Tape 119 - Inflations, Monetary Development, Prospects

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Rose Friedman	Hello, this is Rose Friedman	0:02
	inviting you on behalf of Instructional Dynamics	0:04
	to another of our biweekly interviews	0:07
	with Milton Friedman, Professor of Economics	0:09
	at the University of Chicago.	0:11
	We have just returned to our second home in Vermont	0:13
	and are taping this interview on April 25, 1973.	0:16
	The most conspicuous element on the economic scene	0:21
	at the moment is the extraordinary rise	0:24
	in the consumer price level.	0:26
	Especially the rise in food prices.	0:28
Milton Friedman	The price explosion is really	0:30
	outstanding and almost unbelievable.	0:32
	For two months running, the Consumer Price Index	0:35
	has risen an annual rate of 10% a year.	0:40
	Those are rates of rise of the Consumer Price Index	0:43
	we associate with South American Banana Republics,	0:46
	not with the United States of America.	0:50
	In addition, wholesale prices as well have been rising	0:53
	at incredibly rapid rates.	0:58
	In examining this recent rise, rapid rise,	1:01
	in the Price Index, what most recognize	1:06
	is part of it is furious.	1:08
	The Price Index was not telling the truth	1:11
	during the period of price control,	1:15
	during the freeze in Phase Two.	1:18
	Actual prices were undoubtedly rising more rapidly	1:21
	than the Price Index because the people subject	1:24
	to the Price Index were finding ways	1:27
	to conceal the real price.	1:29
	The emergence of Phase Three prevented all of this	1:32
	to come out from under cover.	1:35
	And in addition, it gave many businesses an incentive	1:37
	to report even higher prices than they intended to charge.	1:40
	Because there was a wide spread skepticism	1:44
	about how long Phase Three would continue,	1:46
	and whether it might not be replaced	1:49
	by a return to a more rigid price control	1:53
	in which case it was desirable	1:57
	on the part of business people to have a high base price.	1:59
	Exactly that same phenomenon occurred	2:04
	just before August 15, 1971	2:06
	when the freeze was initially introduced.	2:09
	Because of the large amount of talk in months prior	2:11
	to that date about the possibility of price control	2:14
	many businesses raised their stated list prices	2:17
	in order to have a high base for	2:20
	the price control period.	2:24
	Much more attention has been devoted to the fact	2:27
	that this is primarily a food price rise.	2:30
	And commentator after commentator has noted	2:32
	that in rises in the price of food are	2:35
	in large part caused by features	2:38
	particular to the food industry.	2:41
	Weather, the great rise in World demand for food and so on.	2:44
	All of that is correct.	2:50
	And yet I do not believe that one can dismiss	2:51
	that part of the rise in the Consumer Price Index	2:54
	which can arithmetically be traced to food prices	2:58
	as simply an aberration.	3:01
	After all, if food prices rise	3:03
	by a rapidly large amount,	3:07
	that leaves consumers with less purchasing power	3:10
	to spend on other things.	3:12
	And our ordinary theory would lead us to expect	3:13
	that other prices would rise less rapidly as a result.	3:15
	There is no systematic reason to expect	3:20
	that a rise in food prices,	3:23
	an abnormally high rise in food prices	3:24
	would make the rise in prices in general	3:28
	any larger than it otherwise would be.	3:30
	It would merely mean a redistribution.	3:31
	The rise in prices in general must be a result	3:33
	of the general demand, of the general level of expenditure.	3:36
	And the question of which particular prices rise	3:40
	depends on particular conditions of supply and demand.	3:42
	Thus I would not regard myself the extraordinarily	3:45
	rapid rise in food prices as an explanation	3:48
	of the extraordinarily rapid rise in consumer prices.	3:51
	More over, the rise in consumer prices	3:54
	has not been restricted to food.	3:56
	Other prices have been rising as well	3:58
	and that is equally true in the wholesale price area.	3:59
	So, while I think it is fair to say	4:04
	that the actual rate of rise in prices	4:07
	has probably been less than the 10% that has been recorded.	4:09
	It has nonetheless been at an extraordinary	4:14
	and astounding level.	4:17
	My subscribers know that I have been saying	4:19
	for many months now that I thought the deceleration	4:21
