Tape 143 - Economic outlook for 1974

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-	Welcome once again as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson	0:02
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:05
	This series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:08
	This program was recorded December 20th.	0:10
-	This is the occasion for my annual outlook tape	0:14
	on what's going to happen to the American economy in 1974.	0:20
	A year ago, I had the same task	0:30
	to try to peer into the future	0:34
	and decide how the odds looked	0:37
	with respect to the American economy in 1973.	0:39
	It's worth a word or two at the beginning	0:45
	to go back to that time to see how things developed in 1973	0:47
	and compare that with how they looked to be a year ago.	0:51
	At the turn of the year from 1972 to 1973,	1:00
	there was the usual fashionable forecast	1:04
	that the fashionable forecast	1:08
	was on the whole an optimistic one.	1:10
	It predicted a strong increase in money GNP.	1:15
	It looked forward to a continuation	1:21
	of substantial real growth	1:26
	not as rapidly as in 1972 itself,	1:30
	but more rapidly than is required just to keep up	1:35
	with the long term trend of the American economy.	1:41
	And that fashionable forecast was reasonably optimistic	1:43
	with respect to some abatement	1:48
	of the rate of price inflation.	1:51
	Indeed, it was in the backwash	1:55
	of that rather optimistic fashionable forecast	1:58
	that the Nixon economic team	2:03
	made the fateful decision on January 11th 1973	2:06
	to suspend the phase two price controls.	2:11
	How did things shape up?	2:17
	In the event, we now know that the money GNP	2:20
	did increase strongly in 1973.	2:27
	The experts were right in that respect	2:31
	but they were not right for precisely the correct reasons	2:34
	because the experts all underestimated	2:40
	the degree of price inflation.	2:45
	They underestimated the degree of food price inflation	2:47
	in the first part of the year.	2:50
	These are supply and demand prices.	2:51
	They underestimated the amount of increase	2:54
	in industrial prices under the decontrol program	2:57
	as the phase two was gutted on January 11th.	3:04
	And the experts overestimated the rate of real GNP growth.	3:11
	This is very striking because within a couple of months,	3:19
	two to three months after the turn of the year,	3:25
	the more canny of the experts were changing their tune.	3:28
	And you could see the new fashionable forecast forming.	3:32
	And actually if we turn to the shading	3:37
	which had taken place by March	3:42
	from the January unmitigated optimism,	3:44
	it had moved in the following way.	3:51
	Namely, there was then by March	3:55
	came to be universal agreement	3:58
	among the fashionable forecasters, the experts,	4:00
	that there would be a growth rate slow down in real terms	4:03
	in the last half of the year.	4:08
	And as a matter of fact,	4:10
	they shifted their position just in time	4:12
	because just as they were shifting their position	4:15
	in the second quarter itself,	4:17
	the so-called growth recession already began to set in.	4:19
	So I would say that this has been a pretty good year	4:24
	for the experts.	4:30
	I was at a meeting just recently	4:31
	and they were all congratulating themselves	4:33
	on how closely they had hit the year.	4:36
	I was not quite as congratulatory to them	4:39
	as they were to themselves because there was after all	4:42
	that period from January to March	4:46
	before they really got the word of what was going to happen.	4:48
	Namely, that we would be moving	4:55
	into the growth recession sooner than before.	4:59
	Actually, there's a panel of 60 economists	5:04
	followed by the American Statistical Association	5:08
	and their median forecast has done pretty well	5:11
	over the years.	5:15
	It does as well as the random experts	5:17
	in the fashionable forecast.	5:20
	It does better than pure monetarism	5:22
	and it does better than non-judgmental computer forecasts,	5:26
	but perhaps not quite as well	5:33
	as the very best of the eclectic	5:36
	computer judgmental forecasters.	5:39
	Well, more interesting perhaps	5:44
	than the median figure given by the experts	5:47
	was a number which they collect	5:50
	which is the probability of a downturn	5:52
	two months ahead, four months ahead, and so forth.	5:55
	And already by the end of 1972,	5:59
	the probability of a downturn ahead	6:05
	was going up on the part of these experts.	6:07
	One of the reasons that the experts are complacent	6:12
	is that they give themselves the alibi	6:15
	that they couldn't have foreseen the increase	6:17
