Tape 122 - Devaluation of the Dollar

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-	Welcome once again as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson	0:02
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:05
	This bi-weekly series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:09
	This program was recorded February 22nd.	0:12
-	What did we used to talk about	0:17
	before there were recurrent international crises?	0:18
	Again, since my last tape,	0:23
	we've had another devaluation of the dollar.	0:28
	This time, a 10% devaluation	0:31
	adopted unilaterally by President Nixon.	0:36
	This means that the price of official gold	0:39
	has been raised from $38 an ounce to $42.22.	0:44
	I make that to be 10% on the higher number,	0:50
	or really a 1/9 increase in the price of gold.	0:54
	Since the mark has stayed at the old parity	0:59
	with respect to gold,	1:03
	since the franc has stayed at that parity,	1:04
	it means that, in effect,	1:06
	the dollar has been depreciated by 10%.	1:08
	It means that the mark and the franc	1:12
	have been appreciated by 10%.	1:14
	Even more important, the act by President Nixon	1:18
	has provided the occasion to force the Japanese	1:23
	into appreciating the yen.	1:26
	The yen is now a floating currency.	1:30
	Since the February action of President Nixon,	1:34
	the yen has appreciated by some 16 odd percent.	1:38
	Instead of 308 yen to the dollar,	1:45
	now it's only 265 yen to the dollar.	1:49
	What are we to think about this?	1:55
	Is this a sign that we are in trouble?	1:57
	Is this a sign of worse things to come?	2:00
	Is it a good thing?	2:04
	I must say that I regard these developments,	2:06
	on the whole, as a good thing.	2:10
	You know that I have thought for a long time	2:14
	that the American dollar is overvalued.	2:17
	I did believe that the Smithsonian depreciation	2:22
	of the dollar, which took place	2:25
	just a little more than 14 months ago,	2:27
	was a step in the right direction.	2:30
	I didn't think that we could justify	2:33
	a bigger step in that direction	2:35
	than took place there by agreement.	2:37
	But we all knew, if we were sophisticated,	2:42
	that the outcome could not be determined for a long time,	2:47
	for two or three years.	2:53
	As it happened, we have not been given the opportunity	2:58
	to wait for that controlled experiment	3:01
	to reach its fruition.	3:03
	Because the American trade balance turned so bad	3:06
	at the end of the year this last year,	3:09
	because of the Italian difficulties,	3:13
	which caused the Italian lira to float,	3:15
	and the English difficulties,	3:18
	which caused the English pound to float,	3:20
	there grew up a conviction among the treasurers	3:23
	of multi-national corporations	3:28
	and on the part of anybody who had footloose capital	3:30
	that the dollar was still in trouble,	3:34
	that the Smithsonian medicine was not working,	3:38
	that it was not going to work,	3:41
	and that a very profitable speculation	3:43
	would be to be to transfer your money into marks or yen.	3:48
	Yen would be even better than marks,	3:53
	but it's not so easy to do.	3:55
	And as a result, you stand to make	3:58
	a handsome overnight profit if the dollar is toppled.	4:03
	If, by chance, the United States	4:08
	and the Principal Central Banks of the IMF	4:11
	are able to withstand the speculative raid,	4:14
	then you have very little to lose	4:17
	except your time and some commissions.	4:20
	It constitutes, more or less, a one way bet.	4:25
	Now, you would say that being the case,	4:30
	how can any stable exchange rates	4:32
	hope to stand up next year?	4:35
	Perhaps it will be the turn of the mark to be toppled.	4:39
	I don't think we have to be as pessimistic as that.	4:43
	We can agree that any pegged exchange rate	4:46
	is likely to get into trouble.	4:48
	But I think we can also agree that the speculator	4:50
	who is betting on the right fundamental side	4:54
	is more likely to have things going his way	4:57
	than just the speculative mob	5:00
	who tried by their own action	5:02
	to create a self-fulfilling prophecy.	5:04
	And so I believe,	5:09
	if there had not been legitimate grounds	5:10
	for apprehension, that the dollar was still overvalued,	5:12
	then the speculators could not have toppled	5:18
	this particular rate.	5:20
	Since I have been one of those	5:24
	who have been disappointed by the slowness	5:26