	of inflation levels produced in reaction	4:24
	to the recession of 1970,	4:27
	had come to an end.	4:32
	That the trough rate of price rise	4:33
	was probably reached in the middle of 1972.	4:38
	It's extraordinarily difficult to make such a judgment	4:41
	because of the effect which the freeze Phase One	4:43
	and Phase Two had in distorting all these figures.	4:46
	But nonetheless, as best you can judge, from the figures,	4:48
	I would say, that sometime between April and August 1972	4:52
	mark the trough and the rate of price rise	4:57
	for both consumer prices and wholesale prices.	4:59
	In the general price deflator,	5:03
	the price deflator implicit in the National Income Figures	5:05
	the trough is reached in the third quarter of 1972.	5:11
	Again, perfectly consistent with that.	5:15
	A mild rise in the fourth quarter	5:17
	and then the explosion to a 6% rate of rise	5:19
	in the first quarter of '73.	5:22
	So that, I am not surprised at seeing	5:25
	the acceleration of inflation continue.	5:28
	That is what I expected.	5:31
	But the magnitude of the acceleration	5:33
	goes well beyond anything I had expected.	5:34
	And it is a phenomenon	5:37
	that has relatively few precedence in history.	5:39
	Indeed, the only precedence I can think of	5:42
	that matches this period,	5:45
	is what happened in 1950 and '51	5:47
	immediately on the, or mostly in 1950,	5:50
	immediately on the outbreak of the Korean War	5:53
	when we had a tremendous expansion	5:57
	in the rate of price rise.	6:00
Rose Friedman	Can you interpret this acceleration	6:03
	and inflation as a result of	6:05
	the monetary explosion in late 1972?	6:07
Milton Friedman	I do not believe so.	6:10
	The timing is wrong.	6:13
	As I have commented before,	6:15
	while the rate, on the average,	6:17
	the change in the rate of growth, the money,	6:20
	tends to effect nominal income, that is dollar spending,	6:24
	dollar income, with a lag of about 69 months.	6:28
	That breaks down into two very different parts.	6:33
	One, the effect on real output.	6:35
	And one, the effect on prices.	6:37
	The lag between the rate of monetary change	6:38
	and the rate of change of prices is far longer.	6:41
	On the average, it had been something	6:44
	like 20 to 24, 26 months, about two years.	6:46
	I think one can readily interpret the beginning	6:50
	of an acceleration of inflation in mid '72.	6:54
	As a result of the monetary acceleration	6:58
	that began in February 1970.	7:00
	That leads you to	7:03
	a lag between the monetary change	7:06
	and the acceleration of inflation.	7:09
	Of something over two years, something like,	7:11
	26-28 months which is a little bit long	7:15
	but well within the rage of previous experience.	7:19
	And similarly,	7:23
	there is a reasonable correspondence between	7:26
	the mildness of the acceleration of inflation	7:29
	after mid '72 and the mildness	7:32
	of the acceleration of monetary growth in 1970.	7:35
	However, in order to interpret the recent price explosion,	7:39
	as a reaction to the monetary change in late 1972,	7:46
	one would have to	7:52
	assume an extremely short lag.	7:56
	Something like four or five months.	7:58
	Which is very shorter than before and moreover,	7:59
	the magnitudes don't compare.	8:02
	We had to rapid a rate of rise in money.	8:04
	There is no doubt.	8:06
	But it was nothing like sizable enough	8:07
	to produce a 10% rate of growth of consumer prices.	8:10
	I think, what you're going to interpret,	8:14
	is you have to look at more or less like this that,	8:17
	the more rapid expansion of the money supply in 1972	8:22
	than in 1971, a rate of rise that the narrow money supply	8:27
	of something like 8% a year	8:31
	or the broader money supply of something	8:32
	in the neighborhood of 10-12% a year.	8:34
	That acceleration did with the usual	8:39
	lag of six months or so, produce an acceleration	8:43
	in the rate of total spending.	8:47
	Total GNP, total consumer spending in the life.	8:48
	But the actual acceleration in the rate of total spending	8:52
	was larger than would have been expected	8:55
	from the monetary change alone.	8:57
	And the division of it between prices and output	9:00
	had a larger fraction in prices	9:03
	than one would have expected from past experience.	9:04
	The questions is, how can one account for that?	9:07
	I go back again to the Korean War episode I mentioned	9:10
	which seems to me the closest comparable case	9:12
