Interviewer: Rolling. Okay, good. Okay. So good afternoon. - Afternoon. Interviewer: We are very grateful to you for participating in the witness to Guantanamo project. We invite you to speak of your experiences and involvement in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We hope to provide you with an opportunity to tell your story in your own words. We are creating an archive of stories so that people in America and around the world will have a better understanding of what you and others have contributed and observed. - Al right. Well, thank you for inviting me. Interviewer: I want to thank you. Future generations must know what happened at Guantanamo and by telling your story, you're contributing to history. We appreciate your courage and willingness to speak with us. And if anytime during the interview you'd like to take a break, just let us know we'll do that. And if anything you say you'd like to withdraw just let us know when we can withdraw it. - Okay. Interviewer: Okay. So I'd like to begin with just if you don't mind telling us your name and where you were born and a little bit where you grew up and your age, birth date. Anything else about your family and education. Just so we have a little background about who you are. - Alright. Yeah, I'm Morris Davis. I'm originally from North Carolina, graduated from law school in 1983 and joined the North Carolina bar. And shortly thereafter joined the US Air Force. Primarily I think because my father was a 100% disabled veteran of World War Two, who passed away the week after I passed the bar exam. And he always instilled, I think in my brother and I that there was a sense of freedom is not free and everybody has a duty to do their part. And so I think I've kind of felt an obligation to him. So I joined the Air Force intending to do four years and get some litigation experience and then probably get back to North Carolina. And 25 years later, I retired from the Air Force. Interviewer: And what age did you say you were? - Oh, I'll be 51 now. 52 next month. Interviewer: Oh, happy birthday. - Well, thanks. Interviewer: And you're currently living? - Right outside of Washington, DC in the suburbs of DC. Interviewer: Okay. So I guess we'd like to start with just a little bit. 'Cause you told us why you joined the military but what did you expect in the military and how did it end up that you ended up staying there for 25 years before we go to Guantanamo? Just a little background. - Yeah. Well, the thing that really attracted me to join the Air Force was the opportunity for litigation experience, where as you know a lot of folks when you graduate law school if you joined a law firm or it takes time, the partners go to court and you do the work for them to do it, but the military is an opportunity to immediately get courtroom experience. And to me that was appealing. It didn't hurt when they said they were gonna send me to Cocoa Beach, Florida that kind of closed the deal. Interviewer: For training or for-- - And for my first assignment. And so I thought it'd be nice to live in Florida for a couple of years and get some trial experience. And then I would go back home to North Carolina but after joining the military and I guess there's one reason when I retired I didn't have any great desire to practice law 'cause in my view the military practice of law was the most ethical practice of law that there is, there are some occasional bad apples that come along but by and large it's a very above board gentlemanly practice of law. So I think it was really the people and the practice that caused me to stay in. And it was always fun. It was always getting to do different things and see different places and if I had it to do over again I'd get back and do it again. Interviewer: And after 911 how did it happen that you got ultimately involved in Guantanamo not til later on. - Well, initially President Bush signed an order in November of 2001 that authorized the detention of the detainees and the creation of military commissions. Shortly after that there was a call went out through all the services looking for JAGs, attorneys that were willing to volunteer to be involved in whatever capacity, defense counsel's, prosecutors, judges. 'Cause they were creating the system they needed volunteers. At the time when 911 happened I was the deputy commandant of the Air Force JAG School in Montgomery, Alabama. And I've volunteered to be the chief defense counsel. I was a colonel at the time, they were looking for colonels to be the heads of both sides. My concern was there was so much hatred and right after 911 that I thought being involved with the defense is gonna be a very unpopular role that nobody would be interested in doing. And I thought it was important that we do it right, that if we just succumb to the anger then the other side won. So I volunteered to be the chief defense counsel, Will Gun, Colonel Will Gun who was also an Air Force JAG was selected for that job. So at that point, I guess from late 2001, early 2002 when this process was being created until 2005 I kind of watched from the periphery but I wasn't directly involved with the commissions. And then in July of 2005 I got a call from the judge advocate, general of the Air Force asking if I'd consider being chief prosecutor. My involvement started in 2005. Interviewer: And why would they ask you to be a prosecutor if you had volunteered to be a defense attorney? - Well, the judge advocate general recently retired now was Jack Rives and I'd known him for a number of years. Actually had moved to Cheyenne Wyoming at the time. I was the staff judge advocate, the senior attorney for 20th Air Force, which is headquartered in Cheyenne Wyoming. It's the command that controls all the intercontinental ballistic missiles. And I'd only been there for about six months when he called me, I was the third chief prosecutor. And as we sit here today in June of 2010 there on the fifth chief prosecutor. Te first one was an army Colonel Fred Bork and early part of 2004 there were a couple of Air Force attorneys that worked for Fred in the prosecution office that felt that he was pressing them to do some things they thought were perhaps unethical. And there was some email traffic between the two that eventually wound up in the New York times. And so Fred moved on to another job and was replaced by Colonel Bob Swan. And then Bob decided to retire. I guess it was around July of 2005 is when he made the decision he was gonna retire. He decided to retire. He wanted to stay on, he wanted to be directly involved in the high-value detainee, the Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad Cases. And so Bob retired or decided to retire and then stayed on in a civilian capacity with the prosecution. I think General Rives felt that the Air Force JAGs had had a role in the controversy that had kind of permeated the office. By 2005 it was three years into this effort and nobody had been prosecuted, there've been fits and starts and injunctions and nothing had really happened. There was a lot of frustration. Then you had this email flat blow up. And I think the office, the morale was not what it should have been. And I think he kind of felt like the Air Force had contributed to things being in this state and wanted to contribute to turning things around. So he called and asked if I'd consider taking the job. And I think my family was a little reluctant. We'd moved from Alabama to Wyoming in February of 2005. And here we are in July looking at moving from Wyoming to Washington but for an attorney this was a once in a lifetime opportunity. And I still think my attitude was the same as it was when I volunteered to be the chief defense counsel that it was important that we do this right. And show the world that despite what other people do to us that we're still gonna take the high ground and do it, right? Interviewer: Were you trained before you went to Guantanamo on some of the issues that you would face in Guantanamo or did they just send you there and say now you're in charge? - It was the latter really. When I came on board it was actually September 2005, is when I actually moved to Washington. Our offices were in Washington and then we would travel to Guantanamo as needed. And it was really, it was a very short, I got the call in like mid July asking if I'd consider doing it, flew to Washington August 1st and had an interview with Jim Haynes who was the DVD general counsel at the time. And then I think the next day I got the call that he selected me to be the chief prosecutor. And then we had to go back to Wyoming, get packed up and then move 30 days later to DC. It was basically show up and learn as you go. Interviewer: Did Jim Haynes have other candidates to look at or you were the only candidate that he interviewed? - I don't know if he interviewed others or not. When Bob Swan decided to retire all the services were asked if they had nominees to take Bob's place. But I don't know who else, I don't know if the names that were put forward or if other people were actually interviewed or not. Interviewer: And do you remember any of the questions Jim Haynes asked that you found somewhat unusual or unique? - Yeah, the whole interview probably lasted less than half an hour. And there weren't any real like I would say probing, I think it was he wanted a face-to-face meeting to kind of get to know me before making the decision. We talked a little bit about, by August of 2005 this process has been in existence for almost four years and nothing had happened. The critics of the process that had a field day. And in some cases they were truthful in their criticisms and some they embellished and other parts were just outright lies and the department of defense and their typical fashion would say no comment. And then there'll be upset when the media would report and portray Guantanamo and the military commissions in a less than flattering fashion after they'd said no comment. So one of the things we talked about specifically was that we needed to, we had a decent story to tell from what I could get a little bit of educating myself on the process. It looked like the framework was there to have a decent process but we were doing a lousy job of telling that side of the story. And I remember him saying, I couldn't agree with you more. So he was very enthusiastic about trying to tell the other side of the story that may have been part of the reason why I got the job. I'd written an article a year earlier about engaging with the media. I'd been the head of the investigation of a sexual assault scandal at the Air Force Academy. And during that I saw how DOD just did a terrible job of public relations. And for example, the secretary of the Air Force had made a statement. There were 52 reported rapes and sexual assaults at Air Force Academy. So in the minds of the public that meant there were 52 Central Park jogger cases at the academy. Now his statement was accurate but out of those 52 cases a number of those were cadets they went to the counseling center and said, when I was eight years old, back in Iowa, my neighbor, my cousin, it had nothing to do with the academy. But once you've said there are 52 reported rapes and sexual assaults, you've painted that picture and DOD did nothing to correct that misperception. So that's what led me to write this article about the poor job that we were doing. And I think Jim Haynes was enthusiastic about taking a more proactive approach with the media. Interviewer: Did you meet Donald Rulph too? - No, I never did. No. The interview was with Jim Haynes and then Dan Del Ordo was the principal deputy general counsel came in for a bit during the interview and then had to leave. I guess the part that probably got the most attention from the interview was Jim Haynes had brought up that these trials Guantanamo, the military commissions are going to be the Nuremberg of our times. And he said, well, you knew this is a real opportunity. You could be as famous as Robert Jackson. What struck me is I think it showed how naive he was about the military, I think you'll find most military folks don't take on missions or tasks looking at it for what's in it for me. But I think that was his, he's a political creature. And I think from him that was like a real hook for, Hey this is a chance to be famous and having read up on Nuremberg after he made the comment about and this is gonna be the Nuremberg our time, at Nuremberg not everyone was convicted. There were some acquittals. And certainly as a prosecutor you never go into court looking to lose. But if it did happen that at least it would tend to validate the process of this at the kangaroo court is not a rigged process that it does do justice. And I remember he was sitting across from me and he kind of rocked back and said, acquittals, wait a minute we can't have acquittals. We've been holding these guys for