Dakwar, Jamil - Interview master file / Witness to Guantanamo / Duke Digital Repository

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Good morning.

0:05

Interviewer

We're very grateful to you

0:06

for participating in the Witness to Guantanamo Project.

0:07

We'd like you to speak of your experiences

0:12

and involvement in Guantanamo Bay issues.

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We are hoping to provide you an opportunity to

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tell your story in your own words,

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we're creating an archive

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of stories so that people in America and around

0:24

the world will have a better understanding of what happened.

0:27

Future generations wants to know what happened in Guantanamo

0:33

and by telling your story, you're contributing to history.

0:37

We appreciate your willingness to speak with us today.

0:41

And if you wanna take a break any time

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please let us know.

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And if you do say something that you'd

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like us to remove, we can remove it, let us know.

0:48

And we'd like to begin by having you tell us your name

0:52

and your place of birth and your birth date and age.

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My name is Jamil Dakwar,

1:02

I am now 42 years old.

1:04

I was born in Haifa, which is in North of Israel.

1:08

And I moved to the United States in 2002.

1:13

Interviewer

And what was the year and date,

1:16

what's your birth date?

1:18

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August 23rd, 73.

1:19

Interviewer

1973?

1:22

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Yeah.

1:23

Interviewer

And before you moved to the US,

1:24

what were you doing?

1:28

Just a little bit about your schooling and background?

1:29

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Sure, I was practicing human rights law

1:32

in Israel and in an organization,

1:35

a human rights group called Adalah, which means justice

1:37

the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel.

1:40

It's a group that was formed in 1996 to protect the rights

1:44

of the Palestinian minority within Israel

1:48

but later on expanded its mandate

1:52

after the beginning of the second Intifada

1:54

to take cases also in the West Bank and Gaza

1:56

particularly petitioning the Israeli Supreme Court.

2:00

So I was doing human rights, lawyering and litigation

2:03

on a wider range of issues

2:08

including on issues of torture and detention.

2:09

Interviewer

Will you, could you give some background

2:13

on your education if you said you do lawyering?

2:15

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So, yeah, I went to law school

2:18

at Tel Aviv University law school

2:19

and I was admitted to the Israeli bar

2:21

and practiced law in Israel for about four or five years

2:26

and then moved to the United States where I did my LLM

2:31

at NYU School of Law.

2:34

And then I joined Human Rights Watch as a fellow.

2:37

And then after that

2:40

I joined the ACLU as a staff attorney in 2004.

2:42

So that's briefly my biography.

2:47

Interviewer

And what brought you to America?

2:50

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It really, it was a chance to after four or five years

2:53

of doing intensive human rights lawyering got an opportunity

2:58

to do my LLM, a spot of public interest scholarship

3:04

that was offered.

3:07

And my partner and my wife at the time also

3:09

received her Fulbright to do her PhD at Columbia University.

3:12

So there was time for us to take a break,

3:15

come to United States, pursue our graduate degrees

3:20

and reflect on some of the experiences that we had

3:24

in our country.

3:28

And the plan was actually to go back after,

3:30

a few years, three, four years or so, but

3:33

as things happened, things changed.

3:38

And maybe partly because of the work that I started to do

3:40

with the ACLU that I felt that that was something

3:44

that really gave me an opportunity to advocate

3:46

and continue to work on human rights issues, but more

3:50

focusing on the United States with really global

3:53

wider implications on human rights broadly,

3:56

particularly after 9/11.

4:00

And that was a time that that was clear

4:01

that the United States has been setting very

4:04

dangerous precedent as far as international law.

4:07

So that was the reason that we kind of stayed

4:11

with more particularly situation

4:14

in our country has become a more difficult

4:18

both the escalation and increase

4:21

of racism and racial discrimination in Israel.

4:26

And the fact that it wasn't really getting any better

4:29

for Palestinians more generally, particularly

4:33

for Palestinians in the West bank and Gaza.

4:35

So while we are connected, we visit,

4:38

we have strong connections,

4:41

but we decided to stay in the United States.

4:43

Interviewer

Where were you in 9/11?

4:48

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I was actually on my way back from a court hearing,

4:51

I argued a case on behalf of villagers

4:56

a Palestinian village that they had home demolition

5:00

or demolition order issued

5:07

against the mosque in the Northern

5:09

of Israel in the Galilee village of Hosni.

5:12

And I was representing the village.

5:18

It was just this very small community

5:21

that was, as I was representing them

5:23

they were really getting recognition

5:28

of getting their planning and housing permits, et cetera.

5:29

But the only mosque that was

5:34

in the village was under demolition procedures.

5:36

And I was trying to very hard to defend the mosque.

5:39

So I was just finishing a court hearing in Acre

5:44

which is North of Haifa,

5:48

driving back and going to a funeral

5:52

to one of my colleagues who her father died.

5:55

And so they were already there

6:00

and I was just running late

6:02

because at the court hearing.

6:03

And I heard the news on the radio.

6:05

And with the time difference

6:09

it was an afternoon time around,

6:10

two or 3:00 PM in Israel time that I heard the news that

6:13

the first plane hit the Twin Towers.

6:18

And then when I got to the funeral

6:22

I actually was the one who told everybody who was there

6:24

because at the time there was really no mobiles

6:27

and the smartphones or internet or tweets or alerts.

6:30

And unfortunately I was the one who told everybody

6:36

that there was something really terrible happened

6:41

on the same day, just moments ago.

6:44

And then I remember going back to my parents' place,

6:47

picking up my son who was about a year,

6:52

he was a year and a half, and I was watching

6:59

on TV, as unfortunately seeing

7:05

the towers collapse live on my parents' TV in Haifa.

7:09

Interviewer

Did that have any impact

7:14

on your coming to America?

7:16

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It was very difficult for us to decide

7:18

to move to the United States because we've been hearing

7:22

we heard about the consequences

7:24

of the 9/11, especially as a human rights lawyer,

7:27

we already had connections to some

7:32

of the organizations active in the United States.

7:34

So we've heard reports, we heard from people who live there.

7:38

It wasn't that easy to be there as

7:40

an Arab Palestinian family to move to the United States,

7:43

but we were determined.

7:48

We thought that it was the right thing to do.

7:51

We felt that it still in New York was a place where we felt

7:53

that it would be much easier to adapt

7:58

and to start a new life for,

8:02

at least study there while doing it.

8:04

And I think that made us make a decision

8:06

and continue to pursue our graduate degrees

8:09

but it wasn't an easy decision.

8:15

And I remember that there was a lot

8:17

of concerns about what would happen.

8:20

And in fact, when we arrived,

8:22

the registration for all the Arab males

8:24

from countries that were

8:28

either Arab or Muslim countries had to register

8:30

under a special registration program

8:33

that was put in place after 9/11.

8:35

And that was one of the first things that

8:38

we knew that that was going on

8:39

obviously all the security,

8:44

that's something that we have been already used to

8:46

as Palestinians living in Israel,

8:50

going through airport security every time,

8:53

for Palestinians, you were treated as a second class

8:56

and a suspect person regardless of what you do.

8:59

And in fact then that was so

9:02

we kind of had already been used to this kind of reality.

9:05

And I maybe made it a little bit easier.

9:15

The fact that, you live around Columbia University

9:17

where it's an international community

9:20

was much more openness

9:23

and tolerance and less of the backlash of after 9/11

9:25

I think made it much easier for us to really settle

9:30

down and to start our lives here.

9:35

Interviewer

Well, before we go into Guantanamo,

9:40

you can make me think,

9:41

is there anything that surprised you when you came

9:42

to America that you didn't expect?

9:44

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Well, yes.

9:48

I mean, the level, I mean, I've had a chance

9:49

to live for one year

9:52

in the United States in Washington, D.C in 97, 98.

9:53

So I had the experience

9:56

of knowing what the United States is and living here.

9:57

So it wasn't like the first time first living experience

10:02

in the United States

10:05

but it was the first experience after 9/11.

10:06

So that was clearly different in the sense

10:09

that there were a lot of,

10:13

the conversation, the political conversation

10:16

was also shifting and changing.

10:19

And remember that it wasn't really easy

10:22

to immediately say who you are, where you come from

10:27

as a Palestinian Arab.

10:30

And there was always this notion that

10:32

you wanna be careful about where you going,

10:37

what you're saying,

10:41

you're also not a citizen here

10:43

that you could easily be if in a few it could,

10:45

there are all these reports

10:50

about FBI into investigations

10:51

and people being monitored under surveillance

10:54

and a roundup of mainly Middle Easterns really, South Asian,

10:58

who were living in New York area.

11:05

So that didn't make it easier for us, but it was.

11:08

I remember that it was still incredibly encouraging to

11:12

see how communities where particularly the civil rights

11:19

or human rights community was pushing back,

11:24

was trying very hard to send the message

11:26

that we should not be,

11:32

we should not abandon the rule of law.

11:35

We should not abandon the respect for human rights

11:37

that this is not, this is an emergency

11:40

that we should not take it as a way

11:43

to violate more human rights.

11:45

And I think that that moment,

11:48

you're seeing more people and organizations like the ACLU,

11:49

like Center for Constitutional Rights and others kind of

11:54

echoing that message.

11:58

It was really reassuring.

11:59

And give it gives you hope,

12:01

or gave us hope that this is a place that

12:03

despite the tragedy of 9/11, despite the reactions

12:06

and the terrible consequences of the 9/11

12:09

as far as a violation of human rights

12:13

in the name of national security, you still had.

12:15

You've seen the people who did not accept that.

12:18

And there was a movement.

12:22

And that actually became more vivid closer

12:24

to the decision of the United States to invade Iraq

12:29

and seeing the protests, the wide protest,

12:34

thousands of people taking the streets

12:36

protesting what is now is really clearly misguided

12:38

and, or wrong decision, and even illegal decision

12:43

to invade Iraq under international law.

12:48

Seeing people just doing that in New York

12:51

and other places was very, very important to realize

12:54

that this place is a place where you can

12:59

still fight for justice

13:03

where you can fight for human rights.

13:04

And then the other things that

13:06

was shocking is just the fact that there,

13:07

as everybody who comes to New York city,

13:13

you are amazed by how great the city is

13:15

but at the same time, you cannot ignore what you see,

13:18

the disparities that you see between,

13:24

just having people not having shelters

13:27

or having adequate housing,

13:30

people badly treated, policing

13:32

that is often unfair and biased.

13:38

And all of those things make you

13:43

wonder whether you made the right decision

13:49

whether this is the place where you want your kids to grow.

13:50

So with that in mind I think what helped us is

13:54

that the fact that we were committed to join

13:58

the people, the movement here, organizations,

14:02

civil society working to change the reality.

14:06

And I think that probably makes it easier

14:08

when your day-to-day job is to fight injustice

14:11

whether it's domestic abuses here in United States

14:17

or human rights violations that happen in Guantanamo

14:20

or (indistinct), or in secret CIA facilities.

14:24

Interviewer

Exactly when did you come to the US?

14:28

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In July of 2002.

14:31

Interviewer

And you said you off camera,

14:37

you said you knew about Guantanamo before you arrived

14:40

'cause Guantanamo opened in January of two.

14:43

So what did about it?

14:46

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So during that time,

14:49

you gotta remember the second Intifada started

14:51

in October of 2000 and where there were massive protests,

14:55

started really with massive protests

15:03

but it escalated into confrontation and armed

15:04

conflict in many places including,

15:07

and especially in Gaza and in West Bank

15:13

but it also affected the Palestinian citizen in Israel,

15:16

the Palestinian community revolted it,

15:23

in solidarity but also an expression of their grievances or

15:25

their injustice against them

15:28

particularly around land issues at the time.

15:30

So, but the second Intifada brought up or

15:33

brought back or escalated the rights violations

15:39

particularly by the Israeli forces.

15:42

And one of the cases that I was working on at

15:45

the time was a case trying to get access to a

15:47

detention facility that was created by the Israeli army

15:52

outside the outskirts of Ramallah

15:58

it's called the Ofer Detention Camp.

16:00

It's really started tents,

16:03

similar to the tents or the,

16:04

what really started at Guantanamo.

16:07

And they brought, and that was in following

16:09

Operation Defensive Shield in April of 2002.

16:13

And the Israeli army re-invaded the West Bank

16:19

major cities, had gone into fighting with a resistance

16:23

in places like the refugee camp in West Bank of

16:30

Jenin refugee camp, where scores of many people were,

16:34

hundreds of people were killed.

16:41

There were serious abuses committed

16:43

including war crimes that were well-documented at the time

16:46

by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International

16:51

but there were also widespread of detention.

16:53

They were rounding up people and

16:55

the military commander issued new orders to

16:57

facilitate their detention and expedite their processing

17:02

with little accountability, with little oversight.

17:08

And one of the things that they realized

17:12

that they needed a new detention facility to house

17:14

and to detain thousands of Palestinians who were rounded

17:17

up during that major military offensive.

17:20

And so detention camp was created.

17:25

It was called Ofer.

