Tape 173 - Monetary Policy, Wheat Sale, Oil Decontrol, Kelso

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-	Hello, this is Rose Friedman inviting you once again	0:02
	to our biweekly conversations with Dr. Milton Friedman,	0:06
	professor of economics at the University of Chicago.	0:09
	We are taping this conversation early in August.	0:12
	We have a couple of letters	0:17
	that I think we ought to take care of first.	0:19
	The first one is from a subscriber, Ray A. Graham, Jr.,	0:22
	who sends the following letter.	0:27
	I sent the enclosed while you were on your Chile and	0:30
	Japan et cetera trip.	0:32
	I think it is still apropos because it seems to say	0:34
	monetarists are old-fashioned and out of date.	0:37
	Now, Burns claims, the economy has turned up,	0:40
	and you said earlier this year	0:43
	the turn would come sometime between August and November.	0:44
	Would you care to comment on this?	0:48
	The earlier letter which Mr. Graham refers to briefly	0:50
	says Dr. Burns testified before the Joint Economic Committee	0:57
	that M-one has lost the significance it used to have	1:00
	and that economists relying upon it were behind the times.	1:03
	He claimed that the aggregate amount of money supply	1:08
	really grew overall at an excessive rate of 7.8%	1:11
	in the fourth quarter.	1:15
	You might answer Mr. Graham's question	1:17
	with the added evidence from Burns's recent testimony	1:21
	before the House Banking Committee	1:23
	and the Joint Economic Committee.	1:25
-	Mr. Burns's statements to which Mr. Graham refers	1:29
	are very much in line	1:34
	with the long tradition of the Federal Reserve for 60 years	1:36
	of finding no evil whatsoever	1:40
	and no mistakes whatsoever in its own behavior	1:43
	and finding excuses in outside events	1:46
	for every departure from prosperity and success	1:49
	in the economy as a whole.	1:54
	I have long been particularly amused by	1:56
	the M-one, M-two game that Dr. Burns is now playing.	1:59
	For many years,	2:06
	during my long career as a critic of the Federal Reserve,	2:09
	the Federal Reserve's favorite answer to me	2:15
	was that I was unrealistic	2:17
	and had no idea what was really going on	2:19
	because I insisted on using M-two,	2:22
	a broader definition of money, instead of M-one,	2:24
	at that time, the Federal Reserve's favorite.	2:29
	But of course, it's not surprising	2:33
	that as soon as M-two	2:34
	speaks up better for the Fed than M-one,	2:36
	the Fed will shift to it,	2:39
	and that has all that Mr. Burns has done.	2:40
	Whether you look at M-one or M-two,	2:44
	there is no doubt that in 1974,	2:46
	the Fed shifted sharply from a highly expansive policy	2:50
	to a highly contractionary policy.	2:55
	Whether you look at M-one or M-two,	2:57
	there is no doubt that the Fed	2:59
	in January or February of this year	3:01
	shifted sharply from a highly contractionary policy	3:03
	to a highly expansionary policy.	3:07
	Despite all of Mr. Burns's talk	3:10
	about the economy being awash with liquidity	3:12
	in the last quarter of 1974,	3:14
	let me just give you a few numbers	3:17
	which bring out dramatically what happened.	3:19
	Consider the annual rates of growth of M-one	3:22
	for the three and a half years	3:26
	from January 1971 to June 1974,	3:27
	the period during which we moved into	3:31
	an accelerating inflation	3:33
	and ending up at double digit inflation.	3:35
	During those three and a half years,	3:38
	M-one rose at the annual rate of 7.1%.	3:40
	From June 1974 to January 1975,	3:44
	M-one rose at the rate of 1.4%.	3:48
	From January 1975 to June 1976,	3:52
	that is, in the past five months,	3:56
	M-one has risen at the rate of 10.4%, or decidedly above	3:58
	the rate of rise in the three and a half years	4:03
	before June 1974 that produced double digit inflation.	4:06
	The story is no different for the broader measure,	4:10
	M-two, or for still broader measures.	4:15
	For M-two, the rate of growth from 1971 to '74 was 10.1%.	4:17
	From June '74 to January 1975, 5.3%,	4:24
	or only about half as much.	4:28
	And in the past five months, 12.9%,	4:30
	again higher than in the earlier period.	4:33
	The fascinating thing about	4:38
	the Federal Reserve's public statements	4:40
	is the extent to which	4:42
	they are able to pull a wool	4:44
	over the eyes of most financial commentators	4:48
	who take the words that come out of the Fed	4:52
	as if they corresponded to reality	4:54
	rather than accepting them for what they are,	4:57
