Tape 129 - GNP; interest rates; stock market

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-	Welcome once again as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson	0:02
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:05
	This program series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:09
	This program was recorded May 31st.	0:11
-	We're beginning to move into the summer season.	0:15
	As far as the domestic economy is concerned,	0:19
	we're still in the same guessing game.	0:22
	If you look at past and present statistics,	0:26
	the economy is strong and it's overly strong.	0:29
	If you look at the forecasts by most experts,	0:32
	the economy is about to move into a mini recession	0:36
	or a growth recession	0:41
	or in the case of a minority of the experts,	0:43
	the economy in 1974 will move into a full-fledged recession	0:47
	in which for at least a couple of quarters,	0:53
	the real GNP will actually move backwards,	0:56
	it will show negative growth.	1:02
	Let me today try	1:06
	to comment on different viewpoints,	1:08
	appraise and evaluate them	1:13
	and if time permits,	1:15
	perhaps we can say a word or two	1:19
	about the so-called energy crisis.	1:20
	I think I might begin today	1:26
	by reading to you from a memorandum	1:27
	of May 23rd 1973	1:31
	by a very able contemporary economist,	1:33
	Albert T. Summers	1:36
	who's a senior vice-president and chief economist	1:37
	of the Conference Board.	1:40
	Dr. Summers does a good deal	1:42
	of lecturing before business and other groups	1:45
	and in addition, aside from his official duties	1:50
	as economist for the Conference Board,	1:54
	he does a certain amount of forecasting	1:58
	and consulting for financial groups.	2:00
	I've found over the years	2:04
	that his is a good voice to listen to	2:05
	because he has a pretty good track record.	2:08
	He keeps in close touch, he's a good analyst.	2:10
	That's true by the way of a number people	2:14
	at the Conference Board,	2:16
	John Kendrick is the director of research there,	2:17
	Martin Gainsborough who's now I guess emeritus	2:21
	but still very active,	2:24
	those are economists whom it's been worth listening to	2:27
	in the past.	2:33
	Well, now let me read you a couple of paragraphs	2:34
	of views by Dr. Summers.	2:37
	He says at least for this cycle, this business cycle,	2:41
	and given the grave impairment of leadership	2:44
	in Washington going into Watergate,	2:46
	it is getting late to expect new policy arrangements capable	2:48
	of calming an overwrought	2:52
	and cyclically exposed business boom.	2:53
	It is too late for monetary policy	2:56
	to affect the consumer boom	2:58
	which is nearing an end anyway.	3:01
	And so many industries have touched the outer limits	3:04
	of their productive capacity,	3:07
	it is not likely that monetary policy	3:08
	can affect the capital goods boom	3:11
	which has now acquired	3:13
	a long-term capacity expansion character.	3:15
	All that can be hoped for	3:18
	is that at least the speculative aspects	3:20
	of an inventory boom	3:22
	which might otherwise be achingly intense	3:23
	both because of share need	3:26
	and also because of rapidly rising commodity prices	3:28
	can be truncated somewhat	3:32
	before its normal cyclical completion.	3:33
	In other words, we have done it again.	3:36
	Those analysts who hope that monetary policy	3:39
	in the political context	3:42
	of the 1970s and hampered by the limitation	3:43
	of its powers to the supply side of the money market	3:48
	could achieve economic stability almost single handedly	3:50
	have been disappointed for the third time	3:54
	in seven years.	3:56
	Three strikes the stock market has grimly concluded	3:57
	and you're out.	4:00
	Now, what's being said there	4:02
	is the implicit view	4:03
	of Dr. Summers that it's not enough to control	4:08
	the supply of money	4:12
	and it's not enough to control the supply of credit	4:14
	and it's not enough for the Federal Reserve Board	4:16
	using conventional open market operations,	4:19
	using conventional discount rate policy,	4:21
	using conventional legal reserve requirements policy	4:24
	to effect interest rates.	4:28
	In his view, we should have been long since getting on	4:30
	with the problem of developing selective credit controls.	4:35
	You couldn't tell that from the passage that I read	4:38
	but elsewhere in the memorandum	4:40
	that view becomes more explicit	4:43
	and I have appeared on the same platform	4:45
	with Al Summers	4:48
	and he's made clear that that is his view.	4:51
	In other words, he would like	4:54
