Tape 137 - Worldwide inflation

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-	Welcome once again as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson,	0:02
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:05
	This program series is produced by	0:07
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:08
	This program was recorded September 20th.	0:10
-	Today would be a good time to discuss the problem of	0:14
	worldwide inflation.	0:18
	The increase in prices which goes on in the United States	0:21
	and which properly exercises	0:25
	and alarms people is not an isolated phenomenon.	0:28
	Actually as we keep reminding ourselves,	0:34
	if you tabulate what's happened to the price level	0:36
	in the last 10 years, in the five years,	0:40
	even in the last year, in a number of different countries.	0:42
	Then the score of the United States is usually at the bottom	0:46
	of the rate of inflation comparison with other countries.	0:53
	But what is to be emphasized is	0:58
	that since about 1968 there has been a common upswing	1:01
	in the rate of price inflation, all over the world.	1:07
	This makes one suspicious of any local causality	1:11
	that is adduced.	1:16
	For example, if somebody explains the German inflation	1:18
	after the late 1960's,	1:24
	on the basis of Willy Brandt coming into power,	1:27
	the Social Democrats,	1:30
	then unless a similar event has taken place simultaneously,	1:32
	in every country and why should it,	1:38
	that would be a remarkable coincidence	1:40
	and in fact, we know it hasn't	1:43
	then one becomes suspicious of explanations based upon	1:46
	these different local factors.	1:51
	This suggests a common international factor,	1:55
	like men from mars or something very cosmic	2:00
	but that also can be a trap,	2:04
	because it's possible that instead of there been	2:07
	an outside common external factor,	2:10
	there could be emerging many of the same,	2:13
	non-special factors in every country.	2:18
	We have to approach this subject with an open mind.	2:22
	Of course we approach it	2:27
	with some previous knowledge	2:28
	about what's happened in the various countries,	2:30
	at other times in the past.	2:33
	But let's review the troops, so to speak,	2:36
	and see what some of the different explanations are	2:40
	that are given.	2:43
	A very popular explanation, it's been associated,	2:47
	for example with Professor Robert Mundell, formerly	2:51
	of the University of Chicago	2:55
	and now of the University of Waterloo and Canada,	2:56
	is that the whole world inflation,	3:00
	is due to the balance of payments debts	3:03
	of the United States.	3:06
	In a measure the same sweeping thesis has been pronounced	3:08
	by Professor Harry Johnson	3:16
	of the Lennon's School of Economics	3:18
	and of the University of Chicago.	3:20
	There are many people abroad who are anxious	3:24
	to believe this because in any inflation,	3:26
	it's a good thing to find a villain,	3:29
	to find a scapegoat.	3:32
	And who can do better in that respect,	3:34
	than good old Uncle Sam.	3:36
	A lot of old scores to settle	3:38
	and this particular thesis,	3:40
	has originated independently abroad.	3:48
	A second sweeping thesis,	3:53
	I'm just trying to name the single most monistic thesis,	3:56
	not because I think they're the most important	4:04
	as you'll see in the course of our discussion,	4:06
	you are forced if you wish, to have a respect for evidence	4:09
	and for logic into a more eclectic position.	4:15
	But let's stick with the most dramatic first,	4:20
	you have the monetarist view.	4:25
	I'm now reading from a publication before me	4:28
	by Professor William Nordhaus of Yale University,	4:32
	it's called the Worldwide Wage Explosion,	4:35
	it's an interesting paper, I recommend it to you.	4:39
	It appeared in the	4:43
	Brookings Economic Activity Paper, 2:1972.	4:46
	Which means that it came out just about a year ago	4:52
	and was presumably written just a little bit before then.	4:59
	It gives numbers on manufacturing wages from 1956 to 1971	5:04
	and it shows very strikingly	5:09
	that there's almost a break in trend in 1968	5:12
	and that the rate of increase rises up to 1970.	5:17
	This for seven different countries.	5:22
	Now if he had continued the data beyond 1971,	5:25
	and if he had widened he's focus	5:35