	of the Smithsonian medicine to work,	5:31
	I must confess that the devaluation	5:35
	did not take me by surprise.	5:39
	Before it happened,	5:43
	I was interviewed by one of the TV stations,	5:45
	and I had candidly to say	5:52
	that I thought that the odds were 50/50	5:54
	that the dollar would be depreciated	5:57
	and that the other currencies would be appreciated.	6:00
	That wasn't very news-worthy at the time,	6:03
	and that part of the interview	6:06
	wasn't carried over the network.	6:10
	But when a few days later, after one weekend,	6:13
	the President made his surprise announcement,	6:18
	they took out the old recorded film	6:21
	and put it on television and said,	6:28
	"Remember, you learned it here first."	6:30
	Well, of course there was no journalistic beat scored there.	6:33
	I didn't know whether the dollar would be devalued.	6:38
	And the multi-national treasurers	6:41
	didn't know whether it would or not.	6:44
	But it was a good bet.	6:46
	Let's look forward.	6:50
	If the Smithsonian medicine didn't work,	6:53
	does that mean that the new medicine devaluation	6:56
	also will not work?	7:00
	I think you can get plenty practical men of affairs	7:02
	in and out of Wall Street	7:05
	in many capitals of the world	7:07
	who really believe that.	7:09
	They believe that depreciation of the currency	7:10
	has been proved to be incapable	7:13
	of bringing balance into the American balance of payments.	7:17
	Perhaps that's one of the ways	7:23
	of interpreting the Wall Street market.	7:25
	I was actually in Washington	7:28
	on the morning of the announcement,	7:31
	and at a meeting where I was,	7:33
	a person came in and said,	7:37
	"Oh the market is up $21 on the Dow Jones already."	7:38
	And he was rubbing his hands with approval of that.	7:44
	He came back a couple of hours later and said,	7:49
	"Well, it's only up $10 now."	7:51
	And then by the end of the day, it was only up $5.	7:52
	And as you know if you follow Wall Street,	7:56
	since that time, the market	7:59
	has taken several quite bad tumbles.	8:01
	The non-economist doesn't believe	8:06
	that the economic medicine is going to work.	8:09
	Or at least part of him doubts that it will work.	8:13
	Is this a well-founded belief?	8:17
	Before discussing that,	8:20
	let me analyze some differences of opinion	8:21
	that appear among economists themselves.	8:27
	I believe that most of the Nixon team	8:32
	think that the devaluation is a good thing.	8:35
	They think that America is better off at the end of February	8:38
	than it was at the beginning of February.	8:44
	They think that not only is it a good thing	8:46
	for the United States,	8:49
	which has an overvalued currency,	8:50
	but the changes precipitated by the President's action	8:52
	will be a good thing for Japan and for Germany	8:57
	with their undervalued currencies.	9:01
	Because it's helpful to a surplus country	9:05
	in the last analysis to reduce its surplus	9:10
	to move towards equilibrium.	9:14
	Just as it's helpful to a deficit country,	9:17
	in the last analysis, to remove the deficit	9:20
	and to move towards equilibrium.	9:22
	This is one of these rare international cases	9:25
	where, properly looked at,	9:28
	there can be a long-run community of interests	9:30
	rather than a conflict of interest.	9:33
	On the whole, I share this view of the administration.	9:38
	As you know, I don't agree with all actions,	9:43
	but I try not to be perverse	9:47
	and if an action seems to me a good thing,	9:50
	then I have no hesitation in saying so.	9:54
	However, there is a school of thought	9:57
	which says that the Smithsonian action was okay.	10:00
	Let me mention the name of Richard Cooper.	10:09
	He's the provost of Yale University,	10:13
	second in command there to Kingman Brewster.	10:16
	He's a Professor of Economics.	10:18
	He's a distinguished economist, I suppose, in his late 30s.	10:20
	There is not a more respected international finance expert	10:27
	within the academic profession than Richard Cooper.	10:32
	And when Richard Cooper disagrees with my views,	10:36
	I listen with care.	10:39
	Dr. Cooper thinks that the Smithsonian depreciation	10:43
	of the dollar was about as much,	10:49
	was at the outer limits,	10:52
	of what is economically optimal or even defensible.	10:54
	He did not then believe that the dollar	11:00
	was as seriously overvalued	11:05
	as people like me have believed.	11:07