years. How are we gonna explain that we can't have acquittals we've gotta have convictions and that point been discussed and debated and I've testified about it in court. And my impression was that it was not him saying that the trials have to be rigged to ensure convictions. I don't think it ever occurred to him this possibility that there could be an acquittal that I think and not just Jim Hayes, I think a number of people had this view that you take a case before a military jury and the military is gonna, they're gonna convict the guy, this notion that military officers might actually think, think hadn't been pondered by some people. And that was I think the context of his statement it just never had occurred to him that there was a possibility of an acquittal. Interviewer: How'd you feel about that? What did you think of that moment? - Well, again, it was kind of in close the session with the here's your chance to be as famous as Robert Jackson. Again, to me, it just confirmed what I'd heard for a long time prior to that that he was a political creature that was naive. I mean, to my knowledge, he has never tried a case. Yet he's the expert on litigation and trial strategy. It just to me showed how naive he was about the military and military justice. Interviewer: So were you worried that maybe you won't succeed in every prosecution and then you'll look bad to General Haynes or you didn't really think about that? - I didn't really think about it. I didn't. Yeah, pleasing him was never high on my agenda. Interviewer: So then did you then get any training once you were hired? Did you meet with certain people who tried to give you some direction or you just pretty much on your own? - It was pretty much on, there was no training course on military commissions 'cause we hadn't done one since World War II. So there was no class you could go to to learn how to do military commissions. There were people involved in the process that had been there for some period of time, General John Altenburg was the convening authority for the military commissions. Convening authority is a unique role in the military justice system. And I can tell you having talked with members of Congress trying to explain what a convening authority is. There's no analog in any other system that I'm aware of to the role of the convening authority but essentially it's kind of a neutral especially a neutral role is not beholden to the prosecution or defense who is the person that decides as a prosecutor, I may recommend charges but is up to the convening authority to decide if the charges go forward to trial, they select the jury members, they review the case when it's over, they can break clemency but it's supposed to be in a neutral role. Interviewer: Being military person, of course, right? The convening authority? - Not necessarily , under the uniform code of military justice, Title 10, which was created again at the end of World War Two, the convening authorities are military officers. And I haven't checked the math lately since 2001 there've been more than 75,000 court marshals convened under Title 10 into the UCMJ, to my knowledge everyone of those has been convened by a military officer. Now General Arltenberg was the convening authority for the military commissions. And he was an army two star retired who had been the deputy judge advocate general of the army. When he left, he was replaced by Susan Crawford who never served a day in her life in the military. So that was, again, one of my concerns when she came on board was if these are title 10 proceedings and they're supposed to be modeled after the uniform code of military justice why if we can convene 75,000 court marshals under a military officer why are these convened by a political appointee? Interviewer: They lawyers be the convening authorities? - No, generally, well they can be, but that's not a prerequisite for being a convening authority. In 25 years in the Air Force I can't think of a court martial being convened by someone who was a lawyer. Interviewer: So what impact was that to you to have a convening authority? - Well, that's the person that's supposed to oversee the entire process, provide resources for both the prosecution and the defense kind of be that neutral arbiter like I said when I come forward with charges the convening authority reviews them and can say yes or no or we can modify the charges or they exercise a great deal of discretion but General Altenburg had been there from the start who was the original convening authority. If you ever talked to him, he'll tell you he took the job because he was concerned that Rumsfeld and Haynes and David Addington and those folks they're gonna call this military justice. And when it went to hell in a hand basket they were gonna blame the military for it. And so he viewed it. And like I said, he had retired. He left a much more lucrative job in a law firm to come back and take on this role. But he thought it was important to do that to prevent people like Jim Haynes from running a muck and making a mess of this and then blaming it on the military. When he met with the secretary Rumsfeld. Well, let me, there's also a legal advisor. The convening authority normally is not an attorney in the military justice system. So the convening authority always has a legal advisor and attorney to advise the convening authority. In this case, the legal advisor for the military commissions was Brigadier General Tom Hemingway who was a retired Air Force general that I had known for pretty much my entire career. He had retired and came back out of retirement back on to active duty to be the legal advisor for general Altenburg. General Altenburg when he met with Secretary Rumsfeld, the plan was was to bring him back on the active duty put him back in two star status. But he said, when he met with Secretary Rumsfeld he said, look, I'll take the job but only in a civilian status because if I come back in uniform and you tell me here's what you're gonna do then I've got to obey your order. So I need to be able to sit here and tell you I hear what you're saying, but I'm not gonna do it. And so that was why he insisted on coming back as a civilian. But when I came on board and General Altenburg and General Hemingway were there, I knew General Hemingway personally and I knew General Altenburg by reputation. I had a great deal of confidence in their abilities and the top cover, they provided to try to do this right. Interviewer: So they informed you of what you're just telling us. You heard that from them and said you had some background understanding of what your role should be. - Right? Yeah I understood from them that their desire was to do this right. And they the decisions I made, they were gonna back me up on doing this the right way. Interviewer: So how do you perceive then when you started working, what did you do first? - I came on board right after remember the exact date. It was right after Labor Day weekend in September of 2005. Bob Swan was still the chief prosecutor at the time that he retired officially retired like two or three weeks later. And that was when we actually, I actually had two or three weeks to kind of get settled in before Bob retired and I took over. During that time, some of the prosecutors in the office had been there for several years at that point. So I talked to get back with them on their experience that they'd had. One of the concerns that I think a lot of people had was as I mentioned that originally first chief prosecutor there were some prosecutors felt that the original chief prosecutor was pushing them to do some things that they thought or bordering on being unethical. Interviewer: Could you tell us some of that since you mentioned a second time what things we're talking about? - I'm not sure exactly what 'cause I know Fred was the original chief prosecutor and I'd known Fred for a number of years. It turned out to be I think largely a poor choice of words and miscommunications. There was a person that was a Navy captain. Let me back up. I was in the army LLM program, the masters of law program in Charlottesville. One of my instructors was Fred Bork. One of my other instructors was John Rolfe who was a Navy Captain, Navy 06. And obviously Fred and John were on the faculty together at the army JAG school years earlier in the early mid 90s. Then if you move on to the post 911 period, Fred's now the chief prosecutor they're proposing John Roth be the chief judge. And so Fred had made some comments about his good buddy John Roth, which some people interpreted it. The fix was in that his good buddy was gonna make everything. I don't believe that to be the case but that was the perception and people were concerned that they were gonna be participating in this sham process and that didn't set well. So in talking with people, one of the first things I did after I became the chief prosecutor. Now, at that point in time the CIA was still operating the black site. So Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and the other high value detainees were still in CIA custody, not DOD custody but there was certainly, like I said, Bob Swan retired from the army to stay on to work on the high-value cases. So it was known that there was a very strong likelihood that in the not too distant future Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad and the other high value detainees would be coming into our system from the CIA and there was concern there'd been reports about waterboarding and some of the other enhanced interrogation that people were concerned about whether they were gonna be expected to go into court and use that kind of evidence. So one of the first staff meetings I had with the prosecution team once I became chief prosecutor was in early October of 2005. And I told him, look, I just wanna establish upfront that we're not gonna try to press the edge of the envelope here and see how much we can get away with. I know there's some concern about some of the techniques that were used to extract information like waterboarding and that we're not gonna use that kind of evidence that and I remember telling folks, I think people have this romanticized view of Nuremberg that I think in its day Nuremberg was quite an accomplishment but that was prior to the Geneva conventions and about 60 more years of judicial development but people have this romanticized notion. I said we're gonna do this right now. We're hopefully our grandkids will sit around one day and talk about Guantanamo the way we look back at Nuremberg and it was my sense after that that people were relieved that his chief prosecutor wasn't going to lean on them to try to press the edge of the envelope and see how much they could get away with. What I instructed them to do if there were cases 'cause I knew at the time up until that point prior to the high-value detainees getting to Guantanamo probably the dirtiest case as far as excessive treatment would have been Mohammed Al Qahtani. Who in my view really is the 20th hijacker but that was probably the worst treatment any of the detainees had experienced. So I said in a case like, like Qahtani, well anything he has said in our custody we're gonna set it aside like it never happened and build the cases independent of any of their statements where there has been abusive treatment. And if you don't use their statement the abusive treatment is interesting, but irrelevant at least as far as the military commissions are concerned. So that was my guidance to my folks were if you had cases like that then build a case independent of their statements and their techniques that you think went too far. Then, I don't want you to feel like you're being pressured to press forth come in and let's talk about it and let's do this right. Interviewer: Did you have certain cases in mind? You mentioned Al Qahtani, did the government say you should go forward on his case or you decided that on your own? - Yeah, nobody really ever pressured me on any, before I came on board there were 10 detainees that had already been charged under the order that President Bush had signed. So I inherited a number of cases that were already in the system at the time I came on board, the way the process worked under the original military order that President Bush signed every case required the president, the president had to personally sign a determination that the person was believed to be a member or supporter of Al Qaeda or the Taliban, it's called an RTB a reason to believe determination by the president. So the way the process would work is we reviewed cases reviewed the evidence and felt that there was sufficient grounds to go forward with a criminal prosecution. The case had to go through the Pentagon to the national security council, to the president who personally had to sign that determination. Once he'd done that we had jurisdiction to bring criminal charges. So