WEBVTT
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Okay, good morning.
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Good morning, professor.
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We are very grateful to you
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for participating in the witness to Guantanamo project,
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we invite you to speak of your experiences and involvement
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at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
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and we are hoping to provide you with an opportunity
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to tell you a story in your own words.
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Thank you, professor Honigsberg,
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it's really a privilege to meet you
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and to work with you on this project.
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Thank you, honored to have you here today.
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We are creating an archive of stories,
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so that people in America and around the world
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will have a better understanding of what you
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and others have experienced and observed.
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Future generations must know what happened at Guantanamo
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and by telling your story you're contributing to history.
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And if there's anything that you say
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that you'd like us to remove let us know
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and if you'd like to take a break at any time
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let us know and we're happy to do that as well.
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And we'd like to begin by just asking you
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some personal questions, like your name,
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and your hometown and your birth date and age,
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maybe we can begin with
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Sure.
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My name is John Adams,
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my hometown is Tucson, Arizona,
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I was born on July 15, 1954, and I'm currently 58 years old.
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And your marital status?
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I'm married.
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And, oh, I'm sorry.
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No I'm happily.
Your education.
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I'm sorry.
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Your education.
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I am a PhD candidate at the school of government
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and public policy at the University of Arizona.
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I have three master's degrees,
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one in English from the University of Massachusetts,
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one in international relations from Boston University,
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and one in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.
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And maybe you can just briefly tell us
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your previous occupation and your current occupation.
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I served in the United States army on active duty
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from 1976, until 2007.
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I retired as a Brigadier general in September, 2007.
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And You currently.
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Currently I am a PhD candidate
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which is an occupation in and of itself,
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but I also run a consulting business
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for national security and defense related issues.
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And did you say where you live probably?
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I live in Tucson, Arizona.
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So I think you asked where is my hometown?
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Yes.
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I immediately thought, well, I live in Tucson, Arizona,
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but I was born in Washington DC.
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Thank you.
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Okay well, we'd like to begin
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with when you joined the military
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and why did you join the military?
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Just a little background there.
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Sure.
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Well, I joined the military in December, 1976,
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I was a student in fact I have a bachelor's
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in economics from the North Carolina State University
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and while I was at the university
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I was in the reserve officer training Corps program
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and was commissioned as a second Lieutenant the same day
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as I graduated from college.
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I had always wanted to join the military
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I think because and there was a couple of reasons one,
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my dad was in the military during world war II.
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He worked in the defense department after that.
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And so it I saw working for the defense department
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and being in the military as an honorable profession,
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and still do of course, but it was something
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that I grew up with and felt comfortable
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in fact, I thought I believed then and still do
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that it was a privilege to serve our country
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and serve our constitution.
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Just briefly could you give us
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a little background as to what work you did
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between 1976 and say the year 2001?
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Sure.
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I began as most newly commissioned officers do,
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as a second Lieutenant,
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I was commissioned in the military intelligence Corps,
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my first assignments though were in the field artillery
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as a second Lieutenant.
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I then after a couple of years
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I went to army flight school where I flew helicopters
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and also flew fixed wing aircraft,
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for several years up until the mid 1980s.
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And then I went, I was sent back
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to military intelligence jobs
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when I was assigned to NATO headquarters
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in Brussels in 1983,
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I was there for three years as a very junior officer
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at this very high level headquarters
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but it was a real education.
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And I was there again for three years,
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working at NATO headquarters and made my share of coffee,
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but, I also had the chance to learn from and observe
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senior leaders who were working
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at a very different, higher level of responsibility
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than I could I'd ever seen before.
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And then I went to West Point to teach English
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after earning a master's degree in English
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at University of Massachusetts.
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I taught English at West Point for a bit over two years,
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and in 1991, I went to Desert Storm,
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worked in battle damage assessment and targeting,
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in CENTCOM headquarters there,
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and then after that experience in Desert Storm,
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I went to, an infantry division in Germany for three years,
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in intelligence, military intelligence assignments,
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tactical military intelligence.
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And when I finished that in 1994,
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I became what the army refers to as a foreign area officer.
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These are officers who are trained in language,
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culture and regional experience
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to serve in assignments that require working
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with other countries, either in,
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from a standpoint of being an advisor
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to army units or from the standpoint
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of being in political military organizations
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as advisors or staff officers.
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In my case, I became an attache,
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which is a little bit more specialized
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in the sense that you don't work in an army organization,
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you actually work in an embassy.
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And so I was assigned as a foreign area officer
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as an attache in Belgium, in Croatia,
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and in Korea over the course of the next decade.
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In between my assignment in Croatia,
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and I have to say I was also temporary duty in Rwanda
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in 1996 to, augment the U.S. embassy there in Rwanda.
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And that proved pretty stressful time.
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I had an assignment between my time in Croatia and in Korea
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in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
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and that was in 2001, September 11th, 2001.
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I was assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
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in the Pentagon on that day.
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Well, I'll ask you about that in a moment,
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I just want to know what languages were you trained in?
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Do you speak other languages besides English?
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Yes, although I have to say I would be arrogant to say
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that my language skills are, are very good,
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but no, I can get by pretty well
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in French Dutch, German and Croatian.
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And were you trained in the cultures
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of these nations that you served in as well?
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Did you have any actual training?
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I had school in Croatian language
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and it was a lot of cultural training as well,
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prior to my assignment and in Croatia in 1998.
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And, I think there's a certain amount of cultural background
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that you get from living in a country,
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so I had, I had lived in Belgium for,
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but, I'd already lived there for three years
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by the time I became an attache at our embassy in Brussels,
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when I was assigned to NATO headquarters,
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and lived in Belgium.
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And so, you know, I'd learned, I spoke the language
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French, and Dutch.
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I was able to get by pretty well, and that helped a lot.
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And then just being, living in the, in Western Europe
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I mean, I was what is called a European foreign area officer
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and someone who lives in Europe and has taken courses
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in language, or has learned a language from in other ways
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or has an advanced degree in this case
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in international relations really helped a lot
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to bridge that cultural gap
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between being an American guy from, you know,
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Maryland, Washington DC area,
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and somebody who has to live work and,
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really to understand the people and the organizations
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and the way of life in Western Europe.
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And just really briefly,
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how long were you in Rwanda when you were there?
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I was there for a month.
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Okay.
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So a brief period of time.
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Can you tell us how it was for you at 9/11,
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exactly where you were and how you reacted
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or what was the reaction around you.
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Sure.
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Well, it was a bad day for everybody.
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And I think the further away, or the further you get,
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or the closer you get to, you know, the,
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in this case the crash site at the Pentagon
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or to ground zero in New York,
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the more intense and the more traumatic the experience,
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and I take nothing away
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from people that have family there at all,
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'cause it's obviously massively traumatic for them as well.
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But I was about 100 meters away from the crash site
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where the plane actually entered the building.
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My, you know, I know no one from my office
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was killed or injured, thank God,
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but there were roughly 120 of our brothers and sisters
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who were some of whom I knew.
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And, you know, I just, you know, describe the scene briefly.
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It was, you know, just a few minutes before nine,
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and some of us, I was the deputy director of European policy
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in the Office of Secretary of Defense,
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and we, a number of us would watch split-screen CNN,
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or I don't know maybe other people
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were watching other things, but usually it was CNN,
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and CNN was on shortly before nine o'clock,
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and I distinctly remember one of our, my office colleagues,
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an air force Colonel in this case said,
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"Whoa, some plane just hit, you know
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one of the World Trade Center towers."
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Well, that's remarkable under any circumstances
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but then as soon as some of us came in to join him
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watching the scene, another plane hit the building
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and it was much clearer that this was not a Cessna
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from the local airport, that it was a jetliner,
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and so it was pretty clear to everybody at that point
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this was not, it's not one, not a coincidence
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and two it's a tragedy of massive scale.
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So, it was disturbing to say the least.
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The leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
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and this is about at nine o'clock,
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my boss, who was the deputy assistant secretary
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for Europe and NATO was in a meeting with his boss,
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or in this case, her boss who was the assistant secretary
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of defense, or one of the assistant secretaries of defense,
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and that meeting would normally last 10 or 15 minutes
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from nine to 9:10 or 9:15.
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Well, it didn't, it lasted another five or so,
235
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because there was this huge problem
236
00:12:10.960 --> 00:12:15.960 line:15%
that although that office could not do much about it,
237
00:12:15.990 --> 00:12:17.970 line:15%
it certainly sparked a great deal of discussion
238
00:12:17.970 --> 00:12:20.760 line:15%
about what is going on and what should we do.
239
00:12:20.760 --> 00:12:24.370 line:15%
And so in this case, my, she, my boss
240
00:12:24.370 --> 00:12:25.341 line:15%
the deputy assistant secretary--
241
00:12:25.341 --> 00:12:26.174 line:15%
What's her name?
242
00:12:26.174 --> 00:12:27.260 line:15%
Can you tells us her name.
243
00:12:27.260 --> 00:12:30.000 line:15%
Lisa Bronson and as I mentioned her name
244
00:12:30.000 --> 00:12:32.920 line:15%
I will mention her with great respect
245
00:12:32.920 --> 00:12:36.640 line:15%
because she was an excellent leader that day,
246
00:12:36.640 --> 00:12:40.410 line:15%
she did, I mean, really I was proud to work
247
00:12:40.410 --> 00:12:44.840 line:15%
with and for her, on that day and days after,
248
00:12:44.840 --> 00:12:47.850 line:15%
because of her leadership skills and because of her,
249
00:12:47.850 --> 00:12:51.620 line:15%
really her devotion to not only taking care of our country
250
00:12:51.620 --> 00:12:54.210 line:15%
but taking care of the people that she worked with.
251
00:12:54.210 --> 00:12:56.070 line:15%
She was, she's really a hero.
252
00:12:56.070 --> 00:12:58.420 line:15%
And she's one of the most,
253
00:12:58.420 --> 00:13:02.340 line:15%
and I think her comportment that day was remarkable,
254
00:13:02.340 --> 00:13:04.100 line:15%
and I'll get to that in just a second.
255
00:13:04.100 --> 00:13:06.360 line:15%
But she came back from the meeting with her boss
256
00:13:06.360 --> 00:13:08.130 line:15%
the assistant Secretary of Defense,
257
00:13:08.130 --> 00:13:10.290 line:15%
and it was clear we had a problem,
258
00:13:10.290 --> 00:13:12.380 line:15%
but we'd only started our meeting
259
00:13:12.380 --> 00:13:13.497 line:15%
which our meeting was supposed to,
260
00:13:13.497 --> 00:13:15.600 line:15%
and I think start at 9:20,
261
00:13:15.600 --> 00:13:16.820 line:15%
and it was just a few minutes later,
262
00:13:16.820 --> 00:13:19.040 line:15%
and there was an army major general
263
00:13:19.040 --> 00:13:21.770 line:15%
who was her deputy there,
264
00:13:21.770 --> 00:13:23.810 line:15%
and he was an air defense officer,
265
00:13:23.810 --> 00:13:27.240 line:15%
very astute gentlemen in all situations,
266
00:13:27.240 --> 00:13:30.690 line:15%
but he said, "We should get some fighter combat air patrol
267
00:13:30.690 --> 00:13:32.380 line:15%
up over the Pentagon."
268
00:13:32.380 --> 00:13:36.740 line:15%
Which good idea, unfortunately, less than a minute later,
269
00:13:36.740 --> 00:13:39.522 line:15%
things don't happen from that quickly,
270
00:13:39.522 --> 00:13:42.090 line:15%
and probably there were others astute as he,
271
00:13:42.090 --> 00:13:44.230 line:15%
who were thinking the same thing,
272
00:13:44.230 --> 00:13:45.790 line:15%
clearly there were, we know from history
273
00:13:45.790 --> 00:13:46.670 line:15%
that that's what happened,
274
00:13:46.670 --> 00:13:50.410 line:15%
but, it was there wasn't fighter combat air patrol
275
00:13:50.410 --> 00:13:53.040 line:15%
of the Pentagon and the plane hit the building.
276
00:13:53.040 --> 00:13:57.690 line:15%
So for us, it was already a great deal
277
00:13:57.690 --> 00:14:00.680 line:15%
of wondering what's going on,
278
00:14:00.680 --> 00:14:03.640 line:15%
but then the term, the thoughts turned to how are the people
279
00:14:03.640 --> 00:14:05.220 line:15%
with whom we work?
280
00:14:05.220 --> 00:14:07.610 line:15%
Because it was a loud explosion
281
00:14:07.610 --> 00:14:10.400 line:15%
that we didn't have any damage to our office,
282
00:14:10.400 --> 00:14:14.000 line:15%
but it was clear as soon as we left the room
283
00:14:14.000 --> 00:14:17.410 line:15%
and went into the hallway that there had been a fire
284
00:14:17.410 --> 00:14:19.300 line:15%
and explosion and it was ongoing.
285
00:14:19.300 --> 00:14:20.133 line:15%
So--
286
00:14:20.133 --> 00:14:21.796 line:15%
You know it was a plane at that time?
287
00:14:21.796 --> 00:14:23.460 line:15%
No, I didn't.
288
00:14:23.460 --> 00:14:26.210 line:15%
I think we surmised that it might be
289
00:14:26.210 --> 00:14:28.026 line:15%
if only because we'd seen the two planes
290
00:14:28.026 --> 00:14:31.010 line:15%
hit the World Trade Center,
291
00:14:31.010 --> 00:14:34.300 line:15%
but it was, we didn't at the time know that it was a plane.
292
00:14:34.300 --> 00:14:36.490 line:15%
I think a lot of us thought it was probably a plane,
293
00:14:36.490 --> 00:14:38.330 line:15%
but we didn't know, we didn't know
294
00:14:38.330 --> 00:14:39.830 line:15%
when we got outside though.
295
00:14:39.830 --> 00:14:42.353 line:15%
We went outside and we formed,
296
00:14:44.960 --> 00:14:48.050 line:15%
the military officers, not just officers,
297
00:14:48.050 --> 00:14:51.963 line:15%
but I mean everybody who was there in uniform, military,
298
00:14:52.800 --> 00:14:57.090 line:15%
formed, and at least to me as an army Colonel,
299
00:14:57.090 --> 00:15:00.570 line:15%
so, I mean, there's a whole pair number of army colonels
300
00:15:00.570 --> 00:15:04.093 line:15%
who were assigned to the Pentagon at any one time,
301
00:15:05.155 --> 00:15:08.740 line:15%
to me as an army Colonel, it was almost,
302
00:15:08.740 --> 00:15:10.940 line:15%
I mean we didn't have somebody barking orders
303
00:15:10.940 --> 00:15:12.273 line:15%
to anybody at that point.
304
00:15:13.694 --> 00:15:17.170 line:15%
We, sort of, and I think it was more a question of,
305
00:15:17.170 --> 00:15:19.080 line:15%
there are people in the building,
306
00:15:19.080 --> 00:15:21.230 line:15%
we need to get in there and help them.
307
00:15:21.230 --> 00:15:24.930 line:15%
We need to go in and try to organize ourselves
308
00:15:24.930 --> 00:15:27.280 line:15%
to evacuate casualties
309
00:15:27.280 --> 00:15:30.080 line:15%
and, you know, at least begin first aid of some sort,
310
00:15:30.080 --> 00:15:32.670 line:15%
'cause it was clear that there was a crash
311
00:15:32.670 --> 00:15:33.503 line:15%
at the side of the building.
312
00:15:33.503 --> 00:15:36.133 line:15%
We could see parts of the plane around.
313
00:15:37.616 --> 00:15:39.900 line:15%
So at that time at that point we knew it was an aircraft.
314
00:15:39.900 --> 00:15:43.950 line:15%
But, and we formed into four-man teams and we'd lined up,
315
00:15:43.950 --> 00:15:46.840 line:15%
which I was, you know, in retrospect
316
00:15:46.840 --> 00:15:50.070 line:15%
I'm glad we got to that level of organization,
317
00:15:50.070 --> 00:15:51.900 line:15%
but it wasn't very long after that,
318
00:15:51.900 --> 00:15:54.150 line:15%
and this all happens in about 15 minutes.
319
00:15:54.150 --> 00:15:57.419 line:15%
So we're not talking about a long period of time.
320
00:15:57.419 --> 00:16:00.030 line:15%
The, side of the building literally collapsed.
321
00:16:00.030 --> 00:16:01.290 line:15%
So there was a hole in the building,
322
00:16:01.290 --> 00:16:03.000 line:15%
when we first went out there was a hole in the building
323
00:16:03.000 --> 00:16:06.313 line:15%
where the aircraft went through the side of the building,
324
00:16:06.313 --> 00:16:08.130 line:15%
and the first couple of floors,
325
00:16:08.130 --> 00:16:09.940 line:15%
the first two or three floors were gone,
326
00:16:09.940 --> 00:16:13.200 line:15%
but there was a sort of an archway,
327
00:16:13.200 --> 00:16:15.260 line:15%
so the top floors were not gone,
328
00:16:15.260 --> 00:16:17.610 line:15%
the plane went in and made a big hole,
329
00:16:17.610 --> 00:16:20.170 line:15%
and there was a fire and explosion,
330
00:16:20.170 --> 00:16:22.170 line:15%
but the real fire and the real explosion
331
00:16:22.170 --> 00:16:24.130 line:15%
and the much larger one took place about 15
332
00:16:24.130 --> 00:16:27.620 line:15%
to 20 minutes after the initial crash.
333
00:16:27.620 --> 00:16:30.170 line:15%
And that dropped the side of the building.
334
00:16:30.170 --> 00:16:33.423 line:15%
So as you may have seen from pictures,
335
00:16:34.395 --> 00:16:36.710 line:15%
you know there're picture taken immediately after the crash,
336
00:16:36.710 --> 00:16:38.290 line:15%
then you'll see this hole,
337
00:16:38.290 --> 00:16:41.000 line:15%
and if you see a picture taken later,
338
00:16:41.000 --> 00:16:44.830 line:15%
there's really almost a cut in the side of the building.
339
00:16:44.830 --> 00:16:46.780 line:15%
And it got larger because there was more fire
340
00:16:46.780 --> 00:16:48.560 line:15%
more destruction and so forth.
341
00:16:48.560 --> 00:16:52.713 line:15%
So, some people would went in, but not too many.
342
00:16:53.709 --> 00:16:56.610 line:15%
And, then, and so we stopped going in,
343
00:16:56.610 --> 00:16:58.503 line:15%
but we did spend the rest of the day,
344
00:16:59.350 --> 00:17:03.500 line:15%
there was probably, you know, several 100 to 1000
345
00:17:03.500 --> 00:17:08.050 line:15%
or so military who stayed until roughly four or 4:30
346
00:17:08.050 --> 00:17:10.823 line:15%
that afternoon, so about six hours I guess,
347
00:17:11.740 --> 00:17:14.970 line:15%
just making IV bottles.
348
00:17:14.970 --> 00:17:16.350 line:15%
I mean, rescue squads
349
00:17:16.350 --> 00:17:18.640 line:15%
from all over the Northern Virginia area in DC
350
00:17:18.640 --> 00:17:20.920 line:15%
came to provide the, you know
351
00:17:20.920 --> 00:17:24.890 line:15%
the initial response to a mass casualty.
352
00:17:24.890 --> 00:17:29.010 line:15%
And so we set up cots and set up IV bottles
353
00:17:29.010 --> 00:17:34.010 line:15%
and treated the casualties as they were available to,
354
00:17:34.550 --> 00:17:36.250 line:15%
as we could get them out of the building.
355
00:17:36.250 --> 00:17:37.570 line:15%
I didn't go into the building,
356
00:17:37.570 --> 00:17:40.380 line:15%
I had, you know, I just didn't go in,
357
00:17:40.380 --> 00:17:41.910 line:15%
I mean, it was, again, we were lined up
358
00:17:41.910 --> 00:17:44.770 line:15%
and there was a huge fire after about 20 minutes,
359
00:17:44.770 --> 00:17:49.600 line:15%
but it was a very disturbing day.