	And he thinks that the Smithsonian medicine was working.	11:12
	He says, "Nobody had any right to expect it	11:17
	"to be working these last 14 months	11:21
	"any better than it actually did."	11:26
	He calls our attention to the fact	11:30
	that we've had a strong upswing in the United States.	11:32
	That is an important reason	11:38
	why our balance of payments has deteriorated.	11:40
	I have to agree with that.	11:44
	He calls our attention to the fact that Europe,	11:45
	while we have been zooming,	11:51
	has been in a period of delayed expansion.	11:53
	Of relative stagnation.	11:57
	This, too, is an exogenous factor	11:59
	contributing to the bad performance	12:03
	of the American balance of payments.	12:07
	He points out a third thing, also unimpeachably true.	12:11
	Dr. Cooper points out that when you depreciate a currency,	12:18
	even if it's going to do you a lot of good in the long run	12:28
	in improving your balance of payments,	12:31
	in the short run, in the shortest run,	12:33
	that depreciation is going to make the patient look sicker.	12:36
	Why?	12:41
	In the short run, the patterns of physical trade	12:43
	have no time to change.	12:46
	Goods are on their way, contracts are made.	12:47
	Immediately, then, the same goods	12:53
	that we buy from abroad become more expensive to us	12:55
	when the dollar has been depreciated.	12:59
	That seems to make our balance of trade worse, not better.	13:02
	Likewise, but I warn you	13:06
	this is a very tricky kind of comparison.	13:09
	You have to decide whether	13:10
	you're going to compare things in dollars	13:12
	or whether you're going to compare things	13:14
	in the foreign currency,	13:15
	but in any case, there can be an appearance	13:19
	that America is selling her goods for lower prices abroad.	13:22
	That means if we keep the same dollar prices,	13:29
	and the dollar is depreciated,	13:32
	then we are really giving away our goods for less.	13:34
	The terms of trade are turning against the United States	13:38
	as economists say, in technical parlance,	13:41
	and there is not, in the short run,	13:44
	to compensate for this, and to over-compensate for this,	13:46
	a swing in the physical volume of our trade	13:50
	toward an increased physical volume of exports	13:55
	and a decreased physical volume of imports.	13:59
	According to Dr. Cooper,	14:04
	the short run is longer than some people have thought,	14:06
	and 14 months is a very short time.	14:10
	So Dr. Cooper is very candid in saying that in his view,	14:12
	the devaluation was a great mistake.	14:19
	In his view, the speculators were impatient.	14:22
	They were too impatient.	14:26
	In his view, the governments of the world	14:27
	should have taught the speculators a lesson.	14:30
	It should not have made their paranoid suspicions	14:33
	self-fulfilling sources of profit.	14:39
	Make no mistake about it,	14:42
	there have been some very large profits made.	14:43
	If you have a position in marks of several million dollars,	14:46
	I'm thinking now of even private individuals,	14:53
	and if you have this on borrowed money,	14:56
	then you have, in a very short period of time,	14:59
	on a highly leveraged margin, made a tremendous profit.	15:02
	Dr. Cooper is not alone in this view.	15:14
	In the companion IDI tapes,	15:18
	many of you will have heard Professor Milton Friedman,	15:21
	Professor Friedman was in Japan last year,	15:26
	he reported on his observations	15:28
	as to whether the yen was still greatly undervalued	15:31
	relative to the American dollar.	15:37
	And Professor Friedman is a patient man,	15:39
	unlike the impatient people that Dick Cooper criticized,	15:43
	Professor Friedman is a man	15:48
	who can look below the surface and around the corner,	15:49
	and when Professor Friedman	15:53
	looked at the relative stability of our wages and prices,	15:56
	true, we've been having inflation,	16:02
	but we've been having the slowest rate of inflation	16:03
	of any of the countries that we're talking about.	16:06
	Whether it be Germany, France, or Japan,	16:10
	the United States' cost level has been going up more slowly.	16:14
	We've had a nice increase in our productivity	16:18
	in this business cycle expansion.	16:21
	And so Professor Friedman on a number of occasions	16:23
	has indicated that he thinks	16:27
	that if we can only wait the requisite year or years,	16:30
	that it may turn out to be the case	16:38