there were 10 cases that had been through that process and had been charged which included, Hamdan and Salim Hamdan and David Hicks, Omar Kotter, Interviewer: Was Mosain Bag one of them? - He was never charged. I was trying to recollect if he'd been through the RT, the reason to believe process I don't recall that he was. Mosain Bag had already gone back to England by the time I came on board in 2005. So I'm just not that clear on the chronology of his case. Interviewer: And Al Qahtani was one of them? - Al Qahtani had not been charged. I believe, I was trying to recall. I felt that there was enough information on Al Qahtani to establish his guilt without using anything he ever said. I mean, the fact that he followed the same route from the middle East through London to Orlando on the same not the actual same plane as the other hijackers but the same Virgin Atlantic flight number that they had flown in on. And you had Muhammad Ata, he had the records of him and the rental car pulling into the parking garage in Orlando at the same time, Ata didn't show up to pick you up to go to Epcot in late August of 2001. So I thought we could build a pretty compelling case independent of his statements. We prepared the RTV, the reason to believe package it went through the Pentagon through the NSC and it made it to Harriet Meyer's desk and sat there. And to my knowledge, it never made it past her desk. So we never charged Al Qahtani Interviewer: Do you know why it never made it past the desk? - I don't know. I mean, I know I inquired a number times usually General Hemingway, who was the legal advisor handled the administrative, getting the packages coordinated through the Pentagon and over to the White House and back to us. And for months we kept asking about 'cause other cases would come forward and go through and come back and then Al Qahtani just seemed to have gotten hung up at Harriet Meyer's office but it was never under the old process under the president's military order. Al Qahtani was never charged. Now he was later charged under the military commissions act but I don't know if you recall, Ms. Crawford refused and again, as I mentioned the convening authority has a lot of discretionary authority. The chief prosecutor the person that replaced me had gone forward with charges against Al Qahtani and Ms. Crawford refused to refer the charges to trial. And I'm sure you read or in her interview with Bob Woodward that came out in January of 2009, she said the reason she didn't send the case to trial was because Al Qahtani had been tortured. Interviewer: So which case did you care to begin with? Which two cases or three cases did you have any in mind? - Unfortunately, as I said, there were 10 that were already in the queue. When I came on board I was trying to recall, I think it was Hamdan there'd been a stay issued because Hamdan and I believe was at the court of appeals at the time I came on board in September of 05. So the convening authority General Altenburg had issued a stay on all the cases just came to a grinding halt after the Supreme court granted Cert and Hamdan. So for a while there was nothing, I think people thought we just sat around and played solitaire on the government computer all day. People continued reviewing evidence and working on cases and building the case file so that when we got the green light to proceed we were ready to proceed. And eventually in late 2005 General Altenburg lifted the stay in a couple of the cases like Omar Kotter, Albalum and I guess there's been three cases that have been completed so far. Those three were all part of the original 10 that had been queued up before I got there. Supreme court came out with a Hamdan decision in June of 2006. It just blew everything out of the water. Now I'll never forget that day, Bob Swan. It was just, I remember right before the decision came out Bob was saying, Oh, it's gonna be a six to three vote. We're gonna win we're to win six to three. And we weren't there. So we were just having to follow it on the, actual we were looking at a SCOTUS blog and I forgot the guy's name that runs, good grief. He kept posting updates and you can just kind of see the blood start to drain out of Bob as it became clear it wasn't gonna be a six to three win in the Hamdan case. But when the process came to a halt and we were, it required going to Congress and getting statutory authorization. I remember saying, the one case I don't want to lead off with is David Hicks which wound up being the case that we ended up leading off with. One of the things I never could get anyone to give me any direction on was, in my view there's gotta be a threshold. We had the authority to detain the enemy during times of armed conflict, detaining the enemies, an administrative process and then convicting someone as a war criminal is a different kettle of fish. And they're not necessarily, you can be detained as an enemy combatant without being a war criminal. Now, I guess you would have to be a enemy combatant in order to be a war criminal the two are not one in the same. One of the things I never could get any clear guidance on is where is the cut line? I mean, particularly after Congress approved material support for terrorism in theory you could have charged just about everybody, how far down the hierarchy do you wanna go? And like in my view David Hicks never would have made the threshold but nobody would ever give me any clear guidance. So what I instructed the prosecutors to do was to use 20 years to look at a case and if in your mind looking at the evidence it would warn a 20 year sentence. And that's a keeper. But if it doesn't measure up to the 20 year threshold and let's not, we've got plenty of cases to work on without messing with the ones that don't warrant a serious sentence. And I kind of base that on the John Walker Lynn got 20 years. So that was kind of the benchmark for evaluating. Interviewer: Was that your benchmark or did other people also consider? - That was mine. Like I said, I mentioned it to Jim Haynes to El Dorado to General Hemingway and nobody was willing to commit to what the threshold should be. Interviewer: Let's hold. Its okay. So we've talked about how you use the 20 year threshold and otherwise you wouldn't pursue the case? - Right? Yeah. The way the process works there's an organization, I guess I think it still exists. Called set of the criminal investigation task force, was an organization created, actually was headquartered in at Fort Belvoir, just South of DC but it was a joint service though kind of the law enforcement end of the detainee spectrum. They were headquartered at Fort Belvoir. They had a detachment at Guantanamo. They had one over in Afghanistan and their job was to kind of collect up all the bits and pieces of information and try to put it in some kind of a coherent package that we the prosecutors and could take a look at and see if we thought there was a case to be made. So we would get cases from Sidoff once they had done what they could do then we would evaluate the case and decide again kind of using that arbitrary 20 year threshold I came up with whether it was a case worth pursuing and it appeared, when I came on board I think the detainee population was about 550. There were roughly 70 cases that we thought we had a enough evidence to proceed with. Interviewer: And you said you didn't wanna pursue David Hicks but in fact that he was one of the first, well the one of the first-- - He was the first. Interviewer: How did that happen? - It happened in as I mentioned, Hamdan the Supreme Court decision came down in late June of 2006. It just shut down the whole show. We worked with Congress over the summer and with DOD and the other executive branch agencies to try to craft a statutory framework to revive the military commissions. Congress passed the military commissions act. And September of 2006 the president signed it like the next day which happened to be the same week they transferred the high-value detainees from the CA black sites to Guantanamo, the Military Commissions Act is the statutory framework for the process. But if you look at it it's pretty bare bones. So, and again, the analogy was to make this process as close to the court-martial uniform code of military justice process as possible. So the way that process works you have the uniform code of military justice, the statute. Then you have a manual for courts martial which is a voluminous document that really puts the meat on the bones. And it gives you the element of the offenses, the defenses that apply, miss the real mechanics of how the process operates which is like the uniform code of military justice applies to all the services. And then each service has their own regulation that then further defines like how you style a motion and that level of detail. So with the military commissions you have the Military Commissions Act, you have the manual for military commissions which again is a very substantial document. And then you have the regulation for Trial by Military Commissions. So when Congress passed the statute in September of 06 the next step was the then based on the statutory authorization was to create the manual for military commissions which is done by the secretary of defense. The manual was being drafted within the, again it's a joint effort within the Pentagon and department of justice and CIA, everybody was participating in creating this thing but it took from September until January of 2007 to create this document. In early January, 2007, I got a call from Jim Haynes, one of the few, Once I became the chief prosecutor in September of 2005 I had minimal contact with him or his office other than occasionally when we needed resources they would assist in doing that. But he never was really involved in the day-to-day operations of the prosecution until early January of 2007. And I don't recall the exact date but it was the same date that President Bush announced he'd withdrawn Mr. Haynes nomination to be a judge on the fourth circuit court of appeals. So within hours of the president withdrawing his nomination he called me and said, "How quickly can you charge David Hicks?" And I said, "Well, until we get the manual "for military commissions, we can't charge anybody" 'cause that's the document that lays out the elements of the crime. So we kind of need to see what the elements of the crime are before we start charging anybody with a crime particularly with material support for terrorism which didn't exist under the old system. We'd kind of like to see what the elements of that offense are before we decide who we can charge it with. Also general Altenburg in the fall of 2006 had left and gone back to private practice. My recollection was when he took the job he said he would do it for two years. And this was like four years later he was still doing it. So I think in his mind he thought and when he had the break between after the Hamdan decision came out and you got this new military commission back it was a good time for him to move on. So at the time Haynes called in January of 2007 we had no convening authority. I mean, if I charged anyone there was no one to forward the charges to. And there was no manual for military commissions that told me what the elements of the charges were. So I said, "I can't charge David Hicks "or anyone else until I've got a manual "for military commissions and a convening authority." And he said, "Well, how quickly after," he said, "We're working on the manual, we're getting close to that. "How soon after the manual can you charge David Hicks? "As this has taken way too long. "We gotta get this thing moving." And I said, "the thing is hundreds of pages, "we'll need a couple of weeks "to review it and kind of digest it and then compare "the facts that we know of the cases "and how they're gonna fit together." And he said, "That's too long. "We gotta move this thing quicker." And I said, "Look, we'll move it as quickly as we can "but we're gonna need a couple of weeks "to look at this new process and see where we go with it." So he hangs up within 15 minutes I get a call from Dan Del Orta, who's the principal deputy to Haynes. And Dan said, "Look, I talked to Jim. "And he told me about his conversation with you." He said, "Disregard everything he told you." He said, "Those are your decisions to make not his. "So don't pay any attention "anything Jim just said." Interviewer: So is that coming from him or was that coming from Jim telling him to tell you? - No, Dell Ordo before becoming the principal deputy general counsel was a career army JAG. My best guess is after Haynes got off the phone with me he went to Del Ordo and said, "Hey I just talked to Mo Davis and is gonna take" and I think Del Ordo went, "Wait a minute. "that's called unlawful command influence. "You can't do that." Which prompted him to pick up the phone and call me and