Tape 76 - The European monetary crisis

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-	Welcome once again as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson	0:02
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:04
	This biweekly series is produced by	0:07
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated	0:09
	and was recorded May 14th, 1971.	0:11
	Professor Samuelson, I see that	0:14
	according to the front pages of the paper,	0:15
	people have been discussing the European monetary crisis.	0:17
-	This week, there can only be one	0:20
	topic for economic discussion.	0:22
	This is the week that the German mark	0:24
	was permitted to float, to find its own level	0:29
	according to momentary supply and demand.	0:32
	Listeners of these tapes will not be,	0:36
	I think, surprised at the development	0:40
	nor will they be surprised to learn that	0:42
	all things considered, I regard the so-called crisis	0:47
	that happened last week and which I think is still	0:52
	not quite over, I regard that as a good thing	0:56
	and not as a bad thing.	0:59
	I think that we and the world are better off	1:00
	for its having taken place.	1:03
	Let me analyze, let me give the reasons why.	1:05
	By way of initial summary,	1:11
	there are, in my opinion, three	1:14
	causes of the present crisis.	1:17
	First and by all odds the most important,	1:21
	there is the long-term fact	1:24
	that in my judgment	1:27
	the American dollar is an overvalued currency	1:28
	and has been an overvalued currency	1:32
	probably at least since 1959.	1:35
	I will elaborate on that view in a moment.	1:38
	Second in importance to this long-range fact	1:44
	of overvaluation	1:47
	is the trend of interest rates in the United States.	1:51
	Recently, we have been fighting unemployment,	1:56
	and we have been doing so	2:01
	by engineering easier money.	2:03
	As a result, interest rates for domestic reasons	2:07
	are supposed to be down in the United States,	2:11
	down to levels lower than	2:16
	those interest rates which for domestic reasons in Europe	2:19
	are considered to be appropriate.	2:22
	And in consequence,	2:25
	the long-term cumulative deficit	2:26
	has begun to show up as a very insistent and gnawing	2:31
	oversupply of dollars in the hands of the	2:38
	central banks of Europe.	2:41
	Thirdly, and least important,	2:45
	is the proximate cause which triggered off	2:48
	the crisis.	2:53
	That proximate cause of course involved	2:54
	billions of dollars of speculative funds,	2:57
	so-called hot money, but which I think it would be more	3:01
	descriptive to call cool money.	3:05
	The fact that five different research institutes in Germany	3:08
	were about to release a report	3:13
	urging upward revaluation of the mark	3:17
	and perhaps floating of the mark	3:21
	was a rumor	3:25
	known to any interested speculator,	3:27
	and this finally did it.	3:30
	According to the stories,	3:34
	and many of them are garbles,	3:36
	but according to one version of the stories,	3:37
	the Germans were literally	3:40
	receiving	3:43
	billions of dollars of	3:45
	speculative funds, cool funds,	3:48
	and on the day that finally suspension took place,	3:51
	in the first four minutes of trading,	3:56
	one billion dollars came in.	4:00
	That was a straw which broke the camel's back,	4:03
	and the Germans immediately suspended	4:07
	adherence to the rules of the Bretton Woods game.	4:12
	They stopped supporting the dollar	4:14
	by being willing to purchase dollars for marks	4:17
	at the agreed upon parity or the upper	4:21
	interval of that agreed upon range.	4:26
	So last week, there was no trading for a number of days	4:31
	in dollars at many,	4:35
	in all of Europe, I guess really.	4:40
	Now,	4:42
	strictly speaking, the official government ceased to trade.	4:45
	Whether a private individual could have made a deal	4:50
	without running afoul of the law, say, in Germany,	4:53
	I don't know.	4:58
	I would presume that in principle,	4:58
	he would be free to make his own bargain	5:00
	if he could find another person.	5:02
	But I think in fact,	5:03
	if you had been Diogenes with your lantern,	5:04
	walking around Germany, trying to buy marks for dollars,	5:06
	de facto you would not have been able to	5:11
	find anybody to transact with,	5:14
	so de facto and in Europe,	5:17
	there was suspension of the dollar.	5:21
	Now let me	5:27
	go back to my three causes	5:29
	and analyze them in a little greater depth.	5:32
	We have had a miracle of productivity growth	5:37