	in terms of which to measure.	9:15
	To measure this episode.	9:16
	That time again,	9:18
	the rate of rise in total spending	9:21
	and the rate of rise in prices was much larger	9:24
	than could be explained by the prior monetary expansion.	9:26
	There was a prior monetary expansion	9:29
	one could have expected from that source alone	9:31
	an increased rate of rise of price.	9:34
	But the prior monetary expansion was much too small	9:37
	to explain the very rapid jump in consumer prices.	9:40
	Consumer prices rose from one year to the next	9:44
	at an annual rate of something like 15% a year.	9:46
	Even higher than what we are now experiencing.	9:48
	In reexamining that period, I have come to the conclusion	9:51
	that it is one episode that I know in American history	9:54
	or indeed in any other in which you could interpret	9:57
	the expansion, the price experience and price inflation	10:00
	as primarily a result of an autonomous change in velocity.	10:05
	That is to say, as a result	10:10
	of a desire by the public at large,	10:13
	to spend much more rapidly relative to their liquid assets	10:15
	than they had earning.	10:19
	And in that case, the reason for that was easy to find.	10:20
	A war unexpectedly broke out.	10:24
	1950 memories were still very strong	10:28
	of the extraordinary price rise	10:31
	that had taken place during World War II.	10:33
	To almost everybody, a war implied shortages	10:35
	and higher prices and as a result,	10:40
	there was generated a large amount of anticipatory buying.	10:45
	That as people went out and spent at a higher rate	10:48
	relative to their liquid assets than they had before	10:51
	and this in turn resulted in a rise in velocity	10:53
	and in higher prices.	10:57
	I think something, the same thing, must have been happening	10:59
	in these past few months.	11:02
	The occasion for the fear of inflation	11:06
	was not the outbreak of a war, indeed,	11:08
	if you can call it that, the Vietnam War was ending.	11:11
	I don't mean when I said if you can call it that,	11:16
	I meant if you can call it the end.	11:18
	I don't mean if you can call it the Vietnam War.	11:19
	It's hard to know and view it the way that whole thing	11:21
	is coming unstuck right now.	11:23
	Whether it's proper to describe it in those terms.	11:25
	That wasn't the cause this time.	11:27
	What was the cause was a combination	11:31
	of the	11:35
	widespread belief that price controls were not much longer	11:38
	going to be holding,	11:42
	if they had at all, were not much longer going	11:44
	to be able to hold back in check the inflationary pressures.	11:46
	The rise in a few very visible prices of foods,	11:53
	especially meats.	11:58
	The substitution at the same time of Phase Three	12:00
	for Phase Two and the widespread newspaper	12:03
	and other speculation that an inflation was coming	12:06
	all reinforced by the International Monetary Crisis	12:09
	and the devaluation of the dollar	12:13
	which were widely taken to made and	12:14
	be further importance of future inflation.	12:17
	In this atmosphere, I think expectations	12:21
	must have been very unstable.	12:23
	After all, there had been no significant,	12:25
	substantial tapering off of inflation really	12:29
	to cut out peoples,	12:31
	really to reduce sharply peoples expectations	12:33
	about future rate of price inflation.	12:36
	And under these circumstances with all added on to this	12:38
	all the talk of the energy crisis	12:44
	which again brought up the specter of shortages.	12:46
	The only way I can see that one can interpret	12:50
	this episode is another autonomous jump	12:52
	in consumer spending as a result of a fear	12:55
	of further inflation.	12:59
Rose Friedman	In retrospect, what is your view	13:00
	of this whole experiment in price control?	13:03
Milton Friedman	Well, I hate to be in	13:05
	the position of simply saying I told you so	13:07
	but my opinion of it in retrospect is identical	13:10
	with what my opinion was in prospect.	13:13
	This episode has simply fallen into line	13:17
	with all previous episodes of price control that I know of.	13:20
	For awhile,	13:25
	it always looks as if the price control is working	13:27
	because it suppresses symptoms.	13:29
	In this particular episode,	13:32
	the circumstances for the price control appearing	13:34
	to operate favorably where particularly good	13:37
	because inflation was tapering off in any event	13:40
