Tape 105 - The British pound

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Narrator	Welcome once again as	0:02
	MIT professor Paul Samuelson	0:03
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:05
	This bi-weekly series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics, Incorporated and was recorded	0:09
	July 1, 1972.	0:12
	[Paul Samuelson]- We are exactly as I speak	0:13
	at the halfway mark of the year 1972.	0:16
	Therefore it would be a very good time	0:21
	to wrap up a summary of just how the first half	0:22
	of the year has developed and to look forward	0:26
	to the second half to see whether things	0:29
	are going as had been earlier projected or not.	0:30
	However, the big news of this week must be the fact	0:35
	of the floating of the British pound	0:39
	and I wish to devote my primary attention	0:43
	to that fact and to the issues which it raises.	0:47
	Then if there is time, I might try to comment	0:52
	on where it is that we stand.	0:57
	Just eight days ago, the chancellor, the Exchequer	1:01
	in Britain announced that the pound was going to be floated.	1:06
	This did not come as a complete surprise	1:14
	because the pound had been under very heavy attack	1:17
	in the preceding weeks.	1:20
	And the British government as Chancellor Barber said	1:23
	had lost a great deal	1:29
	of the reserves which it had earlier accumulated	1:30
	from the last successful depreciation of the pound.	1:34
	They had lost those reserves in the defending of the pound.	1:38
	Very sensibly, in my judgment and in the judgment	1:42
	of many economists, the British decided to let	1:46
	the pound float and not try to defend the indefensible	1:51
	or what should not be defended.	1:55
	This is of great interest to the student of economics.	1:59
	It's of interest to the student of foreign finance	2:03
	but it's also of great significance just	2:10
	to the ordinary American.	2:15
	Why?	2:17
	Not I think because when
	the pound floats, it's going to float greatly downward	2:21
	thereby giving British export industries a tremendous	2:27
	comparative advantage compared	2:30
	to domestic American industries	2:33
	with the result that we will have our markets flooded	2:35
	by British goods soon and the further result	2:38
	that in third markets of the world	2:42
	in Latin America, the British will outsell	2:45
	American exporters.	2:47
	No, I believe that the pound won't fall anything	2:49
	like that much and I don't think that the British	2:54
	even at the new lower rate of the pound	2:57
	will be that competitive as far as	3:00
	the United States is concerned.	3:02
	It's not in connection with our current balance	3:05
	of trade, merchandise trade that this is of interest.	3:08
	It's of vital interest though because	3:13
	the speculators so called, having successfully	3:17
	toppled the pound now have the taste	3:21
	of blood in their mouths and they have turned	3:25
	their attention to the dollar.	3:28
	In the several days since the pound was floated,	3:31
	there has been a necessity for the central banks	3:35
	of Western Europe and the central bank of Japan	3:38
	the bank of Japan, to support the American dollar,	3:41
	to swallow still more hundreds of millions of dollars	3:44
	of hundreds and millions of unwanted dollars.	3:49
	The British lira has also been under some attack	3:55
	and there's been some necessity to support it	3:59
	because the three weakest currencies	4:01
	since the Smithsonian Agreement	4:04
	have been the dollar, the pound and the lira.	4:07
	Now, let me begin by saying why I think it's a good thing	4:13
	for the British pound not have remained	4:18
	at the previous parity.	4:21
	Britain, as well know, has taken the fateful decision	4:23
	to go into the Common Market.	4:27
	This decision has taken a long time in being consummated.	4:29
	First, when the Macmillan Tory government wanted to go in,	4:34
	when the British people by and large, at least	4:39
	the people who count were convinced they ought to go in,	4:42
	it was General de Gaulle who at the last moment	4:45
	kept them out, who jettisoned the Brussels talks.	4:48
	Then, in came the Labour government	4:52
	and Harold Wilson has a rather sad equivocating position	4:56
	on this when he was the prime minister.	5:01
	When it was popular to say you were	5:05
	for getting into the Common Market.	5:06
	He was for getting in the Common Market.	5:08
	But then when he got out of power	5:10
	and when Prime Minister Heath of the Tories	5:11
