Tape 123 - More on the Dollar Crisis; the domestic outlook

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Announcer	Welcome once again as MIT professor	0:02
	Paul Samuelson discusses the current economic scene.	0:04
	This biweekly series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:08
	This program was recorded March 8th.	0:11
-	[Professor Samuelson] I've had to say	0:14
	a great deal about the currency crisis,	0:15
	and one would have thought that, perhaps,	0:18
	by this time it would be over	0:20
	and one can move on to other matters.	0:21
	Well, as you know, the 10% devaluation	0:25
	of President Nixon didn't clear the air.	0:28
	The floating upward of the Japanese yen	0:33
	by another 15% plus didn't satisfy the speculators.	0:35
	The speculators turned, among other things,	0:41
	away from all currencies and toward	0:44
	the free gold and bid the price of it way, way up	0:47
	with the result that there still is a great deal of doubt.	0:53
	Now I don't think since at the moment that I'm speaking,	0:56
	we have to be in a position of waiting.	1:00
	I don't think that I should spend very much time	1:03
	in speculating on what we'll all know next week.	1:07
	My guess, just for what it's worth,	1:11
	is that, as I speak on March 8th,	1:17
	I can't expect that next week we'll	1:22
	go back to business as usual at	1:24
	parities all around those	1:27
	close to what President Nixon	1:32
	left us with some twenty-odd days ago.	1:35
	In other words I don't believe that	1:39
	the lack of confidence has been now taken care of.	1:41
	What are the most likely patterns?	1:46
	Well there are two quite possible patterns.	1:49
	Most likely, it seems to me, is	1:52
	that the Germans will finally	1:54
	convince the French that the common market countries,	1:55
	at least in the short run, have to have	1:59
	a united front and float against the dollar.	2:03
	Now, to be sure, the British pound	2:06
	is not all that strong, and one would not	2:10
	be surprised if they didn't join	2:12
	enthusiastically in the common float	2:14
	at least at present parities.	2:16
	And the Italian lira is not out of the woods either.	2:18
	But I dare say those problems can be solved,	2:20
	and I guess if I had to bet my money,	2:24
	the most likely thing in a week or two	2:27
	would be that, at least for a short period of time,	2:30
	the continental countries of the common market will stop	2:32
	supporting the dollar, and the dollar	2:37
	will have to find it's own level.	2:39
	That's the meaning of the dollar's floating.	2:40
	Now I think that's a very good outcome.	2:43
	I don't know whether, if that should eventuate,	2:45
	that in the months ahead the dollar	2:50
	would float downward or would float upward.	2:53
	A lot of people, a lot of speculators,	2:56
	must think that the dollar is pretty sure to float downward,	2:58
	but there are a lot of reasons against that	3:02
	and one of the advantages of having the dollar float is	3:05
	that the price will move right now	3:10
	to separate the bulls and the bears	3:12
	and to make them about equal in number,	3:14
	and we can let the free market take care of that.	3:16
	Now there's another possibility.	3:22
	Namely, the solution along the lines	3:25
	that the French undoubtedly have been wanting	3:27
	and which the Germans have been resisting.	3:30
	Because they couldn't agree with each other,	3:32
	it's cost the German treasury billions and billions	3:35
	of paper marks in order to take over paper dollars.	3:38
	And I don't think there's any doubt that the German	3:44
	government is gonna take a loss on	3:46
	a lot of those paper dollars,	3:48
	so it' been an expensive decision.	3:50
	But of course if you're in a common market	3:52
	you have to get along with your	3:54
	partner in that market who's just	3:57
	about as big and just about as politically	3:58
	powerful as you are and certainly is as stubborn as you are.	4:00
	I'm referring to the way the French	4:05
	must look to the Germans.	4:06
	Now the French undoubtedly would have said,	4:09