	and therefor, the price control could take credit	13:43
	for what would have happened.	13:46
	But, as in all such episodes in the past,	13:49
	after a period of a year or so,	13:52
	the difficulties started arising under the price control.	13:55
	Then you have real troubles.	13:57
	The Nixon Administration on this occasion	13:59
	saw that those difficulties were arising,	14:02
	and were coming to a head and so they thought	14:04
	they would avoid the adverse effects of price control	14:06
	by shifting to Phase Three and getting away from	14:10
	the more severe, rigid controls.	14:12
	The result was simply the kind of an explosion	14:17
	that have had after a year or more	14:20
	of price controls in other countries.	14:23
	And particularly after	14:25
	those price controls have been dropped.	14:26
	We have exactly the same thing	14:28
	in a more exaggerated form in 1946	14:29
	when the World War II price controls were dropped.	14:32
	European countries have had exactly the same thing	14:35
	when they have dropped price controls.	14:37
	In addition,	14:40
	the period of price control,	14:42
	in addition to having no significant effect	14:46
	on the underlying inflationary forces,	14:49
	indeed if anything, producing a step up in those forces	14:51
	by virtue of encouraging the Fed	14:56
	to expand the money supply more rapidly	14:58
	than it otherwise would,	14:59
	and encouraging a larger government deficit	15:01
	than otherwise would have occurred.	15:03
	In addition to that,	15:06
	in addition to causing distortions in such areas as lumber	15:08
	and other sensitive areas,	15:15
	this whole experiment has had one enormously costly effect	15:19
	which we envisioned in advance	15:24
	and which unfortunately will haunt us for many years.	15:28
	And that is the miss-education of the public	15:32
	which it has produced.	15:35
	The public has been told, and had learned a lesson	15:36
	that the price of peanuts is determined in the White House,	15:40
	it is not determined in the market place.	15:43
	It has learned that if anything happens	15:46
	to a price they don't like,	15:47
	either because their own wage doesn't go up fast enough	15:49
	or because the price they have to pay goes up too fast,	15:51
	that the thing to do is to yell and shout	15:54
	for price control and wage control.	15:56
	And moreover, the President in the administration	15:59
	had no answer make	16:01
	because they have encouraged that miss-education.	16:03
	I believe from the long run point of view	16:06
	this miss-education of the public at large	16:08
	will turn out to have been the most serious price	16:11
	that we have paid for this episode.	16:14
	Just about three weeks before the freeze	16:20
	on August 15, 1971 was imposed,	16:25
	I wrote a News Week column	16:28
	entitled Steady as You Go	16:30
	in which I praised President Nixon and Secretary Shultz	16:32
	for sticking to the policy of steady monetary policy,	16:36
	steady fiscal policy, and no price and wage controls.	16:41
	I may say that was not one of the more stellar	16:45
	bits of clairvoyance that I have ever engaged in.	16:48
	I couldn't have chosen	16:51
	a worse date to publish that bit of praise	16:52
	because just three weeks later came the August 15th freeze.	16:55
	But it is interesting to go back and speculate now	17:01
	and ask oneself how the economy would be,	17:03
	what state it would be in,	17:07
	if instead of shifting that policy,	17:08
	that policy had been maintained.	17:11
	On economic grounds,	17:14
	there can be hardly any doubt that we would be	17:16
	in fair better shape than we now are.	17:18
	It might be that prices would be rising,	17:21
	but it would have risen over the period	17:23
	on the average as much as they did.	17:24
	But you would not have had the sharp shocks to the economy.	17:27
	A freeze for 90 days, then some expansion of prices,	17:31
	post freeze bulge I should say first.	17:35
	Then some expansion under Phase Two.	17:38
	Then this business of going to Phase Three.	17:40
	Then the rapid explosion of the past two months.	17:42
	You would have had a much calmer and steadier atmosphere.	17:45
	The answer will be, well it was politically essential	17:48
	for Mr. Nixon to do something like this	17:51
	in order to get reelected.	17:53
	Again, retrospects makes clear that that was wrong.	17:54
	In order for that to have been correct, it must be	17:57