17:28

I was just outside.

17:29

Interviewer

Can you spell that?

17:31

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Ofer, O-F-E-R.

17:31

And we as, the organization I was working for,

17:35

Adalah and other Israeli human rights organizations

17:39

petitions the Israeli Supreme Court

17:43

because there were already reports

17:45

of abuse of, very poor conditions.

17:46

It was, although it was April

17:52

but it was also cold it's still called in this area.

17:54

There were allegations of torture and abuse, et cetera.

18:01

So we, after seeing investigative journalists report

18:06

that was came out by a newspaper

18:11

we petitioned the Supreme Court calling

18:14

for access to detention facility.

18:15

And we, after petitioning the court

18:18

we got access to the detention camp.

18:22

And I was one of the few human rights lawyers

18:25

who got access to Ofer Detention Camp

18:28

shortly after it was open.

18:32

And so we had to tour the facility and meet with some

18:34

of the detainees, meet with officers,

18:37

military officers and they prepared a report

18:40

that we then submitted to the court.

18:42

But I remember during that time

18:44

around the time that we were litigating the case,

18:46

we heard about some of the reports coming

18:48

that the United States has opened a new facility

18:53

in Guantanamo Bay.

18:56

And we said, well, wow this seems like the United States

18:58

is copying the Israeli forces, the Israeli military

19:02

in doing what it's doing, because it was,

19:07

there was already kind of some pictures

19:10

and photos about abuse and mistreatment at least

19:12

in terms of showing detainees shackled

19:17

and burnt on the ground and all those things kind of for us,

19:22

it was, wow, this is something that

19:31

is not only happening here but it's happening

19:33

in the United States.

19:36

And in fact, you've seen right after 9/11

19:37

as the Israeli government use 9/11 as a way to say

19:40

to the US government, we have 9/11 that's what

19:46

their argument was.

19:55

We have 9/11 almost every day,

19:55

and you gotta have to stop criticizing us

19:58

for what you call human rights violations,

20:02

because even the Bush administration and the,

20:05

if you look back and the first months in after he got,

20:08

was elected from first year he really

20:13

his administration did not spare for criticism

20:18

including on Israel's use of targeted killing

20:22

which later on the United States has adopted

20:25

as an official policy.

20:29

Obviously torture was another policy that was used

20:31

by the Israeli government for years, for decades.

20:35

It was only curtailed by

20:38

the Israeli Supreme Court decision in 1999,

20:40

but it was really not the end of the use

20:43

of so-called exceptional or moderate physical pressure.

20:46

And certainly there were calls to re-instate

20:51

those same torture practices and abuses

20:57

that happened for decades in Israel.

21:01

And we know now that the Bush administration

21:05

actually have looked at some of the

21:09

practices of the Israeli government

21:13

including the legal arguments that were made,

21:15

they actually cited

21:17

Israeli Supreme Court in arguing that for example

21:19

certain enhanced interrogation techniques do not

21:23

amount to torture.

21:26

And that to us as, or to me,

21:28

particularly as a human rights lawyer,

21:32

that already practices law in Israel,

21:33

understood the Israeli legal system

21:36

and how Israel normalized torture

21:40

and how they made it really legal with official approval

21:42

by even the attorney general realized

21:46

that there was a lot of similarities there

21:50

and the comparisons are really striking.

21:52

So that's kind of one of the reasons

21:55

that I decided after moving to United States

21:58

to continue to be involved in human rights advocacy,

22:01

particularly looking at issues of torture

22:07

and detention and Guantanamo obviously was one of

22:08

the first thing that I have been asked

22:12

by the ACLU to work on, in fact,

22:16

in one of the very first days of my work at ACLU

22:18

I was asked to monitor

22:22

the military commission at Guantanamo,

22:23

but before I joined ACLU,

22:26

another way of me coming across or dealing with,

22:28

or hearing about Guantanamo was when I was working

22:35

with Human Rights Watch, I was doing research

22:38

on human rights violations in the aftermath

22:42

of the suicide bombings that happened in Casa Blanca

22:47

in May of 2002.

22:51

There were serious crackdowns on Islamists in particular,

22:58

there were people who were rounded up,

23:04

secretly detained, tortured, and abused.

23:06

And my research at Human Rights Watch

23:09

specifically looked at how the Moroccan authorities reacted

23:11

to the Casa Blanca bombing.

23:15

And my purpose was to show how they fail to

23:17

meet their international human rights obligations

23:21

by documenting violations within the criminal justice system

23:24

but they created a new procedures.

23:31

They were also some suggestions of creating,

23:34

passing a terrorism act, just

23:37

like the United States passed the Patriot Act.

23:39

And I remember when we concluded our investigation

23:41

and had a meeting the human rights minister,

23:44

the Moroccan human rights minister

23:46

and we conveyed our concerns.

23:47

One of the things that he reacted to us, he said, well

23:54

you are coming to me from the United States.

23:56

You are an American based organization Human Rights Watch.

23:59

This is what we are doing here.

24:04

It's part of what happened after 9/11,

24:05

just like Guantanamo, it's all,

24:08

he said something like it's all like one package.

24:10

It's like the whole package.

24:13

It's like, this is a whole game that we were part of it.

24:14

So, and I remember that we had to later on

24:17

go back as a Human Rights Watch researchers,

24:23

collect all these responses

24:26

from different government officials

24:28

around the world that use Guantanamo

24:30

as a way to justify their own abuses

24:33

to use it as a way to advocate for ending

24:36

Guantanamo abuses, ending the regime of Guantanamo,

24:39

show, look, Guantanamo really created a new,

24:42

dangerous reality that all other countries

24:46

that will now see, will say this is a fair game

24:48

to violate human rights

24:52

because we have a national security crisis.

24:53

And it turned out to be true

24:55

that the United States lost its credibility,

24:57

had not only encourage other countries to take,

25:01

to revise their laws, take exceptional

25:05

or emergency measures, including resorting to torture

25:08

and abuse in other countries.

25:11

So that was the second time that I had to deal

25:16

with in Guantanamo, but really my work

25:21

on Guantanamo started when I officially started

25:23

with the ACLU.

25:25

And literally the first week of my work in November of 2004

25:26

I was asked to go down to Guantanamo to monitor

25:31

the military commission hearing

25:33

of not other than Salim Ahmed Hamdan,

25:37

who at the time his case was,

25:41

he was brought before a military commission

25:44

while his habeas case,

25:47

challenging the military commission system

25:49

was argued or was litigated before the federal court.

25:51

And I got there a day

25:56

or two before the hearing and getting,

26:00

to understand this place Guantanamo,

26:02

we were, I remember housed in the other side of the base,

26:05

the old courtroom was used,

26:11

not the current one that is used

26:15

for the military commission.

26:16

The one that used to be, I think, dentistry

26:17

or was a very small courtroom but with no glass,

26:20

it was open, you could see everything really,

26:26

several feet away and it wasn't.

26:31

But I remember that, what was dramatic about this case

26:33

is that we all were waiting the hearing to start

26:38

and were sitting there and, not more than 20 minutes

26:44

or maybe half an hour into the hearing,

26:49

the judge got a piece of paper from his assistant and

26:52

he was asked to take a recess.

26:58

And so he called for a recess, he went into his chamber

27:01

and came back and he said that this hearing is adjourned.

27:04

And we didn't know what was going on.

27:09

We had no idea what's going on

27:12

but I remember that at the time Neal Katyal

27:13

who was presenting Salim Ahmed Hamdan with Charlie Swift,

27:16

were at the defense table and he looked back at us.

27:24

We were four monitors representing the four

27:27

major human rights organizations,

27:30

including ACLU Human Rights Watch, Amnesty

27:32

and Human Rights First.

27:34

And he said, we won.

27:36

And that was, he won the habeas case,

27:39

when the federal judge in Washington said

27:42

that basically the military commission system

27:45

was in violation of the constitution.

27:49

And he said that the judge is not,

27:52

the military commission are not giving

27:57

the prisoners an opportunity to,

28:02

under the Geneva Conventions to decide,

28:04

to determine whether they are actually have POW status.

28:07

And that in itself, the military commission order that was

28:11

at the time in place violated the constitution.

28:16

And so that was pretty dramatic.

28:21

Interviewer

Well I wanna continue with that trivial

28:27

but I just wanna go back

28:30

because what you were saying is really interesting

28:31

we haven't heard it from anyone else.

28:32

So you're implicating and I just wanna know how far

28:34

you're going on that.

28:39

Do you think the US talked to Israel

28:40

and asked them for advice on how to create Guantanamo

28:43

and what kind of treatment to use?

28:48

-

We don't have hard evidence to

28:53

prove that that's what actually happened.

28:57

And there are a number of documents,

29:00

official US documents that suggest

29:03

that the United States officials

29:06

including legal counsel lawyers,

29:09

when they were asked to design new policy,

29:12

particularly around torture issues,

29:17

that they have actually looked at the Israeli model,

29:19

looked at the Israeli way of handling issues

29:22

of detention and interrogation and torture.

29:27

And in fact, in one of the memos

29:30

I think it was in The Bybee Memo.

29:32

One of the Bybee Memo was actually cited,

29:33

the Supreme Court, Israeli Supreme Court decision from 1998.

29:36

There were other revelations that we know about

29:42

including the Senate Intelligence Committee report

29:46

on interrogation practices, the Senate torture report.

29:51

And also there's a section there.

29:53

It also specifically cited how the CIA

29:56

in this particular case has also used Israeli justification

29:59

or use of torture or legalized use of torture in order to

30:06

justify their so-called enhanced interrogation techniques.

30:09

We've also had some other testimonies

30:14

one recent one that was made

30:18

by a former security contractor who was deployed

30:20

and worked in Iraq,

30:27

who also describe how they have used Israeli tactics

30:29

or practices particularly the so-called

30:34

the kindergarten chair

30:36

which is essentially a very low chair, small chair

30:38

that really looks like a kindergarten chairs,

30:41

that historically, the Israelis have developed it

30:45

or used it to interrogate and

30:48

to torture Palestinian prisoners

30:50

by subjecting them to stress positions.

30:53

And he specifically talks in his book that just came out

30:56

on that particular connection that they were actually told

31:00

and they were provided that as a matter.

31:05

So we don't know exactly how close the collaboration.

31:07

I mean, I wouldn't be surprised

31:11

if there were no close collaboration.

31:12

We know that after or shortly before the invasion of Iraq,

31:15

the US army in particular was looking

31:21

at ways that Israelis were fighting urban warfare

31:23

including the use of bulldozers that are used

31:29

by the Israelis to demolish houses

31:33

and civilian houses in massive ways as it happened

31:35

in Rafa and Gaza and other places in the West Bank.

31:39

And so they looked at,

31:41

I think Chris (indistinct) from The Guardian wrote

31:43

about that at the time in around 2003.

31:47

So there are all these connections that are made,

31:50

but remains to be seen in the future,

31:54

I'm sure we will have more access

31:58

to information and to this level of collaboration

32:00

but more recently we know that the targeted killings program

32:05

under the Obama administration has also looked

32:08

at the Israeli model

32:10

and Israeli practice of use of targeted killings.

32:13

Interviewer

How do you know that?

32:16

-

They're a part of the,

32:17

some of the memos that were released,

32:19

have made it clear that they actually

32:21

when they described the, and discuss the justification

32:25

for the assassination or the killing of American citizen,

32:29

Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen.

32:35

And these are so far the only memos

32:39

that have been released, we're still

32:42

fighting to release to get other memos declassified.

32:44

But in this particular case

32:48

you can see that there's also a discussion

32:49

of Israeli use of targeted killings, particularly

32:51

the Israeli Supreme Court decision that was issued

32:54

in the mid-2000 and looked at the practice

32:58

of targeted killings.

33:03

And to what extent it would comply with international law.

33:04

But I think it is not unreasonable to say

33:10

that really what Israel has become

33:16

for the United States is that it's a laboratory.

33:20

It's a lab where Israeli officials,

33:22

reigning military and security establishment

33:26

test different tactics and practices.

33:28

And they then are, we see them replicated,

33:31

used in other places,

33:36

the Gaza or the Dahiya doctrine in the South Lebanon

33:39

or in Beirut particularly Beirut or the Dahiya

33:44

and particularly the neighborhood

33:46

where (indistinct) majority neighborhood

33:48

and how the Israelis have developed

33:50

this way of striking in a civilian neighborhood.

33:52

And we saw that developed in Gaza.

34:00

And then very recently we've seen the military,

34:04

US military actually confirming that they looked at

34:09

practice luck knock on the roof practice.

34:14

The knocking on the roof practice is a way

34:18

that the Israeli government has developed in Gaza

34:20

during its military offensive on Gaza,

34:25

particularly in 2014, the summer of 2014

34:28

and during the 50 day war on Gaza,

34:32

the Israeli military developed some tactic that would

34:35

then they use it to say that we actually warned civilians

34:39

that before we bombarded before

34:44

we targeted a particular civilian objective

34:46

by sending a missile or attack a part

34:50

of a building of a civilian structure.