	Why don't you, in Germany, split the mark?	4:11
	Have a two-tier mark system?	4:15
	I'm not talking now of the two-tier gold system,	4:17
	but I am talking of the system which the French have	4:20
	and which the Belgians have and which	4:22
	quite a number of other countries in Europe have,	4:24
	whereby for ordinary commercial transactions,	4:27
	the parity of the dollar,	4:31
	as agreed upon after President Nixon's February 1973	4:34
	10% devaluation, is maintained and is supported	4:39
	within the widened bands of the IMF,	4:44
	2 and 1/4% on each side of that parity.	4:48
	But as far as capital flight is concerned,	4:51
	know you wanna get your dollars out of the United States	4:54
	and into Germany, into marks, that's your business.	4:59
	You gotta find somebody who will	5:03
	make a deal with you because we in Germany,	5:05
	we the central bank, will not support that.	5:07
	The result undoubtedly then I think would be,	5:10
	where you have two kinds of currencies,	5:13
	almost by Gresham's Law,	5:14
	that the capital account German	5:16
	mark parity would slip downward.	5:21
	Now whether it would stay downward or not I can't say.	5:24
	You'll have to ask a successful speculator	5:28
	who's gonna turn out to be successful	5:30
	to give you the answer to what	5:32
	has not yet been determined in the present	5:34
	and must wait upon the future.	5:36
	Well I think that either of those solutions	5:39
	would not mean the end of the world,	5:45
	and I suspect that the first of those	5:49
	would make quite a lot of people happy,	5:51
	and I don't think that official	5:53
	Washington would be unhappy about it.	5:55
	Well let's turn from the international	5:58
	situation to the domestic situation.	6:00
	I'd like to comment on the strangeness of the present times.	6:03
	If you will talk to a bank economist	6:10
	or a corporation economist or	6:12
	an economist in one of our university research centers	6:15
	who has a computer model of the GNP,	6:20
	and if you ask him, "How's business, how are things?"	6:24
	He'll say, very likely, "Pretty well.	6:27
	"1972 was a great year of real growth,	6:31
	"and on the inflation front it was	6:34
	"rather surprisingly favorable.	6:37
	"1973 looks to be another great year on the	6:42
	"physical output growth side,	6:46
	"and, although we won't do as well	6:50
	"in terms of inflation as we did last year,	6:52
	"we're still not going to do very, very badly."	6:55
	Well those fellas have generally tended to be right.	7:01
	In fact they're more right than	7:05
	any other group that you can name.	7:06
	When you get somebody who espouses	7:08
	minority opinion and who tells you	7:11
	he's been right all the time,	7:13
	believe you me that if you had	7:15
	kept a little black book on him,	7:18
	on just what he said over the years,	7:20
	and I don't care who the well-known	7:23
	publicists in these matters are that you consider,	7:27
	I've kept book on most of them,	7:31
	and I can assure you that your mean squared error	7:33
	from those fellas would be colossal.	7:35
	Well if everything's so rosy,	7:40
	as the consensus forecast seems to indicate,	7:42
	why is it that we're all so unhappy?	7:45
	Why is it that the stock market	7:48
	has been making such heavy weather?	7:50
	Why is it that if you go to a	7:52
	good New York luncheon club, and I don't care	7:55
	whether this is downtown or uptown,	7:58
	you will find a great amount of trepidation.	8:00
	This is so marked that I've just recently	8:05
	been writing a Newsweek column on the phenomenon.	8:09
	I entitled it What's Wrong?	8:14
	And I constructed a hypothetical,	8:17
	but I can assure you he's a very real fellow,	8:20
	but a hypothetical composite	8:22
	of the fears and preoccupations	8:24
	which a typical man in the financial	8:27
	community is feeling these days.	8:31
	And I put it in the form of a	8:33
	question and answer dialogue just like	8:34
	some of the question and answer dialogues	8:37
	that I've actually had to participate in.	8:39
	Now in 750 words of a Newsweek column	8:46
	I can barely scratch the surface.	8:48