	to see some direct credit controls	4:56
	that will limit consumer spending	4:59
	and spread out the strength in consumers' spending	5:02
	so we won't have feast and famine.	5:05
	And what he's saying is that as far	5:09
	as this business cycle is concerned,	5:12
	it's too late really to perfect such instruments	5:13
	and to use them.	5:16
	But I think he's saying something more,	5:18
	namely that his earlier optimism	5:21
	that the government officials	5:24
	and Congress and concerned and interested economists	5:26
	and policy makers would be getting on	5:30
	with the task of developing these tools,	5:32
	that prospect has not materialized.	5:36
	I never thought it would	5:39
	and I wondered in sharing a platform with him	5:41
	at his optimism that we were about to move	5:45
	in that direction because I saw no particular traces	5:47
	of it but I guess that Dr. Summers now sadly concludes	5:50
	that as far as the immediate business cycle situation	5:55
	is concerned, we can't expect to have much hope.	5:59
	I may say that as of his early May model,	6:04
	it calls for a weakening of real growth	6:09
	from 8% down, I'm speaking now from memory,	6:14
	to something like 6.5% in the second current quarter	6:18
	down to something like 4% by the fourth quarter	6:22
	and then down by the second quarter	6:26
	of 1974 actually to a negative rate of growth,	6:29
	that to be maintained in the middle of 1974.	6:36
	I believe that the primary energy	6:40
	for so dramatic a movement,	6:42
	I call the movement dramatic,	6:47
	in 1937 we would have considered such a movement gentle	6:49
	but the business cycle has been tamed,	6:53
	the business cycle no longer shows	6:55
	the wild energy that used to be the case	6:57
	and so, the Summers' scenarios	7:00
	that I'm describing for you	7:02
	is about as dramatic as any of the scenarios	7:03
	of any of the forecasters	7:06
	and in order to get the energy	7:08
	to make things move that much that quickly,	7:10
	Dr. Summers must rely primarily	7:14
	upon an inventory swing.	7:17
	He has by the first quarter of 1974	7:19
	inventory accumulation at the rate of $21 billion	7:23
	according to my recollection.	7:26
	Then it drops to $10 billion annual rate	7:28
	in the second quarter	7:30
	and then it drops if I remember correctly	7:32
	to essentially the neighborhood of zero.	7:34
	That's a $20 billion swing	7:38
	in a couple of quarters	7:40
	and if you couple that with a decline	7:42
	in housing, residential construction expenditure	7:46
	and with a reduction in the pace	7:50
	of consumers' durable spending,	7:54
	led no doubt by autos,	7:57
	but augmented by other consumers' durable spending,	7:58
	then you get his particular scenario.	8:02
	Well, let me go from the dramatic	8:06
	to the calm.	8:08
	I now have before me	8:12
	the publication in the middle of May	8:15
	of the Argus Weekly Staff Report.	8:19
	I can presume that the forecast	8:22
	that I'm about to discuss	8:25
	is the work of James Meigs,	8:27
	formally of the First National City Bank,	8:31
	formally before that of the Federal Reserve Bank	8:33
	of St. Louis and trained at the University of Chicago	8:35
	under Professor Milton Friedman,	8:41
	also Dr. Waldman and other members	8:44
	of that particular staff.	8:49
	Now, what do they see in their crystal ball?	8:51
	They expect that the real GNP	8:56
	of 8% in the quarter which is behind us	9:00
	will decline, it will decline rather steadily eight,	9:04
	six and 3/4,	9:12
	5.5 but it levels off at about 4%	9:16
	or shows signs of leveling off	9:23
	just below 4% by the end of 1974.	9:24
	From my viewpoint, the scenario that is described there	9:30
	would be a very good one.	9:34
	This would mean we had made reentry	9:36
	towards a high employment, maintainable rate of growth	9:38
	without going in to even a growth recession.	9:45
	Now, it's true we dip below the magic number	9:50
	of four and 1/3% or four and 1/4% or 4%	9:53
	which is what is presumably just needed	9:58
	in order to absorb the growth of our labor force	10:00
	because of population increase	10:05
	and the normal growth in productivity	10:07
	but we don't go below that number	10:12
	by any appreciable degree	10:13
	as far ahead as the eye can see	10:15
	and I think that that's a pretty good scenario.	10:17
	This is based of course since they are monitorists	10:22
	upon an explicit forecast of what's going to happen	10:25
	to the money supply.	10:29
	I'm looking at the chart on their May 15th report	10:31
	on page two	10:37
	and in the upper panel it shows what's happened	10:38
	to the money supply.	10:41
