they had their reasons

46:13

for putting them there in the first place

46:15

and then they had their reasons for releasing them.

46:17

And I think it's fair to say they made some mistakes

46:20

at both ends.

46:23

Interviewer

And so I guess you weren't that involved

46:27

in Guantanamo issues once you completed that memo, right?

46:33

Is that kind of what (indistinct)?

46:37

-

Yeah, I think that's pretty much the case.

46:40

I say I never went down there again.

46:51

I don't think anybody from the state department went down.

46:55

I don't at all.

47:01

It may appear, he may have gone down, yeah.

47:02

He may have done

47:04

because I don't think he was on the first trip.

47:06

And so he probably wanted to take a look at it

47:09

but that would have been different

47:12

and we were in often, what I was involved in

47:16

related to Guantanamo was then the legal issues

47:21

that were raised when the detainees

47:25

began to seek habeas corpus

47:33

and we were involved in all of those cases.

47:37

Interviewer

And so when you involved

47:40

in writing the brief on behalf of the US government?

47:43

-

Well, they would be written

47:46

usually by the solicitor General's office

47:49

or the justice department

47:52

but we would comment on them and I signed onto them,

47:53

some of them.

47:57

Interviewer

What was your reason

47:58

why habeas didn't apply in Guantanamo?

47:59

-

It was basically the Eisentrager case.

48:02

I mean, there were four dissents in the Supreme Court.

48:04

It was a closed case.

48:07

It was not obvious that,

48:10

and Eisentrager case was a very solid preston.

48:13

Interviewer

And did you see it,

48:17

how did the Eisentrager case could be distinguished,

48:19

or it didn't seem?

48:21

-

Yeah, I could see that it might be distinguished

48:24

but it would seem to me to be

48:26

that it was good authority for not having,

48:32

I mean that narrow question of whether there was the right

48:35

if you were not in the US to have a court,

48:44

US court take jurisdiction of your case and supervise it.

48:55

Interviewer

Did you, so did the state department

49:01

believe that Guantanamo was clearly not

49:04

under American territory?

49:07

I mean, that was understood by the state department too

49:11

but it was not American territory.

49:16

-

We went along with the argument that was made.

49:19

Yes, which was, I'm not sure whether it was territory

49:23

or whether we had jurisdiction or authority or whatever

49:29

but those were the issues and you have the briefs.

49:37

Interviewer

Right.

49:40

So (indistinct) were you surprised or not necessarily?

49:41

-

I was surprised.

49:45

Interviewer

You were.

49:46

-

Yeah, as I thought, as I say, I mean, it wasn't,

49:47

for me, it was not a big issue

49:51

because I thought the military would treat them correctly

49:53

just as they treated people correctly in everywhere before,

49:56

without any habeas corpus,

50:03

German POW's never got habeas corpus.

50:06

And so that was what I thought would be happening.

50:12

So on that narrow question, I was quite comfortable.

50:18

Interviewer

How much longer did you work

50:23

in the state department?

50:25

-

Until February of 2005.

50:27

Interviewer

Okay, so word began to come out even more

50:30

as lawyers began to go to Guantanamo in the fall of four.

50:34

So probably you've been.

50:38

-

Yeah, no, it appeared in some time in 2004, I think

50:41

that the memo on torture

50:51

that had been written two years before

51:04

I think became public.

51:10

Somehow we had never seen it.

51:18

Interviewer

Really.

51:19

-

And it cost quite a stir.

51:21

And it also appeared that the defense department

51:30

and the justice department had been considering

51:41

whether and how to apply the army field manual,

51:47

but that all came out in the summer of,

51:52

I think it was the summer of 2004.

51:55

Interviewer

Do you recall your reaction

51:58

when you saw that there was a torture memo written

51:59

without your knowledge two years?

52:02

-

I was not happy about it.

52:04

Interviewer

Why?

52:08

-

Because I should have been advised and asked for my views.

52:09

It had to do with the interpretation of a treaty.