	made it party policy to get written in,	5:15
	Harold Wilson, for reasons which many observers	5:21
	thought were only partisan and political,	5:23
	has turned against the Common Market.	5:26
	Well, the simple truth is he was never	5:28
	in principle, at heart, too much for it or against it.	5:32
	And he gave up a position which he had never	5:36
	held very deeply.	5:39
	Of course, this did split the Labour Party	5:41
	and people like Roy Jenkins, rather courageously,	5:42
	left the Labour Party over this issue.	5:45
	From the economic viewpoint, what has always	5:50
	been interesting is whether going	5:54
	into the Common Market is going to provide	5:56
	a Arnold Toynbee-like challenge	5:58
	to the rather sluggish, dormant British technology.	6:02
	Whether the fresh winds of competition	6:08
	within the Common Market, with Britain as one	6:12
	of the new countries in addition to the original six,	6:14
	say as part of a Common Market of 10	6:19
	including let's suppose Denmark, Norway,	6:22
	Britain perhaps, one or two others.	6:26
	Whether this would cause British productivity	6:30
	to improve, whether it would take the slack	6:33
	out of British industry.	6:35
	Whether it would make British labor shape up.	6:36
	Now, this is something upon which economists	6:41
	haven't anything very useful to say.	6:45
	One of the greatest blows to the prestige	6:48
	of my profession in Britain has been the fact	6:50
	that the you can get as many economists	6:53
	on one side of an important issues like this as another.	6:56
	There apparently is no agreement inside the science	6:58
	of political economy.	7:01
	Whatever the views of economists on this issue,	7:08
	most of us have been rather doubtful	7:11
	whether Britain could absorb this challenge	7:15
	at the previous parity.	7:21
	The fact that she's been doing rather well	7:24
	since the last pound evaluation which I recollect	7:27
	was around I think 1968, gives one a little bit of hope.	7:30
	But still, to tie ourselves up with these	7:35
	continental efficient economies	7:38
	at an overvalued exchange rate	7:40
	reminded some of us of the tragic error	7:42
	which Britain made in 1925 in going back	7:45
	on the pre-World War One gold standard	7:48
	after World War One in the time	7:50
	of Winston Churchill at the Exchequer	7:54
	at an overvalued pound.	7:57
	And many of us trace the really dissent	7:59
	of Britain, not from her Victorian peak,	8:05
	because American toppled her from that position	8:09
	of first place, but from a rather comfortable	8:12
	second place as a world power	8:17
	to that tragic error by Winston Churchill in 1925.	8:19
	And so, we all felt that if she's gonna make an error,	8:23
	it's better for her to make an error in going	8:26
	into the Common Market on the side of an	8:28
	undervalued pound than an overvalued pound.	8:30
	From this viewpoint, we're rather glad	8:34
	the speculators did topple the pound	8:37
	and that the pound is floating.	8:40
	Although our doubts in this matter	8:42
	would not be much set at rest if as is happened	8:44
	in the past week, the pound floats downward	8:48
	by no more than 4% or 5%,	8:52
	and if there's a precipitous decision	8:54
	to re-stabilize at this new level.	8:57
	In other words, the hope of economists	9:03
	for whom I'm now speaking, would be that	9:05
	the British pound would float for a good long time,	9:08
	and in particular, would float through a trial period	9:11
	with Britain in the Common Market.	9:15
	Well what pleases the economists like the ones	9:20
	that I've been speaking of would of course	9:23
	much displease the French government.	9:25
	And the French government, which in any case,	9:28
	is a little bit edgy about Britain's	9:30
	getting into the Common Market,	9:32
	would like for Britain to re-stabilize	9:34
	before she finally comes in.	9:39
	There is a little split in the six of the Common Market,	9:42
	in particular, between the two giants,	9:46
	between the French and the Germans.	9:48
	The Germans have learned of the value	9:51
	of flexible exchange rates.	9:54
	They rather favor some kind of floating exchange rates	9:56
	and at least they do not have a great abhorrence	10:02
	of unsteady exchange rates.	10:05
	The French by contrast, of course,	10:09
	have forgotten nothing and learned nothing	10:12
	and they still favor pegged exchange rates.	10:14
	I've given you what the reaction of economists is	10:21
	to the floating of the pound.	10:25