	to include consumers prices, cost of living,	5:36
	wholesale prices, staple prices.	5:39
	Then he would not have found	5:42
	that after 1971 could be complacent	5:44
	that the worldwide explosion of inflation was abiding,	5:49
	or at least the worldwide explosion of inflation	5:54
	was abiding.	5:58
	Well he sets out to list different popular theories	6:01
	and then as best he can	6:06
	with quarterly data from Economic Time Series,	6:08
	he tries to test out the theory.	6:12
	There is the monetarist theory which says	6:15
	that money is always at the basis of any inflation.	6:18
	And that there's been an upswing in the supply of money,	6:24
	in these different countries, and that is the explanation.	6:28
	He actually applies this to a cross sectional test,	6:34
	in which he takes the behavior of wages,	6:38
	in money terms, in the different countries	6:43
	and in different times.	6:47
	And puts in a monetary factor and a time trend	6:49
	and a real output factor.	6:55
	This is to give all the factors in the,	6:59
	so called quantity theory of exchange, MV equal PQ,	7:03
	a chance to operate	7:07
	and then he wants to see whether the behavior is consistent	7:09
	with a strong version of that.	7:18
	Now of course, although he's putting up a strong version,	7:21
	he's recognizes that the effect of money,	7:23
	is not supposed to take place instantaneously,	7:26
	he does use lag variables at the recommended best lag.	7:28
	And to make a long story short,	7:36
	with respect to all of the countries,	7:39
	seven countries, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan,	7:41
	Sweden, United Kingdom, United States,	7:44
	he cannot accept the strong version,	7:47
	of the monetarist hypothesis, in any case.	7:49
	If you weaken the version	7:54
	and just see whether there might be evidence	7:57
	to believe in it, in a weaker form,	8:01
	he does get some evidence for Canada, France	8:04
	and West Germany	8:08
	and the United Kingdom.	8:12
	However there's evidence to reject the hypothesis,	8:14
	also for a number of countries.	8:21
	So he's conclusion is,	8:25
	plainly the strict monetarist type hypothesis,	8:27
	is rejected whenever the evidence is sufficient.	8:30
	That is sufficient to make a crisp judgment,	8:32
	one way or another.	8:35
	In no country is the hypothesis accepted,	8:36
	for either co-efficient that is the effect of prices	8:38
	and the effect of output, in 10 cases its rejected.	8:44
	Well, if I were a monetarist, I would be interested in this	8:48
	because one should always test ones own theory.	8:53
	But of course I wouldn't throw in the towel,	8:57
	because who expects any simplified version of any hypothesis	9:00
	to be realized and I think the journalistic utterances	9:08
	of proponents of a theory when you get	9:12
	to the scientific level have to be put aside	9:16
	and you must take their best formulations	9:20
	and not their total formulations,	9:23
	or even their average formulations.	9:27
	Well now, still another explanation which is widely used	9:31
	is that there has been a worldwide deterioration	9:37
	of the Phillips Curve trade off between money wage rates,	9:44
	nominal wage rates	9:50
	and the degree of unemployment in every country.	9:51
	This is tested by Professor Nordhaus,	9:56
	both in a naive form, where he just used unemployment,	9:58
	regressed against the wage inflation.	10:02
	But also in more sophisticated forms	10:06
	in which the expectations of inflation are,	10:09
	somehow arrived at and put in the equations.	10:13
	Here too one sees the, by the late 1960s	10:21
	what seems to be a deterioration	10:27
	of Phillips Curve's in many countries simultaneously.	10:30
	I went to a conference,	10:34
	more of less on this subject in Sweden.	10:36
	I think it was around 1966, really before this period.	10:39
	This was a conference in honor	10:45
	of Professor Erik Lindahl's 60th birthday	10:47
	instead of giving him a Festschrift, a book of bound essays.	10:52
	The Swedish colleagues and admirer of Professor Lindahl,	10:58
	had the happier idea to have a scientific conference	11:03
	around subjects which he was interested in.	11:07
	And I remember there were several survey papers there,	11:09
	both for Sweden but also on a cross sectional basis	11:12
	and even by the middle 1960's,	11:17