	namely a public relations whitewash.	5:00
	This has been true	5:02
	of every annual report of the Federal Reserve	5:03
	since the first one in 1914.	5:05
	It has been true of almost,	5:09
	almost without exception,	5:11
	of all statements before congressional committees	5:12
	by a chairman of the Fed.	5:15
	The most recent examples of this propensity	5:17
	toward whitewash	5:24
	is provided in the two statements that you referred to.	5:26
	The earlier of these was a statement on July 24, 1975	5:31
	before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.	5:35
	The second was a statement on July 29	5:39
	before the Joint Economic Committee.	5:42
	The contents of both are essentially the same.	5:44
	In many ways, the more important of these	5:47
	is a statement before the committee on banking.	5:49
	This is the second of the quarterly statements	5:52
	required under the concurrent resolution	5:56
	passed earlier this year about which I talked at some length	5:59
	in earlier tapes.	6:02
	This concurrent resolution requires the Fed,	6:05
	from time to time, to state what its objectives are	6:09
	with respect to monetary growth rates.	6:11
	In this statement,	6:15
	the first thing we might call attention to	6:18
	is the double talk, whereby Chairman Burns implies	6:21
	and leaves the impression	6:27
	that the targets stated in his May 1st statement	6:29
	before the Senate Banking Committee have not been changed,	6:35
	when in fact they have been raised.	6:39
	Let me read to you from his statement.	6:44
	Quote, on May 1st of this year,	6:58
	I informed the Senate Banking Committee	7:00
	that the Federal Reserve was seeking	7:01
	a moderate rate of expansion	7:03
	in the monetary and credit aggregate	7:04
	and that the course we are pursuing	7:06
	will promote an increase of M-one	7:08
	between five and seven and a half percent over the 12 months	7:10
	ending in March 1976.	7:13
	He then referred to the related growth rates	7:16
	in other aggregates and went on.	7:18
	Quote, economic prospects now are not materially different	7:20
	than the Federal Reserve anticipated	7:24
	two or three months ago,	7:26
	and we therefore as yet see no reason	7:27
	to alter the general course of monetary policy.	7:30
	Accordingly, the Federal Open Market Committee	7:33
	has reaffirmed its intent to seek the growth ranges	7:36
	announced earlier.	7:41
	Most newspaper commentators,	7:43
	in fact, every single one that I have seen,	7:46
	stopped at that point in his report,	7:48
	and the headline said the Fed keeps on changed its targets.	7:50
	They stopped a little early.	7:56
	The next sentence says, quote,	7:58
	in view of the erratic movements to which monthly figures	8:00
	on money balances are subject,	8:03
	the projected growth ranges for the several aggregates	8:05
	now cover the 12-month span from the second quarter	8:08
	of 1975 to the second quarter of 1976.	8:12
	In the future, we will generally express	8:16
	our projected growth range of each monetary aggregate	8:19
	from a quarterly base	8:22
	since a three months average is less subject	8:23
	to erratic movements in a single month base.	8:26
	Well, that sounds fun,	8:29
	but it essentially conceals a change in target.	8:31
	And the more amusing thing about it is	8:35
	that the particular three months used as a base	8:38
	is not a random three months.	8:40
	In the very next page of his testimony,	8:43
	Mr. Burns goes on to explain	8:46
	that two of those three months, namely May and June,	8:49
	were abnormal.	8:54
	He says the May-June bulge in the monetary aggregates	8:56
	did not come as a surprise,	8:59
	but it was larger than we had expected	9:01
	and very much larger than we desired.	9:03
	But that didn't keep him from including it in the base	9:05
	to which the ranges, the growth ranges to be applied	9:08
	in order to eliminate erratic movements.	9:11
	What is the result of applying	9:14
	the same percentages to the quarterly base	9:17
	instead of the monthly base?	9:19
	As the subscribers know,	9:22
	I have pointed out repeatedly	9:25
	that during that quarter, the Fed has consistently	9:27
	been above the upper limit of its earlier range.	9:29
	As a result, the effect of using the new base	9:33
	is implicitly to raise the specified range.	9:36
	I have made the calculation	9:41
	to ask the following question.	9:43
	Let me take the new base.	9:45
	Beginning on that new base,	9:47
	let me estimate the five to seven and a half percent limits	9:49