	in food prices and other prices.	6:19
	Well, if in the year	6:23
	when your price forecast turns out right, you take credit,	6:25
	then I would say those who take credit for the sun	6:28
	must be prepared to be blamed for the rain in some part.	6:32
	And so that is a defect of the forecasting art	6:36
	if price increases happen because of exogenous factors,	6:41
	harvests, and so forth,	6:46
	and if you aren't able to predict those,	6:47
	then you must admit that that is part	6:49
	of the imprecision of your forecasting ability.	6:51
	Let's turn from the past to what the outlook is ahead.	6:56
	And here, I think we should do it in two steps.	7:04
	We should begin with what the outlook was	7:07
	prior to the October war in the Mid East	7:11
	because once again there was forming a consensus,	7:15
	a clustering of the fashionable forecasters	7:20
	around a particular scenario.	7:24
	That scenario, you know very well.	7:26
	It was that 1974 was to be a year of growth recession.	7:29
	That the real output in 1974 was to grow positively.	7:34
	It was not to be a national bureau year	7:43
	of genuine recession,	7:45
	not even of the mini-recession type.	7:47
	But that positive rate of growth of real output	7:50
	in the four quarters of 1974	7:54
	was to average out perhaps at 2% per year annual rate,	7:58
	3% per year annual rate.	8:03
	Some of the fashionable forecasters might have said 1%.	8:06
	But within that range,	8:11
	you would capture most of their forecasts.	8:12
	They also forecast there would be	8:16
	some degree of inflation abatement	8:18
	so that instead of enjoying or suffering	8:21
	a 7% rate of increase in price inflation	8:26
	of the overall price index that's used as the GNP deflator	8:31
	which is what we did experience in '73.	8:36
	In '74, the optimists thought	8:39
	that we might go down to 5%, five and a half percent.	8:43
	There were a few optimists who even went down below that	8:48
	and a few optimists,	8:51
	and now I mean a few optimists	8:53
	with a good forecasting record,	8:55
	who thought that as far	8:57
	as the cost of living index is concerned,	8:58
	the improvement in the rate of inflation	9:00
	might be even more than that.	9:03
	You could begin to talk in some of the quarters in 1974	9:04
	of 3% rate of increase in prices and not more than that.	9:08
	This growth recession did mean	9:17
	some lessening of the steam in the economic boiler.	9:21
	It would imply some upward climb	9:24
	in the rate of unemployment.	9:28
	But the unemployment rate which had gone down	9:31
	in the fall of this year	9:34
	just before the Mid East war to four and a half percent	9:37
	could stand a bit of climb	9:43
	in the view of lots of economists,	9:46
	particularly non-university business economists.	9:49
	They were concerned whether the natural rate of unemployment	9:52
	at which inflation would begin to accelerate	9:56
	was as low as four and a half percent.	9:58
	So they thought of us as being in an overheated economy,	10:00
	the result in part of stimulating the economy	10:04
	for an election year.	10:08
	And so they were prepared to suffer.	10:11
	Of course, they wouldn't be out of jobs,	10:15
	but they were prepared to suffer fairly cheerfully	10:17
	an increase in the unemployment rate	10:21
	from four and a half percent	10:22
	to four and three quarter percent,	10:23
	to 5%, to five and a quarter percent,	10:25
	five and a third percent.	10:28
	And they were only going to begin to worry	10:29
	about that unemployment rate	10:31
	if it seemed to threaten to go to five and a half percent	10:33
	and above five and a half percent.	10:38
	With respect to profits,	10:41
	there was some spread of opinion among the forecasters,	10:44
	but on the assumption that the decontrol program	10:48
	would be favored by the administration	10:53
	and politically, it would be acceptable.	10:55
	They had some optimism that profits would not fall off	11:00
	in this growth recession in any degree.	11:06
	Some of them had a very slight drop in profits.	11:10
	Some had profits level throughout the growth recession	11:13
	to be followed by a climb later.	11:17
	And some even had an increase in profits.	11:19
	I'm of course speaking of money profits.	11:23
	Those are the kind that the accountants let you report.	11:26
	As an afterthought, many analysts pointed out	11:30
	that those profits were swollen	11:34
	by inventory valuation upward adjustments	11:36
	due to the inflation itself.	11:39
	And so if you put everything on a reproduction cost basis	11:41
	including the cost of reproducing the machinery	11:44
	that was being depreciated during the year	11:47