34:56

And that was the warning.

34:59

And so the civilians who were in that structure had knew

35:00

that moments after that, less than a minute,

35:05

minute and a half

35:09

it would actually be completely demolished, bombarded.

35:10

And so the Israeli said that they used throwing leaflets

35:15

and other warnings calling civilians

35:19

asking them to flee, to leave and including using

35:23

that knock on the roof.

35:27

The knock is a missile knock part of the civilian structure.

35:28

Warning civilians, obviously that was complete failure

35:33

because not only that civilians in Gaza,

35:40

they had no place to go

35:42

because ultimately there was no safe haven to

35:44

civilians to go to.

35:48

And if you look at the map

35:50

I think there was a interactive map developed

35:53

after the 2014 war that showed

35:56

that literally all places in Gaza were targeted militarily.

35:59

There were all strikes in

36:03

almost all over the Gaza strip.

36:04

So there was no safe haven.

36:07

Gazans could not leave the Gaza strip

36:09

which something that usually civilians can do

36:12

in a time of armed conflict or a war,

36:15

fleeing going across the border.

36:17

They could not go inside Israel obviously,

36:19

they could not go to Egypt.

36:21

No one, there were some people who tried to take bullets

36:23

but ultimately they actually,

36:26

some people actually tragically died,

36:30

trying to flee through the water.

36:33

But essentially that practice,

36:36

the knocking on the roof become counterproductive was

36:38

in violation of international humanitarian law

36:44

because it really did not amount

36:46

to a reasonable warning to civilians.

36:48

And that even if that warning was made

36:51

that did not turn this particular place

36:54

into a military objective.

36:56

So the US military just recently acknowledging

36:58

that they use the same practice

37:02

in Iraq and Syria while they were attacking ISIS targets,

37:03

where there were some civilians living

37:11

and they actually cite that.

37:12

It did not save the life

37:16

of a woman who left the building

37:18

but then went back and when the strike happened

37:21

she actually got killed in that building.

37:24

So these things across the borders

37:26

there's collaboration, cooperation between countries

37:29

certainly between very close allies happen all the time.

37:32

There might, WikiLeaks cables have shed

37:37

some more light on that collaboration

37:40

but it doesn't have the smoking gun that

37:42

or the hard evidence to show

37:45

that the Americans actually sought

37:46

and received full advice from the Israelis

37:51

on how to conduct the so-called war on terror after 9/11.

37:53

Yet we don't have that information yet.

37:57

Interviewer

You used an interesting word (indistinct).

37:59

(indistinct)

38:01

When we interviewed detainees.

38:04

Many of us told us that Guantanamo

38:06

was a psychological prison

38:07

more than a physical torture, was that true?

38:09

And they felt that it was used

38:13

as experiment that Americans

38:14

they felt America was using that to experiment

38:16

on various psychological tortures.

38:18

Do you have any sense on that

38:21

and would that have also been duplication

38:22

of some Israeli procedures?

38:26

-

Well, all the interrogation procedures that were used

38:28

by the US military, some form of those military

38:33

interrogations were at some point used

38:38

by the Israeli government.

38:40

Certainly distress positions,

38:42

the sleep deprivation, the use of loud noisy music.

38:45

These are all the hallmark

38:52

of the Israeli interrogation manual.

38:54

And which continued to some extent after 1999,

38:58

again after the Israeli Supreme Court

39:03

ordered the government to end, order the Shabak,

39:04

the Israeli General Security Services

39:07

to end the use of some of interrogations,

39:11

but left certain loopholes.

39:13

So there was already a set of interrogation methods

39:16

that were known and used in Israel

39:21

and they may very well been adopted

39:24

in the way that we saw it in Guantanamo,

39:28

certainly the sleep deprivation program or the so-called

39:30

the frequent-flyer.

39:34

Interviewer

That came from Israel?

39:36

-

The sleep deprivation program in Israel has been prominent

39:38

in the system of interrogation system.

39:41

In fact the way that detainees and prisoners describe it,

39:46

after the 1999 Supreme Court decision in Israel

39:52

is that the way that the government officials went

39:56

around it is by making shifts,

39:59

meaning they were making the justification that we needed to

40:03

do these interrogations because of necessity

40:10

that we need to complete the investigation

40:19

in a very short time.

40:22

And they were stopping it and starting it

40:23

in a very short time and not really allowing

40:28

detainees to sleep in a reasonable time.

40:30

And you really talking about,

40:33

less than three or four hours of sleep per day

40:34

which is what the sleep deprivation program

40:38

or the frequent-flyer program was all about.

40:40

I'm not sure if it's exactly the same,

40:44

shifting detainees from one cell to another,

40:46

how it happened in Guantanamo,

40:49

but the fact that they were virtually

40:51

interrogated, Palestinian prisoners

40:55

in Israeli jails interrogated virtually around the clock

40:57

resembles at least the frequent-flyer program at Guantanamo.

41:00

Interviewer

One more thing you said earlier

41:07

before we go back to Guantanamo and that is

41:10

you said that many countries,

41:12

you mentioned Morocco but then you said other countries,

41:15

used Guantanamo to justify their own bad behavior.

41:19

Two questions about that

41:24

if you can mention some other countries

41:25

but also do not think these companies

41:27

would have done it any way

41:31

and they just use America as a cover-up or

41:32

were they actually influenced by American's behavior?

41:34

-

Yes, I don't think that they needed United States

41:39

to approve those abuses

41:47

or those practices or policies, yeah.

41:51

The United States, as we know,

41:54

over the history had a double-talk

42:01

or there was a double standards

42:05

in the way that the human rights talk

42:06

or the foreign policy talk that

42:10

we hold other countries accountable.

42:14

We call on government X to follow the law, et cetera

42:18

while turning a blind eye,

42:24

or sometimes even knowingly ignoring

42:26

and facilitating even a torture,

42:31

whether it's during the dirty wars

42:35

in Latin America to other places around the world.

42:36

So there was always been,

42:41

I think the world is, I mean

42:44

people who studied this and know it from up close,

42:46

they know that the United States, is not very

42:51

it's not been always genuine about

42:54

it's respect or concern about human rights.

42:57

It was really often used

43:04

to advance other foreign policy interests.

43:06

And so those countries after 9/11 thought

43:09

that that was high time for them to go all in

43:15

in terms of like doubling down

43:19

on what they were already been doing,

43:21

so they had, they got the US off their back.

43:23

The US was reluctant to publicly

43:27

at least condemn those violations.

43:29

They got support from the US in different ways.

43:33

Sometimes it got security support

43:36

all kinds of things that they needed

43:40

in order to crack down on (indistinct).

43:42

And we know that the (indistinct) cases,

43:43

one good example of how the Chinese

43:46

and Americans have collaborated on that.

43:49

Interviewer

Why did they?

43:53

-

Well there was the common goal of,

43:54

China has its own interest.

44:00

It's on internal, so to speak security interest.

44:02

And the United States has its own post 9/11 interest

44:07

in cracking down on or looking for those

44:10

who are responsible for 9/11.

44:15

And so those both most countries interests

44:17

converged and came together when it was,

44:21

I will do this for you, you do this for me.

44:24

And that was done not only for China,

44:27

there were other countries.

44:30

In fact, there were other countries where they

44:31

needed the United States financial support.

44:33

They needed the United States diplomatic support,

44:36

places like Macedonia,

44:39

places if you look at all the other cases

44:41

where the United States have used the fact

44:44

that they needed the United States in order to get into

44:48

the UN on some international systems of improving

44:51

their standing in the world

44:59

getting them a better trade deals or advantages.

45:01

So all of those were part of the trade.

45:08

Were part of the dealing that were going on and on

45:12

and certainly the people who suffered most

45:16

or people who had to their rights were violated.

45:19

And a lot of them were people who we know for sure

45:23

that they were innocent people.

45:27

Over majority of people for example, Guantanamo

45:29

belong to that category

45:32

of people who were in the wrong place at the wrong time

45:34

and certainly had not had any way to prove

45:37

or be able to defend themselves.

45:41

And so the United States have after 9/11 facilitated,

45:43

encouraged rights violations in other countries,

45:51

turned a blind eye to other violations where

45:54

were already endemic in certain countries, like in Egypt,

45:57

Egypt before 9/11.

46:00

And I looked at the situation in torture

46:02

and detention in Egypt when I worked at Human Rights Watch,

46:04

there was a history of decades

46:09

long history of use of torture

46:11

to the point that the committee against torture

46:13

and other international human rights bodies

46:19

have determined that torture was widespread

46:22

in places like Egypt, that there was no doubt about it.

46:25

There's no question about it.

46:32

And yet Egypt was one of US closest allies

46:34

where several detainees, prisoners were picked up

46:38

in the so-called war on terror,

46:43

as part of the under condition program found themselves

46:45

in Egyptian prisons, tortured

46:49

at the behest of the United States government.

46:52

A lot of these abuses have not been fully revealed.

46:56

No accountability has taken place.

47:01

There's still people who

47:05

who are calling for justice or calling

47:07

for transparency or calling for accountability.

47:10

But so that was the normal practice

47:13

for the United States to create a web

47:16

of countries that would be the so-called

47:21

partners in the fight against terrorism

47:25

but we could call it partners

47:28

in the mission to violate human rights

47:30

in the name of national security.

47:34

And that's really what happened in many

47:36

many places around the world.

47:38

So definitely the United States,

47:39

they were not waiting for United States to okay

47:42

or to give them that approval.

47:44

And we're living in those consequences.

47:49

I mean, today, the fact that the United States is

47:51

in a way peril, and there was a paralyzed in terms

47:55

of responding to some certain crisis

48:02

because of the fact that these have evolved

48:04

and made more complicated by resorting

48:09

to illegal actions after 9/11

48:11

and made it much more difficult

48:14

for countries and for societies to believe

48:16

that there was any good and really believing

48:20

in human rights when human rights could just be traded off,

48:23

it could be used as a propaganda

48:26

as part of advancing your foreign policy.

48:29

And you're not really genuine about it.

48:33

And you're picking and choosing

48:34

and you cherry picking what really suits you as far

48:36

as international human rights requirements and obligations.

48:38

Interviewer

Have you become more civical

48:43

or at least skeptical since you've come to America

48:45

after listening to you work with us,

48:49

is it not surprisingly to you

48:51

since you worked in Israel?

48:53

-

No, it's not surprising.

48:55

I mean, it's always been, we have to realize

48:56

that government are the ones who create laws,

48:59

international law, not exception to that.

49:06

And they create it in a way that will be,

49:10

give them leeway and they give them the ability

49:14

to act with much less accountability

49:17

with much less transparency.

49:21

There's always this competition or this tension

49:22

between government always wanna grab more power

49:28

and be less accountable and less transparent,

49:34

work in the dark, take shortcuts

49:37

and certainly when it comes to people

49:43

who are powerless or not their citizens in particular

49:47

or not given any attention by the international community,

49:52

by the media, it's easier for the governments

49:57

to do those things.

50:00

So it was, I don't think that it was surprising to people.

50:03

I mean, I remember sitting in the Human Rights Watch

50:09

staff meeting when the Abu Ghraib pictures

50:14

were revealed by CBS News and the 60 Minutes.

50:20

And they were colleagues of who had more experience

50:25

than myself in working

50:28

and investigating human rights violations.

50:32

And they were very shocked.

50:33

They were completely shocked at seeing those things.

50:36

And I was not as shocked as they were,

50:40

I mean, as far as, I did not think

50:43

that the United States would be,

50:46

you're not doing those kinds of things.

50:50

And that's when we didn't even know enough

50:52

about the CIA torture program

50:54

you're talking about spring of 2004,

50:57

and yet what came, what was revealed after that,

51:03

months and years after that,

51:09

perhaps, shocked us more than other thing

51:13

is the fact that, it was made it part of a policy

51:17

not an isolated incident

51:21

as the United States government tried to portray it.

51:25

these are just a few bad apples.

51:28

There was nothing of that

51:31

that really has to do with government policy.

51:32

It was not this, the leadership was really innocent in there

51:35

but if you, now we have more records and more documents

51:40

and more documentation and evidence to show

51:44

that it was a matter of a policy torture

51:47

and abuse was a policy the US military was part

51:49

of a policy is part of the CIA secret detention programme.

51:52

And what is interesting about that too,

52:00

is that they have used the United States

52:03

domestic legal formulations or legal precedent in order to

52:06

justify some of these abuses.

52:16

And you see that across, if you read the torture

52:19

memos in some of the memos that tried to come up with

52:23

for example, the what's the definition

52:26

of cruel inhumane or degrading treatment?

52:29

The equivalent which is prohibited under international law.

52:32

And they're both the in Convention Against Torture

52:37

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

52:38

but it's also has equivalent language

52:43

in the Eighth Amendment to the US constitution,

52:46

the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

52:48

And you see how lawyers resort to interpretation

52:53

of the law, the Supreme Court jurisprudence

52:57

in order to make the case that you're actually

52:59

allowed to do those things in our domestic prisons.