	month after month.	9:51
	From those limits, what is the implied rate of change	9:53
	from March '75 to March '76?	9:57
	That is, what has happened to the prior range?	9:59
	The answer comes out	10:04
	that instead of five to seven and a half percent,	10:06
	we now have five to 7.8, 5.7 to 7.8%.	10:08
	The bottom range was raised	10:14
	by about three-quarters of a percentage point.	10:16
	The top range by over one-quarter of a percentage point.	10:18
	These are not large changes,	10:22
	but they are definite changes	10:25
	and they certainly do not agree	10:27
	with the impression which is given.	10:29
	Let me indicate the effect of those changes in another way.	10:32
	For the latest week for which I have monetary data,	10:36
	which is the week ending July 19,	10:38
	actual M-one was 1.8 billion dollars above	10:42
	the upper limit of the range based on the earlier targets.	10:46
	The change in the base eliminated half of that discrepancy.	10:51
	On the new base, the actual M-one	10:56
	is nine-tenths of a billion dollars above the upper limit.	10:59
	If I look at M-two and make the same calculation,	11:04
	and here again the effect has been to increase	11:07
	the effective ranges,	11:10
	M-two was 4.1 billion dollars above the upper limit	11:12
	on the earlier basis.	11:17
	On the basis of the new targets,	11:19
	it is 2.8 billion dollars above.	11:21
	By changing the target, Mr. Burns erased 1.3 billion dollars	11:24
	of the excess over his target.	11:29
	This is a very discouraging performance.	11:33
	I have expressed on an earlier tape	11:36
	high hopes in maybe this new method of handling things	11:38
	would lead the Fed to be more consistent and systematic	11:42
	in honoring its own aggregate targets.	11:47
	I must confess that the testimony which was given	11:51
	this time greatly reduces any confidence I may have	11:54
	that it will have that effect	11:58
	because it is clear that the whole thrust of the testimony	12:00
	is to rationalize what the Federal Reserve does,	12:07
	whatever it may be	12:09
	and, in advance, to find alibis and excuses	12:11
	for future failure of performance.	12:14
	Let me go on and illustrate that in more detail.	12:18
	First,	12:24
	let us look at what	12:28
	Mr. Burns said in his testimony	12:34
	before the Banking Committee, House Banking Committee	12:36
	about the recession we are in	12:41
	and about monetary policy during that recession.	12:45
	As I pointed out on the numbers I gave earlier,	12:48
	the Fed in fact turned	12:50
	from a very expansive and inflationary monetary policy	12:53
	to a very contractionary monetary policy	12:57
	in the middle of 1974,	12:59
	and in my opinion, this shift in monetary policy	13:02
	was the major factor that produced the sharp	13:06
	increase in the severity of the recession in late 1974.	13:12
	That is not the way Mr. Burns sees it.	13:16
	He says, quote, last summer,	13:19
	as signs of weakening in economic activity multiplied,	13:21
	the Federal Reserve began taking steps to increase	13:25
	the availability of money and credit.	13:28
	The efforts of the Federal Reserve to ease credit conditions	13:32
	together with the weakening of private credit demand	13:37
	resulted in the sharp decline	13:39
	of short-term rates of interest.	13:41
	If this isn't double talk, gobbledy-gook, I never heard it.	13:43
	The fact is that far from moving to ease credit conditions,	13:48
	the Fed moved to tighten them.	13:52
	The sharp reduction in the rate of monetary growth reflected	13:54
	its unwillingness to allow	13:58
	the weakening of private credit demands	14:01
	to have its full effect on rates of interest.	14:03
	Let me go on.	14:07
	There is a considerable discussion	14:16
	or some comment in his statement	14:18
	about future rates of monetary growth.	14:21
	Clearly, he says, the growth rates presently sought	14:24
	by the Federal Reserve,	14:27
	while appropriate in the present environment	14:27
	of high unemployment and unused industrial capacity,	14:29
	could not be maintained indefinitely	14:32
	without rekindling inflationary forces.	14:34
	As the economy returns	14:37
	to higher rates of resource utilization,	14:38
	it will be necessary to reduce the rate	14:41
	of monetary and credit expansion	14:42
	so that the basis for a lasting prosperity is laid,	14:44
	end quote.	14:47
	Now that statement is eminently satisfactory.	14:48
	I agree with it fully.	14:51
	What does it say?	14:52
	It says the rate of monetary growth	14:54