52:16

And we would expect that the department of state

52:21

which negotiated the treaty

52:27

and had a lot of information about it

52:29

would have been a consultant.

52:33

Interviewer

Did you raise those concerns?

52:39

-

Yeah, of course.

52:40

Interviewer

And what kind of reaction did you get?

52:41

-

We're starting with just,

52:44

well we didn't get around to talking to you.

52:45

I mean, (indistinct)

52:48

Interviewer

Did you change your impression

52:51

about what had really been going on

52:53

over these years once you saw that torture memo?

52:55

-

Yes, of course.

52:58

Interviewer

How?

52:59

-

Yeah, and then also, I believe there was also

53:00

by that time, at some point, some indication

53:06

that there were other people being detained,

53:10

not in Guantanamo, but elsewhere,

53:14

which we hadn't been aware of.

53:18

Interviewer

We weren't aware of the rendition.

53:19

-

No, and that, so that then

53:21

and these people being detained

53:25

in what were called later black sites,

53:27

we were not part of that.

53:35

Interviewer

How did this secretary respond to these?

53:38

-

I didn't really discuss it with him.

53:42

Interviewer

Do you feel you should have been informed

53:47

on the black sites as well in the (indistinct)

53:48

-

Of course.

53:51

Interviewer

Because it was also an international issue

53:55

that you should be giving as well.

53:57

-

Yeah.

53:59

Interviewer

Well, these,

54:02

we might know the answer to this

54:05

but I think it's important for history

54:06

because I think people will be watching this even

54:07

perhaps more than today.

54:11

And did you begin to think maybe the rule of law

54:12

wasn't really being adhered to in America?

54:18

I mean, is what kind of, what feelings did you get

54:21

when you all sense, discover these things from the inside?

54:24

-

Well, I was very unhappy about it.

54:29

It felt a little bit the same way as I felt

54:32

when I found out about Abu Ghraib.

54:35

Interviewer

Which is?

54:39

-

Great disappointment and unhappiness

54:41

with the fact that there were people who were not complying

54:50

with what I had thought they were complying with.

54:55

Interviewer

How did you hear about Abu Ghraib?

55:02

-

In the newspaper.

55:04

Interviewer

And what kind of reaction

55:08

did other people have?

55:10

-

The same?

55:12

Interviewer

Well, did it seem to you

55:15

like things are beginning to fall apart.

55:16

You're just given three very distinct events

55:18

that occurred within a six month period

55:22

that American had generally never participated in before

55:26

and is not the way we see ourselves.

55:31

How do people in the state department view all this?

55:34

-

Well, we didn't like it at all.

55:40

I mean, that's clear,

55:43

but I wouldn't wanna speak for other people

55:45

but Abu Ghraib was a shame

55:52

and a blot on the military

55:56

and the people who were responsible for it.

55:59

And similarly the homicides in bogroom

56:03

and the mistreatment of people in Guantanamo

56:08

when that emerged,

56:14

it's hard to know what you can do

56:24

beyond being disgusted and objecting

56:27

and investigating and punishing those responsible.

56:32

Interviewer

I mean, Alberto Mora

56:36

told us that he felt he was misled

56:37

by people higher up as to what was going on.

56:40

Did you have that same kind of feeling?

56:43

-

Yeah, of course.

56:47

Interviewer

Well, looking back at it,

56:50

it's something that the state department

56:53

or somebody that could have done

56:56

to avoid something like this from happening

56:57

and how do we stop it from happening the next time?

56:59

-

Well, I think you make sure that the people

57:04

in the justice department and the defense department

57:06

and the White House consult with a little more broadly

57:09

and actually that began to happen, I believe,

57:14

although I wasn't there and this is going on now.

57:19

Interviewer

How do you make sure?

57:23

-

By appointing people who will do that kind of thing.

57:26

Interviewer

Did you leave

57:30

because of your sense of betrayal

57:31

or a sense of sadness, why did you leave?