360
00:17:49.600 --> 00:17:52.503 line:15%
But we, stayed there till again about four, 4:30,
361
00:17:53.689 --> 00:17:58.689 line:15%
and, then the battalion that was a stationed there,
362
00:17:58.720 --> 00:18:03.720 line:15%
the old guard, which is the same soldiers
363
00:18:03.930 --> 00:18:07.180 line:15%
who guard, a team of the (indistinct) soldier
364
00:18:07.180 --> 00:18:08.973 line:15%
is an army infantry unit,
365
00:18:10.350 --> 00:18:15.350 line:15%
and they arrived on the scene around three 3:30 as a unit,
366
00:18:15.660 --> 00:18:19.673 line:15%
and then they took our places and we left.
367
00:18:20.654 --> 00:18:23.320 line:15%
Well, was anyone thinking about what reaction
368
00:18:23.320 --> 00:18:24.950 line:15%
the U.S. should take at that time,
369
00:18:24.950 --> 00:18:27.283 line:15%
or people were just thinking of saving lives?
370
00:18:28.249 --> 00:18:31.690 line:15%
You know, it's hard to know,
371
00:18:31.690 --> 00:18:34.140 line:15%
I think most of us were just thinking
372
00:18:34.140 --> 00:18:36.660 line:15%
about saving lives at that point.
373
00:18:36.660 --> 00:18:40.140 line:15%
I mean, there was people, we were angry, absolutely.
374
00:18:40.140 --> 00:18:41.558 line:15%
Did you know or you didn't.
375
00:18:41.558 --> 00:18:42.637 line:15%
I didn't know.
376
00:18:42.637 --> 00:18:43.613 line:15%
You were just angry.
377
00:18:43.613 --> 00:18:44.800 line:15%
No, we didn't know, we were angry that somebody would--
378
00:18:44.800 --> 00:18:46.403 line:15%
Were you afraid too?
379
00:18:46.403 --> 00:18:47.810 line:15%
You think were people afraid?
380
00:18:47.810 --> 00:18:48.643 line:15%
Yeah, absolutely.
381
00:18:48.643 --> 00:18:51.010 line:15%
I mean I remember thinking this maybe is,
382
00:18:51.010 --> 00:18:53.940 line:15%
this is maybe it for me, who knows?
383
00:18:53.940 --> 00:18:54.773 line:15%
It might be.
384
00:18:55.930 --> 00:18:57.100 line:15%
You are expecting another plane
385
00:18:57.100 --> 00:18:58.780 line:15%
going into the Pentagon?
386
00:18:58.780 --> 00:19:01.480 line:15%
I didn't, but I, but the reason,
387
00:19:01.480 --> 00:19:02.830 line:15%
but that didn't say it does,
388
00:19:02.830 --> 00:19:04.990 line:15%
but that's an interesting question in the sense that,
389
00:19:04.990 --> 00:19:07.890 line:15%
you know, for, for the rest of the afternoon,
390
00:19:07.890 --> 00:19:12.890 line:15%
there were F-16s flying low over the building.
391
00:19:13.470 --> 00:19:17.210 line:15%
And it was interesting I mean, especially in retrospect
392
00:19:17.210 --> 00:19:20.230 line:15%
at the time it wasn't interesting, it was disturbing,
393
00:19:20.230 --> 00:19:23.170 line:15%
but in retrospect of what would happen,
394
00:19:23.170 --> 00:19:25.890 line:15%
I mean, again you've got maybe 1000
395
00:19:25.890 --> 00:19:30.680 line:15%
or more people outside at a certain level of organization.
396
00:19:30.680 --> 00:19:32.420 line:15%
And I have to say the other,
397
00:19:32.420 --> 00:19:34.660 line:15%
I wanna talk about Lisa Bronson since we mentioned her,
398
00:19:34.660 --> 00:19:36.947 line:15%
I wanna give honor to her,
399
00:19:36.947 --> 00:19:39.430 line:15%
but let me talk about some other group of people
400
00:19:39.430 --> 00:19:42.140 line:15%
that really deserves a great deal of respect and credit
401
00:19:42.140 --> 00:19:43.830 line:15%
for how they behaved and how they comported
402
00:19:43.830 --> 00:19:45.070 line:15%
themselves that day.
403
00:19:45.070 --> 00:19:48.380 line:15%
Were the paramedics from the various
404
00:19:48.380 --> 00:19:51.320 line:15%
first responder units and civilians,
405
00:19:51.320 --> 00:19:53.957 line:15%
but working for fire departments and rescue squads
406
00:19:53.957 --> 00:19:56.423 line:15%
who came in from, you know, wherever,
407
00:19:57.310 --> 00:20:01.500 line:15%
Northern Virginia, Maryland, DC, to help out
408
00:20:01.500 --> 00:20:03.580 line:15%
because of who they are.
409
00:20:03.580 --> 00:20:06.320 line:15%
And they were fantastic,
410
00:20:06.320 --> 00:20:07.670 line:15%
because all of us have some
411
00:20:07.670 --> 00:20:09.440 line:15%
rudimentary knowledge of first aid,
412
00:20:09.440 --> 00:20:13.630 line:15%
I mean, we can do first aid and combat lifesaving
413
00:20:13.630 --> 00:20:15.880 line:15%
and things like that, that we're all trained to do,
414
00:20:15.880 --> 00:20:19.330 line:15%
but I mean, we don't have the skill sets
415
00:20:19.330 --> 00:20:23.230 line:15%
to really organize a mass casualty scenario.
416
00:20:23.230 --> 00:20:27.843 line:15%
And, but these guys did, and they took charge.
417
00:20:28.840 --> 00:20:32.270 line:15%
And it wasn't a question of rank.
418
00:20:32.270 --> 00:20:34.810 line:15%
There were privates there, and there were,
419
00:20:34.810 --> 00:20:36.420 line:15%
I remember seeing a good friend of mine
420
00:20:36.420 --> 00:20:37.610 line:15%
who was a Lieutenant general
421
00:20:37.610 --> 00:20:40.160 line:15%
that I'd worked for at one point, and he showed up.
422
00:20:40.160 --> 00:20:42.470 line:15%
And I don't think he was assigned in the Pentagon,
423
00:20:42.470 --> 00:20:44.260 line:15%
but he came there because he knew
424
00:20:44.260 --> 00:20:47.150 line:15%
that that's where his duty station needed to be.
425
00:20:47.150 --> 00:20:48.960 line:15%
And we're all doing the same thing.
426
00:20:48.960 --> 00:20:52.930 line:15%
And the guys we were listening to, were the paramedics
427
00:20:52.930 --> 00:20:55.620 line:15%
who spoke with authority and competence
428
00:20:55.620 --> 00:20:57.250 line:15%
about how to organize,
429
00:20:57.250 --> 00:20:59.910 line:15%
to handle taking care of the casualties
430
00:20:59.910 --> 00:21:03.710 line:15%
and behaving in a way that would facilitate
431
00:21:03.710 --> 00:21:07.170 line:15%
getting professionals in there to do what they do,
432
00:21:07.170 --> 00:21:11.410 line:15%
put the fire out, identifying and evacuate the casualties,
433
00:21:11.410 --> 00:21:13.180 line:15%
and then treat them and get them to the hospital.
434
00:21:13.180 --> 00:21:16.226 line:15%
So we were just trying to be helpful.
435
00:21:16.226 --> 00:21:20.270 line:15%
I don't think it was a, from my perspective,
436
00:21:20.270 --> 00:21:23.060 line:15%
we would, we were thinking about the guys
437
00:21:23.060 --> 00:21:25.380 line:15%
who were hurt that day.
438
00:21:25.380 --> 00:21:27.840 line:15%
We were also thinking about our families, you know?
439
00:21:27.840 --> 00:21:28.770 line:15%
I mean--
440
00:21:28.770 --> 00:21:30.160 line:15%
Did you call home?
441
00:21:30.160 --> 00:21:34.137 line:15%
I tried, but we, the phones weren't working that day,
442
00:21:34.137 --> 00:21:36.900 line:15%
the cell phones just didn't work.
443
00:21:36.900 --> 00:21:39.920 line:15%
They were, I mean, it was a couple of hours
444
00:21:39.920 --> 00:21:42.113 line:15%
before I got through.
445
00:21:43.030 --> 00:21:44.160 line:15%
You know, at first couple of times
446
00:21:44.160 --> 00:21:45.950 line:15%
you're like, "No, okay, it's not working,"
447
00:21:45.950 --> 00:21:47.030 line:15%
and everyone else has got the same problem,
448
00:21:47.030 --> 00:21:49.500 line:15%
so you don't spend a lot of time doing that.
449
00:21:49.500 --> 00:21:51.810 line:15%
But I mean, it was a matter of hit or miss,
450
00:21:51.810 --> 00:21:54.740 line:15%
and I think after three, four hours, there was enough,
451
00:21:54.740 --> 00:21:56.630 line:15%
I don't know if the word is bandwidth
452
00:21:56.630 --> 00:22:00.410 line:15%
but enough telecommunications space
453
00:22:00.410 --> 00:22:01.243 line:15%
for us to actually get through,
454
00:22:01.243 --> 00:22:04.700 line:15%
and we had, I had a conversation with my wife
455
00:22:04.700 --> 00:22:07.323 line:15%
and that was a very important conversation.
456
00:22:08.650 --> 00:22:11.550 line:15%
My kids, well, let me get back if may,
457
00:22:11.550 --> 00:22:13.330 line:15%
you asked about the aircraft.
458
00:22:13.330 --> 00:22:16.170 line:15%
We, F-16s would be flying over and I'm not kidding,
459
00:22:16.170 --> 00:22:21.170 line:15%
it was really a mass movement away from the building
460
00:22:21.320 --> 00:22:23.080 line:15%
when the F-16s would come in.
461
00:22:23.080 --> 00:22:26.900 line:15%
Because I think it was, you know, we're all adults
462
00:22:26.900 --> 00:22:30.080 line:15%
and you know, we're also human adults,
463
00:22:30.080 --> 00:22:33.627 line:15%
and we'd already seen one aircraft or felt one aircraft,
464
00:22:33.627 --> 00:22:34.910 line:15%
and we could see the results
465
00:22:34.910 --> 00:22:36.610 line:15%
of one aircraft flying in the building,
466
00:22:36.610 --> 00:22:38.690 line:15%
we didn't know what, whether it was an F-16,
467
00:22:38.690 --> 00:22:40.410 line:15%
or there's another aircraft, you know,
468
00:22:40.410 --> 00:22:41.850 line:15%
who knows who this is?
469
00:22:41.850 --> 00:22:44.540 line:15%
People would literally run away from the building.
470
00:22:44.540 --> 00:22:46.360 line:15%
So it was every time a big airplane would come,
471
00:22:46.360 --> 00:22:48.930 line:15%
or an airplane, we go, "Okay, let's get away from this,"
472
00:22:48.930 --> 00:22:50.620 line:15%
who knows what's gonna happen next?
473
00:22:50.620 --> 00:22:52.360 line:15%
And we were really, it was really a movement
474
00:22:52.360 --> 00:22:55.740 line:15%
back and forth across the lawn, outside the Pentagon.
475
00:22:55.740 --> 00:22:56.840 line:15%
Very interesting.
476
00:22:56.840 --> 00:22:59.020 line:15%
But I was gonna say, and I don't know,
477
00:22:59.020 --> 00:23:01.290 line:15%
do you want me to continue to talk about this?
478
00:23:01.290 --> 00:23:02.863 line:15%
Well, what else, what we're gonna say?
479
00:23:02.863 --> 00:23:04.430 line:15%
I was gonna say about my kids,
480
00:23:04.430 --> 00:23:07.363 line:15%
I was really proud of my daughters.
481
00:23:10.360 --> 00:23:13.580 line:15%
My oldest daughter was in, they were both in school,
482
00:23:13.580 --> 00:23:16.050 line:15%
and to be in Northern Virginia is a lot of kids
483
00:23:16.050 --> 00:23:17.910 line:15%
who have come from military families,
484
00:23:17.910 --> 00:23:21.190 line:15%
and so the fact that you'd have a mother or father
485
00:23:21.190 --> 00:23:25.980 line:15%
who worked at the Pentagon is not unusual, you know, a lot,
486
00:23:25.980 --> 00:23:28.450 line:15%
but I remember and this is what my daughter told me,
487
00:23:28.450 --> 00:23:31.580 line:15%
but knowing her I can totally see her doing this.
488
00:23:31.580 --> 00:23:33.840 line:15%
She's strong.
489
00:23:33.840 --> 00:23:36.537 line:15%
And, the teacher told the kids,
490
00:23:36.537 --> 00:23:39.890 line:15%
"Ah, there's been a an accident that Pentagon,
491
00:23:39.890 --> 00:23:41.187 line:15%
so stay right here."
492
00:23:42.150 --> 00:23:45.007 line:15%
And she said, "No, I'm gonna go home."
493
00:23:46.227 --> 00:23:48.040 line:15%
And I thought when I heard that story
494
00:23:48.040 --> 00:23:49.190 line:15%
I was like, "That"--
495
00:23:49.190 --> 00:23:51.140 line:15%
How old was she?
496
00:23:51.140 --> 00:23:55.793 line:15%
Let's see, she would have been 15, strong girl.
497
00:23:56.750 --> 00:23:58.680 line:15%
She didn't, and the rest of the kids
498
00:23:58.680 --> 00:24:00.340 line:15%
said the same thing when they heard her say that,
499
00:24:00.340 --> 00:24:03.610 line:15%
they were like, "okay, Joel has, we're going home too."
500
00:24:03.610 --> 00:24:07.340 line:15%
But, she, her first thought was, "I gotta get home to mom,
501
00:24:07.340 --> 00:24:09.260 line:15%
and I get home to dad."
502
00:24:09.260 --> 00:24:10.102 line:15%
I'm sorry.
503
00:24:10.102 --> 00:24:11.222 line:15%
It's okay.
504
00:24:11.222 --> 00:24:13.617 line:15%
But yeah, real proud of her.
505
00:24:15.160 --> 00:24:17.100 line:15%
Well, can you tell us
506
00:24:17.100 --> 00:24:19.820 line:15%
what happened that evening or the next day,
507
00:24:19.820 --> 00:24:21.490 line:15%
you must have been called to,
508
00:24:21.490 --> 00:24:22.323 line:15%
do you wanna take a break?
509
00:24:22.323 --> 00:24:23.253 line:15%
Are you okay?
510
00:24:23.253 --> 00:24:24.250 line:15%
I'm okay.
511
00:24:24.250 --> 00:24:26.280 line:15%
As to, you must have been called
512
00:24:26.280 --> 00:24:30.050 line:15%
to do something more than saving lives, you know
513
00:24:30.050 --> 00:24:34.190 line:15%
with your position and your knowledge and skillset.
514
00:24:34.190 --> 00:24:37.941 line:15%
Well, the first thing we did is we got back to work
515
00:24:37.941 --> 00:24:39.720 line:15%
the next day.
516
00:24:39.720 --> 00:24:40.553 line:15%
In the pentagon?
517
00:24:40.553 --> 00:24:41.920 line:15%
Yeah, we did.
518
00:24:41.920 --> 00:24:44.951 line:15%
I mean, and this is again, let me get back to Lisa Bronson.
519
00:24:44.951 --> 00:24:46.147 line:15%
I mean, one of her first things was,
520
00:24:46.147 --> 00:24:47.230 line:15%
"You know we need to be strong,
521
00:24:47.230 --> 00:24:48.160 line:15%
we need to come back to work,
522
00:24:48.160 --> 00:24:50.110 line:15%
we need to get busy with what we need to do,
523
00:24:50.110 --> 00:24:52.581 line:15%
'cause our mission was to,
524
00:24:52.581 --> 00:24:56.010 line:15%
we had both the multilateral relationship with NATO
525
00:24:56.010 --> 00:24:58.340 line:15%
which was huge, and as you may remember,
526
00:24:58.340 --> 00:25:00.420 line:15%
the next day NATO declared
527
00:25:00.420 --> 00:25:03.350 line:15%
that an attack on the United States is attack on whole NATO
528
00:25:03.350 --> 00:25:04.760 line:15%
which is the first time they ever did that,
529
00:25:04.760 --> 00:25:06.710 line:15%
I mean, it's the core of the North Atlantic treaty
530
00:25:06.710 --> 00:25:08.820 line:15%
is the attack on one is attack on all.
531
00:25:08.820 --> 00:25:12.180 line:15%
And, it was reassuring certainly to me,
532
00:25:12.180 --> 00:25:15.280 line:15%
as somebody who had worked at NATO and felt strongly
533
00:25:15.280 --> 00:25:16.900 line:15%
that the Alliance was a good thing
534
00:25:16.900 --> 00:25:20.539 line:15%
that in fact it lived up to that core
535
00:25:20.539 --> 00:25:24.650 line:15%
of its own ethics, so to speak, but they did,
536
00:25:24.650 --> 00:25:27.173 line:15%
and, but our job, it was not only the,
537
00:25:28.180 --> 00:25:30.356 line:15%
the job of relating to our European allies
538
00:25:30.356 --> 00:25:32.480 line:15%
to North Atlantic treaty organization
539
00:25:32.480 --> 00:25:34.230 line:15%
but also the bilateral relationship.
540
00:25:34.230 --> 00:25:38.910 line:15%
So the challenge really from that point on,
541
00:25:38.910 --> 00:25:43.910 line:15%
for the next months was to focus on,
542
00:25:44.090 --> 00:25:49.090 line:15%
what can we do to harness this sense of unity
543
00:25:50.030 --> 00:25:53.770 line:15%
among our Alliance, and also the sense of,
544
00:25:53.770 --> 00:25:58.420 line:15%
the bond between us and our bilateral European allies,
545
00:25:58.420 --> 00:26:00.350 line:15%
to appropriately respond
546
00:26:00.350 --> 00:26:02.940 line:15%
to this attack on the United States.
547
00:26:02.940 --> 00:26:04.900 line:15%
At hat time, that morning,
548
00:26:04.900 --> 00:26:08.090 line:15%
did you know that Al Qaeda was involved?
549
00:26:08.090 --> 00:26:09.470 line:15%
No, no.
550
00:26:09.470 --> 00:26:12.940 line:15%
I think that came out only in the next few days.
551
00:26:12.940 --> 00:26:14.910 line:15%
My recollection is, and there may have been others
552
00:26:14.910 --> 00:26:16.670 line:15%
who were more astute than me,
553
00:26:16.670 --> 00:26:19.030 line:15%
but I mean, I was pretty much in the loop
554
00:26:19.030 --> 00:26:21.970 line:15%
so I suspect that it was, it did take a few,
555
00:26:21.970 --> 00:26:26.970 line:15%
it took some time before it was clear who was responsible.
556
00:26:27.230 --> 00:26:30.999 line:15%
But if I recall it was a matter of days
557
00:26:30.999 --> 00:26:34.220 line:15%
before it was crystal clear that Al Qaeda
558
00:26:34.220 --> 00:26:36.020 line:15%
was responsible for the attack.
559
00:26:36.020 --> 00:26:39.220 line:15%
And did the Secretary of Defense
560
00:26:39.220 --> 00:26:42.140 line:15%
or anyone from his office come through
561
00:26:42.140 --> 00:26:45.640 line:15%
to talk to your office about policy
562
00:26:45.640 --> 00:26:48.672 line:15%
or what you might be doing going forward?
563
00:26:48.672 --> 00:26:53.672 line:15%
Not directly, but I know in the case of my boss,
564
00:26:54.130 --> 00:26:56.670 line:15%
the deputy assistant secretary for defense,
565
00:26:56.670 --> 00:27:00.060 line:15%
I mean she had clear guidance from Secretary Rumsfeld
566
00:27:00.060 --> 00:27:03.380 line:15%
in this case to work closely with NATO,
567
00:27:03.380 --> 00:27:06.260 line:15%
and with our bilateral European allies
568
00:27:06.260 --> 00:27:09.030 line:15%
to harness, not only the Goodwill,
569
00:27:09.030 --> 00:27:13.320 line:15%
but frankly the real capabilities that our European allies
570
00:27:13.320 --> 00:27:15.803 line:15%
both multilaterally and bilaterally have,
571
00:27:16.640 --> 00:27:20.353 line:15%
for the common objective of,
572
00:27:22.354 --> 00:27:27.354 line:15%
"How do we approach or how do we address this attack?
573
00:27:29.450 --> 00:27:34.430 line:15%
Who did it, let's let's attack them, let's eliminate them,
574
00:27:34.430 --> 00:27:37.539 line:15%
and let's do we can to try to prevent any further attacks,"
575
00:27:37.539 --> 00:27:38.770 line:15%
I mean, that was really the objective.