	in order to produce the output on which you made a profit,	11:49
	then you would find that your real profits	11:53
	corrected for price inflation	11:56
	were by no means as rosy as the reported money profits.	11:58
	The dollar looked as if it was going to improve.	12:07
	The medicine of exchange rate devaluation (mumbling)	12:10
	that took place in February.	12:16
	The even stronger medicine more often applied	12:18
	of depreciation of the dollar	12:22
	relative to some key currencies	12:24
	which took place in February	12:26
	and in March on an official basis	12:29
	and which continued on a floating basis	12:31
	of pretty much of a clean float basis up until June	12:34
	meant that the dollar	12:40
	was becoming more comparative all the time.	12:42
	And although we were troubled by our rate of inflation	12:45
	here in this country in 1973 and in 1972,	12:48
	when we looked abroad,	12:52
	we realized that the rate of inflation abroad	12:53
	was even greater than here.	12:55
	And so more and more of our export industries	12:57
	felt that they were becoming competitive.	13:00
	A very good example, of course, a dramatic example	13:04
	is that of the compact car and the mini car in Detroit,	13:07
	the American Motors Company cars,	13:11
	the Ford Maverick, the Javelin, the Vega, the Pinto.	13:14
	These were holding fairly constant with respect to price	13:21
	at a time when Volkswagens were going up in price	13:25
	in part because of the depreciation of the dollar	13:30
	which meant the appreciation of the mark.	13:34
	The Toyota, the Datsun, the Mazda, the Honda,	13:36
	they too were going up in price.	13:41
	More than that, with food scarce all around the world	13:44
	with the United States having in Iowa	13:48
	on our commercial farms	13:50
	great comparative advantage in foodstuffs,	13:52
	we were finding ourselves with very ready markets	13:55
	and at high prices.	13:58
	You might say that what the Arabian countries	14:00
	are experiencing this year	14:04
	which is a very high price for their exports,	14:05
	we were experiencing early in the year for our foodstuffs.	14:08
	And therefore, there was a very nice comeback	14:16
	in our merchandise balance of payments,	14:20
	a comeback in our current balance of payments	14:24
	on current accounts including invisibles,	14:28
	net export surplus rising nicely.	14:31
	And the basic deficit which takes into account	14:34
	the fact that the United States became a pretty good place	14:38
	to buy into, to invest in, to buy land if you were Japanese,	14:41
	to buy stocks if you were from Western Europe.	14:47
	The basic deficit was also improving.	14:50
	And so one had reason to look forward	14:54
	to a continuation of this trend.	14:57
	All in all, since following periods	15:00
	of overly strong expansion,	15:04
	there tends to be some need for periods of relaxation	15:07
	the way we have to run our mixed economy these days.	15:12
	That was a fairly cheerful picture	15:18
	and although it didn't seem so cheerful to many of us	15:21
	who were making that forecast at the time,	15:24
	in retrospect, we look back with nostalgia upon it.	15:26
	Then came the Mid East War.	15:31
	The impact of the belligerency itself on the economics	15:34
	is not particularly notable.	15:40
	Obviously, that was a very intensely fought war.	15:43
	It meant that inventories of tanks	15:47
	and munitions were depleted on both sides	15:49
	so it meant some nice reorders for the Russians	15:52
	on the part of the oil liquid Arabians,	15:55
	those countries which had oil giving Egypt and Syria	16:02
	which didn't have oil the revenues	16:06
	to support them in that rearming.	16:09
	It meant to some degree for the U.S. repurchases	16:11
	either by the Israelis who were paying for it themselves	16:16
	out of their own resources	16:21
	or to the degree that we were making loans,	16:23
	or putting it in the cuff,	16:27
	or making gifts as the so-called aid program,	16:28
	it meant some increase for the defense business,	16:32
	but this is negligible.	16:35
	If you reckon the total of this	16:36
	in comparison with what is needed	16:39
	to change the business situation for 1974,	16:43
	the Mid East War as a war	16:48
	has no important macroeconomic repercussions	16:50
	on Western Europe, on Russia, or on the United States.	16:53
	But in the aftermath of the war,	16:58
	we did have developing the oil boycott.	17:00
	The OPEC Monopoly of 1216 leading oil producers	17:04
	primarily in the Persian Gulf but not all of them Arabian	17:11
	was already flexing its muscles	17:16
	and increasing prices all the time.	17:19
	There was squeeze play on.	17:21