say, "Disregard everything Jim just told you." Which a few days later the Secretary Gates signed the manual for military commissions. And two weeks to the day after that Jim Haynes called me and said, 'Where are the charges on David Hicks?" And I said, "Well, they're not ready yet." And he said, "Well, you promised me two weeks "after the manual was signed, you would charge David Hicks." And I said, "Well, we're not quite there yet. "And we still don't have a convening authority. "So if I charge him, who do I send the charges to?" And he goes, 'Well, we're getting close "to having another convening authority named. "That should take place in of days that you promise me "and I promised other people that we'd get Hicks charged." And I said, "Look, we're doing the best we can. "And we're moving as quickly as we can." And he said, 'Well, there are other people you can charge "along with David Hicks." He said, "It's not just gonna be Hicks, is it?" And so there a couple of other cases that we're considering, but we're expecting probably a batch of cases that we'll charge right off the bat. And so he was not happy that we didn't have the charges, but if you look we actually charged David Hicks. I forgot the exact date, but it was early February of 2007. And at the time there was no convening authority. And Ms. Crawford was appointed the convening authority a few days afterwards. Interviewer: So did Del Orte know about the second phone call? - I don't know. I never discussed it with him. So I don't know if he did or not. Interviewer: Were you concerned that Jim Haynes was calling your gammon and apparently going out of the protocol? - Well, it certainly made me and again to this day I don't know the behind the scene political environment that was prompting this but it was certainly, I think one could surmise if you look at that point in time, John Howard who was the prime minister in Australia at the time was just getting beat about the head and shoulders over the David Hicks issue back in Australia, he had an election coming up later that year and David Hicks was becoming a real albatross around his neck. And he was one of our more visible supporters of our efforts in the war on terrorism. Dick Cheney made a visit to Australia about the same period of time. And suddenly for the first time in two years Jim Haynes is calling me saying with a personal interest in a case. So you can make of that what you want but it was certainly was the timing was unusual. Interviewer: Did Jim Haynes mentioned David Addington? - No. His comment to me was you promised me you'd have charges on David Hicks within two weeks. And based on your promises, I made promises to other people but he never identified who they were. My fear was and I had this discussion with General Hemingway and General Altenburg earlier on that, David Hicks, the world had been told these guys are the worst of the worst. And if you lead off with David Hicks who was just a knucklehead, it's not, you know what I mean? That's not exactly the picture you want to, the world has been waiting for years for these military commissions to get going and you lead off with a guy that's just a knucklehead, but yeah that's the way it unfolded. Interviewer: Well, did you feel pressured you felt you had to then indict David Hicks given the phone call from Jim Haynes is that why you did it? - I don't really that I felt that I had to, that was a case that had been around from the start. So it was well developed, the prosecutor on the case it was a Lieutenant Colonel, Kevin Shenai who had been working on the case for a number of years. As far as the being developed it was as well developed a cases any that we had on the books, but it certainly his level of culpability was only very very low end of the spectrum. So I think most people would have preferred that he not be the first one out of the shoot. Interviewer: And what happened subsequently with other cases, how did that develop? - Well, I've neglected to mention that in February early February, we charged a David Hicks, Salim Hamdan and Omar Katar were the first three cases that we charged under the new military commissions act. Ms. Crawford was appointed convening authority a few days after that, we went to Guantanamo. I believe it was in March, right? Or April of 2007 to do the arraignment of David Hicks. We went down on a Sunday or I'm sorry. Yeah. On a Sunday, when these things take place the military commissions, everybody shows up typically at Andrews Air Force Base or sometimes out of Baltimore, Washington Airport but the prosecution, the defense, the judges, the non-governmental organization, the news media everybody gets on the airplane. I mean, it's like when professional wrestling comes to town the whole entourage gets on the plane together and they all fly to Guantanamo. So we all fly to Guantanamo on a Sunday thinking that on Tuesday morning we're gonna arraign David Hicks, which in arraignment typically takes 15 minutes. So it's a lot of effort for what we thought was gonna be be 15 minutes of work. Well, we get down to Guantanamo and on Monday morning I get a call from general Hemingway saying there's been a plea bargain in the Hicks case, which typically in the military is called a pre-trial agreement or in the civilian world its a plea bargain. But those are typically negotiated between the prosecution and the defense. And then once the two sides have come to terms they put it in writing and present it to the convening authority who has the power to either approve it or disapprove it. Well, in this case, the prosecution was completely eliminated from the discussion and the deal was negotiated directly between the defense counsel and Ms. Crawford. And so we found out Monday morning, we thought we were gonna be going in and doing an arraignment. And instead we found out that there'd been a deal cut in the David Hicks case. Interviewer: Is that legitimate, can the convening authority negotiate a deal? - There's nothing that precludes it. And in my 25 years in the Air Force, I was involved in or reviewed hundreds of pre-trial agreements. And this is the only one I've ever seen that was negotiated directly between the convening authority and the defense counsel without the prosecution being involved. And its just atypical of the way the process normally. Interviewer: What do you think about that for your own role in this? - I thought there was, again, I would love to know the whole backstory. I mean, my personal view was that was a favor to John Howard to make this case go away before the election came up in Australia. We'd had discussions with the defense, there were a number of cases where we had discussion with defense counsel about potential plea bargains. And we'd had discussions with Dan Maury was representing David Hicks and we'd had discussions with the defense about a potential deal, but any discussions we ever had were measured in years not months. And the deal that was cut was for nine months which you had a guy the first military commission, the worst of the worst convicted war criminal gets a misdemeanor punishment. And part of the deal was he was promptly returned to Australia to serve his sentence. And then by new year's of 2007, David Hicks was a free man. Interviewer: So were you seeing that this is all very political and that in fact your role was really just a political role more than just? - In my perception, I had a very, people have asked me because originally I was probably the most vocal proponent of military commissions in Guantanamo Bay. I wrote law journal articles and went around to universities and professional organizations wrote op-eds touting, trying to tell the other side of the story. And I've had people ask me about, Well, were you just saying that or did you really believe it? I really believed it. Like I said, I had a tremendous amount of confidence in General Altenburg and general Hemingway and the top cover they provided to get this done right. To me when the wheels began to come off the wagon started with General Altenburg leaving. And then later in the spring of 2007 General Hemingway left. And by the summer of 2007, I had grave doubts about the system I've been touting the year before I had grave doubts about. By then my feeling was that we had a meeting in or series of meetings in the spring of 2006 before the Hamdan decision came down, when I came on board in 2005, as I mentioned it was not a done deal, but it was expected that the high-value detainees at the CIA were keeping we're gonna be turned over to the department of defense. Interviewer: You have been informed about that? - Right. I guess, as I said, it wasn't a done deal but that was certainly the expectation. In the spring of 06 there were a number of meetings where the national security council wanna be able to go to the president and lay out his full range of options on what to do with the high-value detainees. I mean, I think the CA by that point were getting really concerned that their mandate. I mean, their mandate was to hold these guys to extract intelligence. At some point in time you've gotten all you're gonna get and they didn't feel their mandate was to operate the Bureau of Prisons. And so they were very anxious to get these guys off of their books and into somebody else's hands. But the national security council wanted to be able to go to the president with the full range of what his options were to deal with these folks that run the black sites. Obviously for the department of justice, prosecuting a Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad is a real career maker for a US attorney. So, I think initially DOJ really wanted to take on the 911 cases. As you looked at the evidence that we had the lack of rights advisements, the enhanced interrogation techniques and a number of other things, I think they came around eventually to the point of view that a military commission was a more viable option than federal court. So it wound up by the time the Hamdan decision came down I think all of the powers that be were pretty much in agreement that military commissions were the best option for these guys including department of justice went along with that even though they went along with it I think they still wanted to keep their hands on the reins. So I've told people before and I kinda felt like Mickey Mouse at Disney World if you take your family to Disney World at some point you expect Mickey to come out and wave at the crowd. These were called military commission. So you need somebody to put on the costume and come out and sell this as a military effort even though DOJ behind the scenes wanted to pull the strings and say, for me that was the kind of a constant battle on who's really in charge here. I mean, am I the chief prosecutor like Mickey Mouse is, Mickey Mouse is the face of Disney but he doesn't get a seat in the boardroom. And so it was a question of who's in charge of this process. And I felt a high degree of confidence in that process until, like I said, General Altenburg left, Hemingway left, Jim Haynes is no longer. He'd been nominated for seat on the fourth circuit Court of Appeals. He was not confirmed, President Bush renominated him in September of 2006. And I think he really kept his nose out of my business because he had this aspiration of he didn't want to generate any attention. He wanted to get confirmed. And it was after in January of 2007 when his nomination died his second death that I think he felt unconstrained to screw it. I can do what I want to do now. And that's when, like I said, the same day his nomination was withdrawn is the first time he ever picked up the phone and called me on a particular case. Interviewer: So it seemed like that going after the next two Hamdan and Kadir did you feel in control of those cases? Did you feel that again the civilian authorities were somewhat behind the scenes of DOJ as someone who was involved? - No, on those two I didn't. There was never anyone that ever press made it to pick those two cases to go along with David Hicks. They just happened to be cases that were again had been in the pipeline for a number of years that had prosecutors, Jeff Grow Herring was the lead prosecutor in Katar still is to this day. Hamdan's it was Lieutenant Colonel Steve Couch had been working on the case. It had been handed off to a Lieutenant Colonel Will Brit but they were cases that were on the shelf and ready to go. And that's how they wound up. Interviewer: You felt okay with those cases, you felt that you could pursue those? - Those are both in my view good cases. I know there's an argument about Cotter and whether he was a child soldier. To this day I think a lot of disagreement about whether he should be prosecuted, but I never, I reviewed the issue and my view was the convention on the rights of the child specify that when there are provisions in there that say anyone below, Cotter was 15 at the time he was captured there are provisions in the convention on the rights of the child that said, if you're under the age of 16 you can't receive the death penalty or confinement for life. We didn't intend to refer the case as a capital case. So in my view even though we're not a signatory to the convention we were still within the spirit of the convention. Interviewer: So could you talk a little bit about just moving on? 