576
00:27:38.770 --> 00:27:41.760 line:15%
So, not with me personally,
577
00:27:41.760 --> 00:27:43.860 line:15%
but I know I have absolutely no doubt
578
00:27:43.860 --> 00:27:47.720 line:15%
that she had, she Lisa Bronson had a personal contact
579
00:27:47.720 --> 00:27:50.530 line:15%
with the secretary almost immediately.
580
00:27:50.530 --> 00:27:52.623 line:15%
In fact, again, to her credit,
581
00:27:53.460 --> 00:27:55.740 line:15%
and not everyone did what she did,
582
00:27:55.740 --> 00:27:58.320 line:15%
but because she was very competent and because she had,
583
00:27:58.320 --> 00:28:00.110 line:15%
she was a good leader,
584
00:28:00.110 --> 00:28:03.523 line:15%
she was one of the senior officials in the Pentagon
585
00:28:03.523 --> 00:28:08.523 line:15%
in the days, following who really stood on duty
586
00:28:09.020 --> 00:28:11.780 line:15%
almost 24 seven, and she really worked hard,
587
00:28:11.780 --> 00:28:14.120 line:15%
and we could tell it was her,
588
00:28:14.120 --> 00:28:15.530 line:15%
and that meant a lot to us.
589
00:28:15.530 --> 00:28:19.110 line:15%
I mean, here's someone who really cares,
590
00:28:19.110 --> 00:28:22.120 line:15%
and someone who again cares about the United States
591
00:28:22.120 --> 00:28:24.220 line:15%
but also cares about the people she works with.
592
00:28:24.220 --> 00:28:26.070 line:15%
It was inspirational.
593
00:28:26.070 --> 00:28:27.400 line:15%
So as time went on,
594
00:28:27.400 --> 00:28:30.520 line:15%
and since this project is about Guantanamo,
595
00:28:30.520 --> 00:28:33.670 line:15%
did you hear about Guantanamo early on
596
00:28:33.670 --> 00:28:35.233 line:15%
while you were working,
597
00:28:35.233 --> 00:28:37.150 line:15%
I assume you were still in the Pentagon,
598
00:28:37.150 --> 00:28:38.740 line:15%
did that word go through,
599
00:28:38.740 --> 00:28:41.410 line:15%
it would not have gone through your office.
600
00:28:41.410 --> 00:28:46.040 line:15%
No, we didn't handle a Guantanamo per se,
601
00:28:46.040 --> 00:28:49.650 line:15%
but because there were many European nationals
602
00:28:49.650 --> 00:28:53.933 line:15%
who found themselves detained in Guantanamo,
603
00:28:55.130 --> 00:28:58.987 line:15%
we got involved in the bilateral issues
604
00:28:58.987 --> 00:29:03.987 line:15%
between France and Spain and the U.K.,
605
00:29:04.270 --> 00:29:07.690 line:15%
because they all had nationals at Guantanamo.
606
00:29:07.690 --> 00:29:10.040 line:15%
Can you explain how, what that means,
607
00:29:10.040 --> 00:29:11.490 line:15%
how you got involved.
608
00:29:11.490 --> 00:29:14.090 line:15%
Well our, each of our office was organized
609
00:29:14.090 --> 00:29:16.530 line:15%
so that, again, my, I was the deputy director
610
00:29:16.530 --> 00:29:19.420 line:15%
of European policy, so that the officers
611
00:29:19.420 --> 00:29:21.920 line:15%
and civilians who worked in my office,
612
00:29:21.920 --> 00:29:24.563 line:15%
each of them were responsible for one or more,
613
00:29:25.690 --> 00:29:29.740 line:15%
European countries, bilateral defense relationships.
614
00:29:29.740 --> 00:29:34.740 line:15%
So, and you know, let's imagine that Spain for example,
615
00:29:35.670 --> 00:29:37.110 line:15%
we had an officer or a civilian,
616
00:29:37.110 --> 00:29:39.210 line:15%
I think it was actually a Navy captain
617
00:29:39.210 --> 00:29:40.993 line:15%
who had responsibility for Spain,
618
00:29:41.920 --> 00:29:46.920 line:15%
but in any case, his portfolio was to work
619
00:29:49.110 --> 00:29:52.632 line:15%
on all aspects of the bilateral defense relationship.
620
00:29:52.632 --> 00:29:57.632 line:15%
And where we had, Spanish nationals in Guantanamo,
621
00:30:00.670 --> 00:30:05.670 line:15%
he would be the point of contact for the Spanish embassy
622
00:30:06.640 --> 00:30:09.490 line:15%
to talk to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
623
00:30:09.490 --> 00:30:10.820 line:15%
about Guantanamo issues.
624
00:30:10.820 --> 00:30:14.903 line:15%
So those issues would cross his desk.
625
00:30:14.903 --> 00:30:18.330 line:15%
Same with the UK, same with France,
626
00:30:18.330 --> 00:30:20.010 line:15%
same with other European countries
627
00:30:20.010 --> 00:30:23.900 line:15%
that happened to have nationals detained at Guantanamo.
628
00:30:23.900 --> 00:30:26.310 line:15%
So, that was our involvement.
629
00:30:26.310 --> 00:30:30.080 line:15%
And it was in, although it wasn't a matter of, you know
630
00:30:30.080 --> 00:30:32.820 line:15%
there was no sense of, that officer
631
00:30:32.820 --> 00:30:37.099 line:15%
or our office supervising the detainee
632
00:30:37.099 --> 00:30:42.099 line:15%
in Guantanamo, those were military corrections officers
633
00:30:43.410 --> 00:30:47.350 line:15%
who were actually doing the work at Guantanamo itself,
634
00:30:47.350 --> 00:30:50.063 line:15%
but in terms of the of handling the various issues
635
00:30:50.063 --> 00:30:53.716 line:15%
that would come up between the embassy,
636
00:30:53.716 --> 00:30:57.840 line:15%
that had an interest in their national in Guantanamo,
637
00:30:57.840 --> 00:31:01.500 line:15%
they would be, our office and that particular officer
638
00:31:01.500 --> 00:31:02.960 line:15%
who had that country's portfolio
639
00:31:02.960 --> 00:31:05.500 line:15%
would be the one to handle those relationships.
640
00:31:05.500 --> 00:31:07.780 line:15%
What would be an issue that would come up?
641
00:31:07.780 --> 00:31:09.473 line:15%
Access primarily.
642
00:31:10.390 --> 00:31:12.580 line:15%
Ability to check on the welfare,
643
00:31:12.580 --> 00:31:15.460 line:15%
the ability to visit and talk, just like--
644
00:31:15.460 --> 00:31:16.997 line:15%
And your office would set that up.
645
00:31:16.997 --> 00:31:19.810 line:15%
We, we would definitely set that up.
646
00:31:19.810 --> 00:31:22.600 line:15%
We would be the ones to coordinate that access.
647
00:31:22.600 --> 00:31:25.220 line:15%
And in that process, did you ever hear,
648
00:31:25.220 --> 00:31:27.910 line:15%
or did any of the men and women who were involved
649
00:31:27.910 --> 00:31:31.590 line:15%
in that hear of complaints that maybe some of these men
650
00:31:31.590 --> 00:31:32.790 line:15%
had been mistreated?
651
00:31:32.790 --> 00:31:35.840 line:15%
Is that, did that come up in these conversations?
652
00:31:35.840 --> 00:31:39.130 line:15%
You know what I heard, and I'll only say
653
00:31:39.130 --> 00:31:41.890 line:15%
what I know was that,
654
00:31:41.890 --> 00:31:46.150 line:15%
that it was difficult to gain access,
655
00:31:46.150 --> 00:31:49.647 line:15%
or that in the case of the country involved,
656
00:31:49.647 --> 00:31:52.250 line:15%
and I wish I could give you specific examples,
657
00:31:52.250 --> 00:31:54.930 line:15%
but I remember clearly discussions
658
00:31:54.930 --> 00:31:57.910 line:15%
of the difficulty to gain access.
659
00:31:57.910 --> 00:32:00.940 line:15%
There were some countries who had trouble
660
00:32:00.940 --> 00:32:03.100 line:15%
or their perspective was that,
661
00:32:03.100 --> 00:32:06.221 line:15%
the process of gaining access to their nationals
662
00:32:06.221 --> 00:32:08.265 line:15%
was burdensome.
663
00:32:08.265 --> 00:32:13.265 line:15%
And, so they felt as if they were being,
664
00:32:15.270 --> 00:32:19.980 line:15%
themselves there was a hindrance to the kind of access
665
00:32:19.980 --> 00:32:21.940 line:15%
that they thought they needed to do
666
00:32:21.940 --> 00:32:25.330 line:15%
to get in order to check on the welfare of their nationals.
667
00:32:25.330 --> 00:32:28.680 line:15%
Which, you know, I think history has told us
668
00:32:28.680 --> 00:32:30.670 line:15%
that, that in fact happened.
669
00:32:30.670 --> 00:32:33.003 line:15%
Some of that is just pure bureaucracy.
670
00:32:34.060 --> 00:32:38.230 line:15%
And, so, but if you, if you are concerned
671
00:32:38.230 --> 00:32:41.960 line:15%
about your citizen, and you can't get access,
672
00:32:41.960 --> 00:32:44.070 line:15%
it's not important to you why,
673
00:32:44.070 --> 00:32:46.630 line:15%
you just realized that the person to whom
674
00:32:46.630 --> 00:32:48.900 line:15%
you would like to, not just talk to,
675
00:32:48.900 --> 00:32:51.660 line:15%
but again the whole objective is to verify
676
00:32:51.660 --> 00:32:54.483 line:15%
the health and the welfare of the national.
677
00:32:55.340 --> 00:32:58.240 line:15%
And the more you hear about the fact that the national
678
00:32:58.240 --> 00:33:00.620 line:15%
is there with no charges,
679
00:33:00.620 --> 00:33:04.200 line:15%
the more you hear about the fact that the nationals there
680
00:33:04.200 --> 00:33:09.160 line:15%
on a period of undefined period of time,
681
00:33:09.160 --> 00:33:11.040 line:15%
the more concerned you become,
682
00:33:11.040 --> 00:33:12.410 line:15%
and I can appreciate that.
683
00:33:12.410 --> 00:33:14.360 line:15%
And I think that was the real sense of,
684
00:33:16.700 --> 00:33:19.070 line:15%
yeah, the bureau, whether it's bureaucracy
685
00:33:19.070 --> 00:33:22.030 line:15%
or intentionally trying to hinder access,
686
00:33:22.030 --> 00:33:24.900 line:15%
the result is the same in terms of your concern
687
00:33:24.900 --> 00:33:26.281 line:15%
about your citizens.
688
00:33:26.281 --> 00:33:29.210 line:15%
Well could you describe if the liaison
689
00:33:29.210 --> 00:33:31.690 line:15%
was trying to smooth the waters between
690
00:33:31.690 --> 00:33:35.220 line:15%
the nation that is interested
691
00:33:35.220 --> 00:33:38.680 line:15%
like Spain as you use before and access,
692
00:33:38.680 --> 00:33:40.300 line:15%
what would the liaison do,
693
00:33:40.300 --> 00:33:43.800 line:15%
would he go up the chain of command to try to get access
694
00:33:43.800 --> 00:33:45.450 line:15%
and be pushed back?
695
00:33:45.450 --> 00:33:48.570 line:15%
Well, there was, you know there are different levels
696
00:33:48.570 --> 00:33:51.040 line:15%
of course of complaint,
697
00:33:51.040 --> 00:33:53.427 line:15%
if let's say, I mean, just take a--
698
00:33:53.427 --> 00:33:54.260 line:15%
Yeah.
699
00:33:54.260 --> 00:33:55.940 line:15%
I wanna use, I say the word hypothetical,
700
00:33:55.940 --> 00:33:59.210 line:15%
but, again I don't have the records,
701
00:33:59.210 --> 00:34:02.730 line:15%
but what I remember is that there were instances
702
00:34:02.730 --> 00:34:07.730 line:15%
where it was clear that one of the,
703
00:34:07.970 --> 00:34:09.280 line:15%
one or more of the European countries
704
00:34:09.280 --> 00:34:12.920 line:15%
was concerned that they didn't have the level of access
705
00:34:12.920 --> 00:34:14.860 line:15%
that they felt comfortable with.
706
00:34:14.860 --> 00:34:19.360 line:15%
And so it would become elevated beyond our office,
707
00:34:19.360 --> 00:34:22.237 line:15%
because we were at the entry level for the embassy,
708
00:34:22.237 --> 00:34:25.490 line:15%
one of the embassy, let's say the political officer
709
00:34:25.490 --> 00:34:28.889 line:15%
from the European embassy would contact,
710
00:34:28.889 --> 00:34:32.170 line:15%
or the defense attache, or somebody from the embassy
711
00:34:32.170 --> 00:34:34.290 line:15%
who related with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
712
00:34:34.290 --> 00:34:36.580 line:15%
would contact our office,
713
00:34:36.580 --> 00:34:39.340 line:15%
and if we, they didn't get the satisfaction that they wanted
714
00:34:39.340 --> 00:34:42.130 line:15%
if they were unsuccessful in gaining access,
715
00:34:42.130 --> 00:34:45.250 line:15%
or arranging a visit, then it would be elevated
716
00:34:45.250 --> 00:34:48.954 line:15%
to another level up to, you know,
717
00:34:48.954 --> 00:34:52.220 line:15%
I don't recall any specific conversation with the secretary,
718
00:34:52.220 --> 00:34:55.570 line:15%
but of course that could have happened.
719
00:34:55.570 --> 00:34:56.600 line:15%
But you didn't have,
720
00:34:56.600 --> 00:34:59.690 line:15%
or your office didn't have authority to provide access.
721
00:34:59.690 --> 00:35:02.240 line:15%
No, we had to try to arrange it.
722
00:35:02.240 --> 00:35:04.389 line:15%
Our, job was to facilitate,
723
00:35:04.389 --> 00:35:09.180 line:15%
our job was to facilitate it as to the extent
724
00:35:09.180 --> 00:35:11.113 line:15%
that we had guidance to facilitate it.
725
00:35:12.060 --> 00:35:17.060 line:15%
And I, my sense, and I, again, this is only my sense,
726
00:35:17.210 --> 00:35:20.760 line:15%
my sense is that there was not a great deal of interest
727
00:35:20.760 --> 00:35:25.040 line:15%
in facilitating access, if only because
728
00:35:25.040 --> 00:35:27.997 line:15%
there were other things that we wanted to do.
729
00:35:27.997 --> 00:35:30.230 line:15%
And that's, I think from a standpoint
730
00:35:30.230 --> 00:35:35.230 line:15%
of gathering intelligence and isolating the prisoner,
731
00:35:35.930 --> 00:35:37.890 line:15%
bureaucracy would tend to be something
732
00:35:37.890 --> 00:35:42.890 line:15%
that we would like to have to make it more difficult
733
00:35:42.960 --> 00:35:46.887 line:15%
for others outsiders to gain that.
734
00:35:46.887 --> 00:35:48.609 line:15%
What time period are we talking about?
735
00:35:48.609 --> 00:35:52.332 line:15%
Are we talking about early 2002 or later?
736
00:35:52.332 --> 00:35:53.870 line:15%
Well you know the time period
737
00:35:53.870 --> 00:35:56.590 line:15%
that I'm thinking of is early 2002,
738
00:35:56.590 --> 00:35:59.580 line:15%
when it really reached a head about that period.
739
00:35:59.580 --> 00:36:02.244 line:15%
And what were you thinking during that time,
740
00:36:02.244 --> 00:36:05.156 line:15%
the way you described it, you must use,
741
00:36:05.156 --> 00:36:07.990 line:15%
you've seen this blocking of access essentially
742
00:36:07.990 --> 00:36:10.120 line:15%
or this pushback on access,
743
00:36:10.120 --> 00:36:12.880 line:15%
did you have any thoughts about what might be going on,
744
00:36:12.880 --> 00:36:14.940 line:15%
or did you think that was probably a good idea
745
00:36:14.940 --> 00:36:17.600 line:15%
because that you were looking for intel
746
00:36:17.600 --> 00:36:19.110 line:15%
or the government's looking for Intel?
747
00:36:19.110 --> 00:36:20.520 line:15%
What were your thoughts during this (indistinct)?
748
00:36:20.520 --> 00:36:24.090 line:15%
Well our mission was to try to build a good relationship
749
00:36:24.090 --> 00:36:28.410 line:15%
and build cooperation with European countries.
750
00:36:28.410 --> 00:36:33.300 line:15%
So, and, you know there are many different strands
751
00:36:33.300 --> 00:36:36.580 line:15%
working towards ultimately the goal of increasing
752
00:36:36.580 --> 00:36:38.580 line:15%
or helping the national security in the United States,
753
00:36:38.580 --> 00:36:40.170 line:15%
and we just part of that.
754
00:36:40.170 --> 00:36:42.710 line:15%
But from, but our our part was to build
755
00:36:42.710 --> 00:36:46.570 line:15%
a stronger relationship, and frankly, to identify
756
00:36:46.570 --> 00:36:51.370 line:15%
and harness those capabilities that our European allies
757
00:36:51.370 --> 00:36:54.030 line:15%
would wanna contribute to the common defense.
758
00:36:54.030 --> 00:36:58.310 line:15%
And, so I do actually remember thinking to myself,
759
00:36:58.310 --> 00:37:00.390 line:15%
that you know, at least in this case
760
00:37:00.390 --> 00:37:04.300 line:15%
where we have on the one hand, created the perception
761
00:37:04.300 --> 00:37:09.300 line:15%
of a difficulty of gaining access in the country,
762
00:37:10.160 --> 00:37:12.400 line:15%
and at the same time as we're essentially
763
00:37:12.400 --> 00:37:14.680 line:15%
asking them to help us,
764
00:37:14.680 --> 00:37:18.000 line:15%
either financially or with military capabilities,
765
00:37:18.000 --> 00:37:20.020 line:15%
that's working across purposes.
766
00:37:20.020 --> 00:37:22.340 line:15%
And it was, we had discussions about that,
767
00:37:22.340 --> 00:37:24.130 line:15%
how to manage that tension.
768
00:37:24.130 --> 00:37:26.165 line:15%
I'm not sure you can avoid that tension,
769
00:37:26.165 --> 00:37:28.963 line:15%
but it was there and we had to deal with that.
770
00:37:30.152 --> 00:37:34.400 line:15%
Was it ever resolved or as time went on?
771
00:37:34.400 --> 00:37:36.283 line:15%
What unfolded?
772
00:37:37.400 --> 00:37:40.465 line:15%
You know, and I feel at a loss
773
00:37:40.465 --> 00:37:42.430 line:15%
to give you specific examples,
774
00:37:42.430 --> 00:37:43.790 line:15%
so these are my impressions.
775
00:37:43.790 --> 00:37:45.910 line:15%
Yes that would be fine.
776
00:37:45.910 --> 00:37:48.220 line:15%
You know, I think a lot of the way it was resolved
777
00:37:48.220 --> 00:37:51.013 line:15%
was that, we move beyond the need
778
00:37:56.425 --> 00:38:00.930 line:15%
to work specific capabilities issues as time went on.
779
00:38:00.930 --> 00:38:04.363 line:15%
Afghanistan was occupied.
780
00:38:05.620 --> 00:38:09.033 line:15%
There were different issues that we needed to address,
781
00:38:10.115 --> 00:38:13.760 line:15%
at as you remember, as we know in the spring of 2002,
782
00:38:15.450 --> 00:38:19.400 line:15%
the focus turned from Afghanistan to Iraq,
783
00:38:19.400 --> 00:38:20.853 line:15%
a different set of issues.
784
00:38:21.961 --> 00:38:24.540 line:15%
And in some cases, a different set of reasons
785
00:38:24.540 --> 00:38:28.913 line:15%
to detain people, you know, as the war went on.
786
00:38:29.900 --> 00:38:34.900 line:15%
So in some cases, the tension worked itself out over time.
787
00:38:37.500 --> 00:38:41.960 line:15%
In other cases, I think it caused some difficulties,
788
00:38:41.960 --> 00:38:43.593 line:15%
especially with some of the countries
789
00:38:43.593 --> 00:38:46.420 line:15%
that were allied with it really couldn't understand
790
00:38:46.420 --> 00:38:50.080 line:15%
why we wouldn't give access to their nationals
791
00:38:50.080 --> 00:38:51.103 line:15%
in Guantanamo.