	I must now turn on to what the reaction is	10:26
	to those in the Common Market who have been looking forward	10:29
	to a rapid evolution of a Common Market currency.	10:32
	I've talked in these tapes before	10:40
	about the so-called snake inside the tunnel.	10:41
	This is the agreement among the six Common Market countries	10:44
	to hold down the variations permitted	10:49
	in the exchange rates between themselves	10:53
	to half of the range of 2.5%	10:55
	agreed upon at Smithsonian.	10:59
	So, they can only move around,	11:00
	say the exchange rate between the pound and the dollar,	11:04
	in comparison with the, excuse me I misspoke.	11:08
	The mark and the dollar and franc and the dollar,	11:12
	those two exchange rates in the Chicago Free Market.	11:14
	If the snake in the tunnel holds,	11:20
	cannot be farther apart than half of 2.25%	11:21
	on each side of parity.	11:29
	The British, in anticipation of going	11:34
	into the Common Market, agreed to this.	11:35
	Now, from the standpoint of somebody who thought	11:38
	that you were soon going to have a Common Market currency,	11:42
	the British floating is a blow	11:46
	because the moment the plan is adopted	11:48
	and really, before for the six it is very many months old,	11:51
	and before for the British, it is even a quarter	11:55
	of a year old, it has already broken down.	11:58
	Think then of how likely it is	12:01
	that the lira will break down.	12:03
	I picked the lira because that's the currency	12:05
	which has been weakest among the six.	12:08
	How are we to react to this?	12:13
	Well, those of who think that pegged exchange rates	12:15
	come to think that pegged exchange rates are unsound.	12:18
	I never had much confidence that the snake in the tunnel	12:22
	could be made to work prior to one central bank	12:25
	in the whole Common Market and one central bank	12:30
	in the whole Common Market is very far away.	12:33
	Coordination among the different central banks	12:36
	must from it's very nature, be of a limited type	12:38
	and could not serve as the equivalent	12:42
	of a single central bank.	12:43
	Moreover, to really have a one currency area optimally	12:46
	like say, the United States, and you could get	12:50
	some arguments as to whether it wouldn't be a better thing	12:53
	for the South or the Southwest, if it had	12:55
	the possibility of a different exchange rate	12:58
	from the Northeast from which I am now talking.	13:01
	Then you could get out from under our minimum wage laws	13:06
	which bear much harder in Arkansas, say,	13:10
	than they do in Massachusetts.	13:13
	But let's assume that for the United States	13:15
	a single, unified currency is optimal.	13:18
	Under what condition would for Western Europe,	13:23
	a single unified Common Market currency be optimal?	13:26
	It might be optimal if you had one labor market.	13:29
	If labor was free to move	13:34
	from unemployed mining villages in Belgium	13:35
	to the booming Kiel area in Germany.	13:39
	And similarly, from southern Italy a labor	13:45
	free to move to the factories of Holland	13:49
	and all this frightens the Norwegians	13:53
	to the fisheries in the waters off Norway,	13:57
	Norway being one of the Common Market countries.	14:02
	Well if you had very free movement of capital,	14:05
	if you had one government, than you could have	14:07
	possibly one currency.	14:11
	But, remember the snake in the tunnel didn't wait	14:13
	for the realization of the other parts of the package.	14:16
	It went ahead and the thought was that if you can cut	14:19
	the range down to a half of 2.25%,	14:23
	I'm sure the French would like to go to a half of a half.	14:26
	And pretty soon you would have a single currency.	14:28
	Well, we just didn't think that could work.	14:31
	It seems to violate all economic betting odds	14:34
	and the pound has been the first instance to show that.	14:38
	I cannot, therefore, shed any tears of grief	14:45
	over the floating of the pound from the standpoint	14:49
	of jettisoning the quick development	14:55
	of a Common Market currency.	14:58
	I don't think that quick development was ever truly	15:00
	in the cards and I shall remain pessimistic	15:03
	about what will happen even after the pound gets stabilized.	15:05
	What I should do now though, because it's most	15:11
	of my relations would be interested in,	15:13
	is to turn to what the ramifications may be	15:15
	on the American dollar itself.	15:18
	In many tapes, up to about a couple of months ago,	15:21