'Cause Hamdan got a light sentence too if you will and Cotter still going on. So what happened in your role as these are months? - Yeah. Again, I don't recall the exact timeframe. We went to the arraignment on David Hicks and it turned out to be not just an arraignment but the whole trial was over and done by the end of the week because he pled guilty. We went back in June of 2007, I'm sorry May of 2007 for the arraignments on Cotter and Hamdan and there were two separate judges in each of those cases. But in both cases, the judges dismissed the charges against them because the military commissions act says the military commission has jurisdiction over alien unlawful enemy combatants. And it says that a finding by the combatant status review tribunal is dispositive. Well, the combatant status review tribunal only found that they were enemy combatants. It didn't find that they were unlawful enemy combatants. And so the judges in both of those cases said we didn't establish jurisdiction because the word unlawful was missing from the determination. So once again the whole process just came to a grinding halt. And this was another interesting twist, I guess, the time we had the actual trial of David Hicks. Joshua Dreytell was his civilian defense counsel. The judge wanted Mr. Dreytell to sign an agreement that he would abide by, there's an agreement civilian counsel have to sign to be a military commission defense counsel, but it says I'll come by with all laws and regulations and rules pertaining to military commissions. As I mentioned in a court martial or a military commission you have the statute that creates it. You have the manual for military commissions or manual for court martial. That's the more detailed directive. And then you have the regulation that implements it. At the time we went to trial on Hicks the secretary of defense hadn't gotten around to publishing the regulation. So Mr. Dreytell refused to sign an agreement that he'd abide by rules that hadn't been written. So which became kind of an interesting little twist in the Hicks case. But now in a couple of months later we're back in court with Hamdan and Cotter and the judges dismiss the charges. So immediately I'm getting calls from, we're down to get Moe to a big conference call with folks from the Pentagon and the justice department. And what do we do? And I said, "Well, you gotta appeal this decision." Well, the way the military commissions are set up you go from the convening authority to the court of military commission review and then into the federal court system. Well that point in time there was no court military commission review. No one had ever been appointed to be a judge on the court military commission review. There was no rules for this court that didn't exist and no address. My question was you want me to file an appeal where do I file it with this non-existent court? So they had to scramble and after Hamdan and Cotter, the charges were dismissed. First, we asked the judge to reconsider because that would buy us another week or two of time to try to create this appellate court that didn't exist that we could then appeal the judge's ruling too. But they managed to over the summer cobbled together this non-existent court that we eventually appealed Hamdan and Cotter to and I guess one of the last things before I resigned was we got a favorable decision on the jurisdictional question that the judge, the trial judge has the authority to make his own independent finding of whether the person and whether the government has proved by preponderance of evidence that he's an alien unlawful enemy combatant. Interviewer: So before we go further as to why you resigned it sounds to me like you're telling us the story partly because to show that it just wasn't working the way you perceived it when you first came in there, is, is that true? Or were you surprised at what you saw in the last year that you were there that you were describing? - Yeah. As I said, my confidence level it tapered off dramatically when General Altenburg left and General Hemingway left and then they were replaced by Susan Crawford who was, when Dick Cheney was the secretary of defense. Susan Crawford was his inspector general. When she retired from the Court of Appeals for the armed forces, the only person she mentioned by name in her retirement speech was David Addington. And then now she's the head of the military commission. So I didn't have a real high, I don't know her that well and she's probably a great human being but we've got this process called a military commission that historically has been controlled by a military officer now being controlled by a friend of the vice president whose never served in the military which caused me some concern. And then when General Hemingway left he was replaced by a General Thom Hartmann who was an Air Force reserve one star who was a corporate attorney for an energy company that does business with DOD, in his private life who was now called active duty to be the legal advisor. So yeah, I went from two people that I had enormous trust in to two that-- Interviewer: Was Hartmann connected to Cheney? - Not that I know of, not that I know. Interviewer: So could you go on them as to why you resigned because you put that out? - Right. General Hartman came on board in June of 2007 the latter part of June. Well, actually it was early July. That's not right. The latter part of June, I met with him. I'm sorry. General Hartman came on board early July because it was the week of July 4th 'cause I met with him, on Monday he showed up his first day on the job, July 4th I think was like on a Wednesday. And on Friday that week I had surgery at Walter Reed for I've had pinched nerve in my neck. So I was going to be out for a month having surgery. So I got to meet him for like 30 minutes that week. And then we had the holiday and then I had surgery and then I'm gonna be out. While I'm out I've started getting calls and emails from folks at the office going you better hurry up and get back in here the general's taken over. His job was supposed to be a part of that independent neutral convening authority process. But now he's taking over the prosecution function, reviewing evidence, reviewing charges, talking about who's gonna be assigned basically becoming both the neutral legal advisor and the partisan prosecutor at the same time. And so that's when he and I had a fundamental disagreement about our respective roles. Interviewer: Why do you think that happened? - I think General Hartman came in with this expectation that this process had been screwed up for six years and he was gonna be the white Knight that was gonna save the day and make everything, force this thing through the system and get it going and get it done. Interviewer: And do you think he wanted you to resign or he was just doing this in the hope that you would resign or do you think he would have pushed you out of your head? - I can say from other people that have worked with him and from his continued involvement after I left that it wasn't just me. He treated everybody like a dog so it wasn't that I was singled out for his rat. That's just him. I mean, that was the argument. Later I testified in a couple of hearings about unlawful command influence because of General Hartman and the person that replaced me, Larry Morris who was the fourth chief prosecutor. Part of his argument was, was look here the general might be an overbearing jerk but he's that way to everybody. To both sides, not just the defense he's a jerk to the prosecution too. So, but that was just him. But in the context of this dispute with him one of the things I had raised there was a deputy general counsel guy named Paul Nye who was the primary point of contact for military commission detainee related stuff for Jim Haynes office. And when Paul came on board, I believe this is the summer of 2006, he'd asked me, he said, "Who do you work for? "And what's your chain of command?" And I said, "Well, you asked a good question. "There's no wiring diagram that says..." Which was odd, the military is very power hierarchical, you know what your chain of command is, mine was never defined. And so I had raised that with Paul when he became the deputy general counsel. And so when this dispute with Hartman blew up I'd raised it again said, "Look this is another example "where nobody knows where the lines of authority are. "We need to figure out who does what?" And so it eventually led to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England on September 4th of 2007 published written orders that said I report to General Hartman, General Hartman reports to Jim Haynes, which made Jim Haynes my second line, my second line of command was Jim Haynes. I got the order that morning and that afternoon I resigned. Interviewer: So when you resigned how did you feel about that? You were the first prosecutor to resign, right? - Right. Interviewer: For political reasons or for reasons that how did you feel about that? Did you feel, you knew the public would be watching you knew everyone. I mean, what were you thinking? - I was thinking that, I guess one of the things I skipped over there one of the fundamental disputes that General Hartman and I had was over waterboarding and torture and General Hartman's view was look the president said we don't torture. So what makes you think you can say we do? I got instructed my folks like in Qahtani and by the Khalid Sheikh Muhammad had been transferred that we were gonna build those cases independent of anything they ever said in our custody. General Hartman's view was that was good evidence. Those confessions were good evidence because the president says we don't torture. Interviewer: He said that to you? - Yes. And he testified to that. He testified at a Senate judiciary committee hearing in December, 2007. But his view was that as chief prosecutor I didn't have the authority to exclude that evidence that the president said we don't torture. And if the president said it, then we don't torture. And now I've got a written order from Secretary England saying this guy is now my commander. And then his commanders is Jim Haynes who was the guy that signed, that wrote the memo that Rumsfeld signed that said waterboarding was A okay. So when I took the job, I had told General Rives who was the judge advocate general of the Air Force. Well, in fact, the first public presentation I ever did was in March of 2006 at Case Western and it was broadcast on CSPAN and somebody in the audience asked me, 'cause I was there standing up for Guantanamo and standing up for the military commissions and somebody in the audience asked, "Well, what would you do "if you ever felt you were being pressured to use evidence "that you thought was coerced, what would you do?" And I said, "If that ever happens "I'll call it a day and head to the house and quit." So I told General Rives, look I'll keep the job as long as we're committed to a full, fair and open trials. And I'll stick with this as long as you want me to. So on September 4th of 2007 when now I've got written orders that say I report to Hartman and Hartman reports to Haynes. And both of them think waterboarding, the president says we don't torture. That was when I concluded that it was time to call it a day and head to the house. Interviewer: Did you inform them before you publicly announced that you might quit and did they respond to that? - No, I was called over. There'd been this dispute between General Hartman and I over where the lines of authority were. So I got a call that morning from Dan Del Orto saying, "Hey, can you come over to the our offices "we're in Crystal City, Virginia?" He said, "Can you come over to the Pentagon a bit?" I don't know what time, 10 o'clock. So I go to the Pentagon at 10 and I meet with Dan Del Orto and Paul Nye, who was the deputy general counsel. And they said, "Hey, we've we finally worked out "the chain of command and we've got written orders "where is clear now who does what and who reports to who? "Here's the copy." And it was the order from Secretary England that laid out I report to Hartman, Hartman to, so I took the order and went back to Crystal City and drafted my resignation, which they followed up an hour later with a written order that I was precluded from talking to anyone about why I resigned. Interviewer: I had heard that General Hoffman tried to force you to take on a number of trials before the election