	if you used the Phillips Curve as your seismograph,	11:20
	something ominous was beginning to be recorded in the data.	11:22
	Now, mind you although I'm listing all these,	11:30
	as different explanations,	11:32
	a sophisticated analyst could very well argue	11:34
	that there's nothing initially exclusive about them.	11:37
	If the Phillips Curve is going to go to pieces	11:40
	and you are a monetarist,	11:42
	you might argue that it's because	11:43
	of certain monetaristic behavior that that takes place.	11:45
	Well, there are still others.	11:52
	Let me mention one very important one.	11:55
	The dual price phenomenon in Europine	12:00
	and Japanese economies in which, so to speak,	12:07
	there are two different regimes of prices.	12:12
	There are domestic prices	12:15
	and there are international prices.	12:17
	And these answer to a different drum beat.	12:20
	This particular thesis that I'm speaking of,	12:24
	is actually associated with the name of Professor Lindahl,	12:26
	who observed it in Sweden.	12:29
	But I have seen comments, observing the same thing in Italy.	12:32
	And the same thing in Japan.	12:37
	But to Americaneers it comes as a little bit of news,	12:40
	or of a strange thing,	12:45
	because I haven't seen any particular evidence	12:46
	that this dual price theory,	12:49
	this two phases of the economy,	12:53
	each which has the different kind of inflation,	12:57
	that doesn't seem to apply to the United States.	12:59
	However, we aught to pay attention to it	13:03
	because sometimes things which happens in one country,	13:04
	happen earlier there in another country	13:07
	and you can get some lead on	13:10
	what may happen in your own country	13:12
	by observing what happens there.	13:14
	Let me explain what's involved here.	13:16
	I'll take Sweden as an example,	13:19
	but I could as well take Italy,	13:22
	or I could take Japan.	13:24
	These are open economies, they are very export oriented.	13:26
	Their manufacturing firms are used	13:32
	to dealing in foreign trade.	13:35
	They follow trends very closely.	13:38
	They depend upon foreign trade.	13:41
	So a large sector of the economy is completely open.	13:44
	But of course, as everywhere,	13:48
	the existence of transport costs gives a certain amount	13:51
	of local isolation for certain goods.	13:55
	The textbook examples, we used to give,	13:58
	would be things like bricks.	14:00
	Bricks are very heavy, they're not very valuable per pound,	14:03
	the transport costs become very heavy.	14:07
	If you move bricks between regions, even within a country,	14:11
	they are also made out of materials which are ubiquitous.	14:16
	To be found anywhere, anyplace will have some sand	14:20
	and limestone, there are exceptions to this.	14:23
	And so, the market for bricks is always set in local terms.	14:28
	Same thing would be true of haircuts, of personal services	14:34
	and a great number of domestic goods.	14:38
	So in Sweden you have two vertical layers,	14:41
	the domestic goods economy and the world goods economy.	14:47
	Now what happened in the 1960's,	14:55
	already very visible by the middle of the 1960's.	14:58
	What you found was that domestically prices	15:02
	where already rising chronically in every year.	15:05
	4%, 5% that would be the Swedish expectation,	15:10
	with respect to the domestic prices.	15:14
	However if you look at the world price sector	15:19
	of the Swedish economy	15:22
	and you compile an index number	15:23
	of price movements there you you'd find	15:25
	that prices hadn't moved at all.	15:27
	And the explanation given was,	15:29
	that the Swedes could not unilaterally raise their price,	15:31
	they had to meet the foreign competition.	15:34
	Now you might ask why didn't those industries die.	15:37
	How could they meet the foreign competition.	15:40
	Well apparently their profit margins could be squeezed,	15:42
	apparently there were favorable shock effects	15:46
	upon efficiency.	15:48
	And miracles, miracles, year after year after year	15:50
	the Swedish economy and manufacturing for the world market	15:54
	would show productivity changes of 8% per annum.	15:59
	These have a Japanese like sound to American ears.	16:05
	Because we consider ourselves as doing very well	16:10
	if as a year ago and two years ago,	16:12
	in a burst of productivity we get 4%,	16:17
	5% productivity increases	16:21