	I have had to say that the Smithsonian Agreement	15:27
	was tottering.	15:30
	I have had to predict that the odds that it would hold	15:32
	had, which had earlier been 90/10,	15:36
	90% that it would hold, 10% that it wouldn't,	15:41
	had moved a couple of months ago to 60/40.	15:44
	Still the major probabilities, majority of the probabilities	15:49
	in my view, favored the holding of the system.	15:54
	But 60 isn't very much bigger than 40,	15:58
	and so it was in my view then a touch and go thing.	16:00
	My reasons were simple.	16:04
	I said that since Smithsonian, central banks have had	16:06
	to swallow an awful lot of unwanted dollars.	16:10
	They've had to do this because the speculative	16:13
	hot money, cool money, call it what you wish,	16:15
	which was confidently expected to come	16:18
	back to the United States after December 18	16:19
	never did in any great volume.	16:23
	And it was my surmise, my suspicion, my guess	16:26
	that this is at two months ago,	16:31
	that in the next three months, the central banks	16:34
	would simply not be willing to swallow	16:37
	an equivalent number of dollars	16:41
	as they had in the first three months after Smithsonian.	16:43
	Fortunately, we seem to turn the narrow corner	16:47
	and in the two months that have elapsed since that time,	16:51
	the central banks abroad did not have to swallow	16:55
	those unwanted dollars and anything like that volume.	16:58
	Many of us hoped that we might even have	17:01
	in the American balance of payments,	17:03
	barely a surplus.	17:05
	And I'm not talking about the merchandise,	17:07
	I'm talking about the total because money did start	17:09
	to come back into the United States.	17:12
	As we look at the monthly figures, we can see that	17:15
	this was in some appreciable amounts.	17:16
	It's nothing like the amounts that went out last year.	17:18
	The deficit last year was so big that as I revised	17:20
	my textbook for its ninth edition,	17:23
	I cannot get a $29 billion deficit on the same page	17:25
	with the $1 or $2 billion dollar deficits	17:31
	which previously had characterized our balance of payments.	17:33
	What we had hoped for a bare surplus,	17:36
	a very small surplus, but with the events of June,	17:40
	the floating of the pound unsettling things,	17:43
	than the fats in the fire once again,	17:46
	and nervous money is taking dollars abroad.	17:48
	I should reiterate what I've said many times.	17:52
	Who are these speculators?	17:55
	Some of them are conservative gentlemen	17:57
	who live in the Southwest of the United States	18:01
	who are enamored of gold, who are very critical	18:03
	of the political trends of the United States,	18:07
	and who would like to get their money out,	18:10
	legally or illegally.	18:13
	But for the most part I think, the money that moves	18:16
	is bank money and is corporation money.	18:20
	So the speculators are just your friendly	18:24
	vice president or controller, or treasurer,	18:27
	probably the sort of person who in good measures	18:29
	describes these tapes of international corporations,	18:32
	multi-national corporations, just ordinary	18:36
	New England corporations of some size	18:39
	which have international dealings	18:41
	and they are telling themselves prudently	18:43
	and as they talk to their Boston and New York bank,	18:46
	that it's just good business not to be stuck	18:49
	with too many mark obligations.	18:52
	You'd better get into marks, or you better get into francs,	18:55
	and you better get out of the dollar	18:58
	because other crazy people may rock the boat so much	18:59
	that the boat will tip over and you'd better	19:03
	get into the lifeboat before that happens.	19:05
	Of course, as everybody runs to the side of the boat	19:07
	to get into the lifeboat, I'm speaking metaphorically,	19:10
	as everybody tries to shift their money out,	19:12
	they bring on the crisis and there's nothing surprising	19:16
	about that.	19:21
	The question I must now ask myself is this.	19:23
	Will the war of nerves over the pound last long enough	19:27
	and will it spread hard enough to topple	19:30
	the Smithsonian Agreement?	19:34
	And I guess I've got to shift my odds back	19:36
	up again towards at this time, something like 65	19:40
	that the agreement will hold, 35 that it won't.	19:47
	But I'm talking at the beginning of the weekend	19:50
	and by the end of the weekend these odds could change	19:53
	and could change drastically.	19:57
	Now you may say, what is the precision	19:58
