Interviewer: Good morning. - Good morning. Interviewer: We are very grateful to you for participating in the Witness to Guantanamo Project. We invite you to tell us of your experiences and involvement with the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center. We are hoping to provide you an opportunity to tell your story in your own words. And we're creating an archive of stories so that people in America and around the world will have a better opportunity to understand what happened in Guantanamo in the last dozen years, Future generations must know what happened and by telling your story you're contributing to history. And we certainly appreciate your willingness to take the time to come here today. - Thank you, happy to be here. Interviewer: Thank you. And if there's any time you'd like to take a break please let us know. And if you do say something that you would like us to remove, if you let us know we can remove it. - Okay. - And we'd like to begin, if you wouldn't mind introducing yourself and telling us a little bit about your background and when you were born and age and schooling. - Sure. My name is Cliff Sloan and I was born December, 1957. So I'm 57 and I grew up in Chicago, went to Harvard for college, undergraduate. Came to Washington, worked on Capitol Hill for a couple years, then went to Harvard Law School. And I clerked for a couple of judges after that, including Justice John Paul Stevens. And I've been in Washington since then. I've been at law firms. I've had different positions in government. I also spent eight years at the Washington Post Company. Interviewer: And what caused you to get involved with government, just? - Well initially I was always just very interested in government and public issues. And so I was really drawn to it and was thrilled to be working on Capitol Hill right after college for a Congressman from Chicago, Sydney Yates, whom I respected tremendously. But I've always just been very, very interested in public issues. Interviewer: And before you worked for President Obama could you give us a little detail on some of the other work you did for the government? - Certainly. Well, as I mentioned, I clerked for two judges, one on the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia, the Federal Court of Appeals for Judge J. Skelly Wright, and then for Justice John Paul Stevens on the Supreme Court. I also worked in the Office of Independent Counsel on Iran-Contra under Judge Lawrence Walsh, investigating Iran Contra and part of the prosecutorial team there. I worked in the Solicitor General's office at the Justice Department in the first Bush administration and I worked in the White House Counsel's Office under President Clinton in the first few years of his administration. Interviewer: And did you know President Obama when he selected you to be an envoy or was it just through these connections you just identified? - Well, I had met President Obama a few times and I had worked with the White House on some matters, particularly in terms of as an outside lawyer looking at Supreme Court, possible Supreme Court nominees. But I also knew Secretary of State Kerry quite well and I had worked with him on a number of things. And so I had a close relationship with Secretary of State Kerry and with other people working for him at the State Department. Interviewer: So I assume Secretary Kerry recommended you and I assume he approached you and asked you if you were interested. Why were you interested? - Well, it was not something that I had been thinking about, but when I was approached about it it's something that I thought that the issue of Guantanamo was very important. And if people felt like I could make a positive contribution on it, it was something that I wanted to do and something that I wanted to try to help out on. I was convinced that President Obama, Secretary Kerry and others were very serious about wanting to tackle the problem, the issue of closing Guantanamo. And of course this was after President Obama gave a speech in May, 2013 at the National Defense University in which he strongly reiterated and renewed his commitment to closing Guantanamo and that's something that I felt very strongly about and I felt if I could make a contribution I wanted to be a part of it. Interviewer: And did, why do you think you could make a contribution given how frustrating it had been in the past four to six years before you became an envoy? - Well, as I say, I felt that there was gonna be a renewed effort and renewed commitment. I fully recognize it had been a difficult issue, but I also felt that perhaps I could bring some skills to it. I had worked in Washington in a lot of different capacities. I worked in administrations of both parties. I worked in all three branches of government, in a couple of the positions that I had worked in before, both in the White House Counsel's Office and in the solicitor General's Office. I had a perspective on really all of the departments and agencies in the federal government. I had worked with Congress quite a bit. And so while I knew that it was a difficult issue I felt that perhaps I could make a contribution there. Interviewer: And how'd you begin the process once you were selected? - Well, so I began on July 1st, 2013, and on July 2nd I went to Guantanamo and spent a full day there, looking at the facility, meeting with the military the people who were there and getting a, I think a good feel for the facility. Also that first week I met with a number of the human rights groups who have been very, very involved in efforts to close Guantanamo. And one thing that I felt was very important from the beginning was really to try to have a fresh start on it. I knew that it had been a very difficult issue and that there was a lot of disappointment and frustration. And I found when I was talking to people on all sides of it, and I should also mention that even before starting, and certainly afterwards, I was reaching out to