Tape 187 - In search of an energy policy

Download
- Rights
- Limited Re-Use
  CC BY-NC 4.0
  More Rights Info
- Files (1)
- MP3
- Please be patient with media downloads. They are often large files.
Share

Embed Code
<iframe src='//idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4vq2ss6j?embed=true' height='125px' width='100%' frameborder='0' marginwidth='0' marginheight='0' scrolling='no' allowfullscreen></iframe>
Permalink

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4vq2ss6j
Skip to Item Info

Loading the media player...

Files for this Item

Transcript

Transcripts may contain inaccuracies.

-	Welcome once again as MIT professor	0:02
	Paul Samuelson discusses the current economic scene.	0:04
	This series is produced	0:06
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:08
	Professor Samuelson, as we move	0:10
	into the winter heating season	0:12
	when there's an increased demand	0:14
	for petroleum products and natural gas,	0:15
	the question has to arise once again,	0:18
	where are we in terms of an energy policy?	0:20
-	Well, to discuss that issue,	0:23
	let me first describe two unhedged views	0:27
	on oil policy that are really	0:31
	diametrically opposed to each other.	0:33
	The first view, perhaps associated	0:37
	with Republicans more than Democrats	0:41
	and in part with the administration,	0:46
	but still not completely typical of anybody	0:49
	I would think, but certain economists,	0:53
	would go as follows.	0:56
	You begin with the axiom,	0:58
	the only good price control program	1:00
	is a repealed price control program.	1:01
	The sooner we phase out all controls the better,	1:05
	according to this view.	1:08
	The same would apply actually	1:10
	to President Ford's tariff on oil imports.	1:12
	According to people of this way of thinking,	1:17
	there is no real long run oil emergency.	1:19
	Provided we let prices rise and fall	1:23
	with supply and demand,	1:25
	there's just nothing wrong with the US	1:27
	importing half or more of its oil by the 1880s,	1:30
	if that's the way the cookie of supply and demand crumbles.	1:34
	Furthermore, provided we let the different kinds of energy,	1:38
	natural gas, coal, oil, gasoline,	1:42
	fissionable uranium, et cetera,	1:46
	let them in effect be auctioned off at their market worths,	1:49
	the problem will take care of itself.	1:53
	Any rise in price that occurs	1:56
	under this scenario is what ought to occur,	1:58
	given the scarcities of the situation.	2:01
	People of this persuasion, I think,	2:07
	tend to go on to argue	2:09
	that the temporary monopoly of OPEC,	2:10
	like any temporary monopoly,	2:14
	is going to disintegrate anyway.	2:17
	And having free pricing of energy domestically is likely,	2:20
	this school thinks,	2:27
	to be the most efficient way of hastening	2:28
	that day of disintegration of the OPEC oligopoly.	2:30
	Well, that's	2:36
	one view.	2:38
	By contrast, let me try to describe	2:40
	in an unhedged way, still another view.	2:43
	Perhaps one associated with many	2:47
	of the Democratic Congressmen.	2:50
	According to this view, if you decontrol oil,	2:54
	and if you try very hard in this immediate short run	2:58
	to promote US independence from imports,	3:02
	that that will do more of what it's already been doing.	3:07
	Namely, increasing the rate of inflation	3:11
	in the cost of living.	3:13
	That acceleration of inflation from energy	3:17
	will go farther, will be aggravated	3:22
	if decontrol is allowed to take place suddenly.	3:26
	And if the higher prices for fuel	3:30
	will withdraw purchasing power	3:35
	from our consumers and thereby slow down recovery,	3:37
	first place some extra revenues may go abroad	3:41
	and come back only slowly	3:44
	into the purchasing power stream at home.	3:46
	Secondly, some part of the domestic purchasing power will go	3:49
	as rents to oil producers and oil companies,	3:57
	and although they will ultimately	4:02
	be recycled, there is no Say's law,	4:04
	no valid Say's law according to this view,	4:09
	which says that they'll be recycled at the same rate.	4:11
	To put things in the language of monetary theorists,	4:15
	the velocity of circulation of money is effected	4:20
	by the qualitative composition of pricing	4:25
	and countenancing	4:30
	complete and sudden decontrol	4:34
	will have a adverse effect	4:38
	upon the recovery.	4:41
	People of this viewpoint tend generally	4:45