	that the dollar would be no longer an overvalued currency.	16:41
	In that case, the devaluation most recently	16:45
	would not, itself, be optimal.	16:49
	Of course, a person who believes in flexible exchange rates	16:53
	and floating exchange rates, like Professor Friedman,	16:57
	doesn't have to make up his mind on these issues.	17:00
	He doesn't even have to be right	17:03
	if he does make up his mind on these issues,	17:05
	because he would let the free market take care of this.	17:08
	And a person of that persuasion	17:13
	would undoubtedly,	17:16
	even if he thought that the devaluation	17:18
	of the dollar might've been unnecessary,	17:21
	or even if he agreed with Dr. Cooper	17:24
	that a year or two down the road	17:26
	will find retaliatory devaluations by our trading partners,	17:29
	then such a person will still approve of the devaluation	17:37
	because of what came in its train.	17:41
	The big thing that happened	17:46
	was not the nominal change in the price of gold.	17:47
	It was not the devaluation	17:51
	of the American dollar relative to the franc.	17:53
	The big thing was that the Japanese	17:55
	were forced into floating.	17:58
	The Prime Minister had said	18:02
	that he would not appreciate the yen any further.	18:03
	That was a rash thing for a political leader to say.	18:08
	It was bad economics for him to have said that.	18:11
	President Nixon has forced his hand.	18:16
	You might say that President Nixon has saved his face	18:19
	because although there has been a political uproar	18:23
	and a request that the Prime Minister retire,	18:29
	because of a lack of confidence,	18:34
	because he has gone back,	18:35
	all he, in fact, has had to do	18:37
	with his still comfortable majority	18:39
	is to apologize for his failure.	18:41
	And who's to say that when he first met	18:44
	with Undersecretary Paul Volcker,	18:47
	that he wasn't secretly pleased	18:50
	that the President's precipitous action	18:53
	got him, the Japanese Prime Minister,	18:56
	off the hook?	18:59
	The American dollar is now floating	19:03
	relative to four of our six major trading partners.	19:06
	You will say, no, those four currencies are floating	19:14
	relative to the American dollar.	19:18
	I believe that these are exactly the same things.	19:21
	From day to day,	19:27
	if the Japanese yen can change in its price,	19:27
	then the dollar is changing relative to the yen.	19:32
	As Einstein said, everything is relative.	19:34
	Canada has a long tradition of floating.	19:38
	And, by the way, it's the Canadian surplus	19:42
	which is part of our trade balance picture.	19:45
	Japan is now floating.	19:52
	Italy and England are floating.	19:55
	The Swiss, very kay-jo-lee, to keep from having	20:00
	to swallow so many dollars as volatile funds came in,	20:05
	immediately let their currency float.	20:10
	And that doesn't tell the whole story	20:13
	because if we turn to many other currencies	20:15
	which are nominally stable,	20:18
	they are on a split currency basis.	20:21
	And at least as far as Capital Account is concerned,	20:25
	they are also floating.	20:27
	I'm referring to the French franc,	20:30
	the Belgian franc, the Dutch guilder.	20:32
	And still others.	20:36
	So I have to agree that we are in a better situation	20:38
	at the end of February	20:46
	than we were at the beginning.	20:48
	I myself would not consider it a tragedy	20:52
	if Dick Cooper turned out to be right,	20:54
	and the new medicine, on top of the Smithsonian medicine,	20:57
	began in two years to work so powerfully	21:02
	that it became some other country's turn	21:07
	to depreciate or to devalue.	21:11
	I put not premium upon pegged stability.	21:14
	And given the fact that for a dozen years	21:18
	the American dollar has been overvalued,	21:23
	given the great overhang of dollars abroad,	21:25
	it would seem to me to be most offensible	21:29
	if you're gonna make an error,	21:34
	to make an error on the side of undervaluation	21:35
	of the dollar at this point of the game,	21:40
	rather than overvaluation.	21:42
	Now, Dr. Cooper will point out,	21:44
	and he will point out cogently,	21:46
	that the others are not very likely	21:48
	to let us get away with an undervalued dollar.	21:51
	Well, let's put it to them, and in any case,	21:55
	it is premature, in my judgment, to worry about that.	21:58
	Economic theory suggests important hypotheses	22:07