	has a great deal to do with inflation.	14:55
	But if the rate of monetary growth is high,	14:57
	you are threatened with inflation,	14:59
	but the only way you can halt inflation	15:01
	is to have low monetary growth.	15:03
	Fine, excellent sentence.	15:05
	But now if that's true for the future,	15:07
	wouldn't you suppose it had something to do with	15:09
	past inflation?	15:11
	If so, you would never find it out	15:13
	by reading Mr. Burns's testimony.	15:15
	Mr. Burns discusses at some length past inflation.	15:17
	And what does he attribute past inflation to?	15:22
	It's attributed to speculation,	15:25
	to the lax financial performance of the US government,	15:27
	to bad harvest, to oil prices, to dollar devaluation,	15:31
	to the worldwide boom.	15:36
	In the whole discussion of the developments leading up	15:38
	to the double digit inflation of 1974,	15:41
	there is not, the word money and monetary policy	15:44
	is not even mentioned,	15:47
	let alone brushed to one side.	15:49
	Clearly, past inflation was none of the	15:54
	Federal Reserve's fault.	15:56
	I said earlier that the Fed is now already	15:58
	creating alibis for the future.	16:01
	In his testimony before the Joint Economic Committee,	16:04
	Mr. Burns jumped on a question	16:09
	to go out of his way to stress the possibility	16:13
	that Russian wheat sales	16:17
	might have inflationary consequences.	16:19
	If inflation does develop,	16:23
	as it will if the Fed continues	16:25
	with anything like its present rates of growth,	16:28
	I think you can be quite sure	16:30
	that you will hear from the Fed	16:33
	that it was events beyond its control	16:35
	that produced its result,	16:38
	that it had nothing whatsoever to do with it,	16:40
	that it was Russian wheat purchases and similar things.	16:41
	This has been a rather long-winded	16:51
	answer to Mr. Graham's question,	16:54
	to the subject that Mr. Graham's question suggested,	16:56
	and I suddenly discovered that I really haven't	16:59
	commented on the specific point he raised	17:02
	in his recent letter, in which he said,	17:05
	now Burns claims the economy has turned up,	17:07
	and you said earlier this year,	17:10
	the turn would come become August and November.	17:11
	That's true.	17:13
	The turn has come, I believe.	17:14
	As I said on some earlier tapes,	17:17
	the lag between the change in monetary policy	17:20
	and the change in the economy has been abnormally short.	17:22
	I am inclined to put the trough of monetary policy	17:27
	in January as indicated by the figures I gave earlier.	17:30
	And the turn in the economy appears to have come in May,	17:36
	which means that you only had a four months lag	17:41
	between the change in monetary policy	17:44
	and the change in the economy,	17:46
	whereas ordinarily we would have a six to nine months lag.	17:48
	In some ways, this is a favorable sign,	17:53
	but in some other ways, I think it's a very	17:55
	unfavorable sign.	17:57
	The reason I think it is an unfavorable sign	17:59
	is because it suggests that the lags may be sharpening.	18:02
	I have commented earlier here that I have seen	18:07
	very real signs, I believe,	18:11
	that the lag in the relation of interest rates	18:12
	to rate of change in money has definitely shortened.	18:15
	If the lag in the relationship of spending	18:18
	to monetary growth has also shortened,	18:20
	this means that we may come,	18:24
	that the expansion may turn into inflation	18:28
	sooner than I have heretofore have been supposing.	18:32
	I have been arguing that even if the Fed were to continue	18:33
	with a very, the kind of very expansive monetary policy	18:36
	it has been engaging in,	18:39
	the initial effects would be on output,	18:43
	that we could expect '75 and '76	18:45
	to see a very vigorous expansion	18:47
	and that the effect on inflation would not be felt	18:50
	until late '76 or early '77.	18:52
	But if the whole process is being telescoped,	18:55
	then it might be that the effects on inflation	18:57
	would be felt much sooner.	19:00
	Now I don't mean to be predicting	19:02
	that the Fed will necessarily continue on its present	19:04
	extraordinarily expansive rate of growth.	19:07
	Mr. Burns stated specifically in his statement before the	19:10
	Banking Committee that the Fed did not intend to permit	19:17
	recent, the rates of growth of May and June	19:21
	to be continued.	19:24
	And there are some signs that over the past few weeks,	19:25
	there has been some tapering off and tempering	19:29