53:02

So why can't we not do them abroad,

53:05

after all these are non-citizens.

53:08

If the Supreme Court gave us the green light to do to,

53:11

okay, those abuses or mistreatment

53:14

we should be able to do that.

53:17

And I think that, that it was for a lot of people shocking

53:20

but not to my colleagues who worked

53:26

on prison abuses in the United States,

53:28

the National Prison Project of the ACLU, for example

53:32

had been documenting, working on prison abuse

53:34

in the United States for years, as well as many others

53:38

other organizations and advocates and lawyers.

53:41

And they're familiar with prolonged solitary confinement.

53:44

They're familiar with abuses

53:47

in prisons and jails and detention facilities.

53:48

But the difference is that it was never really,

53:56

was never really part of the plan where

54:01

lawyers came together in the US government

54:03

and said we're now going to go

54:06

and torture these individuals and subject them.

54:07

There were some incidents, obviously

54:11

like the Burge torture case incident in Chicago

54:13

where there was the tourist police commander

54:16

who made a decision that we were gonna be torture those

54:19

but by and large, it was sanctioned by the,

54:23

I think the interpretation by the Supreme Court

54:30

of what the Eighth Amendment is for better or worse

54:36

it was interpretation that allowed these abuses

54:39

and made policies of segregation or isolation

54:43

or solitary confinement to be legal.

54:47

Even though there wasn't really like

54:52

a master plan to torture detainees

54:54

or prisoners in the United States

55:00

but that environment have made it easier.

55:01

I think for the United States

55:05

to go abroad and to cross the line.

55:07

And we actually know that a number

55:11

of former correctional leaders

55:13

were asked to create the prisons in Iraq after the war.

55:17

Some of the people who actually bad history

55:22

of running abusive facilities in the United States,

55:25

this information came out.

55:30

We know, for example, now because of

55:31

the Senate torture report that the Bureau of Prisons,

55:33

the Federal Bureau of Prison

55:38

have made a visit to a secret facility run

55:40

by the CIA in Afghanistan.

55:43

That gives you, wonder why, what business

55:48

the Federal Bureau of Prisons has in inspecting

55:51

or going to visit a secret facility in Afghanistan

55:54

run by the CIA that had no experience

55:58

of running detention facilities,

56:01

no experience with interrogation.

56:02

And was really experimenting on human being

56:04

through psychologists that were hired to design

56:08

and implement the torture program

56:10

as we know it now and through other kinds of ways.

56:12

So there's these connections that

56:16

I think very important to expose

56:18

as also the community, the legal community

56:20

tried to do with Guantanamo.

56:22

The forced feeding in Guantanamo would not have made legal

56:24

or justified that easily if it was not justified

56:28

in the United States under the judicial approval.

56:31

We know that that courts had deferred

56:37

to prison managers

56:41

to state authorities.

56:45

And the same was made clear in

56:50

some of those cases that were brought to the court,

56:53

obviously there were other hurdles,

56:57

there was an attempt to dismiss those cases

56:59

on jurisdictional grounds

57:03

under the military commission Act

57:06

and the Detainee Treatment Act and other basis legal basis.

57:07

But ultimately when those cases made their way to the courts

57:11

in force-feeding of Guantanamo detainees,

57:15

you really had the conversions of domestic jurisprudence

57:17

very bad one that does not take into account

57:23

international law as far as treatment of prisoners,

57:26

including ethical guidelines issued by internationally

57:30

renowned organizations, medical association

57:38

that made it very clear for example,

57:45

that force-feeding is a violation, is ethically wrong.

57:46

And legally misguided is particularly when

57:53

the detainees have,

57:59

are competent to make a decision about their hunger strike.

58:01

Only when there was questions about the mental

58:05

competency of the detainees or prisoners that you really

58:09

can go ahead and conduct a force-feeding

58:12

without obviously causing a severe suffering

58:18

or cruel inhumane degrading treatment.

58:23

So there's a lot of connections that were made

58:25

and continue to be made between what the United States

58:27

practices within the US military overseas,

58:31

on Guantanamo and other places.

58:35

And what happened in the United States

58:36

that I think important to grapple with

58:38

and to compare and to reckon with.

58:41

Interviewer

Fascinating the intertwining

58:46

of the two jurisdictions as you see it.

58:48

I think that's really interesting and important.

58:51

I wanna go back to that

58:53

but I just wanna ask you, do you think

58:55

since the deprivation is something that the US also learned

58:57

from Israel or knew on its own

59:03

'cause it started that very early in terms

59:07

of just when they flew the detainees to Guantanamo.

59:09

-

No, I think there was already been

59:14

in the army field manual,

59:17

sense of deprivation, and it wasn't something

59:20

that the United States had to learn from Israel.

59:22

If you look at the way that José Padilla was treated

59:26

and he was after all a US citizen and

59:30

he was first detained as an enemy combatant,

59:34

as unlawful enemy combatant

59:41

in the United States military custody.

59:42

And later on, after a legal battle

59:46

and after legal challenge really was,

59:50

the US government was pushed to transfer him

59:52

to civilian custody,

59:55

and then he was prosecuted.

59:56

But his treatment violated,

59:59

was in a way, the way that it was justified,

1:00:03

it was, following some of the military procedures

1:00:06

that will allow certain detainees to be isolated.

1:00:13

In the army field manual there's an Annex M

1:00:19

that specifically talks about sensory deprivation,

1:00:22

sleep deprivation, other practices that are problematic,

1:00:25

and actually already being called as,

1:00:31

in violation of the Convention Against Torture

1:00:34

by the Committee Against Torture,

1:00:37

as recently as November of 2014,

1:00:38

when the United States government was

1:00:42

last time reviewed by the committee,

1:00:44

and so there were already been practices and procedures

1:00:48

that have been put in place before 9/11.

1:00:54

And there've been only used, refreshed.

1:00:56

If you look at the Delta,

1:01:01

the Camp Delta manual

1:01:05

that was actually one of the WikiLeaks

1:01:07

first WikiLeaks documents.

1:01:09

I remember that the document was made public when

1:01:13

I was in Guantanamo, I believe it was in 2006

1:01:18

in one of the military commission hearings that we

1:01:24

were monitoring and this manual became public.

1:01:26

It was just leaked to the press.

1:01:32

I think it was WikiLeaks, was behind that.

1:01:35

And when you look at the manual,

1:01:37

when it talks about sleep deprivation,

1:01:41

isolation, deprivation, and even

1:01:44

hiding detainees from the ICRC.

1:01:47

Interviewer

The manual said that?

1:01:50

-

Yes, from the International Committee of the Red Cross.

1:01:51

Now, when the Bush administration was using

1:01:54

the International Committee on the Red Cross,

1:01:58

as the only international humanitarian organization

1:02:01

that had access to detainees following

1:02:03

the creation of the military base.

1:02:06

We had a manual that made it very clear

1:02:08

that they were hiding detainees,

1:02:11

as a matter of a procedure,

1:02:14

standard operation procedure.

1:02:17

So that's so kind of in a way revealed what many thought,

1:02:18

knew that it was happening certainly

1:02:25

from Guantanamo detainees testimonies

1:02:26

and meetings with their lawyers.

1:02:29

So there was not, there was enough

1:02:32

in the United States manuals

1:02:39

and practices that were reused or refreshed to deal

1:02:43

with the situation in, whether it's Guantanamo, (indistinct)

1:02:51

but the regime that was created after 9/11 needed,

1:02:56

the government decided

1:03:04

that they wanted to create a additional layer of

1:03:05

or a new special program of torture

1:03:10

that was for the US military that was approved

1:03:13

by the highest level of the government,

1:03:15

particularly by former secretary of defense Rumsfeld.

1:03:17

And in the CIA context,

1:03:21

they did it through a separate program.

1:03:23

Although there were some relationship between the two.

1:03:26

Interviewer

When you first came to Guantanamo

1:03:37

the first time, what was your sense when you got there?

1:03:38

What were you thinking?

1:03:42

-

I mean, it was really surreal because

1:03:45

it was a way the security arrangement

1:03:48

for observers was very tight.

1:03:55

So you could not leave without having an escort anywhere

1:03:58

outside your, the guest house where we were stayed

1:04:01

on the thing, the Windward side,

1:04:06

the other side of the base.

1:04:08

You're disconnected from the rest of the world,

1:04:13

your blackberries at the time, mobiles don't work.

1:04:16

There's a particular network that only functions there.

1:04:20

You're not really sure what's happening

1:04:24

in different parts of the camp

1:04:28

and in different parts of the base,

1:04:29

because as monitors,

1:04:34

as military commission monitors

1:04:36

we didn't have access to the camps.

1:04:37

We didn't have access to the detention facilities.

1:04:41

So while we requested from day one

1:04:45

to have access to detention facilities

1:04:49

and to do that without interference so

1:04:52

we have a chance to even meet with the detainees,

1:04:55

interview them how they are being treated.

1:04:58

We were denied that request.

1:05:02

And since then both the Bush administration

1:05:05

and the Obama administration denied human rights

1:05:08

monitors access to detention facilities

1:05:12

to inspect and to interview detainees

1:05:17

and to make sure that they were treated humanely

1:05:20

and in line with international law standards, et cetera.

1:05:24

And that's one of the really challenges,

1:05:29

is lack of transparency,

1:05:30

lack of ability to know what's going on

1:05:32

to the people who you are going to monitor their trial

1:05:34

because part of monitoring trial is

1:05:37

that you're supposed to know where they are detained.

1:05:39

You're supposed to know how they are detained,

1:05:42

what are the legal justification,

1:05:44

what are the,

1:05:46

even the transfer to, and if there are any concerns,

1:05:47

any problems as monitors

1:05:50

you're supposed to be able to address them to deal

1:05:51

with that with the government, with the authorities.

1:05:54

And as we've seen in the last several years,

1:05:57

issues of detention, conditions of detention

1:06:00

have come up in different ways

1:06:03

and certainly within the military commissions,

1:06:05

even though the government has asked constantly try

1:06:07

to reject the authority of the presiding officer

1:06:10

as they were called then,

1:06:15

and evolved into a military judge to hear those arguments,

1:06:17

arguments of from ill treatment,

1:06:25

really issues of abusive and humiliating searches

1:06:34

and transfers from the detention to the court,

1:06:39

to the military commission,

1:06:44

situation of abusing even the incidents

1:06:47

of the Koran being decarcerated

1:06:53

in a way that made it much worse for

1:06:55

the United States to really able to claim

1:07:00

that they were really following the humane treatment.

1:07:03

So all of these things that were coming up constantly, so.

1:07:07

-

How common is it Jamil

1:07:10

for a nation to allow human rights monitors.

1:07:12

-

It is not, unfortunately is not

1:07:17

a practice that is followed by all nations

1:07:22

but more nations than before, more countries today

1:07:26

than let's say, 20 years ago, for example

1:07:31

have an so-called outstanding invitation

1:07:34

to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture.

1:07:37

Interviewer

But we don't, US doesn't.

1:07:44

-

US doesn't.

1:07:45

So the United States have been asked repeatedly

1:07:47

by the Special Rapporteur on torture

1:07:51

and other special procedures of the United Nations,

1:07:54

other experts who wanted to look

1:07:57

at conditions of confinement, treatment of detainees,

1:07:58

and they were denied access

1:08:03

because they would not give them confidential interviews

1:08:04

or conventional meetings with the detainees

1:08:09

and would not give them full access

1:08:10

to all the detention facilities.

1:08:13

And if you are not able to get unimpeded access,

1:08:16

according with the UN protocol,

1:08:20

you are not able to conduct a meaningful visit

1:08:22

or meaningful monitoring visit.

1:08:27

So the United States did create a very bad precedent

1:08:29

by denying independent experts by United nations

1:08:32

to monitor detention facilities,

1:08:37

not only Guantanamo but also elsewhere

1:08:39

and only offered partial access.

1:08:42

That is so-called VIP access

1:08:46

essentially base like Disney show

1:08:48

where you so and shot around the,

1:08:50

how well the detainees are treated

1:08:55

but the truth of the matter,

1:08:57

there's still a major camp in Guantanamo,

1:08:58

that is off limit to the entire world,

1:09:03

entire human rights community,

1:09:09

entire city and people don't

1:09:11

have access to what happens there.

1:09:13

What happened there still secret and classified.

1:09:15

And we are told that because

1:09:22

the International Committee of the Red Cross,

1:09:24

the ICRC has access to the detainees,

1:09:25

no other access is required.

1:09:28

But the truth of the matter is ICRC access

1:09:30

is serving a very specific goal,

1:09:33

specific goal of improving humane treatment of detainees

1:09:38

but doing so in a non-public manner,

1:09:43

doing so confidentially.

1:09:47

The teams go in very dedicated, committed,

1:09:49

they go in regularly, visit detainees,

1:09:53

supposed to have access to all detainees.