that would look good for the administration. - It wasn't Hartman. That was actually it was Deputy Secretary England. There was a meeting, don't recall the exact date. This would have been September of 2006. There was a meeting. There are a number of different groups that were involved in detainees military commission issues. Within the Pentagon there was a group, it's called a SOG, the SOG, Senior Oversight Group which was like the deputy secretary of defense level. I mean, it was Gordon England. It was Steve Cambodia. It was Jim Haynes. That level of... They met once a week then kind of an action group beneath them was called the SUD FUG the special detainee follow-up group. And those were people like my level and General Hemmingways level. And it was actually chaired by Pete Garrin who was the secretary of the army and it met twice a week and it was the more nuts and bolts of issues that would crop up. And then they reported to the senior oversight group. There was an issue in September of 2006. They wanted a timeline of, if you remember, September, 2006 Congress is just approving the Military Commissions Act and we've gotta create the... So they wanted a timeline of how, kind of a flow of how these things are gonna go. And so they asked me to put together a timeline and go to the SOG, the Senior Oversight Group and present it. And that's the only time I ever went to that meeting. But it was at that meeting that the Secretary England said previously now Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad and the high-value guys have just gotten to Gitmo. And so he made a comment at that meeting about we really need to, you need to hurry up and charge these guys so that there could be some real political capital and getting these things charged before the election. Now, in my view, he was referring to the midterm elections, not the 2000. Yeah. And to Jim Haynes credit there are very few good things I'll say about Jim Haynes, to Jim Haynes credit when Secretary England made that comment Haynes jumped in and said, "Hey, wait a minute "there's only one guy that gets to decide who gets charged "and when and that's him and pointed at me." So Haynes, Jim Haynes did the right thing in that case. Interviewer: After you resigned did Haynes ever talk to you? - No. Interviewer: Did anybody from the administration come to you afterwards and talk to you? - No. Interviewer: They just left you hanging pretty much or going off on your own? - Right. Like I said they gave me a written order that I was precluded from talking to anyone about why I resigned. Interviewer: Does that order continue for the rest of your life? - No, it was from General Hartman and General Rives who was the judge advocate general of the Air Force, who I'd been in communication with regularly throughout this whole process and who had been extraordinarily supportive of me. So when I decided to resign I was in communication with other senior officers about what I was doing. And so he said, look, we'll get you, since he is the judge advocate general of the Air Force, he said, "Once you resigned, we'll get you reassigned back." Because at that point I was working for DOD. So we'll get you reassigned back to the Air Force and we'll move you somewhere else here in DC. And he said, "Once you're no longer under that chain "of command and you're under my chain of command, "as long as you're telling the truth "and you're not revealing classified information "you can say whatever you feel like you need to say." So he expedited getting me I guess it was about 10 days from the time I resigned till I became the director of the Air Force judiciary. Interviewer: Oh. And then you were free to talk. - Then that chain of command that Secretary England created no longer existed because I no longer worked in that chain of command. I worked for General Rives. Interviewer: And did general Hartman ever contact you after that? - No. - The only time I ever saw him after that was at the three times I testified about unlawful command influence involving him. Woman: Can I ask a question? Interviewer: Go ahead. Woman: Were you ever consulted about that chain of command and allowed to give input and if you would to have made a decision what would have been at your command? - Oh, okay. Yes. During the dispute with General Hartman I submitted a lengthy memorandum to Jim Haynes office about the chain. What my view of how this process should be structured that the prosecution should be. When the Military Commissions Act was being created by Congress I got a call from Senator Graham, Lindsey Graham's office. Senator Graham is till to this day a member of the Air Force Reserve JAG corp. The first trial I ever did as an Air Force attorney in 1984, my opponent was Captain Lindsey Graham. So I didn't know him well, but I had known him over the years from his Air Force involvement. So when Congress began working on the Military Commissions Act I got a call from his office saying, "Could you come over and meet "with Senator Graham and Senator McCain?" So I went over and met with them. And their question to me was what do you need to get the job done right? And one of the things I mentioned to them was my, I mentioned about the hand of DOJ and the process and that was getting, I can tell you up until my first year there from 2005, through 2006 nobody seemed to express much interest in what I was doing. I mean, I pretty much had a free hand to run the place the way I wanted. A year later now as you know, the high-value detainees are coming to Gitmo suddenly everybody and their brother had some real strong opinions about how to do my job. So I mentioned that to Senator Graham and Senator McCain that I thought we needed. I mean, the uniform code of military justice has a specific provision about unlawful command influence. And it's really directed at trying to lean on, senior people leaning on a judge or a juror to try to influence a Court Marshall. And I explained to them, I said, "Look I'm starting to get a lot of people that now have opinions about how I'm doing my job. "So we need some protection on this too." So they said, "Well, how about can you draft up some language "to include in the statute?" And I did. And it's in there for forbade them, what I wrote that says, "No one may exercise exert unlawful influence "or coercion over any member of the prosecution "or defense in the exercise of their professional judgment." I wanted to ensure that we had the ability to do the right, like on waterboarding. If we thought that evidence didn't measure up then we ought to be able to exercise our professional judgment as prosecutors rather than having some outsiders say, "Hey the president said, we don't torture. "You gotta use it." And so they put that in the statute and I talked to Senator Graham a year later as things started blowing up and he said, "Look your interpretation is exactly what we intended." He said, yeah, I think he was flabbergasted as well that this dispute blew up. But to the memorandum I submitted to the general counsel's office maintain those separate and discreet functions. As a prosecutor our job was to review the evidence, determined if charges were warranted and then to draft those charges, then they go to the convening authority and her legal advisor. And then it's their decision as they did like in the Qahtani Case they didn't refer it to trial, on the Hick's case, Ms. Crawford deleted a couple of the charges and made some changes. That's their proper function but to have the convening authority legal advisor also coming over to my office and reviewing evidence and telling me which cases are gonna... That to me was exerting unlawful influence on me. Interviewer: What would be the chain of command as you would see it. So who would be your super and just the commuting authority. - Yeah, it would have been the way it had worked before anything officially existed in an order was like general Hemingway had been like on my performance evaluations as chief prosecutor were written by General Hemingway but evaluating, and its like the judge advocate general, the judge advocate general evaluates the performance of the judges on the Air Force court of criminal appeals. Evaluating somebody's performance is one role telling them how to decide cases is a different story. Interviewer: So Hoffman could have evaluated you if that would been appropriated. - Yes. Yeah. I think that would have been, that's the way it had existed. That's the normal way it works in military justice practice. It was that additional not just evaluating but also directing like, we mentioned earlier the case on Muhammad Jawad that was one where General Hartman from as soon as he got there that was a case that was number one on his list 'cause a lot of these cases were cases like, like Hamdan, a guy that was running errands and he really liked Jawad. Jawad was a case that we referred to as a guy with blood on his hands because the allegation was that he threw a grenade that had wounded some US soldiers. So to him, that was what we called a sexy case. 'Cause it was actually, it's not one of these, like some of these guys facilitated travel. So they ferried money or airline tickets or it didn't mean they weren't bad guys but it just went particularly exciting. Like somebody that threw a grenade and actually hurt somebody. So he always, every time we'd talk about which cases we were trying to get into the queue, he'd always say, "What about the guy threw the grenade? "What about the guy that threw the grenade?" So when I resigned the first case that went forward after I resigned was the guy that threw the grenade, who was Jawad. Interviewer: Is it appropriate to have Haynes as the supervisor to Hartman in the way you see it? Would that be inappropriate line of authority? - I think it would be again, I think it would be appropriate for him to evaluate his performance. I think it will be inappropriate for him to dictate. The convening authority and the legal advisor are supposed to render their own professional, independent judgment. So it would be inappropriate for him to exercise, command authority and direct how they exercise that judgment. Interviewer: You mentioned waterboarding a few times. So I just wanna get this on the record. Did you have no waterboarding at Guantanamo? - No. To my knowledge no one has ever been waterboarded at Guantanamo or by DOD. I mean, to my knowledge the only people were ever waterboarded or waterboarded while they were in CIA custody. Interviewer: Well, there was a CIA a trailer or several trailers at Guantanamo. Could something have gone on there? - To be perfectly honest, I always felt like I had much greater cooperation from the CIA than I did from DOD. Now a member of the DOD team, but I had more head budding contest with DOD than I ever did with the CIA. As I said I think the CIA was anxious to get these guys off of their books and onto somebody else's and always felt like I had, I can't say unfettered access but they were much more cooperative than the DOD intelligence community. I mean, Steve Cambodian was the under secretary of defense for intelligence who was one of the most, he was always the smartest guy in the room and he wanted to make sure everybody knew that in the first 30 seconds you were in the meeting with him that he was impossible to work with. I've got, I didn't bring one with me, our objective were to have full fair and open trials. Almost all of this information was classified. So in order to have an open trial or a fair trial, I remember having a discussion with Lindsey Graham and him saying, the way the old process works and the way the current one does you can have a closed proceeding. As they've done here recently where spectators are removed from the courtroom under the old the original process that the president created not only could you exclude the spectators you could exclude the accused. And I remember Senator Graham saying and it just doesn't seem fair to tell a guy, "Hey, look if you could have seen the evidence against it "you'd understand why we're doing this to you." But of course you couldn't because it was classified. So part of this process to me that was really important was getting information. And I think there was over classification, everything that was just presumptively classified. Some of it should have been a large part in my view was inappropriately classified but we were trying to get information declassified we'd identify statements we wanted to use. We'd send them in to the DOD intelligence community asking that it be declassified and three or four months later we'd get back pages of black lines. Man, I've got some at home. One of the guys in my office pointed out that the only use you could possibly make of this information if you turn it sideways it kind of looked like the twin towers from the black lines, because there was not a visible word on the page