	in western Europe and in Japan.	5:39
	If exchange rates were at all right in 1949,	5:43
	how could any sensible person expect them	5:47
	to still be right	5:50
	in 1959, at the end of the decade?	5:54
	The rates of real productivity	5:57
	were very much greater in western Europe and in Japan	5:59
	and in the United States.	6:03
	This is somewhat surprising in its quantitative magnitude,	6:05
	but it is not qualitatively surprising	6:08
	because we are the most affluent	6:11
	and the most productive nation in the world.	6:14
	But the laws of technology are really available	6:17
	to anyone who wishes to study them.	6:20
	The methods of good management,	6:22
	scientific management if you will,	6:26
	are available for anyone to adopt.	6:28
	And during the decade of the 1950s,	6:32
	the Europeans and Japanese were closing the gap on us	6:34
	in technology.	6:39
	Actually, many of our consulting firms	6:41
	were helping in this process.	6:43
	Every time a textbook in technology is written at MIT	6:46
	and becomes available around the world	6:50
	and a publisher like my publisher McGraw-Hill	6:53
	has done a very brisk business in	6:55
	exporting textbooks in the post-war period,	6:58
	post-World War II period,	7:01
	that enables the less than most affluent	7:04
	countries of the world to grow even faster than the	7:07
	pace setter can grow.	7:12
	Along with American textbooks and American consulting firms,	7:15
	there has gone directly American licensing.	7:20
	There has gone on all through the 1950s	7:26
	and I'm speaking of how the situation was in 1959	7:29
	but there was continuation of this in the 1960s	7:33
	as I'll describe in a moment,	7:37
	there was going on a tremendous amount of	7:39
	private foreign investment by American corporations.	7:42
	I could not get on an airplane to Europe,	7:45
	but what I saw not only	7:48
	business executives from large American corporations	7:51
	but really from quite small American corporations	7:54
	starting up branch plants.	7:57
	How, I may ask, could anybody expect this	8:01
	not to result in some rather fundamental drifts	8:04
	in cost levels,	8:08
	differentially between nations?	8:10
	If you add on top of this	8:13
	the fact that we had very heavy Cold War expenditures	8:16
	and the Korean War in the 1950s,	8:20
	I think you will not be surprised	8:23
	that by 1959,	8:27
	it became apparent to almost everybody	8:30
	that the dollar shortage,	8:34
	the undervaluation of the dollar,	8:36
	which may have prevailed roughly speaking from 1933 to 1955,	8:38
	that that was definitely over,	8:44
	and that the shoe was beginning to pinch on the other foot.	8:46
	You could see this in our share of world exports.	8:49
	If you looked at the prices,	8:53
	the effective prices of our export goods	8:56
	produced in the United States,	8:59
	and compared them with the effective prices	9:01
	of export goods in Europe from 1950 to 1960,	9:04
	our prices rose relative to theirs.	9:09
	The index numbers don't even do justice to this	9:13
	because there was a great deal of unavailability	9:15
	of goods from European manufacturers	9:19
	at posted prices	9:22
	in the early part of the period,	9:25
	which was not true in the later part of the period.	9:27
	And in the later part of the period,	9:29
	there were accommodations of intermediate credit,	9:30
	of short-term credit, even of long-term credit,	9:32
	from German and other continental exporters.	9:34
	So by the time of 1959, 1960, 1961,	9:38
	I at least thought that the American dollar was overvalued.	9:47
	This was not a majority view at that time.	9:49
	But I think that many economists, if I may say so,	9:53
	were ostrich-like on this matter.	9:56
	Let me illustrate by a test.	10:00
	In the first part of 1961, the Kennedy administration	10:02
	succeeded in persuading the German government	10:06
	to appreciate the currency.	10:09
	Adenauer didn't want to do it,	10:11
	he was still head of state,	10:13
	but Erhard, his Finance Minister, did want to do it.	10:14
	Erhard probably wanted to do it	10:18
	to the tune of 10%.	10:19
	There was a compromise.	10:21
	Germany did it to the tune of 5%.	10:22
	The Dutch guilder also was appreciated by 5% at that time.	10:25
	Those economists who said before this event	10:30
	that the dollar was not overvalued	10:32
	should perhaps have regretted	10:35
	that this event ever took place.	10:37
	I have never met an economist in America	10:38
	who regretted that this event took place.	10:40
	They all agreed we were better off for it.	10:42