a lot of people who had been involved in the issue of, both in the Obama administration and in the Bush administration to try to get as much background and insight as I could. And one point that I noticed was that a lot of people who had been involved in the issue tended to want to sort of re-litigate old battles in a way. And one thing that I felt very strongly and I would say to them, that I think in some ways that's the least productive thing that I can do. Let's just start fresh where we are, let's move forward, let's move ahead. What do you think we should do going forward? Let's not look backwards, let's look forward. And so that was something that I think was was very important for me. And I was, and I would say to people in meetings that I think there's a new air of possibility and that's how we should approach it. So what are the sort of positive, constructive actions that we can take in moving forward? Interviewer: So when you spoke to people did you, does that include the former envoys and ambassadors who worked for both Bush and Obama in trying to settle, resettle detainees? - Some yes, yeah definitely. Definitely worked with a lot of people who were very involved in the transfer process in different phases of it, yes. Interviewer: And what was your impression of Guantanamo that day you went down there? - Well you know, to kind of, I had been at Guantanamo once before in the Clinton administration when it was housing tens of thousands of, I think actually it was Cubans at the time. And I think there were some 30,000, so. But when I went to Guantanamo I was struck by a number of factors about it. I mean, I thought that the... The military certainly explained at length the task that they were dealing with which was a very difficult task and everything that they were doing to try to discharge it. I met with the three Uyghurs who were still at Guantanamo. There had been a total of 22, but there were three who were remaining there and I met with them. And certainly felt very, very strongly that one very important priority was to move out the last three Uyghurs, for many reasons including the fact that the U.S. government had said five years earlier, had told the court that lack of legal authority to be holding them and there were practical problems with moving them. But I felt very strongly that that was that that was a very high priority. Interviewer: So you actually spoke to detainees while you were there at Guantanamo that day? - Yeah, I spoke to the three Uyghurs who were there, yes. Interviewer: And did that change your impression on who you're working for in terms of, you know when you're trying to resettle these detainees? Did you get a better sense of who these people are? - Well, it didn't change my impression of who I was working for, but it did, I think it was helpful to get a feel for the individuals. And there were many different ways of getting a feel for the individuals. Certainly meeting with them was helpful, but there also is very, very extensive information on them. And that is one thing that I think is very important that struck me throughout the time that I was there is that sometimes people can speak in broad generalities about the population at Guantanamo, and there is, you know, tremendous variation among the individuals who are there. And it's really, I think one of the unfortunate misconceptions when people speak about the individuals at Guantanamo in kind of broad sweeping terms that ignore the differences among the population. Interviewer: So after you came back home on July 2nd, what was the next step you did? - Well, as I said, you know, one of the things that I did that week also was meet with the human rights groups who had been very involved in closure. But I immediately tried to get in motion plans for transfer. And so I, there were a few people in the office who had been at the State Department working on the issue. I also had colleagues at agencies and departments throughout the government and one thing that was a priority in the first few weeks was meeting with all of my colleagues across the government including at the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence community, the Justice Department, Homeland Security. But one of the very top priorities was trying to see who we could transfer and how to go about that. And every transfer involves negotiations with a foreign government And whether the individuals are gonna be repatriated to the country of their citizenship or resettled to other countries. And there's a preference for repatriation if it's feasible, but for many of the detainees, because of either security concerns or humane treatment concerns in their home country, it's not feasible to repatriate them. So began tackling the issue of possible transfers in terms of getting going. There had been very few people who had been transferred in the two to three years before I got there. And so a real priority was to try to get going on transfers. And so we started to make arrangements in terms of reaching out to different countries, arranging trips to those countries, and to get the process rolling for getting transfers going. Interviewer: How do you identify the countries? Did other people identify the countries for you? So they had spoken to these nations before you became the envoy or did you yourself identified in these countries? - Well, I would say it's a combination of the two. I mean, first of all, there were some people who could be, who could be repatriated. And, you know, by the end of 2013, so in the first six months that I was there, we transferred 11 people. And of those 11, a number of them were repatriated to their countries of origin. So four went to Algeria, two went to Saudi Arabia, two went to-- - Kuwait, wasn't it? - No not Kuwait at that time. Two went to Sudan. And then so eight of the 11 were repatriations. And then by the end of the year, the three Uyghurs went to Slovakia so that was a resettlement. But you can