	to think of the recovery as in jeopardy anyway,	4:48
	as not being too strong.	4:51
	That will be another story to discuss,	4:53
	whether our current recovery is all that fragile	4:56
	and is such a tender beast that it will be killed off	5:01
	by a shock of this sort.	5:07
	But let me go on with this second view.	5:09
	Since the wage rates tend to rise	5:12
	when consumer prices rise,	5:14
	you can see this, for example,	5:16
	in the escalated contracts, but you also see it	5:18
	in the course of collective bargaining.	5:22
	There'll be a further increase	5:25
	in costs and prices induced by the	5:26
	decontrol of oil	5:32
	resulting in an increase in energy prices.	5:34
	All this will be further aggravated	5:38
	by induced increases in airline costs and fares	5:40
	and rises in prices of all those goods	5:44
	whose production depends on energy	5:46
	and which themselves are raw material cost components	5:49
	for production of other goods.	5:52
	Moreover, these days, this school argues,	5:55
	there's not only a pass-through of higher energy costs,	6:00
	but that there's also evidence of a markup,	6:04
	some kind of a percentage markup,	6:07
	on each such increment of costs.	6:09
	So, the increase in the price of energy	6:11
	cascades through the system,	6:14
	not in an uncontrolled way but in an amplified way.	6:16
	Moreover, just to go on with this,	6:22
	if government policy on decontrol	6:24
	and on insulating us from oil imports	6:27
	does substantially worsen the rate of inflation,	6:29
	how we will be doing in the Consumer Price Index	6:33
	in the next two or three quarters	6:36
	or in the overall GNP deflator,	6:38
	then this school is afraid that Federal Reserve	6:41
	and administration policy formulators	6:45
	will feel forced into tightening the screws	6:47
	of monetary and fiscal policies.	6:50
	Tightening the screws on what already threatens	6:53
	to be a drawn out and weak economic recovery.	6:56
	So, being stampeded into the wrong activistic energy policy	7:00
	will thus, according to people of this persuasion,	7:06
	help to keep the unemployment rate high	7:10
	in the remaining years of this decade	7:12
	and will thereby put an intolerable load	7:15
	on the unskilled earners and on the minority workers,	7:18
	those parts of the labor force that are most subject	7:21
	to unemployment, youth and so forth.	7:24
	Now, I've stated two	7:29
	quite opposed viewpoints.	7:33
	Let me	7:35
	try to	7:36
	judge where there is strength	7:39
	in each view and also what the effect would be	7:42
	of various compromises between these different views.	7:46
	Notice that neither school that I've been describing	7:50
	is very gung-ho on project independence.	7:55
	So, maybe I oughta complete the triangle	7:58
	by putting Dr. Kissenger, Secretary of State, and	8:01
	his erstwhile assistant Mr. Enders	8:07
	into a third corner.	8:11
	Those who think that the main problem	8:13
	is to show the rest of the world	8:15
	that the US can't be bullied by an oil boycott.	8:16
	That we mean business	8:21
	and are going to make ourselves independent	8:23
	of foreign supplies of oils.	8:28
	More realistically, this view would have to go	8:32
	in the form that the trend of our dependence	8:36
	of our increasing dependence,	8:40
	which has been rather clear in the past data,	8:42
	that trend must be changed by activistic action.	8:49
	This third corner school, if I were	8:54
	going to describe it in the same detail	8:57
	that I've described the first two corners,	8:59
	I would have to say, is a great believer	9:01
	in organizing all of the consuming countries	9:04
	into an oligopsony.	9:10
	You fight oligopoly by oligopsony.	9:13
	A monopoly of a few sellers	9:17
	is to be checked by the countervailing power	9:19
	of the monopoly of a few buyers.	9:22
	And so, Dr. Kissenger is to get together	9:26
	with the Japanese and the Germans and the French	9:30
	and form a tight little buying cartel.	9:34
	Then, in good Yankee fashion,	9:39
	there's to be hard horse trading and dickering	9:43
	at some international conference,	9:48
	and armed with our cohesiveness,	9:50
	we will then be able to hack out	9:54
	and agree upon a pricing program,	9:57
	which does what?	10:01
	If it brings down the price that we pay for imported oil,	10:03
	it doesn't play into the hands of project independence.	10:09
	So, I guess the utopian version of this	10:12
	would be that such limited	10:16