	It shows what they think is going to happen	10:42
	to the money supply	10:43
	and that drives the system to produce	10:45
	what they think is going to happen	10:47
	to the real GNP growth of the system.	10:48
	The money supply they think	10:54
	is now coming down from something	10:57
	above a 7% year-to-year percent change	10:59
	and it will go down towards 6%,	11:05
	actually it'll overshoot that	11:09
	and go below 6% by the,	11:12
	let's say the third quarter of the year,	11:17
	it may be a little later than that,	11:21
	Columbus Day or Thanksgiving if you lie	11:23
	but then they have the money supply steady as a rock at 6%.	11:25
	Apparently at that date Dr. Burns	11:30
	will have gotten the election year out of his system,	11:33
	the superiority of a stable money supply target	11:37
	will have been realized.	11:42
	I may mention this is a M1 target,	11:45
	it's 6%, it's perhaps higher	11:48
	than Professor Milton Friedman himself would advocate	11:50
	because he would put it in terms	11:54
	of a M2 target,	11:57
	not much above that 6% rate if at all	11:59
	which means that M1 which has a downward drift relative	12:03
	to M2 would have to aim at I suppose no more than 4%.	12:07
	If the Argus picture	12:14
	were the majority consensus forecast,	12:19
	I think you'd have a lot more happy people	12:23
	around New York and Washington and Main Street	12:25
	than you actually do.	12:28
	In point of fact,	12:30
	Argus and Kidder, Peabody,	12:32
	two financial monitorist forecasting groups	12:36
	have been much more optimistic	12:42
	than the rest of the crew	12:45
	and their readers have been waiting	12:46
	for their optimism to take fruit	12:50
	in terms of the stock market.	12:52
	Well, I don't where the reality lies,	12:56
	somewhere between the Summers' scenario.	12:59
	The Summers' scenario, by the way,	13:05
	is not one of the Doomsday scenarios,	13:06
	if you would listen to an Eliot Janeway	13:09
	or some other people, really big swingers,	13:12
	you can get the Dow Jones averages down	13:14
	to half their present levels	13:16
	and all kinds of crises	13:18
	but I think that among the responsible forecasters	13:22
	with a pretty good track record,	13:28
	you will bow most of them	13:30
	in the limits set by the Summers' outlook	13:33
	and by the Argus outlook.	13:36
	Let me say by the way	13:40
	that the worse of these outlooks, the Summers' one,	13:42
	it doesn't seem to me to be a terribly pessimistic picture.	13:45
	There have been many previous decades	13:51
	in which we would have settled	13:53
	for far less in the way of trouble.	13:54
	I wouldn't welcome the Summers' outcome	13:57
	but it would not mean the end of the economic system	14:01
	as we have known it.	14:04
	It would not necessarily mean	14:05
	very much of an erosion of profits	14:09
	and actually if you read all	14:12
	of Dr. Summers' accompanying memoranda,	14:15
	he is fairly optimistic as a whole.	14:18
	I think it's fair to say	14:23
	that he believes that the stock market,	14:24
	the money market generally	14:27
	has discounted about every kind of trouble it can think of	14:28
	and that maybe it's reached by now pretty much	14:32
	the full discounting so that even if the news turns out	14:37
	to be as bad as he thinks it's likely to be,	14:42
	that would not necessarily have much of a shock	14:45
	on the stock market.	14:47
	The stock market is already prepared for that	14:49
	and for worse	14:51
	and in particular it seems to me	14:53
	you can be quite optimistic	14:54
	about the general, longer-term movement of stock prices,	14:56
	if you take the position which Dr. Summers argues,	15:00
	argues forcefully, that the profitability	15:04
	of American enterprise	15:09
	has now been restored.	15:13
	In other words, according to Dr. Summers,	15:16
	the increase in profits	15:18
	which we've seen in the last couple of years	15:19
	is more than just a cyclical upswing	15:21
	in the profits which is gonna be taken away	15:25
	from us the moment the business cycle turns	15:27
	in the other direction.	15:29
	On the contrary, what he thinks is	15:31
	that there is going to be a better longer-term alignment	15:33
	between cost trends and price trends	15:36
	so that a profitability is really much better	15:40
	than it was in 1970	15:44
	after you correct for cyclical factors	15:46
	and therefore we can look ahead	15:49
	after the cyclical downturn of 1974	15:50
	has begun to spend itself	15:55
	after we begin once again	15:57
	to make our advance in the last part of '74,	16:00
	we can look forward to a very nice continuing growth	16:03