792
00:38:52.086 --> 00:38:54.463 line:15%
And so it became a sticking point that lasted.
793
00:38:55.530 --> 00:38:58.260 line:15%
And I didn't know that because we know that from history
794
00:38:58.260 --> 00:39:00.050 line:15%
that that was in fact the case.
795
00:39:00.050 --> 00:39:02.270 line:15%
And we understood from speaking to detainees
796
00:39:02.270 --> 00:39:06.690 line:15%
that, at cliches or diplomats
797
00:39:06.690 --> 00:39:10.290 line:15%
or whomever from that countries did interview
798
00:39:10.290 --> 00:39:12.850 line:15%
or interrogate them at some point
799
00:39:12.850 --> 00:39:14.960 line:15%
while they were in Guantanamo,
800
00:39:14.960 --> 00:39:18.413 line:15%
so clearly some people did have access.
801
00:39:19.300 --> 00:39:20.230 line:15%
Clearly they did.
802
00:39:20.230 --> 00:39:21.550 line:15%
And do you know who those people were?
803
00:39:21.550 --> 00:39:24.510 line:15%
Were they essentially investigating offices
804
00:39:24.510 --> 00:39:26.962 line:15%
who were trying to seek more information?
805
00:39:26.962 --> 00:39:30.390 line:15%
The people that I am familiar with trying to gain access
806
00:39:30.390 --> 00:39:35.190 line:15%
were representatives of the government who were concerned
807
00:39:35.190 --> 00:39:38.070 line:15%
with verifying the health and welfare that are nationals,
808
00:39:38.070 --> 00:39:40.120 line:15%
as opposed to trying to gather information.
809
00:39:40.120 --> 00:39:42.810 line:15%
And there that may have happened as well,
810
00:39:42.810 --> 00:39:46.013 line:15%
I'm not, I don't, that's not my recollection.
811
00:39:46.013 --> 00:39:47.410 line:15%
And that wouldn't have gone
812
00:39:47.410 --> 00:39:49.484 line:15%
through your office then?
813
00:39:49.484 --> 00:39:51.880 line:15%
The investigative side.
814
00:39:51.880 --> 00:39:54.033 line:15%
If there were an attempt to interrogate,
815
00:39:56.020 --> 00:39:58.092 line:15%
we wouldn't know that.
816
00:39:58.092 --> 00:39:59.860 line:15%
That would not be something that we would clear.
817
00:39:59.860 --> 00:40:04.351 line:15%
But then we might not know if let's say,
818
00:40:04.351 --> 00:40:07.980 line:15%
a diplomat from country like Spain
819
00:40:08.950 --> 00:40:11.663 line:15%
was also a Spanish intelligence officer,
820
00:40:11.663 --> 00:40:13.980 line:15%
I mean, they don't wear a badge,
821
00:40:13.980 --> 00:40:17.480 line:15%
so it's, a matter of, you just know
822
00:40:17.480 --> 00:40:21.100 line:15%
that this this country's diplomat once access,
823
00:40:21.100 --> 00:40:26.100 line:15%
and for, and you entertain the request based on protocol
824
00:40:27.320 --> 00:40:28.850 line:15%
like anything else.
825
00:40:28.850 --> 00:40:30.930 line:15%
And you can either operate,
826
00:40:30.930 --> 00:40:33.380 line:15%
I mean, there's just the, this is a bureaucracy part.
827
00:40:33.380 --> 00:40:36.610 line:15%
I mean, again, if you are a demander,
828
00:40:36.610 --> 00:40:39.167 line:15%
and you don't get what you want,
829
00:40:39.167 --> 00:40:42.330 line:15%
you don't care why, you just don't get what you want.
830
00:40:42.330 --> 00:40:44.850 line:15%
And so that's really what we're talking about
831
00:40:44.850 --> 00:40:46.900 line:15%
from their perspective, from the perspective
832
00:40:46.900 --> 00:40:49.232 line:15%
of the embassy requesting access,
833
00:40:49.232 --> 00:40:52.020 line:15%
then you can't, they can't get it fast enough
834
00:40:52.020 --> 00:40:56.687 line:15%
and they, and there's only one measure of success is,
835
00:40:56.687 --> 00:40:57.837 line:15%
"I got access."
836
00:40:57.837 --> 00:41:00.900 line:15%
And iF anything else is, "I didn't get access
837
00:41:00.900 --> 00:41:02.120 line:15%
and I'm not happy."
838
00:41:02.120 --> 00:41:03.560 line:15%
And that's what we heard.
839
00:41:03.560 --> 00:41:07.490 line:15%
So, but we don't know whether the access in the end
840
00:41:07.490 --> 00:41:10.190 line:15%
was desired in order to interrogate
841
00:41:10.190 --> 00:41:15.190 line:15%
or to gather intelligence, or as we were told to understand,
842
00:41:17.840 --> 00:41:21.550 line:15%
and I, again, I had no reason at the time,
843
00:41:21.550 --> 00:41:23.950 line:15%
and although I can understand why a country
844
00:41:23.950 --> 00:41:26.890 line:15%
might wanna interrogate their national,
845
00:41:26.890 --> 00:41:28.912 line:15%
at the time the issue that was presented
846
00:41:28.912 --> 00:41:31.550 line:15%
as far as I remember was to gain access
847
00:41:31.550 --> 00:41:35.570 line:15%
to the detainee in order to verify the health and welfare.
848
00:41:35.570 --> 00:41:38.600 line:15%
Did the ICRC go through your office too?
849
00:41:38.600 --> 00:41:41.440 line:15%
Not to my recollection, no.
850
00:41:41.440 --> 00:41:43.630 line:15%
We didn't work with the ICRC.
851
00:41:43.630 --> 00:41:45.860 line:15%
And did you continue in the role
852
00:41:45.860 --> 00:41:49.860 line:15%
you described to us for several years?
853
00:41:49.860 --> 00:41:52.950 line:15%
I was assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
854
00:41:52.950 --> 00:41:57.950 line:15%
from July of 2001 until August, 2002.
855
00:42:00.200 --> 00:42:04.920 line:15%
I began getting prepared for my subsequent assignment in,
856
00:42:04.920 --> 00:42:07.350 line:15%
I think, April or may,
857
00:42:07.350 --> 00:42:11.485 line:15%
I was assigned to be the defense attache in South Korea,
858
00:42:11.485 --> 00:42:13.210 line:15%
and I proceeded there in September.
859
00:42:13.210 --> 00:42:14.500 line:15%
So I had a couple of months
860
00:42:14.500 --> 00:42:16.880 line:15%
to go through the requisite training
861
00:42:16.880 --> 00:42:20.070 line:15%
and preparation for that new assignment.
862
00:42:20.070 --> 00:42:21.420 line:15%
Before you went to Korea
863
00:42:21.420 --> 00:42:23.840 line:15%
did you have a chance to go to Guantanamo?
864
00:42:23.840 --> 00:42:25.170 line:15%
I did not.
865
00:42:25.170 --> 00:42:26.060 line:15%
Were you interested,
866
00:42:26.060 --> 00:42:28.288 line:15%
would you been able to have you to, had you?
867
00:42:28.288 --> 00:42:29.535 line:15%
You know, I don't know,
868
00:42:29.535 --> 00:42:31.420 line:15%
I didn't, it wasn't, it wouldn't have been
869
00:42:31.420 --> 00:42:34.263 line:15%
in my portfolio to do that.
870
00:42:35.530 --> 00:42:39.037 line:15%
And I don't recall having thought to myself,
871
00:42:39.037 --> 00:42:40.530 line:15%
"I want to go there."
872
00:42:40.530 --> 00:42:42.590 line:15%
Is there anything else about that period
873
00:42:42.590 --> 00:42:45.440 line:15%
before you left for Korea that I didn't ask you
874
00:42:45.440 --> 00:42:46.370 line:15%
that might be interesting
875
00:42:46.370 --> 00:42:49.283 line:15%
in terms of issues with Guantanamo?
876
00:42:57.037 --> 00:43:00.030 line:15%
I think I've described it as best I can
877
00:43:00.030 --> 00:43:01.700 line:15%
on my recollection.
878
00:43:01.700 --> 00:43:05.210 line:15%
So after Korea, how long were you in Korea?
879
00:43:05.210 --> 00:43:09.050 line:15%
I was there for, I went there in September
880
00:43:09.050 --> 00:43:11.130 line:15%
and I returned in May the following year.
881
00:43:11.130 --> 00:43:13.443 line:15%
And what did you do when you returned?
882
00:43:13.443 --> 00:43:17.740 line:15%
I was assigned as the assistant deputy chief of staff
883
00:43:18.610 --> 00:43:22.670 line:15%
on the army G2, which is the army intelligence staff
884
00:43:22.670 --> 00:43:24.080 line:15%
in the army staff.
885
00:43:24.080 --> 00:43:25.879 line:15%
For what purpose?
886
00:43:25.879 --> 00:43:30.879 line:15%
I was the senior, we had a three-star army general
887
00:43:31.890 --> 00:43:36.050 line:15%
who was the G2, the army intelligence officer,
888
00:43:36.050 --> 00:43:41.050 line:15%
we had a civilian senior executive service civilian
889
00:43:41.780 --> 00:43:45.660 line:15%
who was the, who was an assistant deputy chief of staff,
890
00:43:45.660 --> 00:43:47.640 line:15%
civilian and I was the military
891
00:43:47.640 --> 00:43:48.720 line:15%
assistant deputy chief of staff.
892
00:43:48.720 --> 00:43:51.390 line:15%
So it was a one-star assignment
893
00:43:51.390 --> 00:43:54.890 line:15%
but I was a Colonel on the list to be promoted,
894
00:43:54.890 --> 00:43:56.530 line:15%
so that was my assignment.
895
00:43:56.530 --> 00:43:57.630 line:15%
What was your role?
896
00:43:57.630 --> 00:44:00.100 line:15%
What exactly was you job?
897
00:44:00.100 --> 00:44:04.440 line:15%
I was the, essentially the number two military officer
898
00:44:04.440 --> 00:44:05.670 line:15%
in the G2.
899
00:44:05.670 --> 00:44:08.983 line:15%
So the G2 of the army is responsible for,
900
00:44:10.010 --> 00:44:14.040 line:15%
all matters related to intelligence and security for--
901
00:44:14.040 --> 00:44:15.120 line:15%
World wide?
902
00:44:15.120 --> 00:44:17.300 line:15%
For the United States army.
903
00:44:17.300 --> 00:44:18.880 line:15%
And of course it's organized in the sense
904
00:44:18.880 --> 00:44:22.000 line:15%
that the army staff is a staff organization,
905
00:44:22.000 --> 00:44:23.450 line:15%
so it's not a command,
906
00:44:23.450 --> 00:44:28.450 line:15%
but the army staff organization is develop,
907
00:44:28.780 --> 00:44:33.780 line:15%
or is the senior headquarters, the senior representative
908
00:44:33.880 --> 00:44:36.230 line:15%
in the headquarters of the army for,
909
00:44:36.230 --> 00:44:38.850 line:15%
a different for everything from, I mean,
910
00:44:38.850 --> 00:44:42.762 line:15%
there's a senior official who's responsible for personnel
911
00:44:42.762 --> 00:44:44.110 line:15%
and administration.
912
00:44:44.110 --> 00:44:47.410 line:15%
There's a senior officials responsible for intelligence.
913
00:44:47.410 --> 00:44:52.230 line:15%
Senior officials responsible for operations and logistics.
914
00:44:52.230 --> 00:44:55.570 line:15%
And so there's different staffs that do different things
915
00:44:55.570 --> 00:44:58.630 line:15%
in our case, our office was responsible
916
00:44:58.630 --> 00:45:01.074 line:15%
for all intelligence matters.
917
00:45:01.074 --> 00:45:02.390 line:15%
So did you,
918
00:45:02.390 --> 00:45:04.220 line:15%
clearly Iraq was going on at that time,
919
00:45:04.220 --> 00:45:06.980 line:15%
so you must've been very involved in that,
920
00:45:06.980 --> 00:45:09.900 line:15%
but were you involved in intelligence in Guantanamo
921
00:45:09.900 --> 00:45:11.540 line:15%
at that point?
922
00:45:11.540 --> 00:45:15.720 line:15%
Not directly, although of course there,
923
00:45:15.720 --> 00:45:20.720 line:15%
we had army intelligence activities in Guantanamo and--
924
00:45:22.420 --> 00:45:23.750 line:15%
What does that mean?
925
00:45:23.750 --> 00:45:25.240 line:15%
Well interrogations.
926
00:45:25.240 --> 00:45:26.580 line:15%
About how intelligence
927
00:45:26.580 --> 00:45:29.210 line:15%
would pursue on their own.
928
00:45:29.210 --> 00:45:33.710 line:15%
No in cooperation with the joint task force that was there
929
00:45:33.710 --> 00:45:36.763 line:15%
but there we had, we certainly had personnel there,
930
00:45:37.690 --> 00:45:40.770 line:15%
and conducted intelligence activities there,
931
00:45:40.770 --> 00:45:42.140 line:15%
interrogations and so forth.
932
00:45:42.140 --> 00:45:44.490 line:15%
Would you be involved in gathering
933
00:45:44.490 --> 00:45:48.020 line:15%
or hearing intelligence they obtained
934
00:45:48.020 --> 00:45:52.110 line:15%
and I dunno, maybe taking it to another level
935
00:45:52.110 --> 00:45:54.040 line:15%
or reviewing it yourself, or?
936
00:45:54.040 --> 00:45:56.750 line:15%
We had other agencies that would do that,
937
00:45:56.750 --> 00:46:01.750 line:15%
and in fact that didn't directly flow through our office,
938
00:46:03.220 --> 00:46:06.370 line:15%
although we would find out some of the intelligence
939
00:46:06.370 --> 00:46:09.080 line:15%
that was gathered, because it became intelligence
940
00:46:09.080 --> 00:46:11.580 line:15%
that we needed to provide to the rest of the army.
941
00:46:12.610 --> 00:46:13.443 line:15%
So--
942
00:46:13.443 --> 00:46:15.370 line:15%
Why is that and?
943
00:46:15.370 --> 00:46:19.170 line:15%
Well anything, I mean not just Guantanamo,
944
00:46:19.170 --> 00:46:24.170 line:15%
but worldwide, if there was let's say intelligence
945
00:46:24.260 --> 00:46:27.620 line:15%
that one of our units obtained,
946
00:46:27.620 --> 00:46:30.440 line:15%
or that pertain to the army,
947
00:46:30.440 --> 00:46:32.872 line:15%
then it's important for us to make sure
948
00:46:32.872 --> 00:46:37.040 line:15%
that everybody in the army gets that information,
949
00:46:37.040 --> 00:46:39.430 line:15%
so dissemination of intelligence
950
00:46:39.430 --> 00:46:41.890 line:15%
so it's just part of our job.
951
00:46:41.890 --> 00:46:44.210 line:15%
And in that period, did you ever hear
952
00:46:44.210 --> 00:46:48.660 line:15%
any words about an abuse of prisoners
953
00:46:48.660 --> 00:46:50.430 line:15%
or anything of harsh treatment
954
00:46:50.430 --> 00:46:54.390 line:15%
or anything along those lines, when you were--
955
00:46:54.390 --> 00:46:56.600 line:15%
In this assignment in Guantanamo?
956
00:46:56.600 --> 00:46:59.683 line:15%
I did not, I did not hear that.
957
00:47:01.420 --> 00:47:05.440 line:15%
I think where we, where the army was thrust
958
00:47:05.440 --> 00:47:09.010 line:15%
into the issue of detainees,
959
00:47:09.010 --> 00:47:12.350 line:15%
and how to properly handle them
960
00:47:13.380 --> 00:47:18.380 line:15%
really came to a head in late 2003 and early 2004,
961
00:47:19.230 --> 00:47:24.230 line:15%
so I had been there in the Pentagon for a number of months.
962
00:47:26.200 --> 00:47:31.200 line:15%
I got there in, actually, I really joined the staff in July
963
00:47:33.400 --> 00:47:34.363 line:15%
of 2003.
964
00:47:35.245 --> 00:47:38.110 line:15%
But it was it was several months before
965
00:47:38.110 --> 00:47:43.110 line:15%
the issues that happened at Abu Ghraib became notorious.
966
00:47:44.690 --> 00:47:49.690 line:15%
And we, and so that I spent a good deal of my time
967
00:47:50.230 --> 00:47:53.573 line:15%
on the army staff, in the office of the G2,
968
00:47:54.920 --> 00:47:58.500 line:15%
dealing with that in one way or another.
969
00:47:58.500 --> 00:48:02.630 line:15%
But it was related to, but again
970
00:48:02.630 --> 00:48:05.320 line:15%
we were not in charge of Abu Ghraib
971
00:48:05.320 --> 00:48:07.560 line:15%
nor were we in charge of Guantanamo,
972
00:48:07.560 --> 00:48:09.890 line:15%
nor in charge of Bagram,
973
00:48:09.890 --> 00:48:14.060 line:15%
or any of the other places where detainees were held.
974
00:48:14.060 --> 00:48:19.010 line:15%
But in terms of, and I just go to where I got intimately
975
00:48:19.010 --> 00:48:23.832 line:15%
involved was is the, was an officer
976
00:48:23.832 --> 00:48:27.670 line:15%
really the head of a task force was designed
977
00:48:27.670 --> 00:48:32.670 line:15%
to make sure that the way that the army
978
00:48:33.200 --> 00:48:38.200 line:15%
handled detainees was done according to army values,
979
00:48:38.710 --> 00:48:42.090 line:15%
and that our army values were reflected
980
00:48:42.090 --> 00:48:45.470 line:15%
in our procedures for all different
981
00:48:45.470 --> 00:48:47.283 line:15%
military operational specialties.
982
00:48:48.340 --> 00:48:49.173 line:15%
When did that happen
983
00:48:49.173 --> 00:48:51.150 line:15%
and how did you get involved in that?
984
00:48:51.150 --> 00:48:53.800 line:15%
I was as the assistant deputy chief of staff G2
985
00:48:53.800 --> 00:48:56.590 line:15%
asked to work with in this case, the provost marshal
986
00:48:56.590 --> 00:49:00.610 line:15%
of the army or the provost marshal of the army,
987
00:49:00.610 --> 00:49:02.100 line:15%
who's also the head of the army
988
00:49:02.100 --> 00:49:03.823 line:15%
criminal investigation command,
989
00:49:04.950 --> 00:49:08.190 line:15%
provost Marshall is just as the army G2
990
00:49:08.190 --> 00:49:11.620 line:15%
is responsible for all matters related to intelligence
991
00:49:11.620 --> 00:49:13.047 line:15%
on the army staff, the Provost Marshall
992
00:49:13.047 --> 00:49:17.430 line:15%
was responsible for all matters related to military police
993
00:49:17.430 --> 00:49:18.840 line:15%
on the army staff.
994
00:49:18.840 --> 00:49:23.080 line:15%
And so he, who was a two star general
995
00:49:23.080 --> 00:49:24.503 line:15%
and I was just a one-star,
996
00:49:25.600 --> 00:49:29.590 line:15%
he was the overall director of this task force
997
00:49:29.590 --> 00:49:33.923 line:15%
and I was his action officer since I signed from the G2.
998
00:49:33.923 --> 00:49:37.811 line:15%
Because so much of the handling of detainees
999
00:49:37.811 --> 00:49:40.360 line:15%
is a really a collaborative work
1000
00:49:40.360 --> 00:49:45.360 line:15%
between in this case, military police and intelligence.
1001
00:49:46.180 --> 00:49:49.133 line:15%
So it made sense to, made sense for us to work together.
1002
00:49:50.040 --> 00:49:52.870 line:15%
And, the result of our work together
1003
00:49:52.870 --> 00:49:57.608 line:15%
was to take, the army has a term called
1004
00:49:57.608 --> 00:50:02.608 line:15%
DOTMLPF, doctrine operations, training,
1005
00:50:02.970 --> 00:50:07.210 line:15%
material leadership and education personnel, and facilities.