1:09:56

And we know that that was not the case

1:09:58

but now seemingly things improve

1:09:59

and they would report to the government.

1:10:02

But what is important for the United States to show is

1:10:05

that these reports has to come

1:10:07

out on a regular basis to the public

1:10:09

both the American public and the world to see

1:10:11

and to hear that actually there was no abuse in Guantanamo,

1:10:15

their conditions in fact have improved.

1:10:19

And they are consistent with international law,

1:10:22

particularly Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention

1:10:25

and other human rights standards,

1:10:27

that has not happened yet.

1:10:30

And even under the Obama administration

1:10:32

United states government rejected visits like so,

1:10:33

one thing that we kept and I personally have worked

1:10:36

over the years to increase transparency

1:10:40

and allow more access to Guantanamo facilities.

1:10:42

And we were always told that

1:10:47

that's not what the government would allow

1:10:50

because it jeopardizes national security.

1:10:56

And you've got to understand that these kinds of,

1:10:59

because, for example, having someone

1:11:01

like Juan Mendez sit with some Guantanamo detainees

1:11:05

and those detainees may say something that could be

1:11:13

revealing state secrets or classified information.

1:11:16

God forbid they could tell him

1:11:23

about what happened to them in secret detention

1:11:25

or as they were tortured that for the government

1:11:28

is something that would need to be protected.

1:11:32

It is really remarkable how

1:11:38

people who are still there been held

1:11:42

for so many years,

1:11:45

that you could still think that anything that they could say

1:11:47

or to an independent expert with

1:11:50

with a strict protocol of maintaining

1:11:53

not disclosing information that would even

1:11:58

potentially harm national security,

1:12:01

that in that kind of situation

1:12:03

that will jeopardize national security.

1:12:05

Clearly it was about not adding pressure to

1:12:07

the United States did not want,

1:12:13

did not welcome that scrutiny for two reasons

1:12:14

either there was something wrong going on right now

1:12:18

or happened that the United States was trying to hide,

1:12:21

or the fact that those individuals can say something

1:12:25

about what happened to them in a credible way

1:12:28

to a credible authority that would maybe be made public.

1:12:31

It might really embarrass the government

1:12:35

that the government decided

1:12:37

that it wanted to remain secret.

1:12:39

In both cases, I think United States appear, look bad.

1:12:43

It looks like they're hiding something.

1:12:49

And if you look at even the first review that

1:12:53

the Obama administration did in 2009

1:12:57

on conditions of confinement on treatment of detainees

1:13:03

under the executive order that the president signed

1:13:07

second day in office,

1:13:10

he ordered to conduct a report

1:13:13

to basically investigate whether the treatment

1:13:21

of detainees at Guantanamo meet the requirement

1:13:24

of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.

1:13:27

And he appointed an Admiral who went down

1:13:30

with his team and work very hard in a very short time.

1:13:34

And one of the recommendations that were made by

1:13:40

this Admiral Welsh is that the United States government

1:13:44

should consider allowing additional access

1:13:47

by non-governmental organizations

1:13:51

to Guantanamo, to increase transparency.

1:13:54

Unfortunately, this recommendation has never been followed

1:13:58

or if it was followed, it was followed very

1:14:01

partially and not in a meaningful way.

1:14:03

So that was one of the things that we worked on.

1:14:05

Another area was, revealing documents.

1:14:11

One of the things that the ACLU has done

1:14:14

over the years was using Freedom of Information Act,

1:14:16

request and litigation to get access

1:14:20

to information about government abuses,

1:14:23

especially in Guantanamo, or also in Guantanamo.

1:14:26

And we have received over a hundred thousands

1:14:30

of pages of documents that showed how detainees were abused.

1:14:34

I remember one of the first document

1:14:43

that we received documented how the FBI warned

1:14:45

against some of the interrogation

1:14:49

practices that they observed at Guantanamo.

1:14:50

And they decided not to participate

1:14:54

in those interrogation sessions,

1:14:59

because they thought that they violated

1:15:00

their own rules, the FBI rules.

1:15:02

So the struggle I think for transparency,

1:15:07

Guantanamo, it continues.

1:15:09

I mean, we have made progress,

1:15:10

really partly because of the pressure

1:15:14

on the government, from different actors,

1:15:16

from the media, from human rights organizations,

1:15:18

from lawyers getting access,

1:15:21

more information through their clients

1:15:23

through Freedom of Information Act,

1:15:27

from international bodies,

1:15:28

pushing the United States

1:15:30

and the United States had to provide more answers

1:15:31

on what's was going on.

1:15:36

But the transparency is not,

1:15:37

the struggle is not over yet.

1:15:39

Interviewer

Did it surprise you that

1:15:42

Obama resisted as much

1:15:43

as Bush did on transparency issues?

1:15:46

-

It did surprise us in the beginning

1:15:50

of his administration because he said,

1:15:54

and it was a quote that

1:15:56

"my administration will be one of the most

1:15:57

"transparent administrations in the history

1:15:59

"of the United States."

1:16:02

And he, I think he followed,

1:16:03

this announcement was not followed by concrete actions

1:16:10

as to make sure that transparency is indeed the hallmark

1:16:15

of this administration.

1:16:20

And the reason was I think because there was pushback

1:16:20

from military and the security establishment,

1:16:24

and they did not want to go along with that.

1:16:29

We've seen that happening very very vividly

1:16:33

with a struggle to declassify the summary and findings

1:16:36

of the Senate interrogation report, where it was clear

1:16:40

that there were,

1:16:46

The White House turned into a mediator,

1:16:48

or instead of making, calling the shots

1:16:50

and deciding as the commander in chief

1:16:54

as the president deciding on who has the authority to

1:16:56

declassify information has turned the white house officials

1:16:59

into mediators between the CIA

1:17:03

and the Senate Intelligence Committee chair

1:17:05

at the time, Dianne Feinstein.

1:17:11

If really the government or the president

1:17:15

was sincere about that,

1:17:19

he would be more forceful about pushing

1:17:21

for these documents to be released,

1:17:26

in many cases we needed to litigate years,

1:17:30

these cases and in order to get the government to agree

1:17:35

including the torture memos.

1:17:39

I mean, there was.

1:17:41

And the president said that,

1:17:42

in his first national security speech in 2009

1:17:44

when he delivered a speech in the National Archives

1:17:49

and had to admit that we had to litigate,

1:17:54

we have to respond to litigation.

1:17:58

And that's why I'm releasing those torture memos

1:18:00

and remains to be a struggle,

1:18:03

at almost every, in almost every level that we need to

1:18:06

it's not that easy to get that information.

1:18:11

Interviewer

Can I go back to the beginning Jamil

1:18:15

Why did ACLU get involved in the beginning

1:18:17

with Guantanamo, can you give us all a history

1:18:21

of what caused ACLU's involvement

1:18:24

and exactly how they saw themselves in the involvement?

1:18:26

-

Sure, so the ACLU main involvement really started

1:18:30

with first calling for more transparency.

1:18:35

And I think leading the struggle for more transparency

1:18:42

of what's happening in Guantanamo,

1:18:46

the ACLU was not the organization,

1:18:48

the first organization

1:18:51

to offer legal representation or to file the

1:18:51

first habeas cases that were filed in federal courts.

1:18:58

That certainly is a credit that should be given

1:19:02

to the Center for Constitutional Rights.

1:19:07

Interviewer

Do you know why they said you do that?

1:19:09

-

I think I was not there when that decision was made

1:19:14

but I think that it was not legally

1:19:18

a viable option for,

1:19:26

it was not really seen as something that

1:19:30

you could easily challenge in court.

1:19:33

It was also politically perhaps risky to take that on,

1:19:38

obviously Michael Laettner, late Michael Laettner

1:19:45

and Center for Constitutional Rights

1:19:47

and other lawyers did that and succeeded,

1:19:49

but they also had doubts about the odds of winning.

1:19:54

And they really thought that there was

1:19:58

a long shot and they would do it for the sake

1:20:00

of historic record and for the sake of

1:20:03

making it clear that the government is

1:20:05

denying a judicial review,

1:20:11

denying judicial access, and judicial oversight.

1:20:13

So the ACLU, I think, had not represented individuals

1:20:19

in general, and certainly not in overseas battles

1:20:25

or even though we've always called

1:20:28

for protection of the constitution

1:20:31

and in a time of peace and at a time of war,

1:20:34

we've always challenged abuse of power.

1:20:38

And I think at the time, the ACLU was more

1:20:43

focused on challenging and pushing back

1:20:47

against the domestic framework

1:20:50

that was reframed to allow certain abuses

1:20:53

to take place providing,

1:20:59

for example, the FBI with authorities to do surveillance,

1:21:01

to do wiretapping through the enactment of the Patriot Act,

1:21:05

the ACLU was active there, was on the forefront

1:21:12

and the subsequent litigation that followed that as well.

1:21:16

I mean, the cases that were submitted were filed.

1:21:18

But it also worked on some other

1:21:22

post 9/11 transparency issues,

1:21:24

there was no access to information

1:21:28

about people who were rounded up post 9/11

1:21:29

there was access to closed deportation hearings.

1:21:34

A number of cases were not successful

1:21:41

but the first case that was really successful

1:21:43

that really related to Guantanamo was

1:21:45

the Freedom of Information Act case

1:21:48

that was litigated by colleagues of mine, who were hired

1:21:50

to start a national security project.

1:21:56

And they also found that that was a long shot.

1:22:00

Interviewer

What were they looking forward to achieving?

1:22:04

-

It was really an attempt to follow the lead of

1:22:06

some of the journalistic work and exposes

1:22:10

and investigative journalism that revealed violations

1:22:15

and abuses against detainees that were held in US custody.

1:22:19

And so there were bits and pieces that were revealed,

1:22:23

but certainly the 2003, 2004 (indistinct) rape, abuses

1:22:27

made it very clear that that

1:22:38

was really extreme and more widespread

1:22:40

than people thought.

1:22:45

Other work that was done

1:22:48

by other human rights organizations in,

1:22:49

they met with detainees who were released

1:22:52

from some of these facilities early on.

1:22:55

So the idea was, the government should

1:22:59

tell the American public

1:23:02

what is happening in those dark far places,

1:23:03

like (indistinct), like Iraq prisons,

1:23:08

like Afghanistan prisons, like Bagram,

1:23:12

and Guantanamo Bay.

1:23:14

And so the first batches of documents were really,

1:23:16

when they arrived,

1:23:20

it was surprising to know so much that was not known.

1:23:21

And so that's when the ACLU really decided

1:23:28

to use this information to inform the public,

1:23:32

to work with media organizations,

1:23:36

to work with lawyers who already

1:23:39

and other human rights organizations

1:23:41

to piece together the story of post 9/11 abuses.

1:23:43

So that was really the ACLU role was at

1:23:50

the time between 2002, 2001-2002,

1:23:53

shortly after Guantanamo opened 2002 to 2004

1:23:56

and five pushing for more transparency trying

1:24:01

to be the guardian of the rule of law and even

1:24:07

in some statements to the media and other work

1:24:15

but it did not include challenging the

1:24:20

illegal detention at Guantanamo,

1:24:23

but that changed, in 2004 as the Bush administration

1:24:26

decided to start the first military commission hearings

1:24:32

in the summer, on August of 2004.

1:24:36

The ACLU was one of four organizations that requested

1:24:42

and received official observer status

1:24:45

at the military commissions,

1:24:48

and Anthony Romero in fact,

1:24:51

the executive director of the ACLU

1:24:53

was one of the first observers

1:24:54

to monitor and to report on what's happening there.

1:24:56

And there was very little known about Guantanamo

1:25:01

because very few reporting there were

1:25:04

media access was limited,

1:25:07

and monitoring the military commissions allowed you

1:25:09

access to the base, access to what's happening

1:25:13

in the base generally,

1:25:17

even though you didn't have access to the camps,

1:25:18

to the detention facilities and to the detainees.

1:25:20

And still, that was a very important role that ACLU played.

1:25:23

And we monitored nearly every military commission hearing

1:25:27

since 2004, much less frequent in the last year or two

1:25:30

because of the difficulty of sending observers

1:25:37

to every hearing when there was more

1:25:41

and more observers available and able to monitor.

1:25:44

There was also other arrangements that were

1:25:49

made to monitor

1:25:51

the hearings and more reporters in, honestly

1:25:52

were also, started to get involved

1:25:57

in monitoring what's going on

1:26:00

other than Colonel Rosenberg,

1:26:02

who was really the lead media observer

1:26:04

at those hearings, but more prominently

1:26:10

the ACLU decided to create a special project,

1:26:14

the John Adams Project, when.

1:26:19

(faintly speaking)

1:26:22

It was, you have the 2006 the Supreme Court decided

1:26:24

that the military commission system was

1:26:29

in violation of the constitution

1:26:32

and the Geneva Conventions particularly,

1:26:33

the government decided that that was the time

1:26:39

for the government to move some

1:26:43

of the CIA detainees to Guantanamo.