	of probability statements couched in numerical numbers	20:02
	like 65, 35 which can change in the course	20:06
	of a few days.	20:09
	And the answer, which I must very candidly give,	20:11
	is that that's the nature of odds.	20:14
	Odds are an expression of our imprecision of knowledge.	20:16
	If it was a question of two and two makes four	20:22
	that betting proposition will stand forever,	20:24
	not just for a weekend.	20:28
	But rational men do change the warranted odds,	20:29
	which they are willing to offer or receive.	20:33
	Now I'm not interested in making bets	20:36
	but it's my way of telling you what my degree	20:38
	of confidence is in different sides of the proposition.	20:40
	So, I will sum up this part by saying	20:46
	that I think we are in trouble.	20:49
	I think there's a good chance that we may find	20:52
	exchange controls mounting.	20:55
	Now as a matter of fact, I should welcome you	20:57
	to July 1, and also into the new world,	20:59
	because it was just as of today	21:02
	that the government regulation applies to you and to me	21:05
	and to all of us that any sizable amounts of money	21:08
	taken abroad must be reported immediately	21:12
	to the government.	21:14
	Already of course, banks are undergoing surveillance	21:15
	by the government and themselves have an obligation	21:21
	to perform the act of an agent in surveillance.	21:23
	They must tell the government if any large sums of cash	21:27
	are being asked for by any of their customers.	21:33
	Also, I'm not clear on all the details,	21:38
	and I have found that men of means whom I've talked to,	21:40
	and I've talked to many, not one in 50	21:45
	seems to understand this.	21:49
	They're already are on the books, some rather	21:51
	onerous obligations with respect to international reporting.	21:54
	I believe, for example, that anybody who has	21:58
	a cash balance abroad of over $100,000	22:02
	at the end of any month has a reporting problem	22:05
	with respect to the American government,	22:10
	and this before July 1.	22:12
	Now, why do I move the odds so bearishly	22:17
	towards a possible breakdown of the Smithsonian Agreement?	22:23
	I do so because the post-Smithsonian system	22:26
	really has yet does not have very great logic	22:32
	and I think that a system that is as illogical	22:38
	as the post-Smithsonian system can hardly	22:42
	have a long life expectancy.	22:46
	I realize that a lot of things which are illogical	22:48
	which have steady, staying power,	22:50
	the unwritten British constitution would be an example,	22:53
	the studies that an anthropologist would make	22:56
	of the customs of various primitive peoples,	22:59
	we don't examine them for their logic.	23:02
	But, it seems to me that unless there's	23:04
	a corrective mechanism in the post-Smithsonian system,	23:07
	then it's necessarily through dynamic time	23:11
	going to accumulate stresses and strains	23:17
	which are going to topple it.	23:20
	Now, why do I say there's no steering wheel,	23:22
	no corrective mechanism in the system	23:26
	that was agreed to on December 18?	23:31
	Well, we've widened the band to be sure.	23:35
	What happens though, if the dollar sinks to the bottom	23:40
	of the band at it's lower limit?	23:43
	Under the old gold standard, the band was very narrow.	23:46
	It was set by the cost of transportation of gold.	23:49
	But something very definite of a corrective character	23:51
	came into play when gold reached the lower export point	23:55
	and the dollar was weak.	24:02
	Because what happened was America was supposed to lose gold	24:04
	and that was supposed to reduce	24:08
	our money supply domestically.	24:09
	The reduction of our money supply domestically	24:11
	was supposed to reduce our wage costs	24:13
	and other costs and prices.	24:15
	Simultaneously abroad, the gold flowing into Europe	24:19
	was supposed to engineer and increase	24:22
	in the European domestic money supply,	24:25
	which was to raise European domestic wages	24:27
	and cost levels generally.	24:30
	And then by a mechanism which economists have understood	24:31
	for more than 200 years now since the time	24:35
	of David Hume, the philosopher and economist,	24:38
	this was to be a four way corrective mechanism	24:42
	as prices fell in America and as prices rose in Europe.	24:46
	And this would restore equilibrium	24:49
	by expanding American exports now cheapened	24:52
	and by cutting down on European exports	24:55