	energy, as we continue to import,	10:20
	should be imported at very low prices	10:24
	compared to what OPEC,	10:27
	by its unilateral monopoly, will do,	10:29
	but we don't allow the sweet tooth	10:31
	of the American users for energy	10:35
	to be satiated by oil at cheap prices.	10:39
	Well, the administration's views and programs	10:45
	say as you would determine it	10:50
	from monitoring the speeches of President Ford,	10:53
	would be somewhere between the first corner view	10:57
	that I stated and the third corner view that I stated	11:00
	and I guess a number of the Democratic Congressmen	11:05
	who've been resisting President Ford's suggestions	11:10
	on compromise in oil would be at the second corner.	11:14
	Well, what are we to think?	11:20
	First, I would like to emphasize	11:22
	that we must keep a sense of quantitative balance	11:27
	as to how important the issues are	11:31
	between these different schools.	11:34
	Is it the case?	11:38
	Because if it were the case	11:41
	that the present system is intolerably inefficient	11:43
	and the present system puts an intolerable burden	11:47
	on the incentives to look for oil in North America.	11:51
	Then the first view, whatever you may think	11:57
	of its aesthetic and philosophical importance,	12:01
	would take on a enhanced practical importance.	12:04
	Well, as far as I can tell from studying	12:09
	what there is that is known	12:15
	about the present control system,	12:16
	there is no intolerable	12:19
	depressant of incentives under the present system.	12:22
	If you have old oil, and if you can squeeze	12:29
	an increment out of your old oil well	12:34
	which puts the increment	12:38
	above your quota of old oil,	12:41
	then you have something which is called released oil	12:45
	and you don't have to sell that released oil	12:49
	at the controlled price	12:52
	of five and a half dollars	12:53
	a barrel for old oil.	12:56
	You don't even, in effect, sell it	12:59
	at the price of internationally imported oil,	13:02
	let's say $11.50 or $13.50.	13:07
	You in fact sell it	13:11
	at something like $18	13:15
	because you get a chit, an entitlement	13:18
	with that released oil	13:20
	and in consequence, there is a tremendous incentive	13:22
	to generate, at the present time, released oil.	13:28
	And if you're a believer, as most of the people	13:33
	in the first philosophical camp	13:35
	that I've described would be,	13:37
	in the efficacy of incentives,	13:40
	in getting people to do things,	13:43
	then you must be a believer under the present system	13:44
	in the strong substitution effects	13:47
	which are in the present pricing arrangements.	13:50
	Now, what's important about that	13:57
	is that to the degree that this is true,	13:59
	that there is even under the present system	14:01
	an artificial incentive	14:03
	to	14:07
	generate released oil,	14:09
	we cannot look for any kind of a miracle	14:12
	on that happy morn	14:15
	when all controls are swept away	14:18
	in the fashion that Erhard,	14:21
	as the	14:25
	Chancellor under Occupied Germany,	14:29
	disregarding the American generals instructions,	14:32
	swept away all price controls and then suddenly,	14:35
	as story goes, it's a little bit overdrawn,	14:38
	but it's a good story.	14:41
	We oughta tell it.	14:42
	Suddenly goods became available on the market,	14:44
	flowers flourished and so forth.	14:46
	Well, I don't think you can look for that.	14:49
	Now, if time permitted, I would have to give	14:51
	all of the various qualifications.	14:54
	For example, let's suppose you have old oil	14:56
	and you've been draining off	15:00
	a depletable, limited supply of your reserves	15:03
	so that by no superhuman effort	15:07
	can you ever get back to your quota level.	15:11
	Therefore you have no chance of ever	15:14
	getting into the released oil category.	15:16
	Still, as a nation, if we are interested	15:20
	in promoting project independence,	15:24
	we would like to generate a little bit more old oil	15:26
	than is now motivated by the price under control of $5.50.	15:31
	Well, you would have no motivation to do that	15:37
	because that's all you get on the old oil is $5.50.	15:39
	So, there are places in which there is a disincentive	15:43
	under the present control system.	15:49
	As I've mentioned on these tapes before,	15:52
	there are stories told, anecdotes,	15:53
	some of them are good anecdotes,	15:55