57:37

What caused you to leave at that early

57:40

right after what you just talked about.

57:42

-

Well, a couple of reasons.

57:44

So the secretary who had asked me to come

57:49

and do that job had left.

57:54

And the new secretary, secretary Rice

57:58

had her own counsel from the NSC,

58:02

John Bellinger, whom she wanted to have in my slot.

58:05

And she didn't have anything else for me to do.

58:10

So that was time for me to go

58:12

and it was time for me to go anyway (laughs)

58:13

Interviewer

Did you think the new secretary

58:17

would be more, would do a better job

58:19

in making sure that the DOJ and the DOD

58:22

would inform her of actions they're taking?

58:26

-

I think so.

58:30

And actually for the simple reason

58:32

that what their, the practice that they had had

58:37

of not telling people had kind of backfired on them

58:42

particularly with the torture memo

58:48

which had to be withdrawn

58:50

and their own people, Jack Goldsmith for instance

58:52

had withdrawn quite a few memoranda

58:57

that had been previously issued.

59:03

And he had the approach

59:06

that you needed to consult very broadly.

59:08

That's the way you change it.

59:13

Interviewer

Did you have interactions

59:15

with the CIA to the state department of (indistinct)?

59:16

Like did they, the CIA have any obligation

59:20

to inform the state department

59:23

of it's (indistinct) actions too?

59:26

Or is that where, who would influence?

59:29

-

I would have thought they should, but they didn't.

59:30

Interviewer

Did you know Rizzo?

59:35

-

Yes.

59:38

Interviewer

And during all this time you knew him?

59:40

-

I don't know.

59:42

Interviewer

Looking back, how do you feel about the fact

59:45

that you were interacting with all these people

59:48

and they weren't telling you the truth?

59:49

-

Oh, they weren't telling me everything they were doing.

59:53

Well, I don't like it.

59:57

It's not the way I was brought up

59:59

to operate in the government.

1:00:01

I wouldn't actually put John Rizzo

1:00:06

in that same category

1:00:09

as the people in the justice department

1:00:11

and the defense department.

1:00:13

Interviewer

Why is that?

1:00:15

-

I don't think that he felt he had actually

1:00:16

an obligation to share whatever he wasn't sharing with me.

1:00:19

And he was also very, he was very concerned

1:00:27

at various points about what advice he was getting

1:00:35

or not getting from the justice department.

1:00:39

Interviewer

Did you know what power John Yoo was playing

1:00:43

during those years before the memos came out?

1:00:46

-

Well, it didn't seem to be very close

1:00:48

to the White House counsel's office.

1:00:50

Interviewer

Did you think that it was (indistinct)

1:00:52

-

No, that would be normal.

1:00:55

The office of legal counsel should be very close

1:00:59

to the White House Counsel's office.

1:01:03

Interviewer

Well since

1:01:08

I'm seeing government for so many years looking back,

1:01:14

would you have some advice and perhaps some sobering advice

1:01:17

as to what we can do

1:01:25

in the future to make sure I know you said some things

1:01:28

but I think it's really important

1:01:31

'cause how do you know you have the right people in there

1:01:32

and how do you guarantee

1:01:35

that we do have a situation that won't occur

1:01:36

like you've described?

1:01:41

-

(laugh) you do need to get the right people

1:01:45

and have it be that they are open

1:01:50

and prepared to work with others,

1:01:54

and that they have sound views, that's all.

1:01:59

What else can you do?

1:02:08

I mean, I can't think of people are going to be

1:02:09

in those positions who don't want to work with other people

1:02:16

or let them know what they're doing.

1:02:19

It won't work, it's true.

1:02:23

Interviewer

I mean, I guess I'm seeking.

1:02:31

What kind of emotion did you or others feel?

1:02:32

I mean, it does seem like tell better more as a betrayal.

1:02:37

I mean, it seems to me people who really work in government

1:02:41

for so many years and really believe

1:02:44

in doing the right thing

1:02:46

and are confronted with this, it must be so hot on people.