see there was a real focus on the possibility of repatriation initially. And as I say so in that six months, we got going on the repatriation to those countries and then I was very pleased that we were able to resettle the three Uyghurs to Slovakia. Interviewer: How did that happen? Can you tell us, did you identify Slovakia or did someone else? And did you do negotiation for that? - I did do the negotiation and I went to Bratislava and I also separately met with officials from Slovakia. You know, I can't get into details of the discussions with the foreign government. I would say we work closely with Slovakia on a range of issues. They had previously accepted three detainees from Guantanamo for resettlement, either two or three, I think it was three, in 2010 I believe. But there also are, there also is a wide range of other issues that they work closely with the United States on which we appreciate very much. And so we talked to Slovakia, then they were willing to take this action. It was very, very important humanitarian action and we were very grateful to them for doing so. Interviewer: I assume you can't reveal whether in fact there was some financial assistance to the countries or to Slovakia for taking them in. - Yeah, I can't get in, I cannot get into the arrangements, but I will say that I think that with countries and in general, I was pleased by the support that we got from a range of countries for resettlement during my tenure. And I was pleased that we were able to move forward on that front. Which is really, it is a very significant action when countries agree to do that. And they do it in my experience, there's a range of motivations. They recognize the important humanitarian action. Many countries, most countries have called on the United States to close Guantanamo. They recognize this as the only way we're gonna be able to move forward and closing it. They think there are very important issues, not only for humanitarian reasons, but frankly from security reasons that it is a security problem that it hurts our counter-terrorism efforts. And they're very willing to work with the United States on it. Obviously as with everything with Guantanamo, nothing is easy, But I was very, very pleased by the support that we got from a wide range of allies and friends and partners in regions throughout the world. And yeah, there was support that was helpful from a wide range of religious organizations including the Vatican and the Pope called on countries to accept detainees. International organizations, such as the Organization of American States, strongly urged member countries to accept detainees. So, as I say, that's something I was very gratified by, during my tenure. - Would you initiate those? Would you contact the Vatican or the OAS and ask them to assist you? - Well were in discussions with them. I mean there are ongoing discussions, just as there are with other countries, of course. I mean it's important to recognize for example with other countries, it's part of the ongoing bilateral relationship on a broad range of issues. And they would obviously work very closely with our ambassadors and our embassies in those countries. And the same thing is true with international organizations like the Organization of American States or with the Vatican. You know we have a broad range of ongoing conversations and so this was something that we would talk to them about. Interviewer: Did any country ever say to you if the U.S. won't accept people why should we? - Yes, countries would say that. 'Cause as you know, there's a ban in current law on detainees coming to the United States for any reason. And what I would, and I would discuss it with countries. And I would say first of all, we're trying to get the law changed. We think it's, we think it's not right that there's a ban on transferring detainees to the United States. But also we have a practical problem, which is we have people who are stuck in Guantanamo solely because they don't have a country to go to. That's the reality, and current law prohibits them from coming to the United States. So the question is, do we do something about that? And will you work with us on doing something about it? Because this is the only way that these people can get outta Guantanamo right now. That simply is the reality. But certainly that would come up in conversations. Interviewer: And for security issues, did countries say to you, they were concerned about the security issues of these men? I know the U.S. said they were concerned, but were the countries themselves worried about that? - Well you know without going into detail, certainly security arrangements and security issues are something that is very important in the discussion with receiving countries. So absolutely security issues is, you know is something that is discussed with other countries. Interviewer: Did the OAS initiate the contact with Uruguay? - Well again, without getting into details on particular conversations, but let me just say, you know, we have a strong relationship with Uruguay and it was sort of part of kinda bilateral discussions directly with Uruguay. Interviewer: So what I'm hearing from you is it's possible that there are discussions going on with many nations currently, even though you're no longer an envoy and that maybe something could open up and transfers could occur tomorrow for that matter, based on what you had set forth, you know, months ago. - Certainly, I mean, and so this is, my last day was December 31st. Today is what, February 11th. And so, but my knowledge as of December 31st, yes there were ongoing discussions. It sometimes, it takes a while, in terms of discussions and arrangements with foreign governments. But there's certainly was a very active effort underway looking prospectively for additional transfers. And that's something that is very much, you know, part of the policy of the United States government right now. So yes, absolutely. I think there's very, very