	of profits and I must say	16:11
	that if I could share his confidence	16:14
	about what's happening to the profitability	16:18
	of American enterprise, American corporate enterprise	16:21
	in the 1970s, I think that I could make out	16:24
	a pretty good case that the stock market	16:27
	with the Dow Jones averages	16:30
	in the general neighborhood of 900/925	16:33
	is not a bad buy	16:38
	because an awful lot of irreversible inflation	16:40
	which has raised the value and the reproduction cost	16:45
	of the plant and equipment of American industry	16:48
	has gone by in the years	16:51
	since the stock market generally	16:55
	was at the same level.	16:58
	Now before I move on to other matters,	17:01
	is there any new information available to me	17:03
	or any new method of analyzing the old information	17:08
	that enables me to state more precisely	17:12
	where I would think we would come	17:17
	between the Summers' scenario	17:19
	and the Argus scenario?	17:23
	I can't really say that enough has happened.	17:26
	We did have, for example,	17:30
	in the month of April,	17:31
	the leading indicators actually turned down.	17:35
	This is the first the leading indicators have turned down	17:37
	in a long time.	17:40
	The list is not complete,	17:41
	not all 12 of the items in the index	17:44
	are now available	17:49
	but I think it is a warning sign	17:51
	that we definitely have passed the inflection point	17:54
	of most rapid rate of growth.	17:57
	Probably some of you have seen in the press	17:59
	that Dr. Geoffrey Moore who used to be the Commissioner	18:01
	of the Bureau of Labor Statistics	18:05
	in the first Nixon administration	18:07
	and who has been a long-time worker	18:09
	at the National Bureau of Economic Research	18:12
	on the leading coincidental and lagging indicator approach	18:14
	that he has a new method of analysis	18:20
	which suggests that the bloom	18:23
	is off the boom.	18:27
	As I recall and here I must just rely	18:29
	upon vague press references	18:32
	because I haven't yet been able	18:36
	to see the memorandum by Dr. Moore,	18:37
	he has found	18:42
	that if you take the lagging indicators	18:44
	and if you compare them in a certain way	18:46
	with the coincidental indicators,	18:48
	oddly enough you get a good leading indicator	18:51
	and he has a measure	18:56
	which has tended in post-war business cycles	18:58
	to turn down about 13 months	19:02
	before general business turns down.	19:05
	Well, what does this measure show	19:09
	for the current economy?	19:10
	I believe it shows that for some months now,	19:13
	some few months, that wasn't given in the news item	19:15
	which I saw but let's say four/five months	19:19
	that that measure has been trending downward.	19:22
	If I'm about right in my guess	19:28
	that it's a four or five-month down trend,	19:30
	if we take that from 13 months,	19:34
	we get something like eight or nine months left	19:37
	before the down turn can be expected in the business cycle.	19:42
	Now, we are as I speak just beginning	19:48
	to move into June,	19:51
	so seven months gets us to the end of the year,	19:53
	eight months gets us to February,	19:57
	nine months gets us to March,	19:59
	that pretty much agrees	20:01
	with the Al Summers' timetable	20:05
	because you recall that in the second quarter	20:09
	the rate of growth goes negative,	20:11
	that means between the first and the second quarter	20:12
	which we can put that around April 1,	20:15
	the economy is just passing through the zero level	20:19
	from growth to stagnation, negative growth.	20:25
	This is more than a mini recession,	20:32
	this is more than a growth recession,	20:34
	this is a full-fledged recession	20:37
	but don't be frightened	20:40
	by the expression full-fledged recession	20:41
	because it's not a full-fledged recession	20:43
	of the sort we used to have before the war.	20:45
	In a year like 1937,	20:47
	the Federal Reserve Board Index of Physical Production	20:49
	dropped as I recall more than 25%	20:53
	and from '37 to '38 and from '38 to '39,	20:57
	it recovered more than 25%.	21:03
	Well, I don't think that the Summers' scenario	21:05
	calls for any such extensive an amplitude as that	21:09
	but we would be talking about something	21:14
	that's not dissimilar	21:16
	from what we experienced in 1970.	21:19
	A weak genuine recession	21:26
	more than a growth recession or a mini recession.	21:30
	I don't think you can put much weight	21:36
	on one month's decline in the leading indicators.	21:38
	For that matter, one month's decline	21:42
	in the lead indicator suggests	21:44