	but it's surprising to me how few they are	15:57
	and how hard they are to authenticate,	15:59
	that there is some hoarding of old oil going on.	16:02
	Well now, to the degree that there is hoarding	16:07
	of old oil going on, of course that's like	16:10
	money in the bank for the future	16:12
	as part of project independence.	16:15
	But for somebody who's concerned	16:17
	that the monopoly power right now of OPEC	16:20
	as it weighs whether in the next month or so	16:23
	to raise the price of oil, as OPEC says,	16:26
	to compensate it for the increase	16:31
	in industrial prices by 10% or by 15%,	16:33
	whether it's to be $1.50 a barrel	16:36
	or whether it's to be $3.50 a barrel	16:38
	or whether nominally it's to be no increase at all.	16:41
	There is still another possibility, by the way,	16:47
	which ought to be taken very seriously.	16:49
	Namely that there is in a nominal increase of 10% of $1.50	16:50
	or even of $3.50,	16:56
	but the discounting from list	16:57
	which has been only very minor up until now, becomes major.	17:01
	Well, if you wanted to reduce our demand	17:06
	so as to embarrass OPEC with a lot of unsellable oil	17:11
	by some of its cartel members at the pegged price,	17:15
	then this hoarding of old old oil as I'll call it,	17:18
	as against new old oil,	17:22
	would be something which ought to be held	17:25
	against the controls.	17:30
	Take still another aspect of the control program.	17:34
	One of the bad things about controls,	17:37
	particularly if you start	17:39
	controlling supply and demand prices,	17:40
	and oil is not a supply and demand price	17:41
	simply.	17:47
	But if you start controlling the price	17:48
	of lumber or the price of meat	17:49
	when these are supply and demand prices	17:52
	and lumber moves off to a different auction market,	17:56
	the effect of a control program	18:00
	is often to dry up supplies completely	18:02
	in particular places.	18:03
	And where I live, New England, would be a great	18:05
	target for such a disappearance of supply.	18:10
	However, that is not the way the present controls work.	18:16
	I don't want to give the impression	18:19
	that somebody in Washington cleverly contrived	18:21
	all of these gimmicks and gadgets	18:26
	which turn out, even though very few people	18:29
	outside the industry and outside the bureaucracy	18:32
	and very few in the bureaucracy understand this.	18:34
	It was done the way the British Empire was formed,	18:39
	in a fit of absent mindedness.	18:41
	Nobody quite realized how it was working out	18:42
	but it's worked out pretty well	18:44
	as I want to go on to describe on the import side.	18:45
	Well, on the import side,	18:50
	if oil brought into the US	18:52
	costs $13,	18:57
	that is,	18:58
	the barge captain plus the	19:03
	Arabian company	19:07
	collect $13.50 for oil delivered	19:09
	in the Boston or New York port,	19:13
	I don't think that that's what the cost is	19:17
	to the oil company who brings it in	19:21
	or the ultimate cost,	19:24
	to the public utility in New England.	19:26
	New England is at a natural disadvantage.	19:28
	It should have thought twice before locating itself	19:31
	in the far corner of the country.	19:34
	Although, we have to remember that somebody	19:36
	has to be in each corner	19:38
	if the country is by nature rectangular in shape.	19:39
	However, the other side of this chit	19:44
	which the producer of released oil gets per barrel	19:49
	and which sweetens up his return,	19:52
	is the fact that there is kind of a negative chit	19:55
	which reduces the price to the importers.	20:00
	So, under the present system,	20:04
	there is very elaborate way de facto	20:06
	of taxing the oil rents	20:10
	of all the things which have become more valuable	20:13
	in Kansas and Oklahoma and in Texas and elsewhere.	20:15
	And a very elaborate control of average cost pricing	20:20
	and average profit pricing	20:24
	compensated, though, by marginal effects	20:27
	which are really quite tolerable.	20:31
	So, the present system	20:33
	is not like some price control systems.	20:35
	Perhaps the German one in 1948 before the Erhard miracle	20:38
	was perhaps an intolerable one,	20:44
	made especially intolerable by the propensity	20:47
	of the German people to obey the law.	20:50
	A French system could never become as malignant	20:52
	as a Scandinavian or German system	20:55
	because of the rampant feeling of individualism	20:57