	Let me try to dig deeper and	8:49
	to explain the points that are involved.	8:52
	In the first place a chap like this will say,	8:56
	"I just have an eerie feeling.	9:00
	"like that of the smarter people in 1928 or '29.	9:04
	"that maybe there's something very fishy.	9:07
	"Maybe there's something very wrong.	9:10
	"In fact, I'm filled with nameless dreads.	9:12
	"I get the impression when a stock in	9:14
	"a company that I see is doing great,	9:17
	"as a company is doing great, the earnings are doing great,	9:19
	"they live up to my forecast, and yet	9:22
	"I find I have a 50% loss in that stock,	9:25
	"I get kind of a feeling that somebody	9:29
	"knows something that I don't know,	9:31
	"and I'm just wondering what that could be."	9:33
	Well now my answer on such occasions is,	9:37
	I suppose a psychoanalyst might say the same,	9:40
	"Let's get it out on the table.	9:44
	"Let's give names to these nameless dreads of yours,	9:46
	"and let's just see whether they'll	9:49
	"stand up under the cold light of day."	9:52
	Well the first kind of argument	10:02
	that I'll hear is the following:	10:03
	Is the inflation a great deal worse really,	10:09
	looking ahead, than we've been led to believe?	10:10
	For example one man said to me that	10:16
	he keeps a little sample index number of futures prices:	10:19
	soybeans on the Chicago board	10:24
	of trade, copper, cotton, wool, silver.	10:26
	And he reported to me that his index number	10:33
	of those prices, staple prices, those are	10:36
	volatile, sensitive prices, is up 50% over a year ago.	10:37
	Just this morning as I came into my office	10:42
	I listened on the car radio to the	10:46
	official release of the new wholesale prices	10:47
	for February, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics	10:51
	had to point out that there was more bad news,	10:55
	I think it was 1.6% for the month, and	10:58
	that an index number of such prices	11:02
	over a six month period had	11:07
	something like a 50% annual rate.	11:09
	I must be exaggerating those number	11:13
	a little because that hardly seems credible.	11:14
	And so what this man said to me is	11:20
	maybe there's a worldwide inflation.	11:23
	Maybe we're in a period like 1919, 1920.	11:25
	Now few people can't themselves remember that period,	11:30
	but I'll remind you in the backwash of World War One,	11:34
	there were shortages of goods and prices went up.	11:38
	There was a tremendous boom in the silk market	11:41
	in Tokyo and in the United States,	11:44
	and prices were really soaring.	11:48
	But just about May the bubble burst,	11:51
	and we moved into the rather serious	11:54
	post-World War One recession of 1920-21.	11:56
	Well this man asked me, "Are we in such a period?"	12:02
	He said, "My uncle can remember that Sears Roebuck	12:06
	"was almost technically bankrupt in that period.	12:09
	"There were caught with lots of inventory,	12:11
	"and Julius Rosenwald had to pledge his own personal	12:13
	"fortune collateral for a loan to	12:18
	"keep them out of the bankruptcy court."	12:20
	He even said to me, "Are we, perhaps,	12:25
	"like the Germans in 1920 not realizing that	12:29
	"we were already in the maelstrom of a galloping inflation?"	12:32
	Now none of us needs to be reminded what	12:38
	the German 1921-1923 hyperinflation	12:40
	was like because you literally	12:42
	could light your pipe with money.	12:44
	You could plaster your walls to	12:49
	keep out the cold wind because	12:51
	it took baskets and baskets of the old money	12:53
	in order to buy one glass of beer.	12:56
	And he said, "I remember reading	13:04
	"about the reassuring statements that came	13:06
	"out of Berlin at that time, and I must say	13:08
	"when I hear the reassuring statements coming	13:10
	"out of Washington, instead of	13:12
	"comforting me it makes me scared."	13:14
	Well my answer to him has to be	13:18
	Let's look at the quantitative figures.	13:23
	First I don't think that we could be	13:25
	said to be on the verge of a runaway, galloping inflation.	13:28