	It seems to me	10:45
	although of course the mark, the guilder, and the dollar	10:47
	are only part of the vast	10:49
	multilateral structure of international trade,	10:52
	that this shows that in a sense they did think that	10:55
	the American dollar was overvalued before.	10:58
	Well, in the 1960s,	11:02
	the situation for the dollar	11:06
	seemed to be getting a little bit better.	11:10
	There was overfull employment in Europe,	11:12
	there was open wage inflation in Europe.	11:16
	We are still shocked in this country	11:17
	if there is a General Motors settlement	11:20
	that involves wage increases of 7%, 8%.	11:23
	We will be shocked if the steel settlement	11:26
	turns out to be a 7% or 8% increase in wages.	11:31
	I don't know why we can't continue to be shocked.	11:34
	You'd think after a while	11:37
	we would become accustomed to the effects of life.	11:39
	But in Europe, in Holland, in Germany,	11:41
	you were having during these periods	11:44
	increases in wages	11:47
	of 10%, 12%, 14%.	11:50
	In fact, in Europe, you've had a dual price system.	11:54
	The domestic prices inside of Europe	11:57
	have increased much more	11:58
	than inside the United States.	12:00
	But European industries are very export-minded,	12:02
	partly because of special rebates	12:08
	and special protections, transportation subsidies	12:10
	given by the government to exports,	12:14
	but primarily because	12:16
	the prices and costs have been held down	12:20
	in the export sectors,	12:22
	the export part of the European price level,	12:24
	typical country, I don't care whether it's Sweden	12:27
	or whether it's Italy,	12:28
	shows very considerable stability.	12:30
	In America, we're not export-minded.	12:33
	The body of the dog is the domestic market.	12:35
	Only the tail of the dog is the export market.	12:39
	We do not, if I may say so,	12:42
	have as discriminatory a pricing policy.	12:44
	Our corporate executives keep one eye cocked	12:48
	for the Department of Justice, for the Robinson-Patman Act,	12:52
	for the Clayton Act, for the Sherman Act,	12:55
	for all the different, Miller-Tydings, acts.	12:58
	I realize that there is some relief in Webb-Pomerene Act	13:02
	for monopoly acts abroad,	13:08
	but still, by and large, we do not have the degree	13:10
	of price discrimination which is typical in Europe.	13:13
	No wonder then, if you believe it all	13:18
	in the laws of economics,	13:20
	that as our prices rose relative to theirs,	13:22
	that our share of world trade declined.	13:25
	Nevertheless, from 1959 to 1964,	13:28
	I more or less held my peace.	13:32
	That means in the learned journals of economics,	13:34
	I wrote about the overvaluation.	13:37
	During the time that I was identified as a public mind	13:40
	as an advisor of President Kennedy,	13:44
	even though I was not on the payroll of the government,	13:47
	I did not feel free to	13:51
	enlarge upon my view with respect to the overvaluation.	13:57
	Perhaps that was a mistake,	14:01
	but I was afraid that it would be construed	14:03
	that I was talking for	14:07
	the administration, that I was speaking for	14:09
	the Council of Economic Advisers	14:11
	or even, God forbid, that I was speaking a view	14:12
	which the president actually held.	14:15
	Nonetheless,	14:18
	by 1964, even though the situation had improved,	14:22
	our inflation within the country was less than that abroad,	14:24
	it had not come anywhere near to equilibrium.	14:29
	As I recall it, our current surplus and private accounts,	14:33
	that's merchandise account plus invisibles,	14:37
	had arisen for a quarter or two or three	14:40
	around 1964, '65 to about five or six billion dollars.	14:44
	People who don't believe that the dollar	14:51
	wasn't overvalued, let's say, for example, my colleague	14:54
	Professor Kindleberger would say, my god Samuelson,	14:57
	how much of a surplus do you want?	15:00
	And my answer was, I want a surplus large enough	15:03
	to finance the foreign aid programs	15:05
	which Congress keeps legislating,	15:09
	the offshore military expenditures,	15:12
	troops in Germany and in Japan, elsewhere,	15:15
	which Congress keeps legislating under our Cold War posture,	15:20
	and large enough to offset the torrent	15:25
	of cool money wishing to make foreign investments	15:28
	and branch plants and so forth in western Europe.	15:32
	My only regret is that	15:37
	this desire of our private corporations	15:39
	to invest money abroad is so often confined to	15:42
	Europe and the advanced countries,	15:45