	on the part of all the French citizenry	21:00
	who prefer to go through the red light pedestrian	21:02
	rather than otherwise in contrast to well-behaved Danes.	21:09
	So it's a tolerable system.	21:14
	The second thing is to debunk the fears	21:16
	of the second school of thought	21:21
	that if we instantly decontrol oil	21:25
	or if we decontrol it too fast	21:27
	that we go right back to the Great Depression	21:28
	or right back the the recession we've been in or go	21:31
	very definitely into	21:37
	an anemic and abortive recovery.	21:40
	Well, let's just look to see what difference it makes	21:45
	and I just happen to have received in yesterday's mail,	21:47
	so it's a convenient thing to refer to,	21:49
	the new Wharton School	21:52
	computer forecasts for the American economy	21:56
	in the next two years,	22:01
	from the middle of 1975 to the middle of 1977.	22:02
	And one of the advantages of a structural model	22:08
	like the Wharton model which brings it in contrast	22:11
	with a very simplified monetarist model	22:16
	or reduced form model or even a simple kind of model of the	22:19
	Neo-Keynesian, Raymond Fair type,	22:25
	is that you can run through different solutions	22:28
	and so I'm going to first look at their control solution,	22:33
	their single best guess as to what's going to happen.	22:38
	That's the first thing.	22:41
	Then I'm going to look through an alternative scenario	22:42
	with instant oil price decontrol.	22:46
	These runs were made	22:49
	on September 2nd,	22:52
	1975.	22:55
	Since that time, of course, there have been	22:56
	a little revised production index data	22:58
	and I would say that the recovery	23:01
	from September 2nd, that's the day after Labor Day,	23:05
	until the time that I'm now speaking,	23:08
	has gone a little bit better	23:12
	than they could have known about in September 2nd.	23:13
	Well, for one thing, the first 10 days of auto sales	23:16
	have been strong and so forth and so forth.	23:19
	Well, the first thing I looked at	23:21
	was to see what happens to the rate of real growth	23:23
	in the next four quarters,	23:28
	for the middle of '75 to the middle of '76.	23:30
	And the Wharton School model	23:34
	is a less exuberant model than many	23:36
	and it shows, under its control solution	23:41
	without instant oil decontrol,	23:44
	a 5 1/3% rate of growth in the current quarter,	23:47
	that's the third quarter of the year,	23:51
	the one that's soon coming to an end.	23:53
	8% rate of growth in the fourth quarter of the year.	23:55
	That's the strongest it's gonna show	23:59
	for a long, long time.	24:01
	Then, about 4.5%	24:02
	rate of growth in the first half of '76.	24:06
	The average for the year I make out to be	24:11
	the average of four and a half and	24:15
	six and a half,	24:20
	which would be just 5.5%.	24:24
	That would be a disappointing recovery	24:26
	but remember that Wharton is a little bit	24:29
	on the pessimistic side in comparison	24:31
	with Alan Greenspan or in comparison with Arthur Burns.	24:33
	I ought to mention for the record	24:37
	that Congressional committees	24:40
	kept badgering Dr. Arthur Burns	24:43
	to give his forecast of what was going to happen	24:45
	based upon his announced program of monetary growth	24:49
	and finally, after many hours of badgering the poor bull,	24:54
	the toreadors and picadors all poking at him,	24:59
	he said, all right, you've forced it out of me,	25:02
	I'm gonna give my opinion but I wanna tell you	25:05
	it's only personal opinion.	25:07
	It's not that of the official Open Market Committee	25:08
	or the Federal Reserve or the staff.	25:12
	He said, in my view, and he stated his words	25:14
	very carefully, the present program of 5.5% to 7.5%	25:17
	range for the aggregate monetary target	25:24
	from the second quarter of '75	25:27
	to the second quarter of '76	25:31
	is fully compatible with an 8% real growth rate.	25:33
	Now, if that means anything, and maybe it doesn't,	25:38
	I read that, I wrote down in my little black book	25:42
	that Arthur Burns thinks that	25:45
	the real growth is gonna be fully up to	25:48
	first year recovery and it's gonna be 8%.	25:53
	Alan Greenspan more recently	25:56
	has made an announcement for which he was	25:58
	much criticized by a lot of private economists	26:01
	and you can be sure the university economists	26:03
	won't be very late in joining in,	26:05