	and more commonly we have to settle for 2 1/2 % and 3%	16:23
	and right now its thought,	16:29
	just to bring it to the present date	16:30
	that in the year ahead,	16:34
	we may not even have a 1/2 to 1% productivity	16:36
	because of the impending growth recession	16:40
	that most of the experts still expect.	16:43
	Well, in any case, all those different countries,	16:47
	are subject to common competition	16:52
	and you find them all with the dual price system	16:56
	with their prices held down on exportable	16:59
	and importable manufacturing goods.	17:06
	In order to understand, then, the worldwide inflation,	17:11
	what you have to do postulate is that for some reason,	17:14
	which itself needs explanation,	17:18
	the common level to which the international competition	17:20
	has kept those international prices,	17:26
	there's longer that stability.	17:28
	But now, is everywhere at rates like,	17:30
	and now I'm just reaching for numbers,	17:37
	lets say five or 6% per annum.	17:39
	Not as great as what we've seen in food, fiber and metals.	17:41
	The staple supply and demand determined prices,	17:47
	but much greater than before.	17:50
	And so, stick with example, Sweden,	17:52
	the world goods part of the Swedish market,	17:56
	no longer is holding down the comprehensive index	18:02
	by showing 0% increase per year,	18:06
	or 1% increase per year.	18:12
	It is now showing somewhat comprable increases	18:14
	to those in the domestic tier section	18:18
	of the Swedish economy,	18:23
	and similarly in Italy, in Germany, France,	18:24
	Western Europe generally, Japan and the United States.	18:30
	So we are really left with the query	18:35
	as to why at the worldwide level the constraints	18:40
	of worldwide competition have caused an acceleration	18:45
	of the rate of price increase as against,	18:51
	say the early 1960's.	18:53
	Well, I could go on to list other factors,	18:56
	which were listed by Nordhaus,	19:01
	I'll list some of factors I don't intend to say much about.	19:02
	'Cause I haven't anything interesting to say about them,	19:06
	very rapidly.	19:09
	It could be argued that the demographic factor,	19:11
	there's an increase proportion of young workers in the	19:15
	United States labor force	19:19
	and this is also true in a number of other countries	19:20
	because of the war time	19:22
	and immediate post war burst of births.	19:24
	And that this means that the Phillips Curves,	19:29
	haven't really deteriorated,	19:34
	it's just that the, there are more young people	19:35
	who are subject to more unemployment,	19:38
	and if you weigh things properly,	19:40
	you'll find that the situation is indeed worse.	19:43
	But its not because there's been any change in anything,	19:46
	except the waiting.	19:50
	Then it could be argued	19:52
	that we live in an increasingly militant, social	19:54
	and political environment.	19:58
	This shows itself in confrontations,	20:00
	in university discord,	20:03
	it also shows itself in labor union militants	20:07
	and trade union pushfulness has increased.	20:11
	The Japanese, for example,	20:16
	have a very docile labor force,	20:18
	perhaps their luck, if you wanna call it that,	20:21
	is running out.	20:24
	The French Revolution of 1968,	20:26
	which surprised everybody who thought	20:29
	that de Gaulle had brought order	20:30
	and stability and civility to France forever,	20:33
	is an example.	20:37
	And you certainly find in Germany,	20:39
	sociological and political are factors,	20:43
	now that the defeat is far behind,	20:46
	now that the miracle of productivity,	20:49
	is no longer so remarkable,	20:53
	you see the left-wing of the social democrats	20:57
	and you see much more student activism,	20:59
	in the German universities,	21:02
	than ever took place at Kent State,	21:04
	or anywhere in the United States.	21:06
	And this is sometimes blamed for the situation.	21:08
	Of course, we realize	21:14
	that this would serve Nordhaus better	21:16
	as a possible explanation,	21:21
	if he does stop with 1970 or 1971	21:22
	because, it's been, since 1971 in the United States,	21:27
	at least,	21:30
	that there seems to have been a surprising quieting down	21:31
	of the Phillips Curve wage cost push effects in the	21:37
	United States.	21:43
	Well now, finally there is the factor which,	21:45