active effort to have additional transfers and additional discussions with foreign governments, absolutely. - And I know you've said publicly why, but I'll ask you, since this is for history and people see this 50 years from now, not necessarily tomorrow, but why didn't you stay if you saw other people in that transition where they will also move on? Why weren't you there to help that too, if you were so effective, which apparently you were to help resettle these detainees? - Well in my discussions with Secretary Kerry, when I agreed to take the position, I said that I would stay 12 to 18 months, and I stayed the full 18 months. And I felt very committed to making sure that we make as much progress as we could. And in the course of the 18 months, I think we made a great deal of progress in three areas. Which is one, in terms of getting transfers going again. As I mentioned, there had been almost no transfers in the two, 2 1/2 years before the renewed effort. And we transferred a total of 44 detainees, including a number who were transferred on January 14th. But there was a total of 44 detainees. There were 166 there when I started on July 1st, 2013. We transferred 44 of them. Second, we worked with Congress successfully to remove unnecessary obstacles to foreign transfers. And third, we began an administrative process for those who were not approved for transfer and who are not facing formal criminal charges in the military commissions to give them a fresh look and a fresh opportunity to show that they could now be approved for transfer because they did not present a continuing significant security concern that warranted their continued incarceration. And so on all three of those fronts, I think those were very, very important efforts, very important signs of progress. And we also, I think, laid the foundation for additional progress. But I felt that I had, as I say, I stayed the full 18 months, had gotten a lot done and had set things in motion for additional progress. Interviewer: I mean my fear is that you were so strong and there's so much momentum, and then by you leaving it could collapse again. - Well look, I think, you know, I certainly did everything I could to move the ball forward. But this was not a one man effort. I mean this was really, an all of government effort. President Obama feels very strongly about closing Guantanamo, has made that very, very clear publicly. I heard it from him directly in private. And so I think, you know, throughout the government there is a clear recognition of the importance of moving forward. The only thing that is very important is that when people are approved for transfer, it's based on a unanimous decision by six departments and agencies: the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security Department of Justice and the Director of National Intelligence. There's an interagency working group, it's called the Guantanamo Detainee Transfer Working Group which I co-chaired along with the special envoy at the Defense Department. It meets every other week. It's in touch on a constant basis. All six departments and agencies are very, very involved. So, so there really is a sort of concerted government effort in terms of moving forward. Interviewer: Going back, did you encounter any unexpected problems that, you know, that no one informed you about it and suddenly you were confronted with them? Interviewer: No, I wouldn't say that there were kind of unexpected problems. I mean there, I mean I knew it is an issue that has been a difficult issue. And it has been, there have been, you know, many problems in kind of moving forward and there are many misunderstandings about it. So I knew that there were going to be zigs and zags in the process and, you know, and that proved to be the case. But my overwhelming reaction was that I was pleased at the progress that we were able to make. And I do think there is a, there's a lot of opportunity for sort of common ground and a common sense approach in terms of kinda moving forward with closing Guantanamo. So, you know, so as I say, while there were some zigs and zags, I thought that the more important result was that we were able to move forward. Interviewer: I know you're very positive and I really appreciate probably why you're so successful, but I'm just curious if people around the world are, you know, looking at Guantanamo as a black stain, as you know, and that's why you want to close it. But countries must be really angry at the U.S. for maintaining and continuing, and you must have had to have some of that hostility come to you, or no, maybe not? - Well there's no question that countries around the world feel strongly that Guantanamo should be closed, a broad range of countries. And I heard that directly from them and from different international organizations. As I say that also sometimes was channeled into a willingness to help us and work with us. But I also heard that from our ambassadors around the world, that it's a friction point with many countries around the world and is something that undermines our alliances and relationships. And I had many ambassadors who implored me to move forward as promptly as we could, because it was an irritant with other countries. But other countries also just felt strongly about closing Guantanamo, because it undermines collectively our security. You know at one meeting that I had with a very, very tough ally on counter-terrorism, a country that's on the front lines of counter-terrorism, not a European country, a country from another region, at the end of the meeting this very senior official, who as I say, this is a very tough and staunch fighter against terrorism, leaned forward and he said to me, "you know the single greatest thing the United States could do to combat terrorism would be to close Guantanamo." And so other countries felt about very strongly about the imperative of moving forward on closing the facility. Interviewer: Do you think the message