1:26:47

Some of them, many of them were released

1:26:51

or transferred to other countries,

1:26:53

but that move really that was

1:26:55

the military commission challenge

1:26:57

of the Hamdan decision, because it was

1:26:59

made very clear that the United States government may,

1:27:03

or officials who were involved in mistreatment of detainees

1:27:07

or not affording them the standard under

1:27:13

the Common Article 3 of humane treatment,

1:27:18

may violate the Geneva Convention,

1:27:20

that would also amount to war crimes.

1:27:22

And at that point it was clear to the government

1:27:24

that they needed to basically roll out to end the,

1:27:28

and obviously there were other things that were going

1:27:35

on and there was more pressure

1:27:38

and for more transparency and accountability,

1:27:39

but there was really the legal opinion

1:27:42

of Justice Stephens that have made it a warning

1:27:48

to the government.

1:27:55

So during that time, and as the government decided to

1:27:57

enact the military commission Act of 2006

1:27:59

and the challenges that followed that

1:28:03

in where the government for the first time announced

1:28:05

that it would start to try those who were responsible

1:28:10

for 9/11 before a military commission,

1:28:18

knowing that the military commission system was unfair

1:28:22

and the newly passed military commission Act in 2006,

1:28:27

did not fix all the problems, the flaws in the system.

1:28:34

It was another attempt on another round,

1:28:41

and a failed legal experiment of testing another thing

1:28:45

and building something from scratch.

1:28:50

And it was clear that it is an invitation

1:28:52

to additional rounds of litigation and legal advocacy.

1:28:55

So as the detainees of Guantanamo started to be tried

1:29:03

and prepared for trials, particularly the 9/11 trials

1:29:09

and the United States government was promising the families

1:29:11

and victims of 9/11, that they will be pursuing justice,

1:29:14

but that's not justice as we need to be evading

1:29:18

because they were using the wrong system.

1:29:21

And as the Bush administration put forward

1:29:24

the cases started to start to prepare for these cases.

1:29:26

It made very clear to us that these trials will not be fair

1:29:30

under the current system.

1:29:38

And what really was needed is to

1:29:40

have the most effective and the best legal teams

1:29:43

to be equipped, to defend these individuals for the sake

1:29:49

of exposing the flaws of the system,

1:29:54

the due process violations,

1:29:57

the violation of the US constitution,

1:29:58

decades long history of rule law commitments

1:30:00

and that, and so the collaboration

1:30:07

with the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,

1:30:10

the ACLU started the John Adams Project

1:30:15

as a way to provide resources,

1:30:18

additional resources to

1:30:21

the Guantanamo military commission defense team

1:30:24

by assembling first-rate, the nation's best

1:30:28

capital defense lawyers who

1:30:36

had experience litigating and representing capital cases

1:30:38

in the domestic system and they were ready and were up

1:30:43

for taking this big challenge of representing

1:30:49

the people who were accused

1:30:54

of being responsible for the 9/11 attacks,

1:30:56

not an easy thing to do,

1:30:59

but there were people who like the ACLU

1:31:00

were committed to making sure that whatever

1:31:02

the United States government does

1:31:09

it reflects its own laws and its own values

1:31:10

and its own commitments to human rights and the rule of law,

1:31:13

and that was really an attempt

1:31:17

to challenge the system this flawed system

1:31:19

and bringing to an end.

1:31:25

And ultimately, because of this work,

1:31:29

there several lawyers who were,

1:31:34

civilian lawyers that were hired

1:31:37

and were paid by this fund,

1:31:39

by special resources that were made available

1:31:41

by the ACLU and the national criminal defense lawyers,

1:31:44

in order to work alongside

1:31:50

with military defense counsel to represent the detainees.

1:31:52

And that has really been pushed to shut this down.

1:31:56

And it was made close,

1:32:03

very close to when the Obama administration

1:32:04

or the president Obama was campaigning as a candidate.

1:32:07

And he made promises that he would shut down Guantanamo,

1:32:11

and he made promises that he would not

1:32:13

follow these military commissions

1:32:16

that were really not following the due process.

1:32:18

And the work of of the John Adams Project

1:32:24

kind of made a very clear why there need

1:32:30

to be an end to these cases and we should be brought

1:32:34

to federal courts if there are credible evidence

1:32:39

against these individuals to try them in federal courts

1:32:44

that are tested courts,

1:32:47

and then the individuals who the United States has

1:32:48

no credible evidence against them

1:32:51

can't charge them, bring them to trial.

1:32:54

They should be released.

1:32:57

So that was made very clear from the outside

1:32:58

and I think you ACLU did a historic decision at the time

1:33:00

and a bold decision to take that case

1:33:06

while we fail to do the right thing

1:33:09

maybe in representing the first detainees

1:33:14

who arrived in Guantanamo in January 2002,

1:33:17

we decided that that was also historic role

1:33:21

for ACLU to uphold the rule of law and due process

1:33:24

and the constitutional human rights principles

1:33:28

by creating this project.

1:33:31

Ultimately we know the end of the story,

1:33:34

which we are now, which is, it's not really end of a story.

1:33:36

The Obama administration did not shut

1:33:41

down the military commissions.

1:33:42

There was an attempt to bring some

1:33:43

of those cases to the federal courts.

1:33:45

In fact, the attorney general even filed indictments

1:33:47

in federal courts here in New York against

1:33:51

the 9/11 defendants

1:33:54

this case because of pressure, political pressure

1:33:57

nothing else, because of political expediency

1:34:00

it was pushed back,

1:34:04

sent back to Guantanamo military commissions

1:34:06

that were ultimately revised again with an eye

1:34:09

on repairing it to be able to handle those cases

1:34:14

but ultimately they're still failing to do so.

1:34:20

And as we see days go on, there are few convictions.

1:34:23

In fact, there were only three or four convictions

1:34:29

at Guantanamo, there were still shadow secrecy.

1:34:31

There was fundamental issues that are being litigated

1:34:37

as to application of the constitution

1:34:41

and constitutional principles, wiretapping

1:34:43

or snooping on military defense team,

1:34:46

serious violations of confidentiality.

1:34:51

Other really abuses that only can be,

1:34:55

that can only fit kangaroo courts

1:35:01

not military commissions and handled according to the law.

1:35:03

Man

We need to switch cards.

1:35:10

Interviewer

Need to switch cards?

1:35:12

Okay, I don't have much more of the Guantanamo switch cards

1:35:14

because I do have a few more questions.

1:35:16

Okay, I just have a few more questions Jamil.

1:35:21

One is when the ACLU start the John Adams Project

1:35:23

did they get any pushback from the donors or

1:35:26

from people who the board

1:35:29

or people who were very involved in ACLU?

1:35:32

-

I think internally there was a pretty consensus

1:35:35

that that was the right thing for the ACLU to do,

1:35:39

under the leadership of Anthony Romero

1:35:43

and the legal director, Steve Shapiro, who really,

1:35:47

made a decision and said,

1:35:51

this is something that we've been calling for

1:35:53

a fair trial or release,

1:35:59

we've been calling for either charge them,

1:36:01

try them, or release them since day one.

1:36:04

This is what they should have been saying

1:36:06

since beginning of the post 9/11.

1:36:08

And so if the United States government

1:36:13

is going to try people then we need

1:36:16

to show that we really sticking to the rule,

1:36:20

these trials should be fair.

1:36:23

And so we, not only to talk the talk

1:36:26

but we needed to walk the walk.

1:36:30

And I think it was clear.

1:36:32

I remember having those conversations

1:36:34

with Steve and Anthony that this is the right thing.

1:36:36

And I think most people within the organizations were

1:36:40

on board with that.

1:36:42

Not all funders or donors liked that work.

1:36:44

It wasn't something that they would want to fund or support.

1:36:48

But I think ultimately the ACLU was able to

1:36:52

find the resources to fund this important work.

1:36:54

And it paid off, it paid off because

1:36:58

the professional legal representation

1:37:02

that you're seeing now at Guantanamo military commissions

1:37:06

is due to this project, is due to this initiative.

1:37:10

Interviewer

And you found these top people.

1:37:16

-

Because the top people came and provided

1:37:17

their legal expertise

1:37:20

and provided the support that was needed.

1:37:23

It was very few people in the US military

1:37:26

had tried capital cases,

1:37:29

and capital case there is specific

1:37:31

standards under the ABO rule

1:37:33

or how many people need to be assigned to a case,

1:37:36

both from a perspective of a criminal defense lawyers

1:37:39

and other specialists that need to be assigned to a case

1:37:42

and analyst and researchers,

1:37:46

and requires immense amount of resources,

1:37:47

and doing so in a place like Guantanamo,

1:37:51

where it's constantly, everything is challenged.

1:37:55

Everything is changing.

1:37:58

Rules change constantly,

1:37:59

makes this work even more challenging,

1:38:02

so the ACLU basically said,

1:38:05

we don't have the staff

1:38:08

or the lawyers to defend these individuals

1:38:09

because we don't do,

1:38:12

we do have a Capital Defense Project

1:38:13

that has experienced in litigating cases

1:38:16

in the United States.

1:38:19

And ultimately the head of that project became one

1:38:20

of the 9/11 criminal defense lawyers, Denny LeBoeuf.

1:38:24

And she continues to be involved as

1:38:30

the director of the John Adams Project

1:38:32

but it really required the ACLU to take that unconventional

1:38:36

maybe very bold decision of doing this.

1:38:42

There were fortunately, I think there were also

1:38:50

little pushback or criticism from supporters,

1:38:53

broadly speaking, I think by 2006-2007

1:38:59

people in the United States already been fed

1:39:06

up with what they have heard and saw

1:39:08

and learn about what's happening in Guantanamo.

1:39:11

And you gotta remember that that that was after

1:39:16

almost three or four times

1:39:19

at that United States Supreme Court had made decisions

1:39:21

against the government with regard to Guantanamo policies.

1:39:27

So there was already public opinion that has been

1:39:31

at least ready to accept the fact

1:39:37

that this is not fair.

1:39:39

This is not right.

1:39:43

This is not what the United States stands for.

1:39:45

And to see the ACLU stepping up and doing something to end

1:39:48

this was pretty much consistent

1:39:53

with what I think most people

1:39:55

who really care about the country

1:39:58

and it's history and it's reputation, et cetera.

1:40:01

And so that really helped get the ACLU to be able to do that

1:40:07

without, but we got support from former attorney general,

1:40:12

Janet Reno, for example

1:40:16

wrote why it was important for the ACLU and

1:40:17

for Americans to provide fair trial and why this is needed.

1:40:22

There was not really as much

1:40:29

about individuals who were on trial,

1:40:30

although as a criminal defense lawyers,

1:40:33

that's their main interest,

1:40:37

the main interest should be to defend their client.

1:40:39

And that was the hallmark

1:40:42

of the American justice system for years,

1:40:45

is that no matter who the person who was accused,

1:40:48

they deserve, he or she deserve fair trial and due process

1:40:52

and where those fundamental principles are violated

1:40:57

there's something wrong with the country, with the system.

1:41:00

And that obviously was made very clear to the public.

1:41:03

And I think if you ask, most people would probably say

1:41:09

that that was the right thing to do.

1:41:13

Unfortunately the fear mongering

1:41:15

and the politicization of Guantanamo

1:41:18

and the fact that the United States was involved

1:41:21

in two Wars abroad, Afghanistan, and Iraq

1:41:26

and the fact that there were attempts

1:41:29

after 9/11 and in even some incidents

1:41:32

where were some political violence,

1:41:35

people were resorted to acts of terrorism

1:41:37

in the United States.

1:41:40

Those were used by politicians and by other parts of

1:41:41

the political system and including sometimes

1:41:46

in the media to raise concerns regarding some

1:41:50

policies that United States were doing it right.

1:41:54

For example, instead of increasing the closure

1:41:58

of Guantanamo, those fear-mongering

1:42:01

and the politicization of Guantanamo made it much

1:42:07

more difficult to close Guantanamo.

1:42:10

So the Guantanamo become not as

1:42:12

national security imperative,

1:42:14

as much as it was political imperative,

1:42:16

political interests, narrow political interests,

1:42:19

dictated what should happen to Guantanamo,

1:42:22

while really, if you think about it

1:42:24

the first thing it should be,

1:42:26

what the rule of law means,

1:42:27

what human rights, national security combined

1:42:29

means for a country to operate a place like Guantanamo.

1:42:33

And yet it turned out to be not about that because people

1:42:37

on both sides of the political map

1:42:42

in 2008, during the presidential elections,

1:42:45

both major presidential candidates

1:42:48

were for closing Guantanamo.

1:42:51

In fact, President Bush was for closing Guantanamo.

1:42:52

He released and transferred most Guantanamo detainees

1:42:55

before even Obama took office.

1:42:59

But once you turn something

1:43:01

into a political debate, political issue

1:43:03

then you really lose sight of what's happening.

1:43:09

And that's unfortunate.