	We have to remind ourselves what was	13:32
	necessary for that runaway, galloping inflation.	13:34
	The head of the German central bank,	13:36
	the Deutche Bundesbank, that corresponds	13:39
	to our Federal Reserve system,	13:42
	I think it was Helferich at the time,	13:44
	he was printing off billions and trillions	13:49
	and trillions of trillions of German marks.	13:52
	He said it had nothing to do with inflation.	13:55
	He was just trying to catch up	13:58
	with the increase in prices.	13:59
	That's the amount of money which	14:00
	the system needed at that time.	14:01
	And of course that was a stupidity	14:06
	that has to be read in order to be believed	14:09
	that a man would be capable of it	14:12
	or official, but that's true.	14:14
	I also wanna remind ourselves that	14:16
	in all this period the German mark was floating,	14:21
	the floating of a currency is	14:24
	no protection against domestic	14:25
	indiscipline which leads to uncontrolled,	14:28
	circularly self-aggravating,	14:34
	runaway money supply and runaway inflation.	14:42
	But we haven't come to that point,	14:48
	or, it seems to me, remotely near that point.	14:50
	Now you may have your little gripes	14:54
	with whether Doctor Arthur Burns is,	14:58
	as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,	15:01
	shirking his duty in favor of	15:06
	Arthur Burns as the Chairman of the	15:10
	Interest Rate Control Board or	15:13
	Doctor Arthur Burns in 1972,	15:15
	the longtime friend of President Nixon,	15:17
	who wanted to keep the economy	15:19
	prosperous prior to the election.	15:20
	But, however cynical or hostile	15:24
	you may be towards the Federal Reserve,	15:28
	if you actually look at the statistics	15:31
	of where the money supply was a year ago	15:33
	and where it is now, all seasonal	15:34
	corrections in a sense wash out.	15:37
	Then I think you'll find it's of the order	15:39
	of magnitude of about 7 and 1/2%.	15:42
	I'm talking about now M1 the money supply	15:46
	not inclusive of time deposits.	15:49
	There story would be a little bit different	15:51
	if you were to take M2 inclusive of time deposits.	15:54
	Well that's higher than, say, the 5%	16:01
	which people who believe in absolute stability	16:04
	of the rate of growth of the money supply	16:06
	year in and year out would recommend.	16:08
	But when you look at the magnitude	16:12
	of all the numbers it's not very much higher.	16:14
	Moreover, if you take the position	16:17
	that moving into the beginning of 1972	16:21
	we had behind us a couple of years	16:23
	of disappointing strength in the economy,	16:27
	so that there was a risk of a third	16:30
	year of disappointing strength.	16:32
	Then if the Federal Reserve was going	16:33
	to make an error of judgment, it was	16:36
	important that it make the error	16:38
	of judgment on the expansionary side.	16:39
	And in the event 1972 was a great year,	16:43
	so this 7 and 1/2% increase in	16:47
	the money supply over the year	16:51
	has to be pitted against the real rate	16:54
	of increase of the GNP which is overdue and which	16:56
	was of the order of magnitude of just about 6 and 1/2%.	17:01
	Now you can say that it was 1% too much,	17:06
	and that that contributed towards price inflation	17:10
	or will contribute towards price inflation	17:13
	in the longer run, and you can make	17:15
	more refined estimates of what the	17:16
	velocity of circulation of money would show,	17:19
	but I will remind you that, if you	17:24
	look at the equations of the Federal Reserve Bank	17:27
	of St. Louis, again remember we're	17:30
	looking at policy in the early 1972 period,	17:34
	then the way things have worked out	17:40
	has not been worse than would have	17:42
	been expected by those equations.	17:47
	Now what's past is past.	17:51
	It could still be the case that everybody	17:53
	in the American system would lose his marbles	17:56
	and that things would become so chaotic	17:58
	and disorganized that the vicious circle	18:00
	of galloping hyperflation would	18:02
	be joined and rejoined and that	18:05