	of the rate of growth.	19:32
	But as I mentioned over the four weeks,	19:33
	from the week ending June 25 to the week ending July 25,	19:36
	the money stock grew by a trivial	19:42
	one-tenth of a billion dollars.	19:45
	But this is a very small sample on which to base anything,	19:48
	and hence I think we should continue to look	19:52
	at what the Federal Reserve does	19:55
	and not what it says in its statements,	19:57
	which are clearly intended more to influence the public	20:00
	and the public's attitude toward the Fed,	20:04
	than to describe what is actually going on.	20:07
-	You referred to Mr. Burns's talk about	20:11
	the Soviet wheat deal.	20:16
	Don't you think it's going to be inflationary?	20:17
-	Not at all.	20:19
	Insofar as the Soviet wheat deal has any effect,	20:20
	it's deflationary.	20:22
	I say has any effect because I think	20:24
	it really has very little effect one way or another	20:27
	on inflation or deflation,	20:29
	but let's look at it very quickly.	20:30
	The 1972 wheat deal	20:34
	involved the US taxpayer subsidizing the Soviet Union.	20:38
	We sold that wheat to the Soviet Union	20:43
	at a subsidized low price.	20:46
	As a result, the effect of that wheat sale	20:48
	was to leave the US citizen with less goods and services,	20:52
	somehow or other, we had to pay for that subsidy.	20:57
	We gave away wheat as it were to the Soviet Union	20:59
	instead of using it to buy as many foreign goods	21:02
	as we could, so we were poorer.	21:04
	And with a lower level of total output	21:06
	and the same level of money spending,	21:08
	insofar as that had any effect, it was inflation.	21:10
	But the present wheat deal is quite different.	21:13
	So far as I can see, no subsidy whatsoever is involved.	21:15
	The Soviet Union is going to buy it at the market price.	21:19
	That means that the	21:22
	US economy is able to sell wheat at favorable terms.	21:26
	The proceeds from the wheat will tend to	21:31
	raise the exchange rate of the US dollar	21:34
	in terms of foreign currencies.	21:37
	It will tend to make foreign goods cheaper.	21:38
	It will tend to add to the supply of goods	21:40
	in the United States, in effect,	21:42
	stripping it of financial complications.	21:43
	The US economy is trading wheat for	21:46
	Japanese TV sets and radios,	21:50
	for German cameras, for whatever we buy from abroad.	21:53
	The result is to increase the total volume	21:57
	of goods and services available to the American people	21:59
	and insofar as that has any effect, it is deflationary.	22:02
	I have been very much amused by what seems to me to be	22:06
	an obvious conflict between newspaper reports	22:08
	on the oil situation on the one hand	22:12
	and on the wheat situation on the other.	22:15
	With respect to the rise in the price of oil	22:18
	engineered by the OPEC countries,	22:21
	the journalists said with one cry, that's inflationary.	22:23
	Well now that was the case	22:27
	in which we were buying something at a high price,	22:29
	we were forced to pay a high price,	22:32
	that was in the way I described earlier inflationary	22:34
	in the sense that it did reduce	22:37
	the total volume of resources that we had.	22:39
	We had to transfer wealth to the Arab countries.	22:40
	Now, the same journalists are saying with a single voice	22:44
	that the effect of a higher price for something we sell	22:48
	is also inflationary.	22:51
	Apparently, the one general rule you can follow is	22:52
	that you look at the bad side of everything.	22:55
-	With respect to oil, it looks as though	22:57
	we're going to get decontrol of prices.	23:00
	How do you view this prospect?	23:02
-	I view it as a wonderful example	23:04
	of the strange and mysterious ways	23:06
	in which providence works its will.	23:08
	The actual outcome is the best of all possible worlds.	23:11
	As my subscribers know, I've been strongly in favor	23:14
	of complete and utter decontrol.	23:19
	But in this case, journalistic error has produced	23:21
	political benefit.	23:24
	The widespread talk that decontrol	23:26
	would have dire consequences and rise the price of gas	23:29
	led the Democratic Congress to be adamant	23:33
	in its unwillingness to accept any compromise	23:36
	which President Ford offered.	23:40
	And presumably the same misconception	23:42
	led President Ford to offer increasingly bad compromises.	23:44
	The stalemate means that we are going to have	23:48
	sudden and complete decontrol on August 31.	23:50