reaches the general population of the U.S.? - Well, you know, I'm not sure if it is understood as well as it should be. And, you know, this is not just, for example President Obama. President George W. Bush's administration opened Guantanamo became convinced by the end of his presidency that Guantanamo should be closed. And in his memoir, he says that he was convinced Guantanamo should be closed because it had become, and this is a quote, "a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our allies." And there are many senior officials from the Bush administration who were very active in Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism who came to the same conclusion and who believe strongly that it's time to turn the page and close the chapter on Guantanamo. And I don't think that the, sometimes I don't think there's as much of a public understanding about that consensus across two administrations as there as there should be. Interviewer: And why not? Why doesn't Congress understand what you just explained? - Well, look I think that there are a number of people in Congress who do share that view. As I say, I was pleased we were able to work with Congress in 2013 to remove some of the obstacles. And I think that it, that a careful focus on the facts leads one to that conclusion. And so I remain hopeful and optimistic that there is a common ground approach for moving forward and that the light will shine on those facts and that recognition. Interviewer: What advice would you give the next envoy and why hasn't he or she been selected yet? - Well, I know that Secretary Kerry and the White House are actively looking at successors and there definitely will be a successor. And I'm sure that he or she will be a strong and effective special envoy, 'cause it is a very, very high priority for the President and for Secretary Kerry. I think it is important to move forward as promptly as possible. And again, of the current population, so 122 people there now, 54 are approved for transfer. Most of those 54 were approved for transfer five years ago. Many of them have been held at Guantanamo for 12 or 13 years. It is absolutely imperative to move forward on transferring those who are approved for transfer as soon as possible. It's important in terms of progress and momentum in closing Guantanamo. It's important in making the problem more manageable. And it's important for the individuals who are there, for the human beings who are there, who have been approved for transfer for a very long time. So I think for everybody in government, it is very important to recognize the priority of moving forward on those approved for transfer as promptly as possible. Interviewer: And what advice would you give the next envoy, just practical advice, the kinds of things that he or she wouldn't know, you know from reading the newspapers, the kinds of things that-- - Well look, he or she will come into it, not as a solitary figure, with a very strong support framework and it's worth emphasizing this. Because first of all, there is, there's an office of Guantanamo Closure at the State Department. It was the office I headed. There are six other people in the office. There's a deputy who's acting as acting special envoy. And so by the way, one thing that's very important, all the work at the office is going forward. It's full speed ahead. That office is up and running. There is an acting special envoy and that, you know, everything is moving ahead. But there's that office. There's the entire resources of the State Department. Secretary Kerry has made it very clear he's very committed to it, it's a priority for him, it's a priority for the President. So one works very closely with the embassies around the world, as well as in Washington, with all of the regional assistant secretaries, so there's a separate assistant secretary for each region. And then there also are different individual units and entities within the State Department. And so you've got all of the resources of the State Department. And then as I mentioned, there are these six departments and agencies, these five other departments and agencies, all of whom are working very strongly on it, as well as the White House and the National Security Council. So there is a very kind of robust framework that somebody walks into and very, very extensive ongoing efforts. Interviewer: And will it succeed? Do you think Guantanamo will be shut down by the time President Obama leaves office? - I believe that it will be and I think there definitely is a path to closure. And the reason that I think it will be is because President Obama feels very strongly about closing the facility. He's determined not to hand it off to his successor. Yeah, he inherited it and he doesn't wanna leave it to the next president. And so I do believe that it will be closed during President Obama's Presidency. Interviewer: I hate to say this, but President Obama on his second day of office said that he wanted to close Guantanamo and then nothing happened for six years. So why are you so sure that now a renewed effort is gonna make a difference? - Well first of all, that's not accurate to say nothing happened for six years. There were many transfers that were going forward in 2009 and 2010. Then Congress passed very severe restrictions and the process shut down for two, 2 1/2 years. But there were 242 individuals there when President Obama took office. There were 122 there now. There was this, President Obama ordered this very intensive review of every individual who was there, which led to this approval for transfer, which continues to be a guiding principle. And it's a process that has stood the test of time. The so-called recidivism numbers or re-engagement numbers of those who went through that process is very small. It was a very, very thorough and extensive process. Now, I think it's unfortunate that there hasn't been more progress. And President Obama did call for it to be closed within one year