	I think an American here at home would deem quite important.	21:50
	And that is, that we've have a depreciation of our currency.	21:56
	This factor could also be adduced	22:02
	for the British wage explosion,	22:04
	following the 1967 devaluation of the Pound.	22:08
	An increase in prices could be expected on a,	22:14
	once-and-for-all basis at least in some measure	22:18
	to follow in any country,	22:21
	which has depreciated it's currency.	22:22
	This is not a very good explanation for worldwide inflation	22:24
	because the effects that I'm talking about,	22:30
	or should be talking about,	22:32
	I think are the effects of depreciation.	22:33
	And the effects of appreciation are the opposite.	22:36
	Perhaps was I unfortunate	22:39
	that I followed Nordhaus in speaking of devaluation,	22:40
	let's speak of the British depreciation of the Pound in 1967	22:43
	and let's keep in mind the American depreciation	22:48
	of the Dollar after August 15th 1971.	22:52
	Combinating in Smithsonian at the end of 1971.	22:59
	And then the several depreciation's	23:02
	of the Dollar in February, March	23:05
	and under the floating regime, in the months after March	23:08
	of this year itself.	23:13
	The reason why you can't use this as an explanation,	23:16
	in worldwide inflation,	23:18
	is that the German's are asking themselves,	23:19
	how do we account for the fact	23:22
	that we've had an appreciation,	23:24
	and several appreciations	23:26
	order magnitude over the years,	23:29
	since the late 1960's of 40-some-percent,	23:31
	recon one way and recon another way,	23:35
	you can get it to be over 60%.	23:37
	And we've had inflation.	23:40
	If inflation is causing United States by depreciation	23:43
	then relief from inflation,	23:47
	or even deflation aught to be caused in Germany	23:50
	by that same event.	23:53
	Well, that doesn't seem to have been a strong enough effect.	23:56
	I don't think however you should sell it short completely,	24:00
	because I believe if you look at the Canadian experience,	24:03
	you will find that at times,	24:07
	when the United States was having bouts of inflation	24:10
	and the Canadian Dollar was floating	24:14
	and was in fact floating upwards,	24:16
	that there was a certain measure of buffering	24:19
	of the Canadian rate of inflation against infection	24:22
	by the US rate of inflation.	24:28
	Well, let me say a few words of analysis,	24:33
	about the related thesis	24:38
	that the United States has been exporting inflation.	24:41
	Unfortunately we haven't been exporting at all,	24:46
	this could have been used more asymmetrically,	24:49
	back in the early 1960's when the miracles in Germany	24:53
	and on the continent	24:59
	and in Japan were beginning to run out	25:00
	and they were havin' good deal more inflation than we were.	25:02
	Fact, you remember in that period,	25:05
	oh let's say 1960 to 1964,	25:08
	the US basic deficit was actually improving,	25:12
	was lessening, because we were having less inflation.	25:17
	In that case, you could have said	25:20
	that we were sweeping our inflation abroad.	25:22
	Well, if we had been sweeping our inflation abroad,	25:27
	in the Nixon years since 1968,	25:32
	let's say in the post Indo China war years, after 1965.	25:36
	We certainly had not succeeded in sweeping it all abroad,	25:41
	because there's been plenty left here at home to plague us.	25:43
	How do we give a run for it's money of the theory	25:48
	that it's the United States balance of payments,	25:50
	deficit which is at stake.	25:52
	Well, let's first look at the deficit,	25:56
	when the US parity is not moving,	25:58
	is being maintained by whatever means.	26:01
	If the United States is running a deficit,	26:08
	it means we're importing a lot.	26:11
	That means we have a strong demand for goods	26:13
	and services abroad.	26:17
	That means, in terms of microeconomics,	26:18
	that there are strong markets,	26:21
	that prices are being bit up abroad.	26:23
	That this supplies of goods, which the US gets from abroad,	26:26
	are taken out of the increasing marginal costs margin	26:33
	and that raises prices to us,	26:39
	but of course to the competitive market,	26:41
	it also raises prices to all the demanders abroad,	26:42
	think of Germany as your example.	26:45
	So there is a direct microeconomic demand effect,	26:48