	and it is so rarely in terms of the developing countries.	15:48
	This doesn't mean that an oil company	15:53
	won't put money into an underdeveloped country	15:54
	where the geological signs are good,	15:57
	but you will find it much easier to get private backing	16:00
	for a carbon-black plant in the Netherlands,	16:04
	which is already an industrialized country,	16:09
	than you ever will find it	16:10
	to get motivated, cool money investment in, say,	16:13
	Pakistan in carbon-black.	16:17
	Indeed, when we do invest in those countries,	16:20
	and you can include now Brazil and some others,	16:22
	it's only because of their protectionist legislation,	16:25
	whereby you can't provide the automobiles for Brazil	16:27
	out of Detroit because of their tariffs and quotas.	16:31
	You must have an assembly plant in Brazil	16:35
	even though that may be a rather inefficient way of	16:38
	handling matters.	16:41
	Similarly with respect to refineries,	16:42
	ocean transportation is very cheap	16:44
	and refineries could be in a lot fewer places	16:46
	if it weren't for tariffs.	16:49
	So I didn't think that the five or six billion	16:53
	was nearly enough, and I have to add	16:55
	that part of our export surplus,	16:57
	this remains true today, is phony.	16:59
	It's not a genuine export surplus.	17:02
	It's because of our piecemeal adjustments	17:05
	to an overvalued currency.	17:07
	I have in mind the fact that we tightened foreign aid.	17:09
	I daresay that when we send wheat to India	17:12
	under public law 480, this is a pure outright gift,	17:15
	we get counterpart currency but that's Confederate money	17:19
	really, it's not something that is of any significance.	17:23
	This may appear in our surplus on current accounts,	17:27
	but of course, if we didn't give away that food,	17:33
	it wouldn't be there and it's not truly	17:35
	a net supporter	17:38
	of other than the gift itself.	17:42
	I could go on.	17:46
	We have interest rate equalization tax,	17:46
	so we would have had more portfolio investment abroad	17:48
	if it weren't for that.	17:50
	And we have a mandatory capital controls	17:52
	upon corporations, no signs that the corporations	17:53
	have yet themselves decided to cut	17:56
	down steeply upon their investments.	18:01
	We have mandatory controls on the banks.	18:03
	This year, because of the interest rate change	18:07
	that I'm about to discuss in detail,	18:10
	the banks have not wanted to use all of their quotas,	18:12
	but in other years that quota has been a very binding thing.	18:16
	So you can't even trust the statistics anymore	18:20
	to tell you what the underlying basic balance is	18:23
	since they're already distortions	18:26
	from de facto depreciations.	18:28
	I just repeat again the fact that our military dollar	18:30
	has been devalued to the tune of 50%	18:33
	by the rule which has prevailed now for I guess	18:37
	a decade,	18:41
	that if the Quartermaster Corps	18:42
	can buy something in the United States	18:45
	that costs no more than 50% higher than abroad,	18:46
	it is obliged by law to do so.	18:48
	And I'm sorry to say I have to add	18:53
	that we still do have quotas.	18:56
	We have a voluntary quota in the field of steel.	18:58
	We have had voluntary quotas in the field of textiles,	19:01
	and we have quotas in the agricultural field	19:05
	and we have tariffs	19:09
	so that if we really played the game straight	19:10
	and let the exchange rate be set by supply and demand	19:16
	in truly free markets, the parity of the dollar	19:19
	would be even more overvalued at its present rate	19:23
	in my judgment than shows up from the figures.	19:26
	Well, this is the background.	19:30
	And as a result, there's an accumulation of dollars	19:32
	or dollar obligations abroad	19:35
	which somebody has to hold, some foreigner has to hold.	19:38
	This brings me to 1969, 1970.	19:43
	All the improvement which took place from 1959 to 1964	19:47
	was thrown out the window	19:51
	by the decision of President Johnson	19:52
	in the summer of 1965 to escalate the Vietnam War.	19:55
	He put upon an already	19:58
	essentially fully employed economy	20:01
	a new resource load and did not ask for financing	20:04
	for that load in the form of a surcharge.	20:08
	The Federal Reserve in 1966 was tight,	20:11
	but in 1977, sorry, 1967 and 1968,	20:16
	it reversed itself.	20:22
	The result has been	20:25
	that the basic balance has been getting worse	20:26
	and I think I am speaking the sober and agreed upon truth	20:28