1:43:12

And that makes it,

1:43:13

that's why when you see some of the polling

1:43:15

on Guantanamo or the use of torture,

1:43:17

it's easier for people to say,

1:43:19

we want Guantanamo to maintain, to keep it open

1:43:22

because there are really asked.

1:43:25

They're not really asked

1:43:28

about these issues when they know all the facts,

1:43:30

know all the repercussions, they know what really

1:43:35

that means from a perspective of both domestic

1:43:38

and international perspectives,

1:43:41

but it's about the fear.

1:43:46

How's it gonna affect me as an American?

1:43:49

Is this gonna kind of haunt me,

1:43:52

is that gonna make me feel less safe?

1:43:54

And we know that many

1:43:56

of the post 9/11 policies have not made United States safer

1:43:57

or more safe.

1:44:03

Had made things worse and they were more likely

1:44:04

than not that they were counter productive to the cause

1:44:09

of protecting the country and the citizens.

1:44:13

So now there is more critical analysis

1:44:18

of what's happened and why it's hard to cut back

1:44:22

on those policies.

1:44:28

Well, there's a lot of people who are benefiting from that.

1:44:30

You have people who are security contractors,

1:44:33

the fact that there are more people acting

1:44:37

for security companies than we had pre-9/11

1:44:40

that it's harder and harder.

1:44:45

There's a narrative that was set up

1:44:47

since 9/11, that is hard to change.

1:44:50

There are financial interest involved.

1:44:53

There are people's careers involved.

1:44:55

They're all of a sudden you have these experts,

1:44:58

national security experts

1:45:00

and some of them are being utilized in some of those cases.

1:45:02

And including at Guantanamo.

1:45:07

The first full trial that I saw that was in Guantanamo

1:45:09

was the case of Al-Bahlul is Yemeni detainee

1:45:17

who was alleged to be a close advisor to Osama bin Laden.

1:45:24

And who helped him develop communication and media content

1:45:32

and materials for glorifying Al-Qaeda's

1:45:38

operations and activities around the world.

1:45:41

And he was put on trial,

1:45:44

I was the ACLU observer in the trial.

1:45:46

He gone to the trial.

1:45:50

He did not want to be represented.

1:45:52

He did not really put forward a defense,

1:45:54

later on, there were cracks in his

1:45:58

there were challenged the conviction

1:46:01

he's still serving life sentence in Guantanamo

1:46:04

but there were serious problems

1:46:07

that were revealed on appeal.

1:46:09

But the main point that I wanna make

1:46:12

is that one of the things

1:46:13

that the government did was bringing

1:46:14

so-called a national security expert to show a video of,

1:46:17

was created by a guy who was really making his living

1:46:22

on tracking Al-Qaeda and showing what Al-Qaeda videos like,

1:46:26

and literally he was copying what Al-Bahlul

1:46:33

has created during his time an active membership

1:46:36

with Al Qaeda.

1:46:43

So he made a lot of money.

1:46:44

He came and was given access

1:46:46

to Guantanamo military commission

1:46:49

and was testifying and about,

1:46:51

and he prepared episodes like the ideology of Al-Qaeda

1:46:53

and how they evolved, pre-1998, 96

1:47:01

for the Fatwah that was issued and after the Fatwah

1:47:06

and all the different attacks,

1:47:09

and these are things that are the government knows and does.

1:47:11

And there had, there were people who are now living

1:47:17

on just reinventing and recreating this again

1:47:21

and again, for the sake of showing

1:47:25

that we there's a constant level of fear

1:47:26

and constant level of security threat that we had to manage.

1:47:31

And there's a lot of people who are benefiting from that.

1:47:35

And I think that in of itself needs to be exposed.

1:47:37

The fact that the country has moved to

1:47:41

more security apparatus in

1:47:44

everything we do just as Dana Priest

1:47:47

in The Washington Post revealed in terms of,

1:47:50

how many really people are employed,

1:47:53

how many companies are doing this kind of work who have,

1:47:55

security clearance and have access to information

1:47:59

and what that means to a country

1:48:02

to a democracy like the United States.

1:48:03

These are questions that did not go away by

1:48:07

the fact that Obama decided to change some of the policies.

1:48:10

In fact, he made some, expanded some

1:48:14

of the Bush administration policies.

1:48:17

And I think that the next president

1:48:19

after 2016 elections

1:48:23

will likely to enhance some of those policies.

1:48:26

And it will be more difficult

1:48:29

because the president already has set

1:48:30

a tone and a legal reasoning.

1:48:34

And also some positions that were made as to

1:48:36

his power as a president

1:48:39

he's created some precedent,

1:48:42

I think, equally harmful if not more harmful

1:48:43

than the Bush administration

1:48:46

because you have a president

1:48:48

who knew what he was doing really well

1:48:50

who is a constitutional lawyer,

1:48:53

who came to office with understanding that these

1:48:54

these are failures that we not repeat,

1:48:58

and yet on a number of areas, national security policies

1:49:02

certainly the mishandling of closing Guantanamo

1:49:06

led to this, where we are right now,

1:49:11

that Guantanamo is not closed.

1:49:14

There still, it's becoming a political issue.

1:49:19

It's becoming.

1:49:22

Interviewer

Will it close?

1:49:24

-

Well I doubt if it will close between now and January.

1:49:27

It will require presidential bold action.

1:49:31

The president created the Guantanamo.

1:49:39

And, if you I once used it in one of the blogs that I wrote

1:49:43

from Guantanamo about the whole concept

1:49:49

of military commissions,

1:49:52

military commissions were originally created

1:49:53

by the president and the president

1:49:55

as the one who created them can shut them down.

1:49:58

And similarly is really,

1:50:03

it's the authority, the source that created

1:50:04

something is the one that logically is the one

1:50:09

that to end it, to finish it.

1:50:13

And this is the same to, for Guantanamo,

1:50:16

now, obviously with all the different restrictions

1:50:19

and the rules and the laws that were enacted

1:50:21

through the appropriation over the years.

1:50:24

But I think more than anything

1:50:28

it is about political capital.

1:50:30

It's about the legacy.

1:50:32

I think that the president will

1:50:35

be remembered for a number of things

1:50:38

as far as his national security legacy,

1:50:40

he will be remembered

1:50:43

for ending torture as far as secret detention facilities

1:50:44

and not allowing it to continue,

1:50:49

but at the same time and commitment to close Guantanamo

1:50:53

but not closing it

1:50:59

and doing other things, meanwhile

1:51:00

to undermine that purpose

1:51:02

and using targeted killings

1:51:05

as a main counter terrorism tool,

1:51:07

particularly in places outside conventional battlefield,

1:51:11

places like Yemen, places like Somalia.

1:51:16

And even in places in Pakistan where

1:51:18

it's not clear that there is a level of violence

1:51:19

level that reaches to amount to an armed conflict

1:51:23

and the more really concerning

1:51:28

is his unwillingness to make his policies transparent

1:51:31

and more accountable.

1:51:39

He has said that he wants to be more transparent.

1:51:41

In fact, in the 2013 speech and in the

1:51:44

National Defense University,

1:51:48

he made for the first time

1:51:53

the commitment to make his policy on targeted

1:51:55

killing more transparent.

1:51:58

And he issued a very short document that summarizes

1:52:00

the policy or target again, but it was not enough.

1:52:05

And he promised, and to take steps,

1:52:08

to make sure that the following

1:52:14

or the next future president will not

1:52:16

be open to, or with a free hand to do the same things.

1:52:18

Because ultimately that is up to the president to

1:52:23

create a precedent or to show that,

1:52:28

put limits to his own powers,

1:52:31

consistent with the constitutional powers under the system.

1:52:34

So those are things that I think will haunt the president.

1:52:39

He will be, and the last thing that I would really,

1:52:42

connects to all of those,

1:52:49

the lack of accountability for torture

1:52:51

including torture in Guantanamo.

1:52:53

When you have massive violations of human rights

1:52:56

of abuses that were committed and documented,

1:53:00

very well-documented.

1:53:03

And yet very few people within the chain of command,

1:53:04

specifically the higher command have been held accountable.

1:53:09

It makes it very clear that there was

1:53:15

no attempt to provide accountability.

1:53:18

In fact, the Obama administration gave immunity

1:53:20

to the people who are responsible for those abuses

1:53:25

because he thought that by doing so,

1:53:30

he would have the security establishment,

1:53:32

military defense establishment

1:53:38

back his own policies moving forward.

1:53:41

And in some areas, yes they did,

1:53:44

targeted killing was one of them,

1:53:46

that he got the backing of both the intelligence

1:53:47

and the military defense establishment

1:53:49

as well as people on the hill.

1:53:52

But that ultimately opened the door for more abuses

1:53:54

as we know.

1:53:59

So it is a sad way for,

1:54:00

if Guantanamo will be closed by the end of Obama term

1:54:04

it will be because he really decided to

1:54:10

to do the right thing.

1:54:14

And the more courageous step of even risking

1:54:16

the so-called accusation of he's violating the law

1:54:20

by doing so, I think there are other ways

1:54:25

that he could do that without violating the law

1:54:27

because appropriations that go, not the defense,

1:54:29

other kinds of appropriation could be used

1:54:32

to close Guantanamo but end of the game

1:54:34

is not only closing Guantanamo,

1:54:38

is ending the regime of Guantanamo,

1:54:40

is ending what Guantanamo symbolizes as far

1:54:42

as indefinite detention,

1:54:46

moving Guantanamo to the United States

1:54:48

without ending indefinite detention

1:54:51

is a half step forward.

1:54:54

Ending Guantanamo and making sure that the same pattern,

1:54:58

the same paradigm will not be repeated elsewhere.

1:55:03

Now that the United States may be involved

1:55:07

in more military operations overseas,

1:55:10

what are the rules for engagement

1:55:12

and how will these kinds of abuses will not,

1:55:14

what are the assurances that these will not happen again?

1:55:18

And as far as fairness of moving trials

1:55:21

if you just move the military commission system as is,

1:55:25

it will remain flawed,

1:55:28

it will remain subject to constant challenge and litigation.

1:55:30

So will remain to be seen what happens with that.

1:55:34

Interviewer

Well, the ACLU feel it

1:55:38

that they'll get more documents,

1:55:41

this foyer request,

1:55:43

is that something that ACLU really focuses on,

1:55:44

is that important, an ACLU policy?

1:55:46

-

Well, the ACLU has been also presenting individuals

1:55:52

in Guantanamo, I mean, we have

1:55:57

Mohamedou Ould Slahi

1:55:59

who is a Guantanamo detainee

1:56:00

from Mauritania who has been held

1:56:04

without trial or charge for years for over a decade now.

1:56:09

And his case will be reviewed very soon

1:56:14

before the Periodic Review Board.

1:56:18

We hope that he will be released.

1:56:20

We think that there is no reason

1:56:22

that he should remain in US custody.

1:56:23

We've been involved in John Adams Project.

1:56:27

And that also involves some

1:56:31

litigation representing detainees.

1:56:32

We have also challenged the,

1:56:35

some of the post 9/11 policies

1:56:40

both domestic and international,

1:56:43

domestic, they're using the Material Witness Act,

1:56:45

including some Americans who were caught

1:56:51

and been held and in one of those cases,

1:56:53

made it all the way to US Supreme Court.

1:56:56

There's more and more obviously work

1:57:01

that is being done around transparency

1:57:03

and that is using Freedom of Information Act

1:57:05

to try to challenge or to shed more light

1:57:09

on targeted killings program,

1:57:12

shed more light on transparency

1:57:14

as far as the accountability for the CIA program.

1:57:16

We have represented torture survivors since 2005,

1:57:20

torture survivors who were held in US custody abroad

1:57:28

by the U S military and by the CIA.

1:57:31

And we just brought another case

1:57:34

on behalf of three individuals who were victims

1:57:41

of the CIA torture program based

1:57:44

on the Senate intelligence interrogation report

1:57:46

or report on interrogation practices or a torture report.

1:57:51

So there are a number of ways that the ACLU continues

1:57:55

to work to make sure that there's more transparency

1:57:59

and more accountability,

1:58:04

that laws are consistent with the constitution

1:58:05

and international law on issues of detention

1:58:08

the army field manual that needs to be reviewed and revised

1:58:12

particularly Annex M,

1:58:15

Guantanamo closure to be fair, safe

1:58:18

and humane consistent with the rule of law.

1:58:21

And that this will be the only assurance

1:58:26

that next president will know that it will not

1:58:30

be easy to violate the constitution and international law.

1:58:36

Interviewer

I have only two more questions.

1:58:41

One is, do you think at some point in our future

1:58:43

there will be some,

1:58:48

but not reparations apology

1:58:52

or something else that the US will acknowledge what they did

1:58:53

and maybe patch 'cause they said it was pushing it forward?

1:58:59

-

Yes, I think that, that there,

1:59:02

this chapter, Guantanamo chapter

1:59:04

or the post 9/11 rights violations chapter

1:59:07

will remain open until there will be final closure

1:59:12

with providing a full account,

1:59:15

an official apology for the people who were victims

1:59:20

of these policies,

1:59:24

some compensation and in the case of survivors

1:59:26

of torture and abuse,

1:59:30

rehabilitation opportunities

1:59:31

maybe would be too late for some of them.