1006
00:50:07.210 --> 00:50:09.150 line:15%
And the whole point of doing,
1007
00:50:09.150 --> 00:50:10.780 line:15%
of putting all those together
1008
00:50:10.780 --> 00:50:15.780 line:15%
is because if you are looking at a problem of some sort,
1009
00:50:16.080 --> 00:50:19.873 line:15%
a larger problem of some sort, then you have to have the,
1010
00:50:21.260 --> 00:50:24.430 line:15%
the capabilities in all those areas
1011
00:50:24.430 --> 00:50:26.970 line:15%
in order to address the problem comprehensively.
1012
00:50:26.970 --> 00:50:30.653 line:15%
And so what we did was we took,
1013
00:50:32.390 --> 00:50:35.083 line:15%
all of the military operational specialties,
1014
00:50:36.520 --> 00:50:39.183 line:15%
for example, military corrections,
1015
00:50:40.180 --> 00:50:42.523 line:15%
military police, tactical military police,
1016
00:50:43.550 --> 00:50:48.040 line:15%
army human intelligence collector, army interrogator.
1017
00:50:48.040 --> 00:50:50.070 line:15%
I mean, there's, you know, you could put cooks
1018
00:50:50.070 --> 00:50:51.770 line:15%
and chaplain's assistants and everything else
1019
00:50:51.770 --> 00:50:53.240 line:15%
and I think we actually did,
1020
00:50:53.240 --> 00:50:57.550 line:15%
we took every military operational specialty
1021
00:50:57.550 --> 00:51:02.382 line:15%
that we thought would be involved in any way with detainees,
1022
00:51:02.382 --> 00:51:04.660 line:15%
I mean, it was a comprehensive list,
1023
00:51:04.660 --> 00:51:08.790 line:15%
and their tasks what tasks do these specialties have?
1024
00:51:08.790 --> 00:51:12.290 line:15%
And then cross and make a matrix across walk
1025
00:51:12.290 --> 00:51:16.060 line:15%
of the DOTMLPF, across this whole range
1026
00:51:16.060 --> 00:51:19.100 line:15%
of capabilities that we need to make sure we have.
1027
00:51:19.100 --> 00:51:21.360 line:15%
And it was, and I'll be honest with you,
1028
00:51:21.360 --> 00:51:26.360 line:15%
I mean, the colonel who was working on this project,
1029
00:51:26.660 --> 00:51:30.770 line:15%
much smarter than me, and he really,
1030
00:51:30.770 --> 00:51:32.600 line:15%
I wish I remembered the gentleman's name,
1031
00:51:32.600 --> 00:51:35.810 line:15%
I don't remember his name, but he really was a very good
1032
00:51:35.810 --> 00:51:38.260 line:15%
at putting this whole matrix together,
1033
00:51:38.260 --> 00:51:43.260 line:15%
but we, our team was successful in taking army procedures
1034
00:51:43.730 --> 00:51:47.543 line:15%
which on the whole were pretty good,
1035
00:51:48.500 --> 00:51:50.600 line:15%
but needed to be tightened up,
1036
00:51:50.600 --> 00:51:52.250 line:15%
and it had to be tightened up
1037
00:51:52.250 --> 00:51:54.800 line:15%
in order to make sure we didn't have any abuse.
1038
00:51:54.800 --> 00:51:58.360 line:15%
The spark for our taskforce
1039
00:51:58.360 --> 00:52:03.190 line:15%
was the documented cases of abuse at Abu Ghraib.
1040
00:52:03.190 --> 00:52:06.720 line:15%
It also addressed all places where the army
1041
00:52:06.720 --> 00:52:10.700 line:15%
would conduct any detainee operations,
1042
00:52:10.700 --> 00:52:11.987 line:15%
detainee operations task force
1043
00:52:11.987 --> 00:52:13.556 line:15%
was the name of our task force.
1044
00:52:13.556 --> 00:52:14.820 line:15%
When did that?
1045
00:52:14.820 --> 00:52:19.660 line:15%
We stood up if I recall it was in April or may of 2004.
1046
00:52:21.140 --> 00:52:24.050 line:15%
After the completion of a couple of different
1047
00:52:24.050 --> 00:52:27.470 line:15%
investigations, there was an investigation
1048
00:52:27.470 --> 00:52:31.760 line:15%
by General Taguba, who looked very closely
1049
00:52:31.760 --> 00:52:36.760 line:15%
at the conduct of military police at Abu Ghraib,
1050
00:52:37.240 --> 00:52:39.210 line:15%
and in fact, as a result of that investigation
1051
00:52:39.210 --> 00:52:40.790 line:15%
and subsequent investigations
1052
00:52:40.790 --> 00:52:43.470 line:15%
there were seven army military policemen
1053
00:52:43.470 --> 00:52:47.950 line:15%
who were actually put on trial for misconduct at Abu Ghraib.
1054
00:52:47.950 --> 00:52:52.630 line:15%
And then General's Fay and Jones,
1055
00:52:52.630 --> 00:52:55.540 line:15%
Lieutenant General Jones and Major General Fay,
1056
00:52:55.540 --> 00:52:57.860 line:15%
General Fay was from our office,
1057
00:52:57.860 --> 00:52:59.340 line:15%
conducted another investigation
1058
00:52:59.340 --> 00:53:01.150 line:15%
specifically looking at the, in this case
1059
00:53:01.150 --> 00:53:02.930 line:15%
the two of fifth military intelligence brigade
1060
00:53:02.930 --> 00:53:07.130 line:15%
which was responsible for the detainee operations in Iraq.
1061
00:53:07.130 --> 00:53:09.218 line:15%
And there were, if I recall correctly,
1062
00:53:09.218 --> 00:53:12.860 line:15%
roughly 28 military intelligence soldiers
1063
00:53:12.860 --> 00:53:17.300 line:15%
who were ultimately put on court martial
1064
00:53:17.300 --> 00:53:20.593 line:15%
or somehow punished for their misconduct.
1065
00:53:21.490 --> 00:53:26.490 line:15%
And to be honest, again, I think the major failure
1066
00:53:26.640 --> 00:53:30.600 line:15%
that was documented by this work,
1067
00:53:30.600 --> 00:53:34.240 line:15%
I mean, clearly some misconduct
1068
00:53:34.240 --> 00:53:39.240 line:15%
by some of the army corrections officers
1069
00:53:42.410 --> 00:53:46.660 line:15%
and corrections personnel who did bad things.
1070
00:53:46.660 --> 00:53:48.220 line:15%
And clearly some misconduct
1071
00:53:48.220 --> 00:53:50.260 line:15%
by some of the army military intelligence personnel
1072
00:53:50.260 --> 00:53:52.680 line:15%
did bad things, but the real reason,
1073
00:53:52.680 --> 00:53:55.730 line:15%
and this is my, what I believe,
1074
00:53:55.730 --> 00:53:58.373 line:15%
but it's also I think born out in the investigation,
1075
00:53:58.373 --> 00:54:00.970 line:15%
none of this would happen, would have happened
1076
00:54:00.970 --> 00:54:04.210 line:15%
had we had strong leadership
1077
00:54:04.210 --> 00:54:08.600 line:15%
that looked at the detainees as they should have,
1078
00:54:08.600 --> 00:54:13.550 line:15%
as human beings and not allowed abuses
1079
00:54:13.550 --> 00:54:15.830 line:15%
of our own regulations.
1080
00:54:15.830 --> 00:54:19.140 line:15%
And a part of it is just pure, you know
1081
00:54:19.140 --> 00:54:22.360 line:15%
lack of supervision, an approach,
1082
00:54:22.360 --> 00:54:26.850 line:15%
a really ineffective approach to duty, at different levels
1083
00:54:26.850 --> 00:54:29.470 line:15%
but at the, at sometimes at the senior level
1084
00:54:29.470 --> 00:54:31.740 line:15%
a lack of supervision and a lack of concern
1085
00:54:31.740 --> 00:54:34.590 line:15%
for what the subordinates are doing.
1086
00:54:34.590 --> 00:54:39.590 line:15%
You can take a soldier or or any other person
1087
00:54:39.710 --> 00:54:43.300 line:15%
in any walk of life, and if a leader
1088
00:54:43.300 --> 00:54:46.720 line:15%
doesn't give that person the training
1089
00:54:46.720 --> 00:54:50.740 line:15%
and the supervision, then you will pay
1090
00:54:50.740 --> 00:54:54.190 line:15%
because that person with lack of experience,
1091
00:54:54.190 --> 00:54:59.190 line:15%
a lack of knowledge, a lack of a proper supervision,
1092
00:54:59.480 --> 00:55:01.200 line:15%
they don't know what they're doing.
1093
00:55:01.200 --> 00:55:03.587 line:15%
And we had a number of problems in,
1094
00:55:03.587 --> 00:55:06.370 line:15%
and I speak about what I know
1095
00:55:06.370 --> 00:55:08.037 line:15%
because we took a hard look at Abu Ghraib,
1096
00:55:08.037 --> 00:55:12.161 line:15%
and I, but I know this problem was one that was shared
1097
00:55:12.161 --> 00:55:15.650 line:15%
with Guantanamo to a certain extent.
1098
00:55:15.650 --> 00:55:18.190 line:15%
I also know from my own observation
1099
00:55:18.190 --> 00:55:22.933 line:15%
it was shared in Bagram, I did visit Bagram in 2004,
1100
00:55:24.710 --> 00:55:27.190 line:15%
which had some of the same problems.
1101
00:55:27.190 --> 00:55:30.110 line:15%
But one of the problems that they had in Abu Ghraib
1102
00:55:30.110 --> 00:55:35.110 line:15%
specifically was they first they took over a prison
1103
00:55:37.280 --> 00:55:40.240 line:15%
that had been part of the former regime,
1104
00:55:40.240 --> 00:55:42.660 line:15%
Saddam Hussein regime, that held,
1105
00:55:42.660 --> 00:55:44.070 line:15%
I mean they probably had people
1106
00:55:44.070 --> 00:55:45.270 line:15%
that shouldn't have been there
1107
00:55:45.270 --> 00:55:47.310 line:15%
but they also had criminals,
1108
00:55:47.310 --> 00:55:50.640 line:15%
hard criminals people that probably would be in prison
1109
00:55:50.640 --> 00:55:53.780 line:15%
no matter what country for all kinds of reasons,
1110
00:55:53.780 --> 00:55:57.090 line:15%
and they put, then you take people off the battlefield
1111
00:55:57.090 --> 00:56:01.610 line:15%
for a variety of reasons, sometimes poor reasons,
1112
00:56:01.610 --> 00:56:06.580 line:15%
and put literally 1000s of people in a facility
1113
00:56:06.580 --> 00:56:09.860 line:15%
that probably should only hold a few 100.
1114
00:56:09.860 --> 00:56:14.090 line:15%
At one point in late 2003, they had 7,500 detainees
1115
00:56:15.205 --> 00:56:17.810 line:15%
in a facility that probably should have handled
1116
00:56:17.810 --> 00:56:19.283 line:15%
less than 2000 people.
1117
00:56:20.160 --> 00:56:25.160 line:15%
And so you also had a shift in the war,
1118
00:56:26.024 --> 00:56:29.700 line:15%
and in the expectations and in the personnel assigned,
1119
00:56:29.700 --> 00:56:34.523 line:15%
I mean, and this is where problems come with,
1120
00:56:35.900 --> 00:56:37.780 line:15%
there's no, excuse, I'm not excusing it,
1121
00:56:37.780 --> 00:56:41.693 line:15%
but this is the context within which problems can occur,
1122
00:56:43.010 --> 00:56:46.830 line:15%
the expectation that certainly in Iraq
1123
00:56:46.830 --> 00:56:51.790 line:15%
that our forces had was that after the invasion
1124
00:56:51.790 --> 00:56:55.093 line:15%
we would reach some semblance of stability.
1125
00:56:56.010 --> 00:57:01.010 line:15%
That the war would be, that we would shift to stability
1126
00:57:01.707 --> 00:57:04.943 line:15%
and operations as opposed to actually fighting a war.
1127
00:57:05.990 --> 00:57:10.040 line:15%
And certainly the combat was different a sword,
1128
00:57:10.040 --> 00:57:12.000 line:15%
and combating insurgents
1129
00:57:12.000 --> 00:57:14.760 line:15%
rather than combating organized units,
1130
00:57:14.760 --> 00:57:17.230 line:15%
or work large organized units.
1131
00:57:17.230 --> 00:57:19.393 line:15%
But, it didn't work out like that,
1132
00:57:20.420 --> 00:57:22.410 line:15%
it was not stability operations
1133
00:57:22.410 --> 00:57:24.520 line:15%
or trying to conduct stability operations
1134
00:57:24.520 --> 00:57:28.260 line:15%
when there is no census stability is fruitless.
1135
00:57:28.260 --> 00:57:32.092 line:15%
So, we had our troops being mortared,
1136
00:57:32.092 --> 00:57:37.092 line:15%
people who were doing corrections jobs or interrogation jobs
1137
00:57:37.840 --> 00:57:40.220 line:15%
or working in a prison where you've got hard criminals
1138
00:57:40.220 --> 00:57:44.390 line:15%
as well as detainees, where you're getting attacked
1139
00:57:44.390 --> 00:57:47.982 line:15%
by mortars and effecting, I mean,
1140
00:57:47.982 --> 00:57:51.710 line:15%
a mortar knows no, I mean it's just gonna blow,
1141
00:57:51.710 --> 00:57:54.960 line:15%
and so it's hitting the, it's hitting our guys,
1142
00:57:54.960 --> 00:57:55.793 line:15%
it's hitting their guys,
1143
00:57:55.793 --> 00:57:59.163 line:15%
and it was just a tremendous amount of chaos.
1144
00:58:00.018 --> 00:58:02.970 line:15%
And at the same time you've got a lot of people
1145
00:58:02.970 --> 00:58:06.210 line:15%
who are mobilized for duty
1146
00:58:06.210 --> 00:58:10.990 line:15%
who have not had years of experience in the military.
1147
00:58:10.990 --> 00:58:15.103 line:15%
So, we like to think, and, I think we should think,
1148
00:58:15.103 --> 00:58:17.890 line:15%
that our military operates according
1149
00:58:17.890 --> 00:58:20.880 line:15%
to the highest set of values.
1150
00:58:20.880 --> 00:58:22.260 line:15%
And certainly that's what we aspire to.
1151
00:58:22.260 --> 00:58:25.130 line:15%
We don't always, but that's the aspiration.
1152
00:58:25.130 --> 00:58:28.330 line:15%
But it's hard to operate according to those values
1153
00:58:28.330 --> 00:58:31.790 line:15%
with people who've not been raised in those values.
1154
00:58:31.790 --> 00:58:36.340 line:15%
And they're motive, they're good young Americans,
1155
00:58:36.340 --> 00:58:38.820 line:15%
but the, you know, two months before
1156
00:58:38.820 --> 00:58:43.270 line:15%
they may have been primarily working in you know, a store,
1157
00:58:43.270 --> 00:58:44.440 line:15%
and that's not the same thing
1158
00:58:44.440 --> 00:58:48.920 line:15%
as taking someone who has steeped in the military values
1159
00:58:48.920 --> 00:58:52.130 line:15%
'cause they've spent a career learning them,
1160
00:58:52.130 --> 00:58:53.530 line:15%
and living by them.
1161
00:58:53.530 --> 00:58:55.880 line:15%
And so we had problems with that.
1162
00:58:55.880 --> 00:58:57.174 line:15%
So there's two questions
1163
00:58:57.174 --> 00:58:58.590 line:15%
that come out that general--
Please, sure.
1164
00:58:58.590 --> 00:59:01.950 line:15%
One is you seek to say the leadership failed
1165
00:59:01.950 --> 00:59:05.487 line:15%
in not supervising the people below them,
1166
00:59:05.487 --> 00:59:07.150 line:15%
is that what I'm hearing?
1167
00:59:07.150 --> 00:59:10.082 line:15%
That certainly was the case in several instances.
1168
00:59:10.082 --> 00:59:11.310 line:15%
And you know there was--
1169
00:59:11.310 --> 00:59:13.200 line:15%
And they were responsible for that.
1170
00:59:13.200 --> 00:59:14.033 line:15%
They were?
1171
00:59:14.033 --> 00:59:15.007 line:15%
Yes, there were--
1172
00:59:15.007 --> 00:59:17.880 line:15%
I mean I know Janis Karpinski was, but--
1173
00:59:17.880 --> 00:59:21.900 line:15%
She was, and I don't wanna to tarnish her record at all
1174
00:59:21.900 --> 00:59:24.400 line:15%
but I just, you know, refer to the record.
1175
00:59:24.400 --> 00:59:26.957 line:15%
But I do, I've also heard
1176
00:59:26.957 --> 00:59:28.960 line:15%
and you've heard, and many people I've heard that
1177
00:59:28.960 --> 00:59:33.470 line:15%
in fact, some of this behavior might've come top down
1178
00:59:33.470 --> 00:59:36.150 line:15%
that when General Miller came to Iraq
1179
00:59:36.150 --> 00:59:39.360 line:15%
he might have directed some of this behavior
1180
00:59:39.360 --> 00:59:42.560 line:15%
that we saw in that the reason
1181
00:59:42.560 --> 00:59:45.340 line:15%
why those people on the ground were arrested
1182
00:59:45.340 --> 00:59:49.240 line:15%
and convicted of those crimes of abusing the prisoners,
1183
00:59:49.240 --> 00:59:51.560 line:15%
might've been a direction of a higher ops
1184
00:59:51.560 --> 00:59:54.410 line:15%
as opposed to just when you call it chaos,
1185
00:59:54.410 --> 00:59:56.890 line:15%
where they just had no discipline
1186
00:59:56.890 --> 01:00:00.103 line:15%
and just behaved as thugs.
1187
01:00:02.050 --> 01:00:03.253 line:15%
I can't say that.
1188
01:00:04.260 --> 01:00:07.980 line:15%
And I, that was not my recollection.
1189
01:00:07.980 --> 01:00:12.980 line:15%
My recollection was that, General Miller, when he came,
1190
01:00:14.750 --> 01:00:19.640 line:15%
actually made the situation better not worse,
1191
01:00:19.640 --> 01:00:21.710 line:15%
because he's disciplined.
1192
01:00:21.710 --> 01:00:25.420 line:15%
And I served with him, you know, years before,
1193
01:00:25.420 --> 01:00:27.070 line:15%
when I was a Lieutenant, he was a captain,
1194
01:00:27.070 --> 01:00:31.523 line:15%
and he was a hard guy, but he was dedicated.
1195
01:00:31.523 --> 01:00:34.960 line:15%
And, he was dedicated as a captain.
1196
01:00:34.960 --> 01:00:37.340 line:15%
We were all very convinced
1197
01:00:37.340 --> 01:00:39.540 line:15%
that he was gonna do well in the army.
1198
01:00:39.540 --> 01:00:43.630 line:15%
And he did, but I sense that when he actually came
1199
01:00:43.630 --> 01:00:48.630 line:15%
as the, to supervise detaining operations in Iraq,
1200
01:00:48.680 --> 01:00:51.000 line:15%
that one of the things he brought was,
1201
01:00:51.000 --> 01:00:53.520 line:15%
this sense of discipline and education,
1202
01:00:53.520 --> 01:00:55.690 line:15%
or discipline, dedication to his job,
1203
01:00:55.690 --> 01:00:59.180 line:15%
so I, my recollection and I, you know
1204
01:00:59.180 --> 01:01:01.480 line:15%
I haven't had a chance to speak with him about this,
1205
01:01:01.480 --> 01:01:03.610 line:15%
but I suspect that if I did
1206
01:01:03.610 --> 01:01:06.787 line:15%
it would be a conversation where I would say,
1207
01:01:06.787 --> 01:01:08.000 line:15%
"I appreciate what you did,"
1208
01:01:08.000 --> 01:01:10.350 line:15%
'cause we did, we had real problems,
1209
01:01:10.350 --> 01:01:12.370 line:15%
and what we needed was strong leadership.
1210
01:01:12.370 --> 01:01:14.890 line:15%
That was in my mind, that was the real problem,
1211
01:01:14.890 --> 01:01:16.440 line:15%
is we didn't have strong leadership
1212
01:01:16.440 --> 01:01:18.780 line:15%
that was doing the kind of supervision.