	Typical monopoly operation.	17:23
	And isolating each of the big consuming countries,	17:25
	some of which were very dependent upon Mid East oil.	17:29
	I'm thinking of Western Europe and Japan in particular.	17:33
	The monopolist was able to strike some very sharp bargains.	17:36
	From the standpoint of the monopolist	17:42
	and from the standpoint of the non-Arabian countries,	17:44
	the war was a godsend	17:47
	because it enabled a vast increase in the price of oil.	17:50
	And so the whole outlook has changed.	17:55
	If we are to have for as long as say half a year of 1974	17:58
	a shortfall in oil from the Mid East	18:05
	which by the President's reckoning	18:08
	will be in the order of magnitude of 17% of our oil needs.	18:11
	Let's say three million barrels per day	18:17
	out of an 18 million barrels per day needed.	18:20
	Then all of the fashionable forecasters	18:25
	began to go back to their computers,	18:28
	began to recompute the picture	18:29
	and they were able to find	18:31
	that we went from a likely growth recession	18:34
	with minority odds for a genuine recession	18:37
	in which you had	18:41
	at least two quarters of drop in real output	18:42
	to the odds favoring that real recession.	18:45
	And so I have to say	18:51
	that premised upon that prudent man's view	18:53
	with respect to energy	18:57
	that 1974 is going to be a year of genuine recession.	18:59
	The first half of the year is going to be weak.	19:05
	That output is going to decline	19:08
	for the first half of the year.	19:09
	The unemployement, if it was previously going to grow	19:11
	to five and a third percent,	19:14
	perhaps five and a half percent,	19:15
	then I have to go along with the fashionable forecasters	19:17
	who think that by the end of 1974,	19:20
	we'll be talking about 6% unemployment.	19:23
	In the case of some forecasters, even more.	19:28
	Now, I'm going to qualify this if proposition	19:31
	about energy in a moment,	19:36
	but let's stick with it	19:38
	because I think a prudent man must do so	19:39
	in the absence of knowledge to the contrary.	19:43
	This means for the year 1974, stagflation with a vengeance	19:46
	because instead of there being an abatement	19:51
	of the rate of price inflation,	19:54
	whatever abatement there may tend to be	19:56
	with respect to foodstuffs,	19:59
	whatever abatement there would tend to be	20:02
	with respect to international metals	20:05
	because Europe is going to be in a growth recession	20:07
	or now with an energy cut off to her too	20:12
	and I'll include Japan in this.	20:16
	She's going to move into a more genuine recessions.	20:18
	Whatever abatement you could have expected	20:23
	on the rate of inflation from those factors	20:25
	is going to be much more than outweighed	20:27
	by the increase in the cost of energy itself	20:29
	which is dramatic.	20:33
	Many of my listeners will have known that just a week ago,	20:35
	86 million barrels of oil were sold at auction by Iran	20:40
	not at the one dollar and two dollar price per barrel	20:46
	which was typical of just a couple of years ago,	20:51
	not at the three and four dollar per barrel	20:53
	which are typical of what's going on now,	20:56
	but at the 16 dollars a barrel	21:00
	and for low sulfur oil,	21:03
	for as much as 17 dollars and 40 cents a barrel.	21:05
	The part of the country where I am,	21:09
	we're beginning now to get the fuel bills	21:11
	which have gone up from 20 cents to 40 cents a unit.	21:14
	And the end is not yet.	21:21
	So when you take into account the energy induced shortages.	21:25
	I just saw a large tire company.	21:30
	I saw a letter to their suppliers	21:31
	speaking of a 26% increase	21:33
	in the price of tires by the spring.	21:35
	I make that out to be an annual rate of 100%.	21:38
	There is no way of reckoning all these matters	21:42
	without having for the first half of the year	21:46
	a horrendous increase in the annual rate	21:50
	of the cost of living index.	21:55
	In fact, everybody should begin to talk	21:58
	about the GNP deflator	21:59
	because that won't show quite such horrendous figures.	22:01
	And so we're now talking about stagflation.	22:06
	On this basis, a drop in profits is implied year over year.	22:10
	A drop in profits is implied	22:15
	from the fourth quarter of this year where we are now	22:19
	to the fourth quarter of next year	22:23
	even though that may be followed,	22:25
	according to the most fashionable forecast,	22:27
	by an increase in profits	22:30
	from say the fourth quarter of a year from now	22:32
	to the middle of 1975.	22:35
	I've looked at a round up of the conventional wisdom	22:40
	and it's amazing how a monetarist economist	22:46