	when I say that there is no substantial group of experts	20:32
	who, looking ahead this year, next year, year after,	20:36
	next five years,	20:39
	see that the basic balance is much improving.	20:41
	This brings us to the inherited inflation	20:46
	by President Nixon and his new team in 1969, 1970.	20:48
	During that period as you know,	20:54
	the Federal Reserve engineered tight money,	20:55
	money too tight in the opinion of many of its critics,	20:58
	but in any case tight enough to cause	21:02
	interest rates to be very high.	21:06
	The result was	21:08
	that even after you take out of the Euro dollar statistics,	21:11
	that amount which simply represents avoidance	21:15
	of Regulation Q,	21:17
	it's not easy to decide just how much that is	21:20
	but make your most generous allowance for that,	21:21
	it still remains the case that at	21:24
	interest rates of 9%, 10%, 11%, 12% per annum	21:27
	and sometimes go up to 15% per annum,	21:32
	American borrowers, banks primarily,	21:35
	from their branch offices	21:39
	were willing to borrow back the excess dollars	21:42
	which had to be held abroad.	21:46
	And the European private organizations and individuals	21:47
	were happy to hold those dollar obligations	21:51
	at such generous rates.	21:54
	These were rates on overnight money, on one week money.	21:55
	We papered over our deficit, in other words,	21:59
	by our interest rate policy.	22:02
	As I wrote again and again in Newsweek	22:05
	and The Financial Times and Nihon Keizai Shimbun	22:07
	and spoke of on these tapes,	22:11
	what is going to happen when the weather changes	22:15
	and when for domestic reasons we want to have	22:18
	interest rates lower than those rates abroad.	22:21
	What will happen to this low official settlement deficit	22:25
	and huge liquidity deficit?	22:32
	Only one thing could happen, namely it will show itself	22:36
	in the official settlements deficit	22:41
	because Europeans no longer able to hold	22:42
	dollar obligations at these high yields	22:44
	will turn in their unwanted dollars	22:46
	to their own central bank as they have a right to do	22:48
	and then the central bank will be left holding baby,	22:51
	that is, left holding the unwanted dollars.	22:54
	At this point, a policy of benign neglect was urged	22:58
	by conservative economists and by new frontier economists.	23:01
	This was a strange bed of bedfellows.	23:05
	They said do the right thing domestically,	23:11
	and the problem of our deficit	23:14
	is really the problem for the surplus countries.	23:18
	They will continue to take those dollars,	23:21
	and when they don't want to take those dollars,	23:23
	when they want to seal themselves off from our inflation,	23:24
	they have a remedy open to them	23:27
	which is to appreciate their currencies or let them float.	23:29
	I approved of a policy of benign neglect	23:36
	in the sense that malignant preoccupation,	23:40
	if that's the counterpart, is worse than benign neglect,	23:42
	but I had misgivings about it.	23:45
	I had misgivings about it as I repeat it on these tapes	23:46
	because it's not a good thing with your friends	23:49
	to have this war of terror, take it or leave it.	23:51
	After all, if they get desperate enough,	23:53
	they can bring down the whole house of cards	23:57
	by asking for gold.	23:59
	They have a perfect right to ask for official gold.	24:01
	They have just kept from doing so by the knowledge	24:03
	that if Germany or Japan asks for,	24:05
	say, a billion dollars worth of gold,	24:09
	that we will slam down the window on their fingers.	24:12
	Those fingers haven't been thrust through the window	24:16
	asking for that, so that's not a friendly thing to do.	24:18
	The very words benign neglect	24:23
	rubs salt into the wounds of our allies in Europe.	24:25
	But more than that,	24:32
	what concerned me was	24:34
	that you are putting off the day of adjustment	24:36
	and you are building up	24:38
	vested interest in the export industries in Germany	24:42
	as a typical surplus country,	24:45
	in Japan as another potential surplus country,	24:47
	and within this country, you are making it difficult	24:51
	for employers to compete with imports	24:55
	and making it difficult for employers to produce for export.	24:58
	In other words, you're making it difficult to have jobs.	25:02
	Now I know we can make up for those jobs	25:04
	by welfare, by unemployment compensation,	25:05
	by domestic programs,	25:08
	but if later, we're going to go back to equilibrium	25:10