1213
01:01:18.780 --> 01:01:20.980 line:15%
And frankly, not just supervision,
1214
01:01:20.980 --> 01:01:23.057 line:15%
I think that's part of it,
1215
01:01:23.057 --> 01:01:24.620 line:15%
but the real part of it is, I mean
1216
01:01:24.620 --> 01:01:29.313 line:15%
you can't take a young soldier or anybody who's trying,
1217
01:01:29.313 --> 01:01:30.480 line:15%
who's put in a position,
1218
01:01:30.480 --> 01:01:32.340 line:15%
a very stressful difficult position,
1219
01:01:32.340 --> 01:01:35.140 line:15%
and just let them flail around, that's just crazy.
1220
01:01:35.140 --> 01:01:36.760 line:15%
You have to support him,
1221
01:01:36.760 --> 01:01:38.790 line:15%
and part of being part of being supportive
1222
01:01:38.790 --> 01:01:40.347 line:15%
is not to coddle them, but to tell him,
1223
01:01:40.347 --> 01:01:41.637 line:15%
"Well, this is what I expect you to do,
1224
01:01:41.637 --> 01:01:43.590 line:15%
and I'm gonna give you the tools to do it,"
1225
01:01:43.590 --> 01:01:45.170 line:15%
and if you can't do that, you need to go up
1226
01:01:45.170 --> 01:01:48.100 line:15%
and stand up as a leader and say,
1227
01:01:48.100 --> 01:01:53.100 line:15%
you know, "I can't, you're, I need to support my guys,"
1228
01:01:53.440 --> 01:01:55.870 line:15%
and I don't think there was enough of that going on
1229
01:01:55.870 --> 01:01:56.703 line:15%
at Abu Ghraib.
1230
01:01:56.703 --> 01:01:57.723 line:15%
Who would think to do
1231
01:01:57.723 --> 01:01:59.690 line:15%
what those people did on the ground,
1232
01:01:59.690 --> 01:02:04.677 line:15%
I mean, it seems to me, someone, it just seemed too strange
1233
01:02:05.780 --> 01:02:08.077 line:15%
to have that many people behave like that,
1234
01:02:08.077 --> 01:02:10.240 line:15%
and nobody's watching and nobody--
1235
01:02:10.240 --> 01:02:12.538 line:15%
It is strange and it was shocking,
1236
01:02:12.538 --> 01:02:14.403 line:15%
and it shouldn't have happened.
1237
01:02:15.310 --> 01:02:16.143 line:15%
No doubt.
1238
01:02:17.350 --> 01:02:21.860 line:15%
I really think that when, and again,
1239
01:02:21.860 --> 01:02:23.760 line:15%
supervision is a broad term,
1240
01:02:23.760 --> 01:02:26.470 line:15%
but it really includes supporting
1241
01:02:26.470 --> 01:02:28.980 line:15%
and taking care of your soldiers,
1242
01:02:28.980 --> 01:02:30.930 line:15%
and taking care of the detainees.
1243
01:02:30.930 --> 01:02:32.900 line:15%
I mean, you have somebody under your control
1244
01:02:32.900 --> 01:02:35.010 line:15%
though the term of our, in early 2004
1245
01:02:35.010 --> 01:02:37.280 line:15%
was persons under control.
1246
01:02:37.280 --> 01:02:39.180 line:15%
you've probably heard that term, PUCs.
1247
01:02:40.230 --> 01:02:42.950 line:15%
If you have responsibility for somebody,
1248
01:02:42.950 --> 01:02:46.840 line:15%
whether they're yours, in other words, your soldiers,
1249
01:02:46.840 --> 01:02:50.620 line:15%
or their detainees, you've got responsibility for them,
1250
01:02:50.620 --> 01:02:53.170 line:15%
it's an ethical charge.
1251
01:02:53.170 --> 01:02:57.740 line:15%
In my mind, and I think for, you know, our leaders,
1252
01:02:57.740 --> 01:03:01.840 line:15%
those that took their responsibility seriously,
1253
01:03:01.840 --> 01:03:04.670 line:15%
and did it well, that's how they thought of it.
1254
01:03:04.670 --> 01:03:07.470 line:15%
And, but we had someone who did not,
1255
01:03:07.470 --> 01:03:09.815 line:15%
for whatever reason, and I mean, there's not,
1256
01:03:09.815 --> 01:03:10.990 line:15%
I'm not, again I'm not excusing,
1257
01:03:10.990 --> 01:03:15.540 line:15%
or I'm not, I don't wanna throw rocks at somebody,
1258
01:03:15.540 --> 01:03:20.070 line:15%
especially I wasn't in his or her position,
1259
01:03:20.070 --> 01:03:24.000 line:15%
so I can't, you know, I would be the last person to do that.
1260
01:03:24.000 --> 01:03:27.120 line:15%
But, I'm just speaking as a professional,
1261
01:03:27.120 --> 01:03:29.280 line:15%
you know my first charge as a professional
1262
01:03:29.280 --> 01:03:33.520 line:15%
is to not to take care of the guys above me,
1263
01:03:33.520 --> 01:03:35.450 line:15%
but to take care of my people.
1264
01:03:35.450 --> 01:03:37.360 line:15%
That's what comes to mind first.
1265
01:03:37.360 --> 01:03:41.150 line:15%
And if you've got somebody who's doing misconduct,
1266
01:03:41.150 --> 01:03:44.500 line:15%
who works for you, you're not taking care of them.
1267
01:03:44.500 --> 01:03:47.200 line:15%
You're not doing what you're supposed to do as a leader.
1268
01:03:47.200 --> 01:03:50.070 line:15%
And I think that was where the real, we had the real fault
1269
01:03:50.070 --> 01:03:53.510 line:15%
in Abu Ghraib, both in the MP side,
1270
01:03:53.510 --> 01:03:56.593 line:15%
with non-commissioned officers who should have known better,
1271
01:03:56.593 --> 01:03:58.650 line:15%
and officers who should have known better,
1272
01:03:58.650 --> 01:04:00.290 line:15%
and on the military intelligence side
1273
01:04:00.290 --> 01:04:03.650 line:15%
where we had soldiers and officers, NCOs,
1274
01:04:03.650 --> 01:04:05.200 line:15%
all didn't know,
1275
01:04:05.200 --> 01:04:07.930 line:15%
either didn't take their responsibilities seriously,
1276
01:04:07.930 --> 01:04:12.320 line:15%
or should have known better than to allow abuses to occur.
1277
01:04:12.320 --> 01:04:16.163 line:15%
So we try, we were, I don't think anybody,
1278
01:04:16.163 --> 01:04:21.080 line:15%
I mean, I don't know anybody in the army
1279
01:04:21.080 --> 01:04:25.200 line:15%
who I knew at any level who felt anything
1280
01:04:25.200 --> 01:04:30.200 line:15%
other than shock and dismay that these things occurred.
1281
01:04:31.350 --> 01:04:32.950 line:15%
Did you ever talk to General Miller
1282
01:04:32.950 --> 01:04:34.440 line:15%
after Abu Ghraib?
1283
01:04:34.440 --> 01:04:35.905 line:15%
No, I'd really like to,
1284
01:04:35.905 --> 01:04:37.900 line:15%
But I have never had the opportunity.
1285
01:04:37.900 --> 01:04:40.730 line:15%
And do you think the same description
1286
01:04:40.730 --> 01:04:44.130 line:15%
that you just gave us applies to Guantanamo too?
1287
01:04:44.130 --> 01:04:47.650 line:15%
Since you know, you also did some investigation there?
1288
01:04:47.650 --> 01:04:52.650 line:15%
I think that, you know, I've heard enough about it
1289
01:04:52.880 --> 01:04:55.570 line:15%
from other sources, not again,
1290
01:04:55.570 --> 01:04:58.283 line:15%
we looked at primarily Abu Ghraib,
1291
01:04:59.499 --> 01:05:03.053 line:15%
and I had my own personal experience at Bagram,
1292
01:05:04.199 --> 01:05:09.070 line:15%
and I think Bagram is probably a better comparison
1293
01:05:09.070 --> 01:05:12.027 line:15%
than Abu Ghraib, better than Bagram
1294
01:05:12.027 --> 01:05:15.690 line:15%
and it still exists, it's still a joint facility
1295
01:05:15.690 --> 01:05:16.960 line:15%
between us and the Afghanis,
1296
01:05:16.960 --> 01:05:19.703 line:15%
although it was supposed to turnover I guess two weeks ago.
1297
01:05:23.263 --> 01:05:26.350 line:15%
What I saw at Bagram was disturbing,
1298
01:05:27.450 --> 01:05:30.830 line:15%
and again, I'm speaking about what I saw at Bagram
1299
01:05:30.830 --> 01:05:33.760 line:15%
not at Guantanamo, so two different things.
1300
01:05:33.760 --> 01:05:38.320 line:15%
But I think that both facilities operated
1301
01:05:38.320 --> 01:05:42.560 line:15%
along much the same lines and where you've got a tension
1302
01:05:42.560 --> 01:05:47.560 line:15%
between, gathering intelligence or preventing someone
1303
01:05:48.310 --> 01:05:50.160 line:15%
from returning to the battlefield,
1304
01:05:50.160 --> 01:05:55.030 line:15%
which is another strong reason to, or justification
1305
01:05:55.030 --> 01:05:57.423 line:15%
not just, it's not the right word, rationale,
1306
01:05:59.960 --> 01:06:02.240 line:15%
purported rationale for keeping people
1307
01:06:02.240 --> 01:06:06.910 line:15%
in indefinite detention is to keep them off the battlefield.
1308
01:06:06.910 --> 01:06:08.740 line:15%
You've got a tension between that
1309
01:06:08.740 --> 01:06:11.430 line:15%
and everything that our country
1310
01:06:12.390 --> 01:06:15.520 line:15%
stands for in terms of equal treatment under the law,
1311
01:06:15.520 --> 01:06:17.823 line:15%
and human rights.
1312
01:06:19.580 --> 01:06:21.200 line:15%
There will be, I mean that tension
1313
01:06:21.200 --> 01:06:22.920 line:15%
is gonna be resolved sometimes
1314
01:06:22.920 --> 01:06:27.670 line:15%
in a way that's on the side of abuse.
1315
01:06:27.670 --> 01:06:31.350 line:15%
And I believe that certainly what I saw at Bagram
1316
01:06:31.350 --> 01:06:32.183 line:15%
told me that.
1317
01:06:32.183 --> 01:06:33.760 line:15%
What did you see at Bagram?
1318
01:06:33.760 --> 01:06:38.003 line:15%
I saw prisoners there who were clearly,
1319
01:06:39.120 --> 01:06:42.970 line:15%
I mean, and I was, I was just there for one day,
1320
01:06:42.970 --> 01:06:46.540 line:15%
but it seemed to me that the sort of behavior
1321
01:06:46.540 --> 01:06:48.420 line:15%
that was going on with some of the prisoners
1322
01:06:48.420 --> 01:06:53.420 line:15%
was brutal and inappropriate, and it was shocking.
1323
01:06:53.610 --> 01:06:55.130 line:15%
By whom?
1324
01:06:55.130 --> 01:06:57.360 line:15%
By the people who ran the facility,
1325
01:06:57.360 --> 01:06:58.773 line:15%
and they were--
1326
01:06:59.974 --> 01:07:01.542 line:15%
They weren't afraid to hide it from you,
1327
01:07:01.542 --> 01:07:02.375 line:15%
knowing you were--
1328
01:07:02.375 --> 01:07:03.710 line:15%
They showed me,
1329
01:07:03.710 --> 01:07:06.780 line:15%
I was taking a, essentially to look at the facility
1330
01:07:06.780 --> 01:07:08.350 line:15%
to see what it was like.
1331
01:07:08.350 --> 01:07:11.870 line:15%
And, I know they, just to give you a couple examples
1332
01:07:11.870 --> 01:07:16.860 line:15%
there is, she may have been the worst person
1333
01:07:16.860 --> 01:07:20.150 line:15%
in the world possible, I don't know,
1334
01:07:20.150 --> 01:07:22.290 line:15%
I mean, here I am making a judgment based
1335
01:07:22.290 --> 01:07:26.080 line:15%
on personal observation at one point in time,
1336
01:07:26.080 --> 01:07:31.080 line:15%
but I, it just struck me as odd that this would occur.
1337
01:07:31.530 --> 01:07:34.750 line:15%
There was a woman who maybe she was 30, I don't know,
1338
01:07:34.750 --> 01:07:38.240 line:15%
but she looked like she was 90 and she was frail,
1339
01:07:38.240 --> 01:07:41.780 line:15%
clearly frail, clearly not in good health,
1340
01:07:41.780 --> 01:07:43.780 line:15%
and she was just cowering in the corner.
1341
01:07:45.280 --> 01:07:48.360 line:15%
Just sobbing and weeping in the corner,
1342
01:07:48.360 --> 01:07:51.250 line:15%
in a cell that was empty except for her.
1343
01:07:51.250 --> 01:07:52.280 line:15%
And she was wearing clothes,
1344
01:07:52.280 --> 01:07:53.780 line:15%
it wasn't like she was naked or anything,
1345
01:07:53.780 --> 01:07:58.780 line:15%
but dirty, filthy this really very, very unsanitary.
1346
01:08:02.110 --> 01:08:04.070 line:15%
I know that was unsanitary,
1347
01:08:04.070 --> 01:08:06.853 line:15%
I could see results of the lack of sanitation.
1348
01:08:07.890 --> 01:08:10.050 line:15%
I could, tell it was rags.
1349
01:08:10.050 --> 01:08:14.150 line:15%
And she was looked to be a very old frail woman,
1350
01:08:14.150 --> 01:08:16.590 line:15%
sobbing in the corner, and one of the guards
1351
01:08:16.590 --> 01:08:18.767 line:15%
was like smacking on the door and yelling at her.
1352
01:08:18.767 --> 01:08:21.937 line:15%
And I thought, "Really, how can this be?"
1353
01:08:24.010 --> 01:08:25.510 line:15%
That doesn't make sense to me.
1354
01:08:26.591 --> 01:08:28.070 line:15%
Did you say anything?
1355
01:08:28.070 --> 01:08:29.783 line:15%
No, I didn't.
1356
01:08:32.550 --> 01:08:33.383 line:15%
And what else?
1357
01:08:33.383 --> 01:08:35.930 line:15%
You said you had another example.
1358
01:08:35.930 --> 01:08:38.690 line:15%
I saw prisoners shackled to the floor
1359
01:08:38.690 --> 01:08:40.900 line:15%
with their hands behind their back,
1360
01:08:40.900 --> 01:08:42.490 line:15%
and I don't know how long they'd been there,
1361
01:08:42.490 --> 01:08:46.280 line:15%
but there was 50 or 60 on one concrete slab,
1362
01:08:46.280 --> 01:08:49.570 line:15%
all shackled to the floor by their wrists,
1363
01:08:49.570 --> 01:08:51.120 line:15%
their legs folded in front of them.
1364
01:08:51.120 --> 01:08:53.227 line:15%
Again, maybe they were there for five minutes,
1365
01:08:53.227 --> 01:08:55.113 line:15%
maybe I doubt it,
1366
01:08:56.561 --> 01:08:58.470 line:15%
they were probably there for a lot longer.
1367
01:08:58.470 --> 01:09:02.088 line:15%
And, did, people didn't try to explain to you
1368
01:09:02.088 --> 01:09:04.860 line:15%
how they were running the prison, or?
1369
01:09:04.860 --> 01:09:06.560 line:15%
They said these were dangerous people,
1370
01:09:06.560 --> 01:09:08.390 line:15%
persons under control,
1371
01:09:08.390 --> 01:09:11.880 line:15%
I know at the time the issue was, if they're released
1372
01:09:11.880 --> 01:09:16.603 line:15%
then the Afghanis would turn lose, and they probably would,
1373
01:09:17.680 --> 01:09:19.933 line:15%
but they need to be off the battlefield.
1374
01:09:21.105 --> 01:09:23.240 line:15%
Did you, write a report
1375
01:09:23.240 --> 01:09:25.140 line:15%
about what you observed and--
1376
01:09:25.140 --> 01:09:25.973 line:15%
Yes.
1377
01:09:27.540 --> 01:09:31.180 line:15%
In that did you also suggest better ways
1378
01:09:31.180 --> 01:09:33.318 line:15%
of treating these, the people that we captured?
1379
01:09:33.318 --> 01:09:34.703 line:15%
Yes.
1380
01:09:34.703 --> 01:09:36.369 line:15%
And did anybody read your report?
1381
01:09:36.369 --> 01:09:38.360 line:15%
I don't know.
1382
01:09:38.360 --> 01:09:41.970 line:15%
Who was your report supposed to be for?
1383
01:09:41.970 --> 01:09:43.873 line:15%
I reported to the G2 the army.
1384
01:09:46.260 --> 01:09:47.270 line:15%
And did you ever have a conversation
1385
01:09:47.270 --> 01:09:50.110 line:15%
with the G2 as to what you observed?
1386
01:09:50.110 --> 01:09:50.960 line:15%
I don't recall.
1387
01:09:53.160 --> 01:09:55.720 line:15%
Well, do you thoughts change
1388
01:09:55.720 --> 01:09:58.460 line:15%
after you went to Bagram and saw this?
1389
01:09:58.460 --> 01:10:01.010 line:15%
Did you know, firsthand?
1390
01:10:01.010 --> 01:10:04.400 line:15%
It was disturbing, but to me,
1391
01:10:04.400 --> 01:10:08.730 line:15%
and I wasn't entirely sure what to make of it
1392
01:10:08.730 --> 01:10:11.330 line:15%
other than what I saw was disturbing.
1393
01:10:11.330 --> 01:10:14.110 line:15%
But I also understood that the rationale
1394
01:10:14.110 --> 01:10:15.640 line:15%
was that these were dangerous people
1395
01:10:15.640 --> 01:10:18.063 line:15%
that needed to be detained.
1396
01:10:19.202 --> 01:10:23.660 line:15%
And again, I have no knowledge either then or since then
1397
01:10:25.150 --> 01:10:29.160 line:15%
of the specific individuals that I saw.
1398
01:10:29.160 --> 01:10:32.443 line:15%
I'm simply describing what I saw.
1399
01:10:32.443 --> 01:10:35.590 line:15%
And, so there, again
1400
01:10:35.590 --> 01:10:39.000 line:15%
maybe these were really dangerous people,
1401
01:10:39.000 --> 01:10:41.470 line:15%
but I mean I had no doubt that they were there
1402
01:10:41.470 --> 01:10:45.029 line:15%
for some reason, but I don't know what that was.
1403
01:10:45.029 --> 01:10:48.440 line:15%
And nor do I know if perhaps they were released the next day
1404
01:10:48.440 --> 01:10:49.740 line:15%
because maybe they didn't,
1405
01:10:49.740 --> 01:10:50.760 line:15%
they weren't supposed to be there.
1406
01:10:50.760 --> 01:10:54.440 line:15%
I don't know that, but I wasn't there,
1407
01:10:54.440 --> 01:10:58.234 line:15%
honestly, I wasn't there to conduct an investigation
1408
01:10:58.234 --> 01:11:03.007 line:15%
of that facility, that was not the mission I was on.
1409
01:11:03.007 --> 01:11:05.080 line:15%
What was the mission?
1410
01:11:05.080 --> 01:11:09.640 line:15%
The mission was to look at, to examine the threats
1411
01:11:12.340 --> 01:11:17.340 line:15%
to our force flow, our transfer of units
1412
01:11:17.490 --> 01:11:20.640 line:15%
to and from Afghanistan and Iraq,
1413
01:11:20.640 --> 01:11:22.420 line:15%
to and from the United States.
1414
01:11:22.420 --> 01:11:24.370 line:15%
And to look at force protection issues.
1415
01:11:25.370 --> 01:11:28.610 line:15%
After you observed the two situations
1416
01:11:28.610 --> 01:11:32.230 line:15%
you just told us about, did you talk to anybody
1417
01:11:32.230 --> 01:11:34.310 line:15%
have a conversation with anybody about what you observed
1418
01:11:34.310 --> 01:11:38.860 line:15%
and whether they reinforced what you felt or saw?
1419
01:11:38.860 --> 01:11:41.940 line:15%
Yeah, I mean at the time the discussion
1420
01:11:41.940 --> 01:11:45.170 line:15%
was why are these people here?