of his executive order on the second day in office and was not able to do that. But I think there has been some progress. Now in terms of why do I think things will move forward at this point? I mean first of all as I say, we were able to change the law to remove some of the unnecessary obstacles. And I just, I think that there were many unanticipated developments in the first year or two. Probably through this project, you know that those intimately. As I mentioned to you earlier in the interview, I think in some ways the least productive thing I can do is re-litigate those battles, but I think a lot was learned from those battles. And so I think the question is looking forward, in the next two years of the Obama administration, will it be possible to achieve this very important priority? And I think the answer is yes. Interviewer: And how will you convince Congress or how will the next envoy or this collection of robust agencies convince Congress to release people into the U.S.? - Well what, I think that the path is clear. So first of all, transfer all of those who can be transferred to foreign countries who can be transferred, so safely and responsibly to foreign countries. That's all those who are approved for transfer. Then there's this ongoing periodic review board process. And it has gone to conclusion on nine individuals. It approved six of them for transfer and some of those actually have been transferred from Guantanamo. So that's the first step, which is a very important step, which is transfer all of those who can be transferred. Get it down to a small core who cannot safely be transferred to other countries. For example, there are 10 who are facing charges in the military commission system. And at that point, whatever that number of the small core is, transfer them to the U.S. for super secure facilities. I think when all of those who have been transferred can be transferred and it's down to a small core, it will make absolutely no sense to keep them at Guantanamo. As it is, it is exorbitantly expensive to have the detention facility there. There's a cost of more than $3 million per detainee each year, compared to approximately 75,000 per year per prisoner at a super max facility. And that doesn't even take into account hundreds of millions of dollars of infrastructure improvements that would be necessary if one is saying, we're gonna keep the facility open for years. So you get it down to a small core, it makes no sense to keep them at Guantanamo and I think that will be very clear. I think one of the unfortunate things that can tend to happen in the debate, is that people go to the hardest problem and then sorta get stuck there. But there's an area where we can make a lot of progress, which is moving all of those who can be transferred. And I think when it gets down to a small core then, it will be clear that it's a very manageable issue. Interviewer: And you'll convince, or the administration will convince Congress members that it's acceptable to let this core group come into the U.S.? - Into very secured prison facilities. Yes, I think, yes I do. I think so, because I just think the logic and the facts will be overwhelming, and that it simply makes no sense to keep them in the Guantanamo detention facility at that point. Interviewer: I don't think you'll answer this question either, but have you had conversations with Congress members who are opposed to that who've said maybe they'll be convinced otherwise once you get that number down? - Well I will say this, that in, I spent a lot of time on Capitol Hill in late 2013, working on the legislation to remove the unnecessary obstacles to foreign transfers. And there were definitely members of Congress and Senators I talked to who previously had been not convinced about closing Guantanamo, who when they went through the cost figures, they were outraged by the cost of Guantanamo. And they said, this makes absolutely no sense. So there definitely were individuals in Congress who were rethinking their approach based on the cost. And the other thing which I think was very significant and did not get very much attention last year was that in the spring of 2014, there was an amendment that was adopted unanimously in the Senate Armed Services Committee that would have allowed transfers to the United States for detention and prosecution if, and it set up a couple of procedures and demanding procedures that, before those transfers could take place, the administration had to send a detailed plan for each individual and it also had to give Congress the opportunity to pass a resolution of disapproval. But the important point is that that passed unanimously. And it's an illustration that maybe there are ways that aren't the sort of binary choices that people have been looking at and building in additional procedures where there will be a sort of common ground approach. So I do think that it will be possible to work with Congress on that. But again, I think the highest priority right now is to move forward on moving all of those who are approved for transfer, who can be transferred. - Why didn't Congress, why didn't the entire Senate vote on that? Why just the committee? - Well it, the Senate Armed Services Committee legislation never went to the floor of the Senate. And so, and then there was an agreement with the House on the legislation. There was legislation that had passed the House. So it was just the dynamics of Congress that it never went to the floor. Interviewer: Sounds to me like you should have stayed and advocate on behalf of the administration with Congress. Sounds to me like you'd be more effective at essentially now not much is happening at least to the public. - Well I think there are a lot of people, first of all in the administration, who are making the case to Congress. And as I say, I am absolutely positive that there is a lot going on in the executive branch in terms of trying to move forward on transfers. There's no question