	who does detailed forecasting has a figure	22:52
	which is just like that of a Keynesian economist.	22:56
	The different consulting firms,	23:02
	the Wharton School model,	23:05
	they all show pretty much a similar picture.	23:07
	And therefore, in summary,	23:14
	that is the single most likely picture.	23:19
	However, more valuable than having a particular number	23:23
	is to have a probability spread.	23:29
	And so I must call your attention	23:33
	to something very important.	23:35
	If you've read the London Economist	23:38
	this last week as I'm speaking,	23:40
	you will have been alerted to the fact	23:42
	that there may be an element of charade going on	23:44
	in the oil boycott.	23:47
	If you calculate how many tankers	23:49
	have been loaded in the last weeks of the boycott	23:52
	from the Persian Gulf on their way to Western Europe,	23:57
	to Japan, to the United States,	24:01
	then you would expect a tremendous shortfall	24:03
	from an earlier period	24:06
	or from what could have been expected from this period.	24:07
	And yet when the alert journalist of the London Economist	24:09
	did their numerical exercise,	24:14
	they found that not to be the case.	24:17
	I heard from a well-placed journalist	24:21
	with respect to Japan that he couldn't understand	24:24
	how the flow of oil was still continuing there	24:26
	in view of the tough talk of the Arabian nations	24:29
	and in view of the cries of pain	24:32
	by the Japanese government and the Japanese public.	24:35
	He still couldn't see it in the actual tangible statistics.	24:39
	Even Holland which is being made the special victim	24:44
	of a power play of diplomacy	24:48
	seems to have in Rotterdam pretty good inventories.	24:50
	A bank economist in the Midwest took a poll	24:57
	of the customers of his bank	25:01
	and not one of them had yet suffered	25:03
	from any energy shortage.	25:05
	And only one out of a fairly considerable number	25:07
	had legitimate grounds,	25:12
	tangible grounds for concern for the months ahead.	25:15
	So the conventional wisdom is beginning to think	25:20
	the three million barrels per day	25:24
	is not the correct number, the 17% number.	25:26
	The oil foundation research unit	25:33
	put the number down from three and a half million per day	25:35
	to two and a half million per day.	25:40
	And so we're getting a revisionist viewpoint.	25:41
	Moreover, the whole point of this	25:45
	is for the purpose of resting concessions from Israel.	25:47
	The only way to get those concessions from Israel	25:52
	is to put pressure on the United States	25:56
	to put pressure on Israel	25:58
	because Israel needs the munitions to maintain her security.	26:00
	And so if there seems to be some semblance	26:08
	of successful pressure on the United States	26:13
	and for this purpose, you know,	26:18
	the threat of an oil boycott,	26:20
	a Potemkin oil boycott, an unreal one	26:22
	may be as effective in terms of public relations	26:25
	as a real one.	26:27
	If there's effective pressure on Europe and Japan	26:28
	to put effective pressure on the United States	26:31
	to put effective pressure on Israel to make concessions.	26:35
	And if the Russians are able	26:41
	to put some kind of effective pressure on the Arabians	26:44
	to seem to be going along with the concessions,	26:48
	and we don't know what the Russian interest is	26:52
	whether their interest is in making trouble here.	26:54
	The fact that we have detente going	26:58
	doesn't mean a thing	27:00
	in terms of you're being able to predict	27:01
	what's going to happen.	27:02
	I may also say nobody has the slightest reason to know	27:04
	whether some concessions made by Israel	27:08
	will in fact in any degree satiate	27:12
	the desires of the Arabian countries.	27:15
	Henry Kissinger doesn't know that.	27:19
	He cannot know that.	27:21
	And I'm not sure the powers that be	27:23
	in the principle Arab countries	27:25
	are in a position to know that.	27:28
	Nevertheless, it's possible	27:31
	that having flexed the muscles of the monopoly	27:32
	that there will be a letting up of the embargo	27:35
	and then the stage is set actually	27:39
	for a rather unagonizing reappraisal of optimism,	27:42
	and you could have a lot of tinder around	27:46
	for an overheating of the economy,	27:50
	and an expansion, and for further price rise,	27:53
	and I may also say for stock market boom.	27:57
	But now, since my time is short,	28:00
	let me say that given the oil embargo picture,	28:02
	you must expect that long term interest rates	28:07
	will not come down very much.	28:12
	Housing starts being hard hit by the energy shortage	28:14