	on prices abroad.	26:52
	Lets look at this in a slightly deeper way,	26:55
	at the macroeconomic level.	26:59
	According to the analysis of income determination,	27:02
	the multiple kand,	27:11
	in the familiar Keynesian multiplier process,	27:15
	can be regarding as in part being the export surplus.	27:19
	Time and again we've seen this operate,	27:25
	the late J.M. Clarke of Columbia University,	27:28
	when he came to write a history	27:30
	of the American economy in World War I	27:32
	for the Carnegie Foundation,	27:36
	actually developed independently of Keynesian,	27:38
	the multiplier doctrine.	27:40
	He noticed that we went from a mild recession in 1913, 1914,	27:41
	into a very considerable prosperity,	27:46
	before we ever got into the war this on the basis,	27:49
	of our export surplus generated by belligerents,	27:52
	military war orders in the United States,	27:55
	these were mostly in lines for shipping reasons,	27:59
	but even hand delivered were ready to trade with the Germans	28:02
	and the Turks at that time.	28:07
	So the effect, our deficit is somebody else's surplus	28:12
	and this acts as a stimulant to the total affective demand,	28:18
	in those particular economies.	28:24
	This is reinforced and as a matter of fact,	28:28
	the effects are not added to it,	28:31
	we're saying the same thing in some degree,	28:32
	but they're not identical.	28:34
	By the increase in the monetary reserves,	28:36
	which occurs in the countries abroad,	28:41
	while this process is taking place.	28:44
	And by the way, which stays there,	28:47
	even after the basic deficit has come to be zero.	28:48
	I'm thinking if you're on a gold standard	28:52
	of the actual flow of gold into those countries,	28:54
	that gold is expanded	28:57
	by the banking system in the usual fashion.	28:58
	But even if, gold is not being much used,	29:01
	in international trade in the early 1960's,	29:05
	and it wasn't very much being used.	29:07
	If the countries abroad support the American Dollar,	29:11
	their central banks are willing to take those Dollars in,	29:15
	then and their people are not willing to hold those Dollars,	29:17
	then the central bank must effectively increase,	29:20
	the high powered money, the reserves of the banking system	29:24
	and the amount of currency in circulation abroad.	29:29
	And so the,	29:32
	this reinforces the monetarists view.	29:33
	I think therefore Americans should not be a defensive	29:38
	that, and deny what is undeniable.	29:42
	That our balance of payments is one deficit,	29:45
	is one reason for inflation abroad.	29:50
	It's also one reason for non-inflation at home,	29:52
	because we would have less goods and greater scarcity,	29:55
	and more bidding up of prices at home.	29:58
	It cannot however be used as a worldwide explanation,	30:01
	including the United States.	30:04
	Well my time is just about up, I wanna add something,	30:07
	which Nordhaus had no reason to add,	30:12
	because he stopped really with 1971,	30:15
	we have had a simultaneous worldwide business cycle.	30:19
	An upswing in money national incomes	30:23
	and real national incomes and all countries.	30:26
	And this has coincided with a period	30:28
	of impaired supply of basic agricultural products,	30:31
	and mining products	30:36
	and so in addition you've had commodity price inflation.	30:37
	This is a common international factor,	30:42
	and in the volatile price indexes,	30:47
	its probably the most important of all.	30:50
	It's by no means the most discouraging of all,	30:52
	because what supply and demand sends up, it may	30:54
	and I think will at a later date, send down.	30:58
-	If you have any comments or questions	31:02
	for Professor Samuelson,	31:03
	address them to	31:04
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	31:05
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	31:08

Item Info

Title:

Tape 137 - Worldwide inflation

Date:

1973

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0133
ref2405_i5l
samuelsonpaul
duke:325156
pstau001133
ark:/87924/r4z02zr5c
d808da14-7893-4e62-bed0-39aca062ec90

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Tape 137 - Worldwide inflation

Transcript

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Economists' Papers Archive

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