1421
01:11:45.170 --> 01:11:48.210 line:15%
And the answer, which honestly in the context
1422
01:11:48.210 --> 01:11:51.450 line:15%
of what we were doing in Afghanistan,
1423
01:11:51.450 --> 01:11:56.030 line:15%
which may had a certain degree of sense to it,
1424
01:11:56.030 --> 01:11:58.320 line:15%
and still has a certain degree of sense to it,
1425
01:11:58.320 --> 01:12:02.330 line:15%
is that there are people who we pick up on the battlefield
1426
01:12:02.330 --> 01:12:05.610 line:15%
either in combat or in other operations,
1427
01:12:05.610 --> 01:12:09.300 line:15%
or who were provided given to us by Afghan,
1428
01:12:09.300 --> 01:12:12.250 line:15%
or by other units, by other countries units,
1429
01:12:12.250 --> 01:12:16.090 line:15%
who are who need to be interrogated,
1430
01:12:16.090 --> 01:12:20.960 line:15%
who need to be secured because they're conducting
1431
01:12:20.960 --> 01:12:22.590 line:15%
insurgent operations.
1432
01:12:22.590 --> 01:12:26.010 line:15%
And of course we want to do that.
1433
01:12:26.010 --> 01:12:28.010 line:15%
It, we would be profligated
1434
01:12:28.010 --> 01:12:31.400 line:15%
if we didn't treat them carefully.
1435
01:12:31.400 --> 01:12:36.400 line:15%
But again, there are specific rules for handling detainees,
1436
01:12:39.930 --> 01:12:44.930 line:15%
which is exactly what we took back to our project.
1437
01:12:45.250 --> 01:12:47.940 line:15%
Again, I was there for another mission, but believe me,
1438
01:12:47.940 --> 01:12:50.940 line:15%
we took that experience back to our project,
1439
01:12:50.940 --> 01:12:55.940 line:15%
and we said, "Okay, so this is how we should treat detainees
1440
01:12:58.300 --> 01:13:01.690 line:15%
at each different military occupational specialty,
1441
01:13:01.690 --> 01:13:06.030 line:15%
and across these capability levels.
1442
01:13:06.030 --> 01:13:11.030 line:15%
Let's make doctrine for the corrections NCO,
1443
01:13:11.350 --> 01:13:16.350 line:15%
that he conducts his corrections operations a certain way.
1444
01:13:17.420 --> 01:13:20.140 line:15%
Let's give him tasks that he has to perform
1445
01:13:20.140 --> 01:13:24.590 line:15%
that will tell him these are the standards
1446
01:13:24.590 --> 01:13:27.526 line:15%
that you have to perform, let's provide the,
1447
01:13:27.526 --> 01:13:28.670 line:15%
I mean the doctrine is one thing,
1448
01:13:28.670 --> 01:13:29.630 line:15%
let's give him the,
1449
01:13:29.630 --> 01:13:33.460 line:15%
let's make the organization robust enough
1450
01:13:33.460 --> 01:13:38.300 line:15%
to provide for effective and ethical treatment of detainees.
1451
01:13:38.300 --> 01:13:41.470 line:15%
Let's, train them to do that.
1452
01:13:41.470 --> 01:13:43.437 line:15%
Let's give them the leadership to do that."
1453
01:13:43.437 --> 01:13:47.140 line:15%
And so that's the way we organized our task force
1454
01:13:47.140 --> 01:13:49.380 line:15%
is to take a look at each of the specialties
1455
01:13:49.380 --> 01:13:53.910 line:15%
that would have any contact or dealings with detainees,
1456
01:13:53.910 --> 01:13:58.910 line:15%
and then go through this crosswalk as it were,
1457
01:13:59.380 --> 01:14:02.440 line:15%
to make sure that our doctrine and our organization,
1458
01:14:02.440 --> 01:14:04.270 line:15%
our training, our material
1459
01:14:04.270 --> 01:14:05.840 line:15%
we have to have the right equipment,
1460
01:14:05.840 --> 01:14:08.930 line:15%
our leadership and education, and our personnel
1461
01:14:08.930 --> 01:14:10.610 line:15%
are the right people and our facilities
1462
01:14:10.610 --> 01:14:12.170 line:15%
are the right facilities.
1463
01:14:12.170 --> 01:14:13.150 line:15%
Because if you don't do that
1464
01:14:13.150 --> 01:14:14.560 line:15%
then you'll fix part of the problem,
1465
01:14:14.560 --> 01:14:16.940 line:15%
but the rest of the problem gets ignored.
1466
01:14:16.940 --> 01:14:19.580 line:15%
So, we took that experience, not just mine, of course,
1467
01:14:19.580 --> 01:14:21.030 line:15%
but then we took the experience
1468
01:14:21.030 --> 01:14:24.160 line:15%
of all of us who had some experience
1469
01:14:24.160 --> 01:14:26.140 line:15%
or observation of detaining operations
1470
01:14:26.140 --> 01:14:29.851 line:15%
and produced a, what I think was a pretty effective
1471
01:14:29.851 --> 01:14:31.970 line:15%
change to army doctrine.
1472
01:14:31.970 --> 01:14:32.803 line:15%
So two questions,
1473
01:14:32.803 --> 01:14:36.330 line:15%
one is other people observed similar instances
1474
01:14:36.330 --> 01:14:38.320 line:15%
like you described to us.
1475
01:14:38.320 --> 01:14:39.370 line:15%
Sure.
1476
01:14:39.370 --> 01:14:43.130 line:15%
And, that the program that you design
1477
01:14:43.130 --> 01:14:44.520 line:15%
was it implemented?
1478
01:14:44.520 --> 01:14:46.790 line:15%
Yes, yeah, and it was not, again,
1479
01:14:46.790 --> 01:14:51.050 line:15%
I don't wanna I mean I was part of a team,
1480
01:14:51.050 --> 01:14:52.670 line:15%
so it's not me personally,
1481
01:14:52.670 --> 01:14:55.660 line:15%
it was the team, the task force.
1482
01:14:55.660 --> 01:14:57.820 line:15%
And with support from the army leadership
1483
01:14:57.820 --> 01:14:59.620 line:15%
who were genuinely concerned
1484
01:14:59.620 --> 01:15:02.240 line:15%
that we needed to make sure that our detaining operations
1485
01:15:02.240 --> 01:15:05.490 line:15%
were done effectively and ethically.
1486
01:15:05.490 --> 01:15:07.330 line:15%
But yes, it was implemented.
1487
01:15:07.330 --> 01:15:09.940 line:15%
There were changes that we made to the army
1488
01:15:09.940 --> 01:15:12.351 line:15%
the way we handle detainees based on that report.
1489
01:15:12.351 --> 01:15:15.950 line:15%
So isn't it, I know Guantanamo it's a team effort
1490
01:15:15.950 --> 01:15:20.950 line:15%
of all branches of the military in the detention centers,
1491
01:15:22.190 --> 01:15:25.250 line:15%
so if the army has a new protocol
1492
01:15:25.250 --> 01:15:29.253 line:15%
in terms of how it treats prisoners,
1493
01:15:30.090 --> 01:15:32.760 line:15%
what happens to the Navy and the Marines,
1494
01:15:32.760 --> 01:15:35.140 line:15%
do they lock into that same step
1495
01:15:35.140 --> 01:15:36.510 line:15%
or do they have a different protocol?
1496
01:15:36.510 --> 01:15:39.660 line:15%
Well, the army was charged as the let's call it,
1497
01:15:39.660 --> 01:15:42.282 line:15%
we'll call it the executive agent for the military
1498
01:15:42.282 --> 01:15:44.640 line:15%
to come up with the doctrine and procedures
1499
01:15:44.640 --> 01:15:45.670 line:15%
to handle the trainees.
1500
01:15:45.670 --> 01:15:46.503 line:15%
Oh, okay.
1501
01:15:46.503 --> 01:15:47.760 line:15%
And that would be follow then by the branches?
1502
01:15:47.760 --> 01:15:49.040 line:15%
Yes, yes.
1503
01:15:49.040 --> 01:15:51.880 line:15%
And your protocol
1504
01:15:51.880 --> 01:15:54.550 line:15%
also would apply to Guantanamo--
1505
01:15:54.550 --> 01:15:57.360 line:15%
For military operations, absolutely.
1506
01:15:57.360 --> 01:15:59.957 line:15%
And when was it implemented?
1507
01:15:59.957 --> 01:16:02.333 line:15%
In late 2004.
1508
01:16:04.370 --> 01:16:07.180 line:15%
Huh, and so did you know of,
1509
01:16:07.180 --> 01:16:09.260 line:15%
or did you ever go to Guantanamo?
1510
01:16:09.260 --> 01:16:10.093 line:15%
No.
1511
01:16:10.093 --> 01:16:13.240 line:15%
Did you know of, or do you ever hear or see
1512
01:16:13.240 --> 01:16:15.734 line:15%
that in fact there were significant changes
1513
01:16:15.734 --> 01:16:19.460 line:15%
in the operations of detainees in achievement
1514
01:16:19.460 --> 01:16:22.293 line:15%
of detainees following your protocol
1515
01:16:22.293 --> 01:16:25.047 line:15%
that was implemented in late 2004?
1516
01:16:25.047 --> 01:16:28.430 line:15%
As I understand it, the military
1517
01:16:29.540 --> 01:16:31.983 line:15%
changed its procedures rather quickly,
1518
01:16:33.110 --> 01:16:37.540 line:15%
and that all military operations involving detainees
1519
01:16:37.540 --> 01:16:41.833 line:15%
had to conform with our view of detainee procedures.
1520
01:16:42.769 --> 01:16:43.602 line:15%
Just--
1521
01:16:43.602 --> 01:16:45.236 line:15%
Whether it Guantanamo or wherever it was--
1522
01:16:45.236 --> 01:16:46.069 line:15%
Throughout the world.
1523
01:16:46.069 --> 01:16:47.190 line:15%
Correct
1524
01:16:47.190 --> 01:16:48.680 line:15%
Just generally, I don't wanna get
1525
01:16:48.680 --> 01:16:50.510 line:15%
into too many details and specific
1526
01:16:50.510 --> 01:16:52.490 line:15%
'cause people could always read those procedures
1527
01:16:52.490 --> 01:16:53.631 line:15%
they're public obviously--
1528
01:16:53.631 --> 01:16:54.464 line:15%
Yeah.
1529
01:16:54.464 --> 01:16:55.297 line:15%
But just generally
1530
01:16:55.297 --> 01:16:58.062 line:15%
can you tell us what significant changes
1531
01:16:58.062 --> 01:17:03.062 line:15%
were made in your procedures that caused the difference?
1532
01:17:04.688 --> 01:17:07.840 line:15%
You know, I think our main focus was ensuring
1533
01:17:07.840 --> 01:17:12.130 line:15%
that detainee operations had the right training,
1534
01:17:12.130 --> 01:17:14.853 line:15%
and had the right leadership,
1535
01:17:16.031 --> 01:17:17.710 line:15%
so that there was supervision
1536
01:17:17.710 --> 01:17:20.330 line:15%
at all levels of what detaining,
1537
01:17:20.330 --> 01:17:21.163 line:15%
of any detaining operations.
1538
01:17:22.990 --> 01:17:25.146 line:15%
Because that was the real problem,
1539
01:17:25.146 --> 01:17:29.970 line:15%
that we identified as having looked at the way
1540
01:17:29.970 --> 01:17:32.830 line:15%
we did things wrong, especially Abu Ghraib,
1541
01:17:32.830 --> 01:17:34.970 line:15%
it was a question of training and supervision.
1542
01:17:34.970 --> 01:17:37.050 line:15%
So did you create or did the army create
1543
01:17:37.050 --> 01:17:39.870 line:15%
new training programs specifically in response to--
1544
01:17:39.870 --> 01:17:40.703 line:15%
Yes.
1545
01:17:40.703 --> 01:17:41.536 line:15%
Your protocol?
1546
01:17:41.536 --> 01:17:42.369 line:15%
Yes, they did.
1547
01:17:42.369 --> 01:17:45.129 line:15%
And it was done very quickly
1548
01:17:45.129 --> 01:17:48.254 line:15%
to make sure we didn't have any more problems.
1549
01:17:48.254 --> 01:17:50.240 line:15%
Did you hear from people on the ground
1550
01:17:50.240 --> 01:17:54.450 line:15%
that in fact they did see a change following your protocols?
1551
01:17:54.450 --> 01:17:55.980 line:15%
You know, I don't know that they would say
1552
01:17:55.980 --> 01:17:59.600 line:15%
that they saw a change based on those protocols,
1553
01:17:59.600 --> 01:18:04.233 line:15%
but that it was very clear that the army took,
1554
01:18:05.780 --> 01:18:09.110 line:15%
effective and ethical, which I would argue
1555
01:18:09.110 --> 01:18:12.680 line:15%
are closely related, effective and ethical
1556
01:18:12.680 --> 01:18:17.300 line:15%
detainee handling very seriously and continue to.
1557
01:18:17.300 --> 01:18:19.420 line:15%
I'll just give you a personal example.
1558
01:18:19.420 --> 01:18:24.420 line:15%
I, after I retired, our military intelligence interrogators
1559
01:18:28.000 --> 01:18:30.940 line:15%
are trained at Fort Huachuca Arizona
1560
01:18:31.930 --> 01:18:33.440 line:15%
a place I've known and love
1561
01:18:33.440 --> 01:18:35.340 line:15%
'cause it's not far from where I live,
1562
01:18:36.275 --> 01:18:38.767 line:15%
but that's where that's the home of military intelligence
1563
01:18:38.767 --> 01:18:40.417 line:15%
and that's where they're trained.
1564
01:18:41.300 --> 01:18:46.300 line:15%
And I spent some time, a couple of years
1565
01:18:46.470 --> 01:18:50.866 line:15%
after I retired, with one of the classes of interrogators
1566
01:18:50.866 --> 01:18:52.840 line:15%
and had a chance to speak
1567
01:18:52.840 --> 01:18:56.660 line:15%
with some of these NCOs in this case, mostly NCOs,
1568
01:18:56.660 --> 01:18:58.680 line:15%
usually junior NCOs, who were going through
1569
01:18:58.680 --> 01:18:59.590 line:15%
interrogator training.
1570
01:18:59.590 --> 01:19:04.154 line:15%
And it was clear to me that they had gotten it,
1571
01:19:04.154 --> 01:19:07.430 line:15%
because they understood that their responsibility
1572
01:19:07.430 --> 01:19:10.950 line:15%
was both for their soldiers and also for their detainees.
1573
01:19:10.950 --> 01:19:13.060 line:15%
And what's a sense of responsibility
1574
01:19:13.060 --> 01:19:14.570 line:15%
that they took very seriously.
1575
01:19:14.570 --> 01:19:18.640 line:15%
Which was our, exactly our point.
1576
01:19:18.640 --> 01:19:21.170 line:15%
You know, you have responsibility
1577
01:19:21.170 --> 01:19:22.703 line:15%
for people under your charge.
1578
01:19:23.790 --> 01:19:26.230 line:15%
Doesn't, of course you have response,
1579
01:19:26.230 --> 01:19:28.900 line:15%
you know, because you wear the same uniform
1580
01:19:28.900 --> 01:19:31.320 line:15%
you have responsibility for your soldiers,
1581
01:19:31.320 --> 01:19:34.830 line:15%
but if that's the extent you're missing half of the problem.
1582
01:19:34.830 --> 01:19:37.350 line:15%
You also have responsibilities for these others
1583
01:19:37.350 --> 01:19:38.840 line:15%
who don't wear the uniform,
1584
01:19:38.840 --> 01:19:42.260 line:15%
who have not been charged with a crime,
1585
01:19:42.260 --> 01:19:45.560 line:15%
who may be just in the wrong place at the wrong time,
1586
01:19:45.560 --> 01:19:47.650 line:15%
you're responsible for them too.
1587
01:19:47.650 --> 01:19:50.440 line:15%
But these guys got it, I mean, it's be hard
1588
01:19:50.440 --> 01:19:52.690 line:15%
to take a, you know, a group of 100 guys
1589
01:19:52.690 --> 01:19:54.647 line:15%
and, you know, young leaders and say,
1590
01:19:54.647 --> 01:19:56.970 line:15%
"well you all understand it exactly the same way,"
1591
01:19:56.970 --> 01:19:59.120 line:15%
but spend a few minutes with them
1592
01:19:59.120 --> 01:20:01.780 line:15%
and it was pretty clear that was where they were focused.
1593
01:20:01.780 --> 01:20:03.050 line:15%
And they were focused on not only that,
1594
01:20:03.050 --> 01:20:05.740 line:15%
but they were focused on serving our constitution.
1595
01:20:05.740 --> 01:20:07.760 line:15%
And I came away inspired by that.
1596
01:20:07.760 --> 01:20:10.260 line:15%
And I think that was the change I really do.
1597
01:20:10.260 --> 01:20:11.960 line:15%
So General, listening to you
1598
01:20:11.960 --> 01:20:14.770 line:15%
it makes me wonder, tough me to imagine that the army
1599
01:20:14.770 --> 01:20:17.980 line:15%
who I respect and the military respect,
1600
01:20:17.980 --> 01:20:20.050 line:15%
would not have had something in place
1601
01:20:20.050 --> 01:20:24.620 line:15%
the way you described it prior to your involvement
1602
01:20:24.620 --> 01:20:25.580 line:15%
in these protocols.
1603
01:20:25.580 --> 01:20:29.600 line:15%
I would think that it always was a disciplined organization
1604
01:20:29.600 --> 01:20:32.433 line:15%
with a leadership that was strong and with,
1605
01:20:33.730 --> 01:20:38.370 line:15%
somewhat a caring understanding of who's under your control.
1606
01:20:38.370 --> 01:20:41.262 line:15%
So, I guess I just wanna clarify--
1607
01:20:41.262 --> 01:20:42.095 line:15%
Yeah, sure.
1608
01:20:42.095 --> 01:20:44.430 line:15%
You're telling me that prior to 2004
1609
01:20:44.430 --> 01:20:46.900 line:15%
the army did not have that.
1610
01:20:46.900 --> 01:20:49.365 line:15%
And if they didn't why not?
1611
01:20:49.365 --> 01:20:54.365 line:15%
And I'm not excusing any misconduct at all,
1612
01:20:55.580 --> 01:20:57.010 line:15%
that's not my point.
1613
01:20:57.010 --> 01:21:00.350 line:15%
But I think we have to look at the context.
1614
01:21:00.350 --> 01:21:05.350 line:15%
And I'll just give an analogy, because we, you know
1615
01:21:06.180 --> 01:21:09.833 line:15%
we did in Vietnam, we fought an insurgency,
1616
01:21:11.420 --> 01:21:16.420 line:15%
to debatable level of success, but we fought an insurgency.
1617
01:21:16.820 --> 01:21:20.370 line:15%
And then we trained for other types of conflict
1618
01:21:20.370 --> 01:21:23.930 line:15%
specifically fighting the Warsaw Pact,
1619
01:21:23.930 --> 01:21:28.930 line:15%
that was the focus, maneuver warfare, tanks and combat arms,
1620
01:21:29.130 --> 01:21:34.130 line:15%
you know, not an insurgency, for the next 20 years.
1621
01:21:34.150 --> 01:21:39.150 line:15%
And then we go to Iraq and we first fight a conventional war
1622
01:21:40.350 --> 01:21:44.977 line:15%
and defeat the army of Iraq pretty quickly.
1623
01:21:44.977 --> 01:21:48.807 line:15%
But, when Baghdad Bob said,
1624
01:21:48.807 --> 01:21:51.320 line:15%
"We will fight you in the streets,
1625
01:21:51.320 --> 01:21:52.800 line:15%
and we'll fight you in the villages,"
1626
01:21:52.800 --> 01:21:56.660 line:15%
we all laughed because he was a joker, but he was right,
1627
01:21:56.660 --> 01:21:58.930 line:15%
because that's exactly what happened.
1628
01:21:58.930 --> 01:22:00.453 line:15%
And we were not prepared.
1629
01:22:01.570 --> 01:22:03.460 line:15%
We were not expecting that.