	about the real world.	22:14
	Generally speaking, it cannot prove the truth	22:17
	of any of those hypotheses.	22:21
	And at a deeper level,	22:24
	I think that it is my duty.	22:26
	My conscience as a scientist	22:29
	requires me to go into the possibility	22:31
	that the conventional wisdom among economists,	22:35
	I'm now speaking of academic economists,	22:40
	not of central bankers, may be wrong.	22:42
	There's been a long debate	22:46
	all through the quarter century since World War II	22:48
	as to whether one should be an elasticity optimist	22:52
	or an elasticity pessimist	22:57
	in connection with international trade.	22:59
	What that means is that depreciations,	23:02
	and small depreciations,	23:07
	do the most in correcting	23:09
	balance of payments disequilibrium.	23:10
	If you could be, as the classic economists tended to be,	23:12
	an elasticity optimist,	23:16
	if you thought that a small change in the prices quoted	23:18
	relative to the prices quoted abroad	23:22
	would generate a tremendous swing in physical exports	23:24
	and a tremendous swing in physical imports,	23:28
	these are opposite directional swings	23:32
	of the physical imports and exports,	23:36
	then you would believe that pegged exchange rates	23:39
	and proper domestic policies	23:46
	would not be such a bad combination.	23:48
	Perhaps you would think even better	23:51
	would be unpegged exchange rates.	23:53
	But it would be quite easy to run the world	23:55
	if that was the way the world was.	23:57
	Now, at the other extreme,	24:00
	we have elasticity pessimists.	24:02
	The elasticity pessimists, if they were right,	24:05
	say that when you depreciate you cause changes in prices.	24:07
	But there are very small changes in the physical quantities	24:11
	that then take place	24:16
	in order to compensate for these changes in prices.	24:18
	A real elasticity pessimist would believe that depreciation,	24:21
	even in the longest run,	24:26
	will make the currency worse rather than better.	24:27
	Now, Dr. Cooper's position,	24:32
	the one I mentioned earlier, is in-between.	24:35
	He's essentially, over the longer-run,	24:38
	an elasticity optimist.	24:40
	But in the shorter-run, he is an elasticity pessimist.	24:42
	But he points out, cogently,	24:46
	that the long-run is longer than the short-run.	24:48
	What about the possibility that even in the longest run,	24:53
	the elasticities, though they'd be greater	24:59
	than that of the pessimists,	25:03
	are not as great as that of the optimists?	25:04
	With the result that you may get very little benefit	25:08
	from depreciation,	25:13
	you might get no benefit,	25:16
	that's perhaps too extreme a case,	25:17
	but it might be that, as we say in technical parlance,	25:19
	that the Marshall-Lerner sum of elasticities	25:22
	are very little above the critical level of unity.	25:27
	The critical level at which the depreciation	25:33
	can do any good.	25:36
	In that case, we've still got a very long row to hoe,	25:38
	and there may be room	25:43
	for a lot more destabilizing speculation.	25:46
	It also may mean that the adjustments	25:51
	that the United States will have to make	25:53
	in order to get its house in order	25:55
	will be of a greater order of magnitude	25:59
	than most people in Washington,	26:02
	and most people in Wall Street,	26:05
	and most people in Main Street,	26:06
	and most people in the Ivory Tower,	26:08
	have thought.	26:10
	I cannot rule out that hypothesis.	26:12
	All I can do is review the evidence	26:15
	for elasticity optimism.	26:17
	Let me devote a few minutes to reviewing that estimates.	26:23
	The first post war econometric estimates	26:28
	tended to be in the direction of elasticity pessimism.	26:31
	The shoe was on the other foot in those days,	26:37
	it was a case then of an undervalued American dollar,	26:38
	a case of so-called dollar shortage.	26:43
	And the first econometric estimates	26:46
	seemed to come out with the rather pessimistic conclusion	26:49
	that elasticities were so small	26:55
	that exchange rate adjustments	26:57
	would be likely to do very little,	26:59
	if indeed they didn't make things worse.	27:01
	Then came a group of scholars	27:04
	who examined those econometric estimates,	27:06
	and they found that there were	27:08
	purely technical statistical reasons to discount them.	27:10
	They were technically biased in their identifications	27:17