	that had a freeze not been imposed, in August 1971,	18:00
	someone other than Senator McGovern	18:05
	would have been nominated.	18:07
	It's hard to see any link between the on and the other.	18:08
	It's hard to see that without a freeze,	18:11
	Senator McGovern would have failed as a nomination.	18:14
	And once he got the nomination,	18:16
	Mr. Nixon's reelection,	18:18
	as it now seems in retrospect, was a cinch.	18:19
	So I have a good deal of nostalgia	18:23
	for what might have been in that respect.	18:26
Rose Friedman	A subscriber opens up	18:29
	the whole question of recent monetary development.	18:30
	Mr. Ray Graham Jr asks,	18:34
	I have noticed the monetary base	18:36
	has been increasing somewhat.	18:38
	Is that significant?	18:40
	And could you please explain?	18:41
Milton Friedman	His questions is very pertinent	18:44
	to recent monetary developments	18:45
	because what you have had in the past two or three months	18:46
	is the sharp difference between	18:50
	the rate of growth and the monetary base.	18:53
	That is of what I sometimes call high powered money,	18:56
	currency in the hands of the public	18:58
	plus the reserves held by banks on the one hand	19:00
	and the money supply however measured on the other.	19:04
	If you start with the money supply,	19:08
	M1, the narrow money supply,	19:10
	currency and demand deposits,	19:12
	over the past two months has risen at the rate of 4%	19:13
	or in the past three months	19:16
	at the rate of a little less than 1%.	19:17
	The reason of course for that very sharp slowdown	19:22
	was the attempt by the Fed to offset	19:24
	the extraordinary and unintended rapid bulge	19:28
	in the money supply in November and December of last year.	19:31
	In terms of their earlier objectives,	19:35
	they have succeeded in bringing back	19:38
	the rate of growth measured over a year	19:41
	to the 6% to which more or less	19:44
	they have stuck for a long time.	19:46
	As I have argued repeatedly, that 6% is too high a rate	19:49
	and it would if continued produce	19:53
	an acceleration of inflation.	19:55
	It is also clear that the Fed regards it	19:57
	as too high a rate and is currently aiming at a lower rate.	19:59
	And I would not be surprised if the 4% rate	20:02
	that has been achieved over the past two months	20:05
	is more or less about the rate that they are aiming for.	20:07
	If we look at M2, that too,	20:12
	has over the past two or three months been rather moderate.	20:15
	6% rate of growth.	20:18
	And M2 includes commercial bank time deposits	20:19
	other than large CDs.	20:23
	CDs at 6% over the past two months.	20:25
	5% over the past three months.	20:27
	And again, these rapidly low rates	20:30
	where to offset the undoing rapid rate over the,	20:32
	at the end of last year.	20:36
	Looking at it at a year to year basis,	20:39
	M2 has been growing at the rate of about 9% recently.	20:41
	That again is too high.	20:46
	And again, I believe it is above the rate	20:48
	which the Fed intends.	20:50
	But compare these rates,	20:51
	let me just take the past two months,	20:55
	the 4% in M1 and 6% in M2 with the base	20:57
	which over that period has grown	21:00
	at a rate of over 12% a year.	21:01
	And Mr. Graham's question becomes relevant.	21:03
	What's the explanation of the difference	21:06
	and what does this portend?	21:07
	The arithmetical explanation of	21:09
	the difference is very simple.	21:10
	The base has been rising much more rapidly	21:12
	than the money supply because Treasury Deposits,	21:14
	deposits of the Treasury, have been going up very rapidly.	21:17
	And the Treasury Deposits are not counted	21:20
	as part of the money supply,	21:22
	yet they absorb part of the base.	21:24
	The question is, whether this pattern reflects	21:26
	the fact that the Treasury has been	21:30
	the active central banker, it has been following	21:33
	the monetary policy and slowing down monetary growth.	21:36
	Or whether the Fed, on its part,	21:38
	has been offsetting the Treasury's actions	21:41
	in order to keep the monetary growth past	21:43
	where it wanted it.	21:45
	I am rather inclined to the second of those views.	21:46
	That is a very typical thing for the Fed to do.	21:48
	However, it is true that as the Treasury Deposits come down,	21:51
	this will raise technical problems for the Fed	21:56
	in keeping the monetary growth rate relatively low.	22:01
	However, on the whole, as yet,	22:05