	as prices rise, then the money supply responds	18:10
	and kicks prices up still further.	18:15
	So it's like the comical case of a man	18:19
	who loses his bowler hat in the wind	18:21
	and bends down to pick it up,	18:24
	but very time he bends down he	18:27
	gives the hat a kick forward,	18:28
	and you're in a vicious cycle syndrome.	18:31
	Well if those are your nameless dreads,	18:36
	you're really working very hard to scare yourself	18:38
	because we are not in the backwash	18:41
	of a defeated war, we are not paying	18:44
	reparations to an enemy, we are not	18:48
	in the Weimar Republic with its deep cleavages	18:50
	between those who are not reconciled	18:53
	to the ending of the German empire,	18:56
	the Kaiser's empire, and the Weimar	19:00
	Republic with its heterogeneous	19:04
	group of supporters comprising	19:07
	everything from the extreme left	19:10
	who were really were not for Weimar in that form,	19:14
	to the Social Democrats and the middle parties.	19:17
	There is no such stalemate in American politics	19:27
	of that nature at all, so as far as	19:32
	runaway inflation is concerned	19:33
	of the German pattern, I would not counsel	19:35
	anyone to pay very much to Lloyd's of London	19:39
	to take out insurance against that.	19:41
	But you can't get insurance at	19:45
	Lloyd's of London, I guess what you'd	19:46
	have to do is to buy things, and there are	19:48
	elderly gentlemen and some young ones	19:50
	with the wind up who have been getting into things.	19:53
	Certainly you can't understand the	20:00
	silver and gold market except in terms	20:01
	of the speculative movements in those markets	20:04
	which have nothing to do with the rate of consumption	20:06
	of the metals in the industrial uses	20:10
	or the rate of supply by the mines of those metals.	20:12
	The next question one is asked is	20:19
	well, are we in a Chilean, Argentinian, Brazilian,	20:21
	Latin American pattern which is not	20:27
	runaway hyperinflation that can't go on	20:30
	and finally has to be brought to some kind	20:33
	of an end in the way that Schacht did in 1923 in Germany.	20:36
	We know that a Chile, and Argentina	20:43
	and a Brazil can go along not for a year,	20:45
	not for a decade, not for just one generation,	20:47
	but really for a century with prices rising	20:51
	at an annual rate of 20-30%.	20:55
	It's not comfortable to live through,	20:58
	but people who've lived through	21:00
	nothing else learn to live through it.	21:01
	Of course they don't save and hoard soft paper currency.	21:03
	They don't make long term loans at	21:11
	any kinds of rates of interest that you would recognize.	21:15
	In fact they don't make them at any rates of interest.	21:18
	There are all kinds of sliding scale agreements,	21:20
	all kind of equity ownerships,	21:23
	all sorts of rushing into resort property	21:25
	and residential property, a movement to	21:28
	hold one's net worth in the form of real things	21:32
	which, presumably, will be marked up in balance	21:35
	during these chronic inflations.	21:39
	Well now I don't think that we are	21:42
	near to such a situation appreciably	21:45
	than we were five years ago	21:49
	or seven years ago or three years ago.	21:52
	Of course we're nearer to it than we were	21:54
	one or two years ago because we're	21:57
	in the second or third year of a fairly	21:59
	vigorous expansion, and if this dread fate	22:02
	is going to await us, it's going to await us	22:04
	after the system moves more towards its capacity.	22:08
	And of course any of you who've been listening	22:15
	over the years to these tapes	22:17
	knows that I take very seriously	22:19
	the problem of cost push inflation.	22:21
	If that's what you mean by structural inflation.	22:26
	Namely that the reasons that the price level	22:28
	creeps upward and never creeps downward,	22:33
	and the reasons that fiscal policy	22:37
	and monetary policy tend to, what shall I say?	22:39
	Condone? Permit? Support these increases,	22:46
	is not because of lack of knowledge	22:50
	about the simple MV equal PQ	22:54