	for reasons I needn't detail in this annual survey	28:17
	will mean that mortgage rates will go down some	28:21
	as a result of determined federal reserve	28:25
	and housing agency actions.	28:28
	Corporate bond rates will not go down as much	28:31
	and so if you talk about 50 basis points	28:35
	on the long term rate	28:39
	between now and say the average of next year,	28:41
	you may be talking about	28:45
	all that you can get in the long term sector.	28:46
	In the short term sector	28:50
	in the face of this stagflation,	28:52
	the flation part, I don't see how you can get	28:54
	more than 100, 150 basis points reduction.	28:57
	You certainly are not going to get down to 4%	29:03
	and to 5% in my judgment.	29:06
	With respect to housing, the permits picture looks bad.	29:11
	There's a backup of units to be sold.	29:19
	People don't know where they've got the heating connection	29:25
	if they start to build a house.	29:27
	And so I think we have to be prepared	29:29
	that housing will fall off	29:31
	unless it is given special support.	29:33
	Given the energy shortage, I see no alternative	29:36
	but for the government to be accommodating.	29:40
	The Federal Reserve, I think,	29:45
	will have a countercyclical increase in the supply of money	29:47
	given that assumption.	29:52
	And this, they will be uncomfortable about	29:55
	because it will be in the face	29:58
	of rather horrendous price news.	30:00
	However, six months ahead	30:05
	if we're now talking about the middle of the year,	30:09
	unless you think of the embargo as permanent	30:12
	and I've seen no responsible persons	30:14
	who have been making policy on that basis	30:16
	and I reproached ourselves for that lack.	30:18
	The general picture	30:22
	should begin ahead to look more cheerful.	30:23
	The unemployment rate will be worse	30:27
	but the last half of '74 looks to be better	30:30
	and the conventional wisdom for whatever it is worth	30:33
	looking a year and a half ahead	30:37
	would think that we will be on the upswing again	30:39
	from the middle of next year to the middle of 1975.	30:43
	And this means that the stock market	30:50
	which always tries to discount ahead.	30:53
	Some people say it over discounts matters ahead	30:57
	will before that event actually comes into immediate view	30:59
	will already begin to act upon it.	31:07
	Now, I guess I should tell you if I'm going to be wrong	31:11
	in this general round up of forecasts	31:18
	in which direction I think I'm most likely to be wrong in.	31:21
	I think that we may all be too pessimistic	31:26
	rather than not pessimistic enough.	31:30
	It's part of the elevating of our consciousness	31:34
	with respect to the energy shortage.	31:36
	Even with the boycott being genuine,	31:39
	if the problem is handled at all well in Washington,	31:41
	there are lots of improvisations which can be made	31:46
	and there's a lot of good will on the part of the public	31:49
	which have nothing to do with price	31:52
	which will ration things out.	31:53
	Actually, we've already begun to see	31:57
	in the statistics of energy use	32:00
	some tremendously encouraging amounts of economizing.	32:02
	The trouble is it's like reducing.	32:08
	It's very easy for anybody to reduce for a short time	32:11
	but without the price incentive,	32:13
	it will be very hard to keep patriotism	32:15
	and social solidarity working.	32:17
	In short, the mixed economy is still in a healthy state.	32:21
	We can look forward over the '70s	32:26
	to a satisfactory rate of growth.	32:29
	Undoubtedly, we live in an age of creeping inflation	32:35
	and there is no solution in sight	32:39
	to the unemployment inflation trade off problem.	32:42
	Undoubtedly, we're moving into an epoch	32:47
	where energy is going to be dear.	32:50
	One prediction I can make with great confidence.	32:54
	There will be shortage of economic problems	32:57
	in the year ahead.	32:59
-	If you have any comments	33:01
	or questions for Professor Samuelson,	33:03
	address them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	33:05
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	33:07

Item Info

Title:

Tape 143 - Economic outlook for 1974

Date:

1973

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

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Limited Re-Use

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RL10082-CS-0137
ref2413_goq
samuelsonpaul
duke:325160
pstau001137
ark:/87924/r4dz03j1b
21caf89d-357b-4129-b6c8-5623e55b3164

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Tape 143 - Economic outlook for 1974

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