1:02:47

And I just think it's important

1:02:54

for the viewer to see how you felt from.

1:02:55

-

Well, it's been awhile.

1:03:01

I have to say what, it's eight years

1:03:03

since I was in government or discovered about these things.

1:03:06

And I guess I've gotten used to knowing it.

1:03:10

I don't wanna get all worked up all over again.

1:03:17

Interviewer

Did people come to you

1:03:23

and have comments to you as to what we can do now,

1:03:24

did you worry that maybe there's still more hidden agendas

1:03:29

that you're not aware of?

1:03:33

-

I don't think there are at the moment.

1:03:38

Oh, well, there are now.

1:03:40

I'm not meant to be aware of them.

1:03:41

Interviewer

Could that mean, that tend,

1:03:44

do you think there more that I think there were more hidden

1:03:45

that you weren't aware of.

1:03:49

-

I think it's all pretty much out in the open now.

1:03:51

Maybe there's more, I don't know.

1:03:55

There would be Jack Goldsmith's written a book.

1:03:58

He would be the man who would know.

1:04:03

-

Right.

1:04:05

When Obama was elected,

1:04:06

do you think he would close Guantanamo?

1:04:08

-

He said he would.

1:04:13

Interviewer

Do you think he would,

1:04:14

did you think it was possible?

1:04:15

-

I thought so.

1:04:16

Interviewer

Were you surprised when he couldn't do it?

1:04:18

-

Yes.

1:04:20

That's, I would have thought

1:04:23

he would have been able to do it.

1:04:24

Interviewer

And why do you think he was able to?

1:04:27

-

I think the Congress made it very difficult for him.

1:04:29

They use their appropriating power, I believe

1:04:32

to prevent any expenditures

1:04:38

to move the detainees to the US or something, I don't know.

1:04:43

I wasn't close to it.

1:04:48

That would have been quite a long time after I was out.

1:04:51

-

Do you miss working in government?

1:04:55

-

No.

1:04:57

-

Were you involved in the Iraq?

1:05:03

I know that Colonel Wilkerson told us he was involved

1:05:05

in writing some of the speeches that Colin Powell gave her

1:05:09

in getting involved with some of the work of Iraq.

1:05:13

Were you involved in that too?

1:05:16

-

We were involved in the discussion

1:05:18

of the UN resolutions related to Iraq.

1:05:21

We drafted them.

1:05:24

We looked at other drafts that other people had made

1:05:26

and that was our job to make sure that the invasion

1:05:33

or the use of force against Iraq was authorized.

1:05:39

Interviewer

Did you see Iraq coming?

1:05:44

Some people believe that the administration was,

1:05:47

they had to go into Iraq very early on.

1:05:49

Did you see that early on?

1:05:53

-

I began to think in the summer of 2002,

1:05:57

that we were very likely,

1:06:04

the president would very likely decide

1:06:08

that he had to use force in Iraq.

1:06:10

Interviewer

Why do you think that?

1:06:13

-

Because we were getting reports

1:06:15

that the Iraqi's Saddam Hussein was using,

1:06:17

was trying to develop weapons of mass destruction.

1:06:31

And I thought that the president

1:06:36

would use force to stop him.

1:06:40

Interviewer

Were there any dissenters

1:06:43

who felt that force?

1:06:45

Wasn't a good idea, especially

1:06:47

since we were already in Afghanistan?

1:06:48

-

They're not in the administration as I recall.

1:06:53

Brent Scowcroft wrote a memo, wrote op-ed

1:06:55

and maybe Zbig Brzezinski too.

1:07:00

There would but within the administration

1:07:02

I don't think, and I was not a policy official

1:07:08

in this sense, but I think most people felt

1:07:12

that the threat of Saddam Hussein using,

1:07:20

developing weapons of mass destruction

1:07:27

was something that had to be stopped.

1:07:30

And by use of force if that was necessary

1:07:32

Interviewer

Were you surprised

1:07:36

when you discovered that in fact

1:07:37

that the US was misled

1:07:38

as to his not having weapons mass destruction?