	of the quantity theory of money.	22:55
	It's because when you are faced	22:59
	with cost push structural inflation of that kind,	23:01
	if you fight it by cutting down on the money supply,	23:05
	you don't just cut down on	23:10
	the unhealthy rate of price inflation.	23:12
	You may cut a little into that fat,	23:16
	but you cut also into the good, important flesh	23:19
	of real growth, and you contrive to produce	23:24
	by this method, unemployment in the here and now.	23:29
	Well I don't think that the appropriate	23:39
	pattern for us at this point in the game,	23:43
	this is my opinion, is that of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.	23:45
	I think it's more that of western Europe.	23:49
	They have been living with cost push inflation	23:53
	as we have but at a higher rate for 15 years.	23:55
	The world did not come to an end for western Europe.	24:02
	Indeed these are the 15 years of	24:05
	the greatest economic triumphs of western Europe.	24:06
	So don't sell the mixed economy short	24:10
	with all its imperfections with respect	24:11
	to economists' knowledge of how	24:14
	to control creeping inflation.	24:15
	That's the pattern, which it seems to me,	24:19
	not only lies ahead waiting for us,	24:21
	but I think we are in that pattern,	24:25
	we've been in that pattern for	24:27
	a considerable period of time, and so	24:28
	the question that every sensible person	24:32
	has to ask themselves is how do we	24:34
	improve on that pattern and how do we,	24:37
	as individuals, as private investors,	24:39
	best live within that pattern and accomplish	24:46
	what we want to accomplish which typically	24:50
	is to save the value of our assets	24:53
	and amplify them if possible, provide for our old age	24:57
	if we're lucky enough to be in a position	25:00
	to be able to think about providing	25:04
	something for a good head start with one's children,	25:07
	then we're in the definite, definite minority,	25:11
	but we wanna pass on a bit of a nest egg to them	25:14
	in real terms that can be preserved as best as is possible.	25:17
	Well this raises the question that	25:23
	I've touched on a lot on the past.	25:24
	Why is it that the stock market this last decade	25:29
	hasn't seemed to be the one way, easy street	25:33
	toward preserving or amplifying one's capital	25:36
	that it seemed to be back in the 1940s and in the 1950s?	25:40
	Well first I think we have to recalibrate ourselves.	25:47
	It's a very common notion, at least until recently,	25:52
	that if you're a bit clever, you can get 15% per year	25:55
	in the stock market and get it with reasonable safety.	25:58
	I refer you to an article within the last year	26:03
	in Baron's magazine on the set up of pension funds,	26:07
	pension plans set up by some of the biggest	26:11
	corporations in the world, and they	26:12
	honestly will say to themselves,	26:15
	you wouldn't believe it possible again	26:17
	unless you had read it, that	26:19
	well, we aim to get 12%, we figure anybody	26:22
	can make 9% a year and with	26:25
	cleverness we can make an extra 3%.	26:29
	Well that just isn't true.	26:31
	The best money managers in New York,	26:34
	and it's very hard to define who are the best ones.	26:37
	What is easy is who did the best	26:41
	in the last six months or the last year?	26:43
	But that's a very changeable...	26:47
	It's as changeable as the numbers	26:50
	that come up in Las Vegas on the dice table.	26:53
	But I think there are some who	26:56
	do better over the longer run,	26:58
	and they don't do very many, in my opinion,	26:59
	percentage points better than the crowd	27:01
	and better than the averages themselves.	27:05
	Obviously everybody can't beat the averages.	27:08
	And the story which the averages themselves tell	27:10
	is not the simple story that you learned	27:14
	a few years ago when the Merrill Foundation	27:18
	financed the graduate school of business	27:21
	at the University of Chicago	27:23
	to make a study of how you'd have done	27:25
	if you threw a dart at the financial pages	27:26