	there is no reason to suppose	22:09
	that the more rapid rise in the base	22:11
	is portent of a more rapid rise	22:14
	in the aggregate money in the future.	22:17
Rose Friedman	How do you expect this to develop?	22:22
Milton Friedman	Well, on the monetary side itself,	22:24
	it seems, I continue to believe that the Fed	22:28
	will seek very hard indeed	22:32
	to hold down the rate of monetary growth.	22:33
	And I expect that they will succeed.	22:35
	On the other hand, from the point of view	22:38
	of the economy as a whole,	22:40
	there is only one way in which it can develop.	22:41
	What has happened is that under the pressures	22:44
	of attempting to create a favorable climate	22:48
	for the election last year,	22:51
	just as Water Gate affair,	22:53
	so in the economics sphere,	22:55
	President Nixon and the Republicans	22:57
	didn't want to take any chances and they over did matters.	23:01
	The extraordinarily expansive fiscal policy,	23:04
	the high rate of monetary growth of last year	23:07
	set off a boom at too rapid a rate.	23:09
	We are now booming at a rate that cannot be continued.	23:12
	At a rate which must stop one way or another.	23:15
	I see only three alternatives.	23:18
	And these are the three that have been present all along	23:23
	when we clearly foresee, saw a year ago,	23:25
	that we would get into this box.	23:28
	One alternative is to let the inflation rip	23:30
	and try to get the public at large	23:33
	adjusted to a very high inflation rate.	23:34
	I cannot believe that as yet,	23:36
	that is a feasible economic or political policy.	23:38
	It may become so after some years.	23:41
	The second, is to step hard on the,	23:43
	is to keep the foot on the monetary and fiscal brakes	23:46
	and produce a recession in late 1973,	23:51
	early 1974,	23:56
	which will take some of the heat off the economy.	23:58
	A third, is to reimpose,	24:01
	or impose, far more rigorous	24:05
	and widespread wage and price control	24:07
	in an attempt to bottle up the steam.	24:10
	My own expectation is that both	24:13
	of the last two courses will be engaged in.	24:15
	And I personally regret the final one of those,	24:18
	I think again, the price and wage controls	24:22
	will do more harm than good and will be self defeated.	24:24
	I wish there were some way of avoiding	24:28
	a recession at this stage but I think that	24:30
	the boom is gone so far that there is no longer	24:32
	any possibility of slowing it off	24:35
	without overshooting the other way into another recession.	24:37
	How severe it will be, how long it will last,	24:41
	my crystal ball is much to clouded	24:44
	at this point to speculate.	24:46
	Even precisely when it will start	24:49
	I think is very difficult.	24:51
	And the reason for the special difficulty here is	24:53
	because of the point I made earlier.	24:55
	What I think is an unusual,	24:58
	independent expansion of velocity	25:00
	that is the general, widespread	25:03
	flight into spending because of the fear of inflation.	25:06
	And the crucial question is	25:11
	how fast a reaction to that will come.	25:12
	Because of that, it is possible on the one hand	25:16
	that the recession will start much sooner	25:18
	than one would ordinarily expect	25:21
	it simply from the slow down of monetary growth.	25:23
	If one were to extrapolate from the slowdown	25:25
	of monetary growth alone,	25:27
	one would not expect any appreciable recession to occur.	25:29
	Even if the slow rate of monetary growth is continued	25:32
	until the forth quarter of this year	25:35
	and maybe early next year.	25:37
	But it could be that a reaction	25:38
	to this extraordinarily high rate of spending	25:40
	could come sooner than that.	25:42
Rose Friedman	Thank you very much.	25:44
	Remember subscribers if you have any questions or comments,	25:46
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated	25:49
	166 East Superior Street Chicago, Illinois 60611.	25:52
	We shall be visiting with you again in two weeks.	25:58

Item Info

Title:

Tape 119 - Inflations, Monetary Development, Prospects

Date:

April 25, 1973

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0281
ref2702_cqf
samuelsonpaul
duke:325303
pstau001280
ark:/87924/r4zg6gq1j
fcfbde08-1072-4e9c-850d-29429f77336a

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Tape 119 - Inflations, Monetary Development, Prospects

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