	and those jobs should be in the export industries,	25:13
	it's expensive to have stop and go starting	25:16
	and to drive our workers out of the export industries	25:18
	only to bring them back later.	25:22
	So I have said that equilibrium long deferred	25:23
	is a very bad thing.	25:27
	Given all this background and given the fact that	25:30
	the only direction that the mark could go would be up	25:34
	and that some German professors,	25:38
	by the way these German professors	25:40
	at the five research institutes	25:42
	have generally speaking all been trained	25:44
	in the United States or had training in the United States	25:47
	so they share the view of 95% of American economists	25:49
	which is that there should be flexibility introduced	25:53
	in the Bretton Woods arrangements,	25:55
	and they're wise men, their council of economic advisers	25:57
	has been advising revaluations on Germany	26:01
	for a long, long time.	26:05
	Given this and given the fact that	26:06
	under the rules of Bretton Woods,	26:10
	the interventions are made in terms of the dollars,	26:11
	so that if a Frenchman	26:14
	thinks that the mark is going to go up	26:16
	relative to the dollar,	26:17
	this doesn't show as a surplus of francs	26:18
	held by the German government,	26:20
	it shows by a surplus of dollars.	26:21
	But given all those things,	26:23
	it's no wonder that we had the crisis.	26:26
	I was quoted fairly widely	26:31
	as saying this crisis was a good thing.	26:33
	I know that some of my friends may have thought that	26:36
	here I was trying to pretend to be an establishment figure,	26:38
	trying to throw oil on troubled waters,	26:42
	but from the diagnosis I have given you,	26:46
	you can see that I was genuinely happy last Monday morning	26:48
	when I learned that the German government	26:52
	had decided to let the mark float	26:55
	and not to do what I feared,	26:58
	which was to introduce exchange controls.	27:00
	But I must be careful.	27:02
	Some exchange controls are, I understand,	27:03
	about to be introduced,	27:06
	and one of the things I feared is	27:07
	probably going to happen.	27:09
	Now I could wish that there was a similar crisis	27:13
	with respect to the yen	27:15
	because I think the Japanese currency	27:16
	should also be upward revalued.	27:19
	The German mark has been revalued three times.	27:21
	I've just made the calculation.	27:24
	It's gone up now by 18% in these three different times.	27:25
	The problem is not simply the dollar versus the mark.	27:29
	It's the dollar versus a number of other currencies.	27:31
	And an alternative to what took place	27:34
	might have been to devalue the dollar	27:37
	relative to official gold,	27:39
	not, I hesitate, I hurry to say, in the remaining time,	27:41
	not to do anything about the gold that South Africa	27:45
	can sell in the free market or the Russians,	27:49
	those arguments are now by the board.	27:51
	Well, it's a good thing, but it's not yet over,	27:54
	it's not yet behind us.	27:57
	And there's one bad taste.	27:58
	I have talked to numerous foreign journalists,	28:00
	and the United States has incurred a great deal of ill will	28:03
	during this crisis by what they consider to be	28:08
	our cavalier, one-sided treatment, take it or leave it.	28:11
	And I can't say that I give three cheers	28:16
	for that's happening.	28:19
	But as far as the economics is concerned,	28:21
	it's a move in the right direction.	28:23
	I can only wish that they had persuaded	28:24
	the other common market countries	28:26
	aside from the Dutch to also let their currencies float.	28:28
	Whether after floating for a while,	28:33
	they're stabilized de facto is in my judgment	28:35
	not so important an issue	28:39
	as that the dollar be lowered in its parity	28:40
	relative to these other currencies.	28:44
-	If you have any comments or questions	28:47
	for Professor Samuelson, address them to	28:49
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	28:51
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	28:54

Item Info

Title:

Tape 76 - The European monetary crisis

Date:

circa 1970 to circa 1971

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0076
ref2291_vjr
samuelsonpaul
duke:325099
pstau001076
ark:/87924/r42b8vt84
5707bf35-5901-4c81-94a3-5238acae6d95

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Tape 76 - The European monetary crisis

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Economists' Papers Archive

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