1:59:33

They may not be alive.

1:59:35

As we know from the United States experiences in the past

1:59:37

it's usually takes decades,

1:59:41

the Japanese Americans were rounded and interned

1:59:43

in the internment camp during World War II.

1:59:48

They had to wait until the mid-1980s

1:59:52

with President Reagan offering

1:59:55

official apology and passing law

1:59:59

to provide a remedy for some compensation,

2:00:02

some measure of justice for them.

2:00:05

We already hear from former justices

2:00:08

of the Supreme Court likes Paul Stevens,

2:00:11

Justice Stevens who said that

2:00:14

Guantanamo detainees should be offered even compensation

2:00:18

for abuses that they experienced.

2:00:22

We know that people who worked within the US government

2:00:27

and were challenging,

2:00:31

or try to push back against those policies,

2:00:32

spoke against those policies.

2:00:35

Some of them were whistleblowers

2:00:37

who paid very high price.

2:00:38

Some of them left the government.

2:00:41

Those people shouldn't be honored,

2:00:43

those people should be

2:00:45

rewarded for their courage.

2:00:46

And that has not happened yet.

2:00:48

So there's a host of steps that the government

2:00:50

maybe the future government, in my view

2:00:53

it will take longer than an administration

2:00:56

or two for the United States to realize that it happened.

2:00:58

They did the wrong thing.

2:01:02

And then as long as the concept

2:01:03

of the war on terror, the concept of open wars,

2:01:06

with no boundaries, that the United States

2:01:11

as long as there's this narrative

2:01:15

and paradigms and thinking about both domestic

2:01:17

and foreign policy, it would be harder

2:01:21

for any president to do that

2:01:24

because it will be seen as automatic challenge,

2:01:26

direct challenge to the people who are doing

2:01:29

those exact things in different shapes maybe.

2:01:33

Maybe redesign, repackaged.

2:01:36

As we have seen in the targeted killings program,

2:01:41

we did not have the Office of Legal Counsel

2:01:45

and justice department authorizing the use

2:01:48

of torture under Obama.

2:01:50

It happened under Bush

2:01:52

but we did have the Office of Legal Counsel authorizing

2:01:54

and providing the legal justification

2:01:58

for the first political,

2:02:01

first killing of American citizen without due process,

2:02:04

without outside the protection of a legal process.

2:02:09

So that's really what will take.

2:02:17

And it will take a civil society,

2:02:21

active informing continuing to inform the public about

2:02:23

what happened and what should happen

2:02:27

to make sure that it doesn't happen again.

2:02:30

And I think most of the American public

2:02:33

is not aware of all the details is not informed fully

2:02:35

about what happened.

2:02:39

There's need to be more and more exposure to these things.

2:02:41

And because ultimately

2:02:45

the people who are living here,

2:02:47

they feel that this is a remote issue.

2:02:50

This is happening overseas.

2:02:52

It's not affecting us,

2:02:54

whether it's Guantanamo or whether it's Iraq

2:02:56

or Afghanistan or now in Syria.

2:02:58

Why should we care, right.

2:03:00

Same with refugees,

2:03:03

it seems like this is something that is remote.

2:03:05

Although historically it has been fundamental

2:03:06

to the country's values to open the country for refugees,

2:03:13

although with the same at a mixed message of some people,

2:03:16

some immigrants who were barred

2:03:22

from coming to the United States.

2:03:24

So I think they will have,

2:03:25

there could be constant educational purposes.

2:03:26

It goes to go on and the ACLU is one

2:03:30

of the organizations that is equipped and

2:03:32

well qualified to do that.

2:03:36

Interviewer

I think I'm hearing from you

2:03:40

that maybe someday there will be some accountability.

2:03:41

-

Well, I think as the time passes,

2:03:46

it would be harder to have accountability

2:03:48

within the United States domestic system.

2:03:50

It would be, be much harder for reopening

2:03:54

these cases, more likely than not

2:03:57

there will be more accountability in abroad,

2:04:01

in other countries.

2:04:04

In fact, there were already attempts to investigate US

2:04:05

officials for Guantanamo violations, abuses

2:04:09

both in places like Spain and places like even France.

2:04:13

There's now an attempt to conduct an investigation

2:04:19

in Germany, there likely to be other places

2:04:22

where they will be openness to take on.

2:04:26

It is hard to challenge United States government

2:04:29

or to put former officials on trial or

2:04:32

even investigate them for violations of international law.

2:04:38

Another avenue that would probably

2:04:41

be open to accountability is

2:04:44

is the International Criminal Court

2:04:51

and the United States government

2:04:53

and I think is very, very concerned about the possibility

2:04:55

that the ICC prosecutor would open a full investigation.

2:04:58

There is a preliminary investigation

2:05:03

into abuses that happen in Afghanistan

2:05:04

during the time after the Afghanistan became member

2:05:07

of the court or signed and ratified the Rome Statute.

2:05:11

And that was in May of 2003.

2:05:16

So any violations of the ICC that happened

2:05:19

on Afghan soil would provide the prosecutor

2:05:22

with the power to conduct an investigation.

2:05:26

There is a preliminary investigation that's going on.

2:05:30

It could lead to a full investigation,

2:05:33

could take time but that could

2:05:35

be another avenue for accountability.

2:05:40

It's very hard and unlikely that that that will happen

2:05:41

again, for the, maybe the main reasons

2:05:44

of the gravity of these abuses may not amount

2:05:46

to the same gravity of other abuses of the court

2:05:50

is looking at, or maybe the political challenge

2:05:53

of really clashing with the United States

2:05:58

that was after all in the last seven

2:06:02

or eight years was trying to work with the ICC,

2:06:05

to support the ICC, but not on the United States conduct,

2:06:09

but the conduct of United States foes,

2:06:13

places like Sudan or places like Libya and elsewhere.

2:06:16

So will be interesting to see how that develops.

2:06:22

We have been providing information

2:06:25

to the ICC prosecutor as part

2:06:28

of our responsibilities as a human rights organization,

2:06:31

we were approached by the ICC office.

2:06:35

We will continue to cooperate

2:06:38

with the ICC because it's a fundamental responsibility

2:06:39

of any group that has credible evidence and information

2:06:42

on a violation of the Rome Statute.

2:06:46

And we will, and the victims then,

2:06:50

if that happens, under the Rome Statute,

2:06:53

the victims of torture in this particular case,

2:06:56

mistreatment and torture in Afghanistan

2:06:58

will have formal standing to be able

2:07:02

to be represented by counsel,

2:07:05

to be part of that process,

2:07:07

unlike criminal proceedings in the United States

2:07:10

and elsewhere where victims

2:07:15

of torture don't have a formal standing,

2:07:17

essentially represented by the prosecutor

2:07:21

when the prosecutor takes the case

2:07:23

and prosecute the case but they don't have really

2:07:25

full legal standing to participate in the act.

2:07:27

That would be something that I think will,

2:07:32

may evolve into something that will provide

2:07:35

at least some class of a group of people

2:07:38

who were abused a chance to be able

2:07:42

to get some measure of justice.

2:07:47

Interviewer

Well, Jamil I always ask people

2:07:50

at the end of

2:07:52

is there anything I didn't ask

2:07:53

that you thought we should know

2:07:54

or that you thought before you came in

2:07:57

you wanted to talk about, is there something,

2:08:00

I know you've said a lot today, but.

2:08:02

-

Yeah, I mean, I think the only thing that I had

2:08:04

not had a chance to talk more about is

2:08:06

the fact that there was a lot of advocacy,

2:08:08

international advocacy that was done

2:08:13

at the United Nations level in particular

2:08:16

before the different human rights treaty bodies.

2:08:18

Those reviews and advocacy that happened

2:08:23

were critical in holding the United States accountable

2:08:28

in different times,

2:08:32

the 2006 was the first time

2:08:35

that the US government appeared

2:08:38

before the Committee Against Torture to talk

2:08:39

about Guantanamo and to talk about torture elsewhere.

2:08:41

And they lied.

2:08:46

They said, we don't torture.

2:08:48

I mean, as far as they're concerned,

2:08:50

they were not lying because their definition

2:08:52

or perception of torture was different

2:08:55

than the rest of the world.

2:08:57

But they said we don't torture.

2:08:59

They made other outrageous statements.

2:09:01

And there was a lot of of concern among

2:09:05

international actors of the same bodies

2:09:10

that the United States government supported

2:09:12

for years and helped create post-World War II

2:09:15

were unanimous in their condemnation

2:09:19

of the United States policy post 9/11.

2:09:22

And that says a lot,

2:09:24

from United nations human rights bodies,

2:09:26

the Committee Against Torture,

2:09:29

the Human Rights Committee

2:09:31

and even the

2:09:32

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

2:09:33

to the United Nations experts like the expert on torture

2:09:35

the working group on (indistinct) detention

2:09:39

to experts within the Inter-American system on human rights

2:09:41

the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which held,

2:09:46

was actually the first human rights

2:09:49

body to monitor a case from Guantanamo

2:09:50

to issue a precautionary measure decision against

2:09:55

the United States shortly after Guantanamo was open

2:09:59

and continues to monitor and in fact,

2:10:03

just recently issued a major report on Guantanamo

2:10:05

to even the

2:10:08

Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE.

2:10:10

The United States is a member

2:10:13

and Canada is a member.

2:10:15

This is a post World War II entity that,

2:10:16

evolved during the Cold War has also condemned United States

2:10:21

for its failure to close Guantanamo

2:10:25

to provide due process and other abuses.

2:10:27

And you had that all these testimonies

2:10:30

and yet feel little accountability

2:10:32

and unfortunately Guantanamo remains open.

2:10:36

Interviewer

So, and you will say it's

2:10:42

because US is such a powerful nation.

2:10:44

They don't have to see to

2:10:51

any pressures from other countries.

2:10:53

-

Right.

2:10:55

There is a notion of exceptionalism.

2:10:55

The US exceptionalism is very strong because

2:10:57

it's also developed its own powerful diplomatic,

2:11:00

economic, political military position in the world

2:11:05

that it is hard to challenge this big superpower.

2:11:10

And the more, I think the United States

2:11:19

has be, unfortunately there will be probably

2:11:26

more vulnerable if it did not have that power.

2:11:29

The problem is that this power has not been translating

2:11:32

into always doing the right thing in the world.

2:11:35

It certainly after 9/11, we saw how it was used

2:11:39

in order to do other,

2:11:43

to promote policies and to promote actions

2:11:47

that did not really help maintain state security,

2:11:49

peace, and security in the world

2:11:54

by flouting security council resolutions

2:11:56

on invading Iraq, for example,

2:11:59

by violating the Geneva Conventions,

2:12:02

by creating extra territorial,

2:12:05

extra judicial detention facilities,

2:12:08

secretive secret detention facility to torture people

2:12:10

by creating massive surveillance program.

2:12:15

All of these things, put together would,

2:12:18

if they are, they're creating

2:12:23

a precedent to other governments

2:12:28

they are setting infrastructure

2:12:29

that could easily be abused in the future.

2:12:33

And as we've seen,

2:12:36

easily can be developed in something

2:12:39

that would be worse and would fire back,

2:12:41

would backfire on,

2:12:44

and cause more harm than good.

2:12:49

And so I think that remains

2:12:53

to be the challenge of whether the international partners

2:12:55

of the United States close allies

2:13:02

would also see that their interest

2:13:04

is not with United States interests

2:13:08

continuing these policies.

2:13:09

So far it seems that they have been aligned

2:13:11

because they had more to gain

2:13:14

from the United States cooperation

2:13:17

or working with United States

2:13:20

on these national security challenges and crisis.

2:13:21

They had more to gain by that than gaining

2:13:27

by holding United States accountable for the abuses.

2:13:30

And it's a calculation that every country

2:13:33

in every part of the world is being made.

2:13:36

And I think it's our challenge

2:13:40

as a human rights advocates to expose that

2:13:42

and to put well on not only the short-term

2:13:44

but the long-term strategic benefit.

2:13:47

And as we've seen in the past and the history,

2:13:52

if you're on the wrong side of history

2:13:55

this will condemn you,

2:13:58

this will only bring more ills

2:13:59

and more trouble than making things better.

2:14:02

Interviewer

That's an excellent way to end Jamil.

2:14:08

I really appreciate, that's excellent.

2:14:10

-

Thank you very much.

2:14:12

Interviewer

And we need 20 seconds

2:14:13

of room tone before we shut down the camera.

2:14:14

So Johnny could start that room tone.

2:14:17

Johnny

Begin room tone.

2:14:21

Man

To 10?

2:14:23

Johnny

Yeah, just, we'll all be quiet in the room

2:14:24

for a few minutes, for a few seconds.

2:14:26

Okay, great.

2:14:41

Thank you.

2:14:42

Dakwar, Jamil - Interview master file

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