about that. Interviewer: Are you still involved? Do they still come to you for advice or to give some advice, especially since it's possible some people might be resettled tomorrow that come out of your watch, right out of your time? - Mm hmm. You know, occasionally there are conversations on a transitional basis. But it's obviously, it's an issue that I continue to feel strongly about. Interviewer: So should we expect to possibly see some future transfers because of your work? Can you tell us that or? - Well, I think you will definitely see some future transfers. And I think, but I'll sort of leave it to others in terms of kind of, you know, when those are now announced and how they are announced. But I absolutely would expect additional transfers. Interviewer: Is there something, since you want to keep this short, is there something I didn't ask you that you wanted to share especially since this is for history and it's important that people have a perspective and they have perspective from so many people. We even interviewed a few other envoys as well. And just that something that could people understand why it's been so difficult to close Guantanamo. And if in fact we are moving forward after six years and perhaps some of the thoughts that I haven't asked you that you're wanting to share with us. - Well I would just say that, that I think it is very, very important to move forward. It's very important to close the facility for a wide variety of reasons, including the fact that it actually undermines our national security. I think it's very important for people to realize that there's been a consensus of that among people who were involved in the issue in the past administration as well as in this administration. And I also think that while it's a difficult issue and there's, you know, there are many considerations, it absolutely is possible to move forward. And I think that what sometimes happens is that people think, well, it's such a difficult issue, one can't do anything. And in my experience, that's just absolutely wrong. Progress can be made, it should be made. You've got people who've been there for 12 or 13 years who have been approved for transfer for almost half of the time of their incarceration. And it is just absolutely imperative that we move forward as promptly as we can. Interviewer: You know, I'm sorry, I'm just gonna ask you one more question. As you were talking, I was thinking with Yemen becoming a failed state, if you will and half the detainees left in Guantanamo are Yemeni, how does that impact, you know, moving forward? - That's a very, that's a very important question, because of the number of Yemenis and there's a lot of misunderstanding about that. Of the 54 who are approved for transfer, 47 of them are from Yemen. And nobody's gonna send them back to Yemen with the security situation in this country, in that country at this time. So it's very important to resettle them. And that was something that we moved forward on and we resettled a number of Yemenis and nobody from Yemen had been transferred for a long time. And so it absolutely, if you're gonna make progress on Guantanamo you need to move forward with those who are from Yemen. But one point that is very, very important is that sometimes people say, oh everybody who's left at Guantanamo is the worst of the worst. And they wouldn't be there for so long unless they were the worst of the worst. And that could not be more wrong. Many of those, and many of those approved for transfer, the reason that they're stuck at Guantanamo is because they're from Yemen and they can't go back to their home country. It's very, very important to resettle them to other countries. But it's also very important to correct this misperception that everybody who's there somehow is the worst of the worst. For those from Yemen, they're the ones with the worst luck and that's why they're stuck there. So the problem of Yemen, of the people from Yemen, is central to making a lotta progress on Guantanamo. But the situation in Yemen itself does not materially change anything, because we had reached the conclusion that we needed to resettle those from Yemen because of the security situation. So I think that process of transferring the Yemenis to other countries and resettling them, the ones who are approved for transfer, that needs to go forward full speed ahead. But that's been the operating plan and I would expect that to continue. Interviewer: Who thinks, the people left are the worst of the worst, who thinks that? - No, I'll let them speak for themselves. Interviewer: Okay, but that's the impression you get that people-- - There are some who have said that. There are some who have said that. That anybody who's there is the worst of the worst and that almost by definition, if somebody has been held for that long it's because they are among the very worst actors. And that is simply flat out wrong. And that's an illustration of why I say it's very important to focus on the facts and not to accept these sweeping generalizations. So when one looks at the facts, that simply is not the case. Interviewer: I mean, listening to you and I think we're just about done, it's kind of what I was thinking before, we need a better PR job or the administration needs a better public relations job with you out front perhaps, saying all that you told us today. 'Cause I think the public is not aware of what you've said. Or maybe they don't listen or maybe the media isn't interested in listening. - Well I think a proper understanding of the facts, an accurate understanding of the facts at Guantanamo is very helpful to moving forward on closing the facility. Interviewer: But, you know, well thank you. So I think I'll ask you again, there's nothing more. - I think that covers it. Interviewer: Okay, Johnny needs to take 20 seconds of room tone-- - Yeah, okay. - Before we shut off of our taping. - Okay. - Okay. Johnny: Okay and get room tone. - Okay, thank you. - Yep