	that there still is some way to go	21:46
	in the present expansion.	21:49
	I don't think that the new method of Dr. Moore	21:51
	has been tested enough	21:54
	for me to have much confidence	21:55
	that it can adjudicate for us	21:58
	as to whether we will have a growth recession,	22:00
	a mini recession at the end of '73	22:04
	and going into 1974	22:07
	or a genuine recession or whether as with the Argus model,	22:09
	we will have actual stability.	22:14
	I should in this connection to help you appraise the odds.	22:18
	I mention that Dr. Otto Eckstein	22:22
	of Data Resources Incorporated	22:26
	has looked at the data very carefully	22:28
	and he is of the opinion that the excessive inventory swing,	22:31
	the kind of swing that Dr. Summers is relying upon	22:39
	for his scenario	22:42
	and the kind of swing	22:43
	which Alan Greenspan of Townsend-Greenspan	22:44
	is envisaging in his slightly more optimistic scenario	22:50
	which shows real output continuing to grow	22:56
	all through 1974	23:00
	and only just barely hitting zero at the end of '74,	23:01
	well, Eckstein thinks that business has smartened up	23:05
	and that you're not gonna get this time any increase	23:09
	in inventory accumulation	23:12
	from the present level of seven, eight, nine,	23:14
	$10 billion, I put it very vaguely	23:18
	because there is some lack of confidence	23:21
	that the first quarter number	23:22
	by the Department of Commerce can really be correct.	23:24
	Let's say the most recent level of about 10 billion,	23:27
	well, Dr. Eckstein thinks that the business	23:32
	is not gonna go very much above this any time	23:34
	during the current expansion	23:37
	and if they don't go very much above this,	23:41
	he doesn't think you're gonna get a big slingshot effect	23:43
	which is gonna send the economy very far down below	23:46
	the four and 1/4% rate of growth.	23:50
	In fact his scenario calls	23:53
	by the third quarter of this year	23:56
	for our being less than 4%	23:58
	but that is a fairly happy eventuality	23:59
	because it means we're getting the misery out	24:04
	of our system, the heat out of the system	24:06
	and we are moving to something like an Argus pattern	24:09
	a bit faster than would otherwise be the case.	24:15
	I don't know what the Argus Group would say	24:21
	if the Federal Reserve is building up	24:23
	towards some kind of a money crunch	24:25
	as is fairly widely believed.	24:27
	If we take the numbers that I quoted to you	24:34
	where the rate of growth of money supply shoots down	24:36
	just a bit below 6%	24:38
	but then levels off at 6%,	24:40
	and if we use the Argus methodology	24:42
	and suppose that the money supply	24:45
	later in this year will actually move down	24:47
	to a 3% rate of growth	24:51
	and be held there for let's say four months, let's say,	24:53
	six months, then I presume	24:57
	if you're gonna continue to be a good card carrying member	24:59
	of the monetary school,	25:02
	you would have to give a lot of weight to that	25:04
	and then the Argus Group	25:05
	would join the rest of the crowd.	25:09
	I might just mention	25:12
	that yesterday while Secretary of Treasury George Shultz	25:14
	was giving a fairly cheerful, optimistic description	25:19
	of the American economy,	25:25
	the securities analysts in New York	25:27
	were being addressed by Henry Kaufman	25:29
	of Salomon Brothers	25:31
	and he was giving them the blood and thunder and fire	25:32
	that I mentioned on an earlier tape here	25:35
	and namely that there's a lot of excess in the system	25:39
	that we have been wicked, we have sinned	25:41
	and that that excess can only be got out of the system	25:44
	by a money crunch	25:49
	and we are well on our way towards that money crunch.	25:51
	What I think we are entitled to say	25:56
	is that the Federal Reserve	25:57
	in its open market deliberations	26:01
	has tightened up its goal,	26:03
	it has agreed to countenance a Federal funds rate	26:05
	of 8%, that's my guess	26:10
	and that it is aiming for some kind	26:13
	of an overshoot down,	26:18
	undershoot I guess it would be the more descriptive word,	26:21
	down below that increase in the monetary aggregates	26:24
	which it thinks is appropriate for the long pull.	26:27
	It means business.	26:31
	There has been a letter signed	26:32
	by Dr. Arthur Burns, the Chairman of the Board of Governors	26:36
	of the Federal Reserve System,	26:40
	instructing the banks	26:41
	to be negridly in their rationing out of credit,	26:42
	not to refuse good Main Street customers,	26:47
	the backbone of the country	26:51