	in the direction of creating an impression	27:22
	of greater inelasticity than was actually the case.	27:26
	And so, after the 1949 worldwide depreciations	27:32
	of currencies against the dollar,	27:39
	and after that turned into a reversal	27:41
	of the surplus of the American balance of payments	27:45
	to a chronic deficit,	27:48
	the pendulum began to swing over	27:51
	towards more elasticity optimism.	27:53
	Course there's some people who are impressed	27:56
	by no evidence.	27:58
	They have their opinions already formed,	27:59
	in technical terms, they have beige improbabilities	28:03
	that are such that any new observation	28:06
	can make almost no change.	28:09
	They're content to have	28:11
	Professor Hablura Maridess from Harvard	28:13
	assure them that his earlier generation	28:16
	was assured by Alfred Marshall and Cambridge	28:21
	that it stands to reason that elasticities are elastic.	28:23
	Well, nothing stands to reason in the real world.	28:28
	No sound methodologist believes that by a priori reasoning	28:33
	you can make the falling apples of nature	28:38
	correspond to your predilections and beliefs.	28:41
	So it remains an open question.	28:45
	When the British depreciated a few years back,	28:48
	and after a delay their balance of payments	28:52
	began to improve,	28:56
	the side of elasticity optimists	28:57
	seemed to swell a bit.	29:00
	Of course, recently for a variety of reasons,	29:02
	not all of them bearing upon this debate,	29:07
	the British have lost their favorable balance of payments.	29:09
	Any view which can have its adherence grow in number	29:14
	as a result of short-run events	29:22
	obviously can lose adherence	29:24
	by the same kind of reversed short-run events.	29:27
	And I think we have to be left,	29:32
	particularly when we take into account	29:34
	the disappointments of the last 14 months,	29:36
	disappointments which,	29:40
	if you go back and do as I did recently,	29:42
	scrutinize the writings just 14 months ago of people,	29:44
	of what they really expected to be the case,	29:47
	looked at the computer forecast,	29:49
	then looked at the reality,	29:51
	then I think you have to agree	29:53
	that some evidence against elasticity optimism	29:57
	has been piling up.	30:03
	I want to be cautious, however,	30:05
	and stress the fact that there is no conclusive evidence	30:11
	showing that elasticity optimism is wrong.	30:15
	It's just that the betting odds in Las Vegas	30:18
	of the most rational man	30:22
	has to take into account the possibility	30:24
	that this is not the case at the present state of the world.	30:28
	We're left, I think, as in any court of equity,	30:33
	with the requirement to exhaust all remedies	30:37
	before we seek even more violent remedies.	30:41
	And I think we should give a good chance,	30:45
	I mean this is my advice if asked by governments,	30:47
	and I mean by governments abroad,	30:52
	that the floating exchange rates,	30:54
	which are now widely prevalent,	30:58
	will move to levels that will prove to be more realistic,	31:00
	more maintainable,	31:08
	and that the devaluation of the dollar is a good thing.	31:09
	My final word must be this:	31:14
	I hope you noticed, when the announcement came,	31:17
	that along with the announcement of devaluation,	31:19
	there came the announcement	31:21
	that we were gonna get rid of our capital controls.	31:22
	And I'm sure that the ideological antipathy	31:25
	towards those controls	31:27
	was an important part of the motivation	31:29
	to explain why President Nixon	31:31
	did what he did in February 1973.	31:34
-	If you have any comments or questions	31:40
	for Professor Samuelson, address them to	31:42
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	31:44
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	31:46

Item Info

Title:

Tape 122 - Devaluation of the Dollar

Date:

1973

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0120
ref2379_g7p
samuelsonpaul
duke:325143
pstau001120
ark:/87924/r4np1x14s
d1360119-ece2-4882-b06f-02918dd1a350

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https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4np1x14s

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Tape 122 - Devaluation of the Dollar

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Economists' Papers Archive

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