	now made more expensive.	24:58
	Well one could understand that.	25:00
	One could describe it in a text book	25:03
	but if you, like me, were engaged in	25:05
	preparing a new edition of your textbook,	25:08
	in my case it's the ninth edition,	25:09
	I find that I cannot explain to students if I'm honest,	25:11
	the logic of the present system.	25:15
	There's a different system from the Hume system.	25:18
	What if we have freely floating exchange rates?	25:21
	Then supply and demand determines the matter.	25:24
	And if the pound falls enough or if the dollar falls enough,	25:26
	then that will cheapen our exports	25:30
	and the dollar will then not fall anymore.	25:32
	And so, you'll have a Brownian motion	25:34
	in which the dollar wobbles up and down	25:36
	and exporters and importers don't like that little wobble,	25:38
	but they can protect themselves against it	25:41
	by buying hedging from the new IMM exchange	25:43
	in Chicago or from their friendly bank down the street.	25:48
	That also can be explained in textbook	25:53
	and is in textbooks like mine.	25:55
	But what about this post-Smithsonian system?	25:57
	What is supposed to happen when the dollar	26:00
	or the lira or the pound are at the bottom of their range?	26:02
	Is the flow of dollars out of the United States	26:07
	supposed to be taken gladly and without limit	26:10
	by the other central banks of the world?	26:14
	Are they supposed to expand their domestic money supply?	26:16
	Are they supposed to, thereby increase their cost level?	26:19
	Is the loss of dollars within the United States	26:23
	supposed to cause the Federal Reserve to reduce	26:26
	our money supply and bring down our cost levels?	26:27
	Well, you would be a utopian fool to think that that's	26:30
	how it's supposed to work or that's how it's going to work.	26:35
	So at best, it seems to me the post-Smithsonian Agreement	26:39
	looked at from a longer viewpoint,	26:43
	is going to either degenerate into a floating system	26:45
	in which the range is going to have to be moved.	26:49
	As I put it, if Muhammad won't go to the mountain,	26:52
	the mountain will come to Muhammad or in this connection,	26:54
	if Muhammad will not stay within the existing band,	26:58
	that's the quotation of the dollar,	27:03
	then the band will have to be moved	27:05
	so it'll surround Muhammad.	27:07
	The range will have to be moved to wherever	27:10
	supply and demand puts it.	27:13
	Well, it wouldn't be so bad if you really could believe	27:14
	it's a disguise form of free floating currencies.	27:17
	But remember how hard it was to get the other currencies	27:20
	to appreciate before August, 1971.	27:23
	What makes anyone think it's gonna be easier	27:27
	to get the adjustment now or in the future	27:30
	when it is needed?	27:33
	And so, it seems to me we're more likely	27:34
	to run into the danger of capital controls,	27:37
	of a split mark, a dual mark, a two-tiered mark	27:41
	like the two-tiered franc, one franc	27:44
	which is stabilized.	27:46
	Pegged, let's call a spade a spades.	27:48
	For commercial purposes, for tourist, etc.,	27:51
	and another franc which is for capital purposes,	27:55
	which has some degree of flexibility and finds its level	28:00
	in a floating market.	28:04
	Now, you can have a rather clean system like that,	28:07
	I am not so optimistic that along with this,	28:11
	would not come a good deal of autarky,	28:14
	a good deal of quota legislation,	28:17
	a good deal of tariffs and inpedimous	28:20
	international trade which would be bad	28:22
	for the prosperity of the world.	28:24
	So, that's why.	28:27
	The system being fundamentally wrong at its core.	28:29
	I am the more prone to believe that each new crisis	28:32
	might be that last crisis which topples it	28:35
	or moves it into a new phase.	28:38
Narrator	If you have any comments or questions	28:41
	for Professor Samuelson, address them to	28:43
	Instructional Dynamics, Incorporated	28:45
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago Illinois 60611.	28:47

Item Info

Title:

Tape 105 - The British pound

Date:

1972

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0103
ref2345_85l
samuelsonpaul
duke:325126
pstau001103
ark:/87924/r41834j7g
d248c6ba-0b04-4d90-97b8-3dc02a100fce

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Tape 105 - The British pound

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Economists' Papers Archive

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