or the only thing that would be declassified is the detainee is a 23 year old year. How are you gonna prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with eight words but Cambodia's attitude was a couple of meters ahead when he said, "Look now don't we have the authority to detain the enemy "for the duration of the arm conflict." Yes. Is it likely this arm conflict is gonna end anytime soon? No, but you want me to declassify intelligence so you can have a trial when I can keep this guy anyway. And that was his attitude. Interviewer: So how did the CIA, what did they do for you? You said you had a better relationship with them. How did they help you or assist you? - I was trying to think as far as access to people to information, they were extraordinarily accommodating. And again, is it possible they held something back and I didn't know about it? It is, but it was never my impression that that was the case. So where with DOD it was like pulling teeth, trying to get cooperation. And the agency was much more cooperative. Interviewer: They would give you evidence. Is that what you're saying the CIA did for you? - Yeah, we had a database that I believe contained everything that they had in their possession. Interviewer: Some of it classified and some-- - All of it, every bit of classified. And you didn't know what feed when they used to get that? - No, we did. When we had briefings from the people that did the waterboarding, we had briefings from them on exactly how they did it. Interviewer: I see. So you knew what treatment was? - Yes. Interviewer: So that's how you could distinguish? - Well, that was where I told the team, Bob Swan was heading up the high value team that we'd build those cases. We weren't gonna use anything they said in US government custody we would build it independent of their statements. And again, that's one of the things to me was extraordinarily frustrating like in this dispute with Hartman over, the president says we don't torture. I think in the public's mind to this day, I think they're huge misperceptions about Guantanamo and the military commission. I think to this day if you ask most members of the public they think the detainees live in the dog cages that were camp x-ray that every morning they wake them up and they waterboard them and then through the force feeding and then put them back in the dog cage and that's not the case. So with waterboarding, we're talking about three guys that were waterboarded. And if you like, Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad, I mean there's ample evidence to prove his guilt without using anything he's ever said in our custody. So what's the point of going into court and the nation's gotten a black eye already over this stuff. So why go into court and I'll offer up evidence that most people would say was obtained by torture? Yeah, that's what Hartman was trying to force me to do. Now. There's some other cases like Qahtani and in some others where in my view and I think for most people will agree that waterboarding was a step too far. And most of the information came from the interrogators sitting down get a Subway or McDonald's and they'd sit down and took time to develop a rapport. And I would say 90% or more of the information came that route. It was the rare exception when it was the coercive route. And somewhere between those two is where I think most people would probably strike the balance but it was a minority of the cases not the majority that were coercive. Woman: So why did they use those tactics? The reason in my view and again this, I'll continue. In my view the reason they did, I came on board in September 05. So a lot of this stuff had taken place in the years before that. So I don't have firsthand on the ground knowledge of what happened. From what I do know is in the early days Guantanamo was not that bad of a place other than, the camp x-ray just looks bad. But I think as far as the way people were treated the military treated them much better than I think most people have been led to believe as time went on, you had senior people in the administration like I know Rumsfeld was really aggravated that we'd had these folks that get Moe for months and not much was percolating out of there. And so there was pressure to we need more intelligence. And so that's what led to ramping up he coercion was to try to squeeze more information out of the detainees. Building rapport with somebody takes time and to them time was of the essence. Interviewer: Did you ever sit in on an interrogation while you were there? - I never sat in the room. I actually met personally with some of the detainees, a couple of the detainees. Interviewer: Why would that be? - Oh, we were hoping to do under the old process. If you go back and look at the 10 cases that were originally charged, every one of them at least one of the charges was conspiracy. What we were hoping to do was to find a cooperating detainee, somebody that was willing to work with us, that spoke English and that had a significant involvement in terrorism. They could come in to the jury and kind of explain we called it Al-Qaeda 101, have this person with firsthand knowledge come in. Kinda like the mafia cases, where you have somebody come in and explain how the Gambino crime family was structured. We were hoping to find somebody that could come in and do the same thing for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. And so there were a couple of detainees that when I approached the hierarchy of Gitmo and explained what we were looking for recommended a couple of folks that met the bill. And so I had a couple of meetings with a couple of detainees to talk about whether they were interested in. Interviewer: Were you gonna be negotiating with them by the sentences, something in exchange for it? - Right. Interviewer: Did they agree? - They were favorably inclined. Well, unfortunately this whole thing kind of blew up. I still feel bad, there were two guys at Gitmo that I said, I'll be back. And I never made it back because-- Interviewer: They could have been witnesses for the prosecution? - Right? Now, those were the only two that I ever sat down personally with. There were others that I watched typically the high-value detainees and they were transferred to Guantanamo. One of the big questions after the president officially made the decision that, yes that's gonna be the route. We're gonna transfer him from the CIA to DOD. And they'll go before military commissions. Then one of the questions was and I can tell you the DOD intelligence community Gitmo. You can imagine if you're a young intelligence officer and all of a sudden Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad is sitting right in your backyard, they were chomping at the bit. The CIA maybe didn't get it out of them for two years but give me 15 minutes with them we'll know where Osama bin Laden is, I mean that was kind of the mindset. So they were extraordinarily frustrated when they were precluded from interrogating the high-value detainees. What we came up with was called the claim team which was a group of law enforcement agents, it was a team made up of FBI. And I mentioned set of the criminal investigation task force which was the military law enforcement component. But those two together would go in and interview the high-value detainees. Now we initially debated whether just to, when they showed up at Gitmo in September of 2006, until the plane landed and the door open we didn't know for sure who or how many were gonna get off the airplane, it ended up being 14. Now then later Hottie L Rocky was transferred. So there are 15 people that are in the high-value detainee program. We debated over whether just to work with the information that already exists. Most of the folks like Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad there's tons of information. Do we stick with that or do we make an effort to re-interview them? Which is what we decided. We figured that we're in no worse shape by trying than by not trying. I mean if it's gonna be inadmissible it's gonna be inadmissible. So we elected to use the clean team approach. And then the other big point of debate was whether to do rights advisements or not. And I think with the benefit of hindsight if there's a decision I made that I would reconsider it might've been the decision not to do rights advisements. The primary reason I thought we should not do rights advisements is if we went in and actually it was early 07 by the time we actually implemented the clean teams. If we went in, in let's say February of 07 and read rights to Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad at Guantanamo or we're not also saying that everybody that was interviewed at Guantanamo prior to February of 2007, had those same rights. So the thousands of interviews that had taken place the smaller fish are we not admitting that all of those were obtained in violation of that right. So that was the primary reason for not doing it. Interviewer: You said you would reconsider that when to start. If you wanna take a break? Man: So I was gonna ask you, you said you might do it differently this time but wouldn't that then cause a problem with and you'd have to justify about thousands of interviews without rights Will you justify it then? - The time back you when the decision was made we were looking at prosecuting potentially as many as 70 people. And I think from what I've seen as we sit here in June of 2010, I think I saw were the attorney general said, "We're looking at more like 30." So if you factor in the 15 high-value detainees that only leaves 15 others. So and again, I don't know who those other 15 are but they're probably significant enough players to where there's other evidence, and my concern was that we were gonna particularly in some of the lesser cases where it was really, the evidence was primarily statements that if we did the rights advisement and all those statements were excluded then there were a number of those cases we would have would've lost out on. But as it turns out I don't think they're gonna be prosecuted anyway and it wouldn't have mattered. Interviewer: You started to say, yes, you said it on interrogations. Can you tell me what that was? - Yeah, I'm sorry. The only ones like I said that I personally participated in with the couple of guys that we were interested in using as a cooperating witness. When the high-value detainees when the clean teams were implemented in early 2007. And again, I guess it kind of ties in with the last part about the rights advisement. Well, the teams wound up doing was essentially like a modified cleansing statement telling the detainees it wasn't really a rights advisement but saying, "Look you're in a different place "with different people and we don't care about "anything you've said before "or if you want to talk fine, if you don't." And so it was interesting. We didn't know going into it how many would wanna talk and how many wouldn't. It wound up, I forget the exact numbers but the overwhelming majority were more than happy to talk. In fact, the problem became not whether they would talk is whether they'd ever quit. 