1:07:40

-

I think he misled us.

1:07:46

Interviewer

And the UN was misled too.

1:07:50

-

Yes and no.

1:07:54

Some in the UN I think felt that he was developing WMD

1:07:57

and some didn't.

1:08:05

I don't know that the Mr., was it Blix.

1:08:06

Interviewer

Yeah.

1:08:11

-

I'm not sure what he thought.

1:08:12

He Knew that he hadn't found evidence that he was,

1:08:16

but I don't know that he decided that he wasn't.

1:08:19

Interviewer

Were you involved

1:08:25

with some of the legal issues?

1:08:26

-

Yes, yeah.

1:08:27

Interviewer

I'm not sure.

1:08:32

I have many other questions if.

1:08:33

-

How are we doing on time?

1:08:34

-

We are at about.

1:08:35

-

If I can ask you one.

1:08:37

-

It's what?

1:08:40

Interviewer

(indistinct) 6:15.

1:08:41

-

Oh, we're doing fine.

1:08:42

Interviewer

Yeah, so is there some questions

1:08:42

I didn't ask you that you wanted to share with the audience

1:08:44

as to what you saw these last 10 years, and.

1:08:49

-

I don't think so.

1:08:56

I've written a couple of articles here and there

1:08:59

and I think that I'm not writing anymore.

1:09:03

Interviewer

So should Guantanamo be closed.

1:09:12

Do you think it should be closed?

1:09:21

-

As a base for are meeting,

1:09:24

as a base for detaining people from the war with Al-Qaeda

1:09:28

and yes, I think it would be,

1:09:38

there aren't very many people there anymore.

1:09:45

And as I understand it, maybe 100, something like that.

1:09:49

I think they should be tried in the United States

1:09:56

and dealt with.

1:10:02

Interviewer

You think it will ever be closed?

1:10:09

-

I have no idea.

1:10:12

I mean, the base will stay as a Naval base calling station

1:10:16

whatever purpose it originally had.

1:10:26

Interviewer

Right.

1:10:28

-

Yeah.

1:10:29

Interviewer

Has your attitude or thoughts

1:10:30

about the US change over the last 10 years?

1:10:33

Just what you observed in terms of how.

1:10:38

-

Not fundamentally, no, no, not about the US, no.

1:10:43

Interviewer

Are you disappointed other people

1:10:49

around the world have a different impression of the US?

1:10:52

-

I think we've lost some credibility

1:10:59

and some attraction for some people,

1:11:08

but I'm quite sure that we can win them back

1:11:12

by behaving better.

1:11:16

Interviewer

And you believe we will behave better.

1:11:19

-

I am sure we will.

1:11:22

Interviewer

Do you think that was an anomaly then

1:11:24

with that what happened during those years?

1:11:25

Was it an anomaly and is probably

1:11:29

it's not as likely to happen again.

1:11:31

-

As far as the interaction between the justice department

1:11:33

and the state department and the defense department.

1:11:39

Yes, I think it was.

1:11:42

Interviewer

And the kinds of the torture?

1:11:43

-

Well, that too, yes, yeah.

1:11:46

That's been repudiated.

1:11:48

Interviewer

Right.

1:11:50

And if there was another 911,

1:11:51

do you think it still would be repudiated?

1:11:53

-

I would hope so.

1:11:56

Interviewer

If you have nothing else to add,

1:11:59

I think I'm done.

1:12:01

If there's any kind of thoughts.

1:12:04

-

Okay, yeah, no.

1:12:06

Interviewer

You need 20 seconds.

1:12:06

Johnny needs 20 seconds of room tone where.

1:12:08

-

Right, I have heard about that concept.

1:12:10

Interviewer

Okay, yeah, okay (indistinct)

1:12:13

Johnny

Okay, begin room tone.

1:12:16

End room tone.

1:12:34

Taft, William Howard, IV - Interview master file

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