	saying we were gonna grow by 7%.	26:09
	Well, this Wharton growth is about	26:11
	six and a half, six and a third percent.	26:16
	Now, let's deal with instant oil price decontrol.	26:19
	So magic is the one month effect	26:25
	that it reduces even the current quarter	26:28
	from five and a third percent to four and a third,	26:33
	by a full	26:37
	percent.	26:38
	Of course that's only a quarter of a percent	26:39
	in the quarter because these are annual rates.	26:41
	It reduces by a full percent the	26:44
	booming, exuberant fourth quarter.	26:49
	That goes down from 8% to 7% and reduces by a	26:53
	full, well, I'd say a full percent	27:01
	down to something like 3 3/4% instead of 4 1/2%.	27:05
	Well, I guess that's by 3/4 of a percent.	27:10
	What's gonna happen in the first half of 1976?	27:12
	Well, I think that that would be regrettable	27:18
	if the first year's	27:23
	recovery	27:26
	were not at least 7%.	27:28
	That's been the target that I testified	27:30
	before Congress on.	27:32
	But it would be even more regrettable	27:33
	if something which was going to be	27:37
	about 6 1/3 or 6 1/2% were reduced almost	27:39
	by a full percent to 5%.	27:42
	However, what does it mean in terms	27:46
	of the unemployment rate in the election quarter?	27:47
	It's not as bad as you might think.	27:55
	Instead of having	27:57
	7.9% in the fourth quarter,	28:04
	as under the control solution	28:07
	without complete oil decontrol, you have 8.1.	28:10
	You might say that these are within	28:15
	the degree of accuracy of the numbers.	28:17
	Well, that is true but I think that the spread	28:19
	would be around 7.9 if this forecast is right	28:23
	or around 8.1 and that is a significant difference.	28:26
	I may say that these numbers	28:31
	look a little bit high to me because	28:32
	we're now	28:36
	getting some rethinking	28:39
	on how high unemployment ever reached at its peak.	28:41
	We've had some revisions of the establishment data	28:46
	which I disagreed with the census.	28:48
	The census data of unemployment was showing rather lower	28:50
	than even the Washington officials has expected	28:54
	but the establishment data didn't bear that out.	28:58
	But they've now revised their establishment data	29:00
	and by August, the data are beginning to agree,	29:02
	so that I think that unemployment	29:05
	is not going to go back to 9%.	29:08
	Earlier, as you know, I thought it	29:11
	would go to 9 1/3% and it's about 8.4%	29:12
	and I think it is on its way down very soon.	29:18
	So, these numbers are high	29:22
	but what I want you to learn from them	29:23
	is the difference of about	29:27
	two or three tenths of a percent	29:32
	on the unemployment rate.	29:33
	Now, for somebody who's unemployed,	29:34
	this will seem very callous of me to disregard,	29:36
	because this means some hundreds of thousands of people,	29:40
	and I apologize for my beastliness.	29:43
	But keeping this in perspective,	29:46
	it is not the end of the world	29:51
	if one view prevails and the other view	29:53
	is correct.	29:59
	I myself think that there's a powerful case	30:01
	having discussed all that I've said to you	30:04
	for going slow on solving our long run problem	30:07
	when we're still in the acute phase of stagflation.	30:10
	So, I have no trouble in finding a compromise	30:13
	between the two main schools	30:19
	that I have outlined for you.	30:22
	I think the art of economic policy	30:26
	and also the art of political economy,	30:29
	of keeping our legislative system from getting polarized	30:32
	is to find that compromise	30:38
	and I don't think for all the noise	30:41
	it's all that hard to find it.	30:43
-	If you have any comments or questions	30:46
	for Professor Samuelson,	30:47
	address them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	30:49
	450 East Ohio Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	30:51

Item Info

Title:

Tape 187 - In search of an energy policy

Date:

September 1975

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

Rights Note:

This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0185
ref2477_q8z
samuelsonpaul
duke:325192
pstau001169
ark:/87924/r4vq2ss6j
402d2d70-47fe-472c-bcfc-83ce66dbedb5

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4vq2ss6j

Sponsor:

Sponsor this Digital Collection

Tape 187 - In search of an energy policy

Transcript

Item Info

Economists' Papers Archive

More Info & Options