	or bought all the stocks on the New York	27:29
	Stock Exchange from 1925 to 1962 or 1964.	27:32
	Well, those numbers are solid numbers of history,	27:39
	but they are not solid supports for extrapolation.	27:43
	And people since then have not been	27:47
	achieving those particular numbers.	27:49
	The question everybody on Wall Street	27:54
	is asking himself is, Who's making the money?	27:57
	I'm not, my friends aren't, this man	28:00
	with this style of investment doesn't seem to be.	28:04
	Well when the market is up, somebody	28:07
	has to be making the money, but when	28:11
	the market is down of course it isn't necessarily	28:13
	the case that anybody has to be making the money,	28:15
	and certainly there isn't a balance on the short side	28:18
	which would permit the gains of those	28:21
	who are selling short to equal the gains	28:24
	of those who are holding the stocks	28:30
	long in a declining market.	28:33
	I think it would be found, if a careful study were made,	28:37
	that the trust departments of the banks,	28:40
	particularly the big banks, have been	28:42
	doing better than the crowd.	28:44
	I know I met an old graduate school classmate of mine.	28:45
	He isn't old but he goes back to my time,	28:49
	this is William Greno of CREF,	28:53
	that's the Teachers' Insurance Annuity Corporation,	28:56
	and I asked him how their interest had been done,	29:01
	and this is something that can be very objectively tested,	29:05
	and he was able to point out to me	29:07
	that they'd been doing very well indeed.	29:08
	Now you wouldn't expect the philosophy	29:11
	behind CREF which is a philosophy	29:13
	that puts a great deal of premium,	29:16
	even in the investment of equities, on safety,	29:19
	to outperform all the time those people	29:22
	who are willing to bear lots of risk	29:26
	in the interests of high return,	29:30
	but in recent months and really years,	29:32
	CREF has had the better return and the better safety.	29:39
	Well I suppose I haven't done a detailed	29:45
	autopsy on this, it's because they're	29:48
	in those blue chip growth stocks	29:49
	which, alone, seem to be doing so well.	29:52
	I have mined the IBMs, the Xeroxes of this world,	29:56
	perhaps the Polaroids, I'm a little hesitant	30:01
	to name names because it's wonderful	30:04
	when you're in the glamour group	30:06
	but when all the institutional investors	30:09
	at once decide to put you in the dog house	30:11
	and get you out of that group,	30:13
	it can really be a brutal, deglamorizing experience.	30:16
	This market then is very different	30:21
	from the 1961-62 market when the performance-minded	30:23
	gunslingers began to get into operation.	30:30
	You can see that by taking an index number	30:34
	of how the American stock exchange stocks	30:36
	are doing compared to those on the big board.	30:38
	Or better still, every week in the Wall Street Journal,	30:40
	in the New York Times, in Baron's and other publications,	30:43
	the Arthur Lipper organization shows	30:47
	how the mutual funds are doing, the income funds,	30:49
	the balance funds, the growth funds,	30:51
	in comparison with how the Dow Jones average is doing	30:54
	in comparison with how the Standard and Poor's	30:56
	and other index numbers are doing.	30:59
	And of course it's no news to any	31:01
	of those people that they have been	31:04
	doing very badly compared to the bluer chip averages.	31:05
Announcer	If you have any comments	31:10
	or questions for Professor Samuelson, address them to	31:11
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	31:14
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611.	31:16

Item Info

Title:

Tape 123 - More on the Dollar Crisis; the domestic outlook

Date:

1973

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0121
ref2381_q3s
samuelsonpaul
duke:325144
pstau001121
ark:/87924/r4d50gd53
2c84481f-cc87-40dd-b8f4-1b3b69de0e23

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Tape 123 - More on the Dollar Crisis; the domestic outlook

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