	but all the froth on the boom	26:52
	should be avoided	26:55
	by the discretion of bankers.	26:57
	Most economists have very little good to say	27:01
	about moral persuasion.	27:05
	They don't think that this means anything.	27:07
	I myself give it a little weight	27:11
	and I think it's an omen of things to come	27:13
	from the Federal Reserve Boards becoming still tighter.	27:16
	I would not be surprised to see the prime rate continue	27:22
	to rise, to rise again	27:25
	to see the discount rate	27:27
	which again is looking low,	27:29
	rise in the near future.	27:31
	Well, I guess there really isn't time left	27:37
	to go into the energy crisis.	27:40
	I think that the big guessing game	27:43
	is about the stock market	27:48
	and so let me depart from my usual caution	27:50
	and try to weigh the pro and con elements	27:54
	for the stock market holding up at this level	28:00
	going forward or going down.	28:04
	I perhaps have mentioned in this tape	28:09
	that I've had an unprecedented number	28:10
	of alarmist phone calls,	28:12
	sometimes from complete strangers	28:14
	asking whether this is 1929	28:17
	and whether this isn't the time to sell?	28:19
	Obviously I don't have any opinion	28:21
	to pass upon that question.	28:27
	It's a very dangerous game to call up a professor	28:29
	of economics and ask for his opinion on the stock market.	28:31
	The danger is that you'll get his opinion	28:34
	and that'll do you a lot of harm	28:37
	but I do say and I do say it candidly and frankly	28:40
	that I can think of 10 good reasons	28:44
	why the stock market should be going up	28:46
	and I can think of 10 good reasons why it still has plenty	28:49
	of room to go down.	28:53
	The whole art of investing,	28:55
	I won't say of economic analysis	28:57
	is to adjudicate between those 10 different reasons	28:59
	but I do wanna call your attention,	29:02
	one possible pattern,	29:04
	it's a pattern which has been alluded to	29:07
	in the public press and attributed to Alan Greenspan	29:09
	because in one of his letters to his clients,	29:13
	he's gone into the problem of the stock market.	29:16
	There is a possibility that events	29:20
	will move the way most of the fashionable forecasters think,	29:24
	mainly towards some kind at least	29:28
	of a mini recession	29:30
	and yet the stock market	29:31
	can be fairly strong.	29:34
	I'm recalling for you the 1953 experience.	29:37
	In September of 1953,	29:42
	all the experts for the first time	29:44
	became convinced that we were gonna go	29:46
	into the recession of 1953/54	29:47
	which indeed we did go into.	29:50
	The cause of that recession	29:52
	was primarily the cessation of the Korean War	29:53
	but the stock market in 1953	29:57
	just as it got that same news	30:00
	continued to go upward	30:02
	at a new and faster rate	30:04
	and didn't look backwards really	30:06
	by and large for the whole of the next business cycle.	30:09
	In fact, you might say from 1953 to 1961/62,	30:13
	the stock market was catching up to the post-war.	30:18
	Why?	30:21
	I think the gloss given,	30:22
	the explanation given and it makes some sense to me	30:24
	was that the stock market decided	30:26
	that the recession really wasn't gonna be a very bad one	30:29
	and it was so glad to have the shoe fall,	30:31
	so I'm just warning any short sellers	30:34
	who aren't nimble	30:37
	that it could be that just at a time	30:39
	when the mini recession is confirmed	30:41
	in the minds of everybody,	30:44
	the stock market will take the view	30:46
	that the bad news is out	30:48
	and it's not gonna be a very bad mini recession	30:50
	and profitability is not gonna be very much eroded	30:52
	and paradoxically that could be a signal	30:56
	for the rise of the stock market	30:59
	right in the face of a decline in real growth	31:01
	in the American economy.	31:05
-	If you have any comments or questions	31:08
	for Professor Samuelson,	31:10
	address them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	31:11
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	31:14

Item Info

Title:

Tape 129 - GNP; interest rates; stock market

Date:

1973

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0126
ref2391_7cy
samuelsonpaul
duke:325149
pstau001126
ark:/87924/r47d2qq26
6a7b85ce-4410-4243-adb3-fc8c45cb262b

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https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r47d2qq26

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Tape 129 - GNP; interest rates; stock market

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