'Cause I think for them they enjoyed the rep RTA of sitting around talking to the to the law enforcement guys and drinking coffee and shooting the breeze. Interviewer: You were involved in those? - I wasn't involved. There was just the team members the FBI and the set of agents going in or sometimes with an interpreter with the individual. It was monitored on closed circuit television. And so we would sit in the control booth and watch. We purposely the attorneys purposely didn't listen we only watched, I watched the video of what was taking place but didn't listen to the audio 'cause we didn't want to become, we wouldn't make the attorneys into witnesses. We wanted the agents to be the witnesses. And then also the command structure is part of the deal to do this clean team thing, I believe its general, General Admiral Harris I believe was the commander at the time. But insisted that someone from his staff be... He was one responsible for ensuring they were being treated humanely. And he wanted somebody there that could with eyes on that could attest they're not being mistreated. So there were a number of the high-value sessions where I watched the video portion of that. Interviewer: And you didn't hear anything you just visually watch the-- - Correct. Interviewer: In your time in Guantanamo did you ever hear or voice, see any abuse of any of the prisoners? - I never did. There were times where, yeah, I felt some the detainees were being abusive to the guard staff but I never saw the other way around. Interviewer: And did you go through all the prisons? View them, did you inspect as a prosecutor? - They didn't really inspect them. I think other than the facility where there's a a special site where the high-value detainees are kept, right? I never went through that one but all the others I believe I've been through on multiple occasions Interviewer: Could you have gone through Camp Seven or you wouldn't have been, were you been permitted to? - I don't know. I never, I don't know. I never really had an occasion to-- Interviewer: And had you heard of Camp No which was in the news at 6 Montenegro? - Yeah. I know where it is. As I've mentioned before, I think, referring to the triple homicide, suicide depending on, I'm always at Guantanamo when the suicides happened went over in the camps at the time that it happened. But yeah, if I was a betting man I would bet my bottom dollar that they were suicides. It doesn't make sense. I was at Gitmo when it happened and when word first got out that there three guys were dead. There were some names that popped to mind that were either significant players or there were some in the camps that were troublemakers that were feces throwers and hunger strike instigating. The three guys that died were, when I heard the names, I didn't know who they were. They were so insignificant in that they weren't even names that I recognize. One of the three had been cleared. Maybe it was like a week away from going home. So I just don't see what the, if it had been like Khaleed Sheikh Muhammad or even a Hicks or a Hamdan or if maybe I could see a rash now but I just don't see any, particularly if you recall this was June of 2006 when that took place. So that was still when the president hadn't officially announced that the high-value detainees were coming to Gitmo. So, I mean, Gitmo was on its best behavior. I just can't fathom any rationale for picking out these three guys and killing them and putting that spotlight on Gitmo. Interviewer: And you were close enough to the ground you probably would have heard something if nearly half right? - I don't know. It's certainly not something I could state with absolute certainty but I would, I just can't fathom Interviewer: Have you've been to Camp No? You said you know where it is? - Nobody knows it. I mean, I know where it is but it's appeared to me to be an abandoned and in Gitmo there tons of, there was a point in time when Gitmo was a booming military installation. There's a lot of empty buildings and stuff around there and that area appeared to me to be unused. Interviewer: And then someone told us about the General's cottage, you know where that is? - General's cottage? No. Interviewer: General Scottry God had told us about that term. I hadn't heard of it. - No, I'm not familiar with that one. Interviewer: Did you ever see any people on hunger strikes? - Yes. In fact, I was trying to recall who, let me back up, man. I did see some of the detainees who had been at different points in time. Part of, the numbers fluctuated on how many were or were not hunger strikers. I was trying to recollect one of the commanders, remember if it was Harris or trying to think who took his place. I remember I called one of the commanders when they first took command had a tube inserted because his view was if you're gonna do it to the people that I'm responsible for then I wanna experience it. Interviewer: Were you present, you saw that? - No, my recollection is I was there at Gitmo when it happened but I wasn't standing in the room when they put the tube down his nose. Interviewer: And have you ever seen any doctors interact with the detainees? - They do a day on this, they still do it. When I was there, the medical staff, they do a daily check. Every detainee has an opportunity every day to ask for, they got a head cold or whatever they get it. Everyday there someone from the medical community is present. So I was there as they did their-- Interviewer: Rounds? - Their rounds. And I was trying to recall, and I was over in the clinic a time or two when a detainee would be ever getting treatment. Obviously it wasn't like heart surgery. It was something minor but there were times when I was over in the detention clinic when detainees were present. Interviewer: And the doctors always seemed totally professional to you from your observation? - Yeah. We used to joke about, I remember I was down there. I think what I did think it was like, I twisted a knee. The detention facility has its own clinic within the inside the wire. For us we had to go to the Naval station to the hospital. And I remember I did something to my knee and I was having trouble walking. I had to go over and they basically gave me some Motrin and said and you'll see your doctor when you get back to the US and I remember we were joking about for regular military guys for like routine kind of stuff. It's you call them make an appointment and maybe a month from now you get seen at the Pentagon clinic or at Walter Reed or whatever, if you're a detainee and you've got an ingrown toenail somebody is gonna be there today. At least my view was they got better medical care than we did. I've seen It reported what the ratio was of medical personnel to, compared to any other detention facility of some astronomical ratio but I never saw anything that suggested to me there was inadequate or inappropriate medical care. Interviewer: And did you ever go into the isolation wards in Guantanamo? - You mean in like Camps Five and Six? Interviewer: Yeah. - Yeah. Interviewer: And did you ever see how the men were in isolation in terms of for how long they'd be there or what kind of conditions they were in? - When I was in college to help pay my way through college I was a bail bondsman. And then afterwards in the military as a prosecutor and defense counsel I got to see a lot of other, I've seen dozens and dozens of prisons and jails. I think most Americans are incarcerated if they could see the conditions at Camp Five and Six would volunteer to trade places because they are, I don't know if I showed it, I've used it a couple of times in some presentations I've done I'll put up a picture of a cell and I'll ask the audience what's inhumane about the cell and people who used to say, "Well, it's kind of small "and this has got that one little window in it. "And that look real pleasant." And then I'll put up a picture of another cell and go, okay, what's wrong with this cell? And they always go, "Well, it looks just like the first one." And I'll say, "Well, you're exactly right. "The first cell is where Congressman Bill Janklow "served his sentence. "And this is the one where Omar Cotter serving." So the blueprints for Camp Five and Six were based on existing blueprints for US prison facilities were American citizens are incarcerated. So in my view, the facilities were never. And then if you look at while they're in their 20, 23 hours a day or it was like 22 hours a day, out in Florence, Colorado, that's twice as much time as those American citizens are allowed out of their cells. So I guess it depends on your basis of comparison. I know there was a big push after the suicides. There was also an uprising where a number of the inmates attacked the guards right around the time of the suicides. You kind of have both events in very close proximity. Gitmo went to more of an individual cell arrangement. By the time I left in 2007, there was a Colonel Bruce Wargo was the detention group commander. And he was making a real effort to get back to the communal environment. And he was bringing in like language classes and movie nights and you're trying to make it a more palatable environment. Interviewer: Cool. So 10 years later, Guantanamo was still open. Do you have any thoughts about that? - How long do we have? (chuckles) Yeah, it's disappointing that as we sit here in June of 2010, that we've still had three trials in the history of Guantanamo. As we mentioned, David Hicks got a nine month sentence and essentially a misdemeanor punishment. Salim Hamdan effectively got a five and a half month sentence. You've got about 180 people that are locked up at Guantanamo that have never faced trial. You've got two people that have been convicted as war criminals that are free men. So the kind of the running joke was in order to win in Gitmo you gotta lose and you have to go to court and lose and be convicted as a war criminal and you might get to go home or you can never face trial and be locked up indefinitely. So it's really frustrating. I think we really had the potential to have done this right from the start had the administration, these are gonna be military commissions they should have turned it over to the military as a mission, assign it to southern commander who is responsible for Guantanamo turn it over to the military, making a military mission and let's get it done and get it done right. But you had too many, we used to joke about refer to them as the big brains, the John Hughes and the David Addington and the Jim Haynes that didn't know anything about litigation, didn't know anything about the military but they were the this vangalis that we're gonna run this process. And we're sitting here in June of 2010 and nothing much has happened. So it's unfortunate that the things have ended up this way. And it's to me extraordinarily disappointing that the current administration who campaigned on their respect for the rule of law and justice and what a travesty military commissions in Guantanamo had been have suddenly flip-flopped and have become the third term of the Bush administration at least with respect to national security and detainees in Gitmo. Interviewer: So do you see your light at the end of this tunnel? - I don't know. There've been so many times over the last couple of years where I thought finally and it's never, yeah, I've gotten to the point where I'm afraid to be optimistic. I don't know. I don't know how this is gonna turn out. I'm hopeful that eventually we'll do it right but we've got almost a nine year track record of doing it wrong. So I don't know, it'd be interesting to say as I said, I mean, there's nothing wrong with military commissions had they been implemented the way they should have been. My concern is at this point no matter how much you spruce them up there's been such a taint on just the words military commission around the words Guantanamo that there is no amount of antiseptic that can fix that. Interviewer: Well, what would you do? - If I were king and I could do whatever I wanted. In my view terrorism is not just a US domestic issue. Terrorism affects pretty much every country. If you look the last several, whether it's England or Spain or Russia or Bali or pick your, terrorism's an international problem and there's inconsistent standards on how we deal with it. And if you look at organizations like Al Qaeda and the Geneva conventions were a great by-product of World War Two but it was based on German soldiers in uniform and fighting a country not an ideology like Al Qaeda. So we've tried to take in my view, a square peg and fit it into a round hole where if I were king, I think we should have a international terrorism tribunal. Like we have the international criminal court to deal with these transnational groups that affect everybody and not just us. And I'd probably throw piracy into that as well. And that's another kind of new phenomena that you probably saw months ago where the Canadian stopped a group of pirates and realized there was nothing they could charge them with under Canadian law. So they put them back on their boat and send them on their way. I think groups like that like the Shabaab and Al Qaeda and that should be dealt with as an international issue and not just a domestic issue. Interviewer: And will you close Guantanamo down if you were able to bring these men into international tribunals? - I think that would also ameliorate that problem. If this was treated by the international community then it'd be up to the international community to detain and prosecute or release or whatever the appropriate decisions are made. Again, I think it's unfortunate. I think Guantanamo is a safe, clean, humane facility that has been just, yeah, tarred and feathered to the point of being perhaps irredeemable. Interviewer: Do you regret that you were in Guantanamo for that year, less than a few months? Are you really betting up? - No. I mean, I fact I was telling the young lady on the ride from the airport over here that if I had to do over again, I'd do it over again. 'Cause it's frustrating the way that things ended up but for an attorney it was probably the most interesting 23 or 25 months that I ever had. And the folks I worked with on the prosecution on the defense side as well. I mean the folks I worked with 99% were extraordinarily talented and dedicated and ethical and it's unfortunate but the actions of the 1% overshadow the dedication of the 99% but it was a great group of folks. It was interesting beyond all belief and I'd do it again. Interviewer: That was great. Interviewer: Thank you so much. - It was my pleasure. Sure.