	I suspect that the president will balance that	23:54
	by taking off the tariff on imported oil.	23:57
	The two together will just about balance off.	24:01
	There will be no effect or negligible effect	24:04
	on the domestic price of gasoline and oil products.	24:07
	There will be a significant incentive	24:09
	to domestic production.	24:11
	There will be a significant blow	24:13
	to the OPEC oil cartel.	24:15
-	Now let's see if we,	24:18
	I think we probably have time for that other question	24:20
	that I referred to at the very beginning.	24:22
	It's a question from Jian Parker	24:25
	of the National Bank of Sarasota,	24:28
	and he writes, on July 21, an article appeared in Barron's	24:30
	entitled Mighty Kelso.	24:33
	Mr. Dana L. Thompson comments were and I quote,	24:35
	such big-name professionals as Nobel Prize winner	24:40
	Professor Paul Samuelson,	24:43
	while referring to Kelso's philosophy	24:44
	as a tax loophole gimmick,	24:46
	has refused to debate the issue with him publicly.	24:48
	That other superstar on the conservative side,	24:51
	Milton Friedman, also is sulking.	24:53
	Other leading economists have remained silent.	24:55
	I should greatly appreciate your observations	24:58
	on one of your tapes regarding your sulking.	25:00
-	I shall be glad to give that observation.	25:03
	I might say that in 19,	25:05
	what was it, '50, when were we out in California?	25:08
-	'57.	25:12
-	1957 or '58, when I spent a year at the	25:13
	Center for Behavioral Studies in Stanford,	25:16
	I engaged in a public debate with Louis Kelso	25:20
	and his then-collaborator Mortimer Adler,	25:24
	in connection with the book they had then brought out,	25:30
	whose title I know forget.	25:32
	In the process of preparing.	25:36
-	Capitalist Manifesto.	25:37
-	The Capitalist Manifesto, that's right.	25:38
	In the course of preparing for that debate,	25:40
	I went over the Capitalist Manifesto and the theory,	25:43
	and I described the theory in the public debate	25:46
	as being Karl Marx stood on his head	25:50
	with a 10% discount for cash.	25:53
	What I meant by that was	25:56
	if Karl Marx had argued that labor produced the whole output	25:57
	but only got part of the output	26:02
	and therefore labor was exploited.	26:03
	Kelso and Adler in their book	26:06
	say that capital produces 100% of the, or 90% of the output,	26:08
	but gets a much smaller fraction of the output	26:13
	and therefore is exploited.	26:15
	The fact of the matter is	26:17
	that Mr. Kelso's analysis	26:18
	does not deserve to be called a philosophy.	26:22
	It does not deserve to be called an analysis.	26:24
	It is simply bad and ignorant economics.	26:27
	The policies he has proposed on the basis of it	26:30
	have virtues as tax loopholes.	26:33
	They have no virtues whatsoever as public policy.	26:35
	They do not, in my opinion,	26:39
	promise to improve the operation of capitalism.	26:41
	The fundamental assumption underlying them	26:45
	is that there is no risk involved	26:48
	in borrowing on a debt basis	26:51
	and lending on an equity basis.	26:53
	Now, any individual who thinks that's true has a rather	26:56
	distorted idea of the nature of the economic system.	27:02
	The appeal which any of his proposals have	27:06
	comes solely from the fact	27:10
	that they are tax loopholes	27:12
	and that they provide a benefit in that way	27:14
	and in that way only.	27:18
	I must confess that having once gone through	27:20
	his material in detail,	27:23
	having once engaged in public debate on it,	27:24
	I have no desire to do so any further.	27:26
	It simply isn't worth the effort.	27:29
-	Thank you very much.	27:32
	Remember subscribers, if you have any questions or comments,	27:33
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	27:36
	450 East Ohio Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	27:40
	We shall be visiting with you again in about two weeks.	27:46

Item Info

Title:

Tape 173 - Monetary Policy, Wheat Sale, Oil Decontrol, Kelso

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

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Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

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ref2748_w11
samuelsonpaul
duke:325326
pstau001303
ark:/87924/r4bk1759w
f6375fed-554e-4818-9c25-b09edd3170aa

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Tape 173 - Monetary Policy, Wheat Sale, Oil Decontrol, Kelso

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