1630
01:22:03.460 --> 01:22:07.803 line:15%
We thought we'd beaten the army, we're here,
1631
01:22:07.803 --> 01:22:11.710 line:15%
I think a lot of people thought they were gonna love us,
1632
01:22:11.710 --> 01:22:14.250 line:15%
I mean, there was a tremendous number of misconceptions
1633
01:22:14.250 --> 01:22:16.852 line:15%
about what we would face in Iraq
1634
01:22:16.852 --> 01:22:21.852 line:15%
that were actually strengthened by our initial success.
1635
01:22:23.029 --> 01:22:28.029 line:15%
And easy success breeds overconfidence and complacency,
1636
01:22:29.900 --> 01:22:33.230 line:15%
and lack of preparation for future challenges.
1637
01:22:33.230 --> 01:22:35.880 line:15%
So again, not excusing the misconduct,
1638
01:22:35.880 --> 01:22:38.370 line:15%
but I think from a human standpoint,
1639
01:22:38.370 --> 01:22:40.163 line:15%
and we are after all humans,
1640
01:22:41.050 --> 01:22:44.313 line:15%
we were overconfident and over,
1641
01:22:45.370 --> 01:22:49.350 line:15%
we expected again, stability operations.
1642
01:22:49.350 --> 01:22:51.760 line:15%
We thought, "Okay, we just have to get through that,
1643
01:22:51.760 --> 01:22:55.770 line:15%
we can actually, we'll fire all those Iraqi soldiers,
1644
01:22:55.770 --> 01:22:58.899 line:15%
we'll just send them away, we don't need them."
1645
01:22:58.899 --> 01:23:01.280 line:15%
It's, a peaceful country, they love us here.
1646
01:23:01.280 --> 01:23:03.630 line:15%
And I was, I mean I don't need to go on
1647
01:23:03.630 --> 01:23:06.070 line:15%
with the absurdity that, but I think
1648
01:23:06.070 --> 01:23:07.150 line:15%
that was a big part of it.
1649
01:23:07.150 --> 01:23:09.080 line:15%
And at the larger level, of course
1650
01:23:09.080 --> 01:23:10.340 line:15%
we see it from the national level,
1651
01:23:10.340 --> 01:23:13.520 line:15%
it's, you know, that was clearly
1652
01:23:15.640 --> 01:23:17.860 line:15%
tragic for the United States.
1653
01:23:17.860 --> 01:23:21.300 line:15%
But at the smaller level which frankly concerns me more
1654
01:23:21.300 --> 01:23:24.200 line:15%
because these are my soldiers in there,
1655
01:23:24.200 --> 01:23:28.140 line:15%
they're us, they're our kids at the smaller level,
1656
01:23:28.140 --> 01:23:29.770 line:15%
down at the smaller unit level,
1657
01:23:29.770 --> 01:23:33.270 line:15%
at the private and specialists level.
1658
01:23:33.270 --> 01:23:35.660 line:15%
What we're doing is we're taking kids off American streets
1659
01:23:35.660 --> 01:23:37.110 line:15%
and telling them, "You go over there
1660
01:23:37.110 --> 01:23:41.130 line:15%
and we'll put you in a stability operations,
1661
01:23:41.130 --> 01:23:43.807 line:15%
you kids that were two months ago, you were, you know
1662
01:23:43.807 --> 01:23:46.920 line:15%
you were trained as reservists for national guard,
1663
01:23:46.920 --> 01:23:50.050 line:15%
and maybe you got two more, two weeks a year training,
1664
01:23:50.050 --> 01:23:53.040 line:15%
and now your job is to go over there and fight in a war
1665
01:23:53.040 --> 01:23:55.053 line:15%
against people that want to kill you,
1666
01:23:56.080 --> 01:23:58.930 line:15%
and want to mortar you, and do things
1667
01:23:58.930 --> 01:24:00.840 line:15%
that you can't, you've never done before,
1668
01:24:00.840 --> 01:24:02.670 line:15%
or you've done a little bit of it,"
1669
01:24:02.670 --> 01:24:06.000 line:15%
and those are the kids that we we sent to Abu Ghraib.
1670
01:24:06.000 --> 01:24:08.790 line:15%
Now, whose responsibility is that?
1671
01:24:08.790 --> 01:24:09.970 line:15%
And what about the people
1672
01:24:09.970 --> 01:24:12.161 line:15%
we send to Guantanamo, were they same kind?
1673
01:24:12.161 --> 01:24:13.883 line:15%
Do you think that explains (indistinct)?
1674
01:24:13.883 --> 01:24:16.270 line:15%
You know I think and I don't know this, but I suspect
1675
01:24:16.270 --> 01:24:19.510 line:15%
that we had a higher level of training and experience
1676
01:24:19.510 --> 01:24:22.400 line:15%
of the personnel that we sent to Guantanamo,
1677
01:24:22.400 --> 01:24:26.260 line:15%
if for no other reason that they were usually handpicked.
1678
01:24:26.260 --> 01:24:30.133 line:15%
And, although I'm sure they were very competent reserve,
1679
01:24:31.070 --> 01:24:32.490 line:15%
reserve personnel there,
1680
01:24:32.490 --> 01:24:35.090 line:15%
in fact, I know there were a lot of reserve personnel there,
1681
01:24:35.090 --> 01:24:38.600 line:15%
I suspect that they were there for,
1682
01:24:38.600 --> 01:24:40.760 line:15%
because they'd been hand selected to go.
1683
01:24:40.760 --> 01:24:43.020 line:15%
I don't know that, but I suspect that that's the case,
1684
01:24:43.020 --> 01:24:43.853 line:15%
So you don't think,
1685
01:24:43.853 --> 01:24:44.757 line:15%
oh, so you didn't have necessarily
1686
01:24:44.757 --> 01:24:46.956 line:15%
the same personnel sent to Guantanamo
1687
01:24:46.956 --> 01:24:48.680 line:15%
as the ones you described on Abu Ghraib?
1688
01:24:48.680 --> 01:24:53.680 line:15%
No, but let's again, I'm just you, I will take the Liberty
1689
01:24:55.071 --> 01:25:00.071 line:15%
of speaking with professional speculation.
1690
01:25:01.190 --> 01:25:04.280 line:15%
You know, I think to a certain extent,
1691
01:25:04.280 --> 01:25:07.090 line:15%
the operations at Guantanamo, we're breaking
1692
01:25:07.090 --> 01:25:10.870 line:15%
the same sort of new ground that we broke in Iraq.
1693
01:25:10.870 --> 01:25:14.330 line:15%
Where you know suddenly, you know
1694
01:25:14.330 --> 01:25:17.580 line:15%
I think in our distant past we've probably had situations
1695
01:25:17.580 --> 01:25:21.553 line:15%
where Americans are responsible for the detention of,
1696
01:25:23.980 --> 01:25:27.430 line:15%
prisoners or detainees, large numbers
1697
01:25:28.530 --> 01:25:30.123 line:15%
for an extended period of time.
1698
01:25:32.850 --> 01:25:35.993 line:15%
Where the rules didn't appear to be clear.
1699
01:25:37.170 --> 01:25:42.170 line:15%
The difference with Guantanamo in my opinion,
1700
01:25:42.520 --> 01:25:45.520 line:15%
is that not only were the rules not clear,
1701
01:25:45.520 --> 01:25:48.270 line:15%
that it wasn't only that they were not clear,
1702
01:25:48.270 --> 01:25:52.190 line:15%
is that they were designed not to be clear.
1703
01:25:52.190 --> 01:25:56.423 line:15%
I mean, where in the world is it that you actually take,
1704
01:25:58.950 --> 01:26:03.090 line:15%
not talking about the issue of sovereignty of Cuba here,
1705
01:26:03.090 --> 01:26:07.070 line:15%
but this is not the United States of America.
1706
01:26:07.070 --> 01:26:12.070 line:15%
It is Cuba, and it is neither on our territory
1707
01:26:12.830 --> 01:26:17.500 line:15%
because, well it's not, and so our laws don't apply,
1708
01:26:17.500 --> 01:26:19.900 line:15%
and Cuban law doesn't apply.
1709
01:26:19.900 --> 01:26:21.923 line:15%
So what law does?
1710
01:26:22.810 --> 01:26:25.460 line:15%
Why is it so vague?
1711
01:26:25.460 --> 01:26:28.550 line:15%
Well, I think it's not just accidental,
1712
01:26:28.550 --> 01:26:30.610 line:15%
it's, that's why it's there.
1713
01:26:30.610 --> 01:26:35.610 line:15%
It just happens to be a very useful condition.
1714
01:26:35.670 --> 01:26:37.320 line:15%
It doesn't belong to the United States,
1715
01:26:37.320 --> 01:26:38.300 line:15%
it does belong to Cuba,
1716
01:26:38.300 --> 01:26:40.050 line:15%
but Cuba doesn't have authority over it,
1717
01:26:40.050 --> 01:26:43.700 line:15%
so whatever we wanna do, we can do,
1718
01:26:43.700 --> 01:26:45.430 line:15%
and that's what we do.
1719
01:26:45.430 --> 01:26:48.160 line:15%
Now I'm taking a military guy,
1720
01:26:48.160 --> 01:26:50.120 line:15%
and I'm making him work there,
1721
01:26:50.120 --> 01:26:52.590 line:15%
and all of a sudden, I've gotta explain to him
1722
01:26:52.590 --> 01:26:57.120 line:15%
why is it that we don't have U.S. law
1723
01:26:57.120 --> 01:27:00.650 line:15%
when you are a U.S. military person,
1724
01:27:00.650 --> 01:27:02.710 line:15%
you're a soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine,
1725
01:27:02.710 --> 01:27:06.130 line:15%
who works here, with these people are not,
1726
01:27:06.130 --> 01:27:07.220 line:15%
they're not, we're not gonna treat them
1727
01:27:07.220 --> 01:27:09.210 line:15%
like they're in the United States,
1728
01:27:09.210 --> 01:27:10.940 line:15%
but they're under United States control.
1729
01:27:10.940 --> 01:27:12.780 line:15%
I mean, my head hurts
1730
01:27:12.780 --> 01:27:15.460 line:15%
I mean, it's really an unbelievable to me
1731
01:27:15.460 --> 01:27:18.170 line:15%
that we would be able to justify that.
1732
01:27:18.170 --> 01:27:22.220 line:15%
Again, personal opinion, I'm just saying,
1733
01:27:22.220 --> 01:27:23.790 line:15%
I guess this is not just professional
1734
01:27:23.790 --> 01:27:26.830 line:15%
it's also as an American, it bothers me.
1735
01:27:26.830 --> 01:27:30.090 line:15%
So that, but, and that's having seen
1736
01:27:30.090 --> 01:27:31.490 line:15%
how I think it should work,
1737
01:27:31.490 --> 01:27:35.070 line:15%
where clearly we're gonna make mistakes in an operation
1738
01:27:35.070 --> 01:27:37.200 line:15%
because we've never done it before.
1739
01:27:37.200 --> 01:27:41.000 line:15%
But our determination should always be in my mind
1740
01:27:41.000 --> 01:27:43.708 line:15%
to try to ground whatever we do in the future
1741
01:27:43.708 --> 01:27:48.090 line:15%
in both effectiveness and ethics.
1742
01:27:48.090 --> 01:27:50.270 line:15%
And we have, we know how to do that.
1743
01:27:50.270 --> 01:27:54.860 line:15%
We are a, we pride ourselves on being a nation of law,
1744
01:27:54.860 --> 01:27:57.430 line:15%
we pride ourselves in our constitution,
1745
01:27:57.430 --> 01:28:00.300 line:15%
and should pride ourselves in our constitution,
1746
01:28:00.300 --> 01:28:03.730 line:15%
and grounding our laws in the constitution
1747
01:28:03.730 --> 01:28:06.090 line:15%
when we conduct ourselves in a way,
1748
01:28:06.090 --> 01:28:07.240 line:15%
I don't care where it is in the world,
1749
01:28:07.240 --> 01:28:11.250 line:15%
we conduct ourselves in a way that rides against that,
1750
01:28:11.250 --> 01:28:14.840 line:15%
then we should be ashamed of ourselves.
1751
01:28:14.840 --> 01:28:16.090 line:15%
You're not a lawyer, right?
1752
01:28:16.090 --> 01:28:16.923 line:15%
No.
1753
01:28:19.119 --> 01:28:21.650 line:15%
Were you familiar with the Geneva conventions
1754
01:28:21.650 --> 01:28:24.172 line:15%
since you did some studying of international law?
1755
01:28:24.172 --> 01:28:25.005 line:15%
Yes.
1756
01:28:25.005 --> 01:28:27.200 line:15%
So how did it strike you when you heard
1757
01:28:27.200 --> 01:28:29.350 line:15%
that the Geneva conventions wouldn't be followed
1758
01:28:29.350 --> 01:28:30.183 line:15%
in Guantanamo?
1759
01:28:31.740 --> 01:28:33.063 line:15%
It's really disturbing,
1760
01:28:33.930 --> 01:28:35.480 line:15%
you know, I think we should.
1761
01:28:35.480 --> 01:28:38.250 line:15%
I don't think, I think, you know,
1762
01:28:38.250 --> 01:28:39.540 line:15%
I, first of all I'm concerned
1763
01:28:39.540 --> 01:28:42.750 line:15%
that when we don't follow the conventions
1764
01:28:42.750 --> 01:28:46.610 line:15%
that we ourselves have signed up to,
1765
01:28:46.610 --> 01:28:50.780 line:15%
that we encourage others who have signed up
1766
01:28:50.780 --> 01:28:53.280 line:15%
to it to disregard them as well.
1767
01:28:53.280 --> 01:28:56.740 line:15%
We also encourage those who have not signed up to them
1768
01:28:56.740 --> 01:28:59.433 line:15%
to avoid signing up to them, because why would they?
1769
01:29:01.553 --> 01:29:06.530 line:15%
It's, you know, every, there's no incentive
1770
01:29:06.530 --> 01:29:11.090 line:15%
for a person under control who's being treated
1771
01:29:11.090 --> 01:29:14.924 line:15%
without any, just without any distinction,
1772
01:29:14.924 --> 01:29:17.740 line:15%
without any regard to Geneva convention
1773
01:29:17.740 --> 01:29:20.020 line:15%
or any other standard of justice,
1774
01:29:20.020 --> 01:29:21.910 line:15%
there's no regard for that person to respect
1775
01:29:21.910 --> 01:29:23.110 line:15%
any standard of justice.
1776
01:29:23.110 --> 01:29:24.820 line:15%
Were you thinking this back
1777
01:29:24.820 --> 01:29:27.920 line:15%
in your early years, were you aware of this?
1778
01:29:27.920 --> 01:29:30.040 line:15%
That we weren't following the Geneva convention,
1779
01:29:30.040 --> 01:29:34.140 line:15%
and this could have an effect around the world?
1780
01:29:34.140 --> 01:29:35.037 line:15%
Yes.
1781
01:29:35.037 --> 01:29:36.857 line:15%
Did you ever have conversations
1782
01:29:36.857 --> 01:29:39.260 line:15%
about other people about that?
1783
01:29:39.260 --> 01:29:41.433 line:15%
You know, I don't recall.
1784
01:29:42.860 --> 01:29:44.670 line:15%
Did you ever hear about suicides
1785
01:29:44.670 --> 01:29:45.883 line:15%
in Guantanamo?
1786
01:29:46.946 --> 01:29:47.779 line:15%
Yes.
1787
01:29:47.779 --> 01:29:48.612 line:15%
For the detainees.
1788
01:29:48.612 --> 01:29:49.445 line:15%
Yes.
1789
01:29:49.445 --> 01:29:50.357 line:15%
Were you ever involved in looking into those?
1790
01:29:50.357 --> 01:29:52.580 line:15%
No, I was not.
1791
01:29:52.580 --> 01:29:57.580 line:15%
And force-feeding and hunger strikes
1792
01:29:57.970 --> 01:30:00.058 line:15%
were you involved in looking into that at all?
1793
01:30:00.058 --> 01:30:02.690 line:15%
I was not, no, I had heard about that, but--
1794
01:30:02.690 --> 01:30:04.890 line:15%
So now that was part of your,
1795
01:30:06.810 --> 01:30:09.600 line:15%
mission in terms of the investigation that you were doing
1796
01:30:09.600 --> 01:30:10.710 line:15%
you know for--
1797
01:30:10.710 --> 01:30:13.735 line:15%
Well, clearly we did, if we had found,
1798
01:30:13.735 --> 01:30:18.350 line:15%
every, I mean, now the, when specifically I know,
1799
01:30:18.350 --> 01:30:21.920 line:15%
because I know and respect General Fay,
1800
01:30:21.920 --> 01:30:24.230 line:15%
one of the things that he found, what,
1801
01:30:24.230 --> 01:30:25.710 line:15%
I mean, one of the things that he did was,
1802
01:30:25.710 --> 01:30:27.923 line:15%
he had played a very stringent,
1803
01:30:29.340 --> 01:30:31.980 line:15%
very stringent criteria to the term abuse.
1804
01:30:31.980 --> 01:30:33.030 line:15%
You know, he was, you know
1805
01:30:33.030 --> 01:30:34.610 line:15%
they looked into everything,
1806
01:30:34.610 --> 01:30:38.890 line:15%
and just knowing General Fay, I mean, he's a very,
1807
01:30:38.890 --> 01:30:43.000 line:15%
very careful guy and he did great work,
1808
01:30:43.000 --> 01:30:44.020 line:15%
The Fay Jones report,
1809
01:30:44.020 --> 01:30:47.180 line:15%
in my mind was an excellent report, and he did great work.
1810
01:30:47.180 --> 01:30:48.700 line:15%
And one of the things, one of the hallmarks of it,
1811
01:30:48.700 --> 01:30:51.220 line:15%
was that they looked at specific allegations
1812
01:30:51.220 --> 01:30:54.850 line:15%
or, suspected incidents of abuse,
1813
01:30:54.850 --> 01:30:59.000 line:15%
and it, I mean, it really had a low bar.
1814
01:30:59.000 --> 01:31:01.064 line:15%
So if it was something that could be anybody think
1815
01:31:01.064 --> 01:31:03.263 line:15%
of it as abuse, they would document it.
1816
01:31:05.260 --> 01:31:09.800 line:15%
That same bar doesn't seem to have applied
1817
01:31:09.800 --> 01:31:11.423 line:15%
at all at Guantanamo.
1818
01:31:12.400 --> 01:31:15.650 line:15%
You know, our objective was again to get back to effective
1819
01:31:15.650 --> 01:31:18.592 line:15%
and ethical treatment of detainees.
1820
01:31:18.592 --> 01:31:21.090 line:15%
And as far as the military goes,
1821
01:31:21.090 --> 01:31:25.020 line:15%
I think we reached that objective, our guys, our military,
1822
01:31:25.020 --> 01:31:28.320 line:15%
the army interrogators that I met in 2009
1823
01:31:28.320 --> 01:31:31.620 line:15%
were charged and proud of the fact
1824
01:31:31.620 --> 01:31:34.220 line:15%
that they were gonna uphold the highest standards of ethics
1825
01:31:34.220 --> 01:31:36.200 line:15%
and effectiveness as interrogators.
1826
01:31:36.200 --> 01:31:38.359 line:15%
They weren't interested in doing anything.
1827
01:31:38.359 --> 01:31:41.140 line:15%
They, you brought up Abu Ghraib
1828
01:31:41.140 --> 01:31:43.423 line:15%
and they'd be the first people to just go,
1829
01:31:45.017 --> 01:31:46.930 line:15%
"We don't do that,"
1830
01:31:46.930 --> 01:31:49.840 line:15%
absolutely and I think that's probably applies
1831
01:31:49.840 --> 01:31:54.480 line:15%
to most 99% of the people in the army in 2002 as well,
1832
01:31:54.480 --> 01:31:55.550 line:15%
or 2003.
1833
01:31:55.550 --> 01:31:59.130 line:15%
But I don't, know that the environment at Guantanamo
1834
01:31:59.130 --> 01:32:01.380 line:15%
was the same as it wasn't in Abu Ghraib.
1835
01:32:01.380 --> 01:32:03.540 line:15%
Or that we, that the army, the military
1836
01:32:03.540 --> 01:32:06.260 line:15%
doesn't have the same level of controls it does.
1837
01:32:06.260 --> 01:32:09.183 line:15%
Why wouldn't it be at the same level?
1838
01:32:10.270 --> 01:32:13.490 line:15%
Why, you don't know, why wouldn't it be the same,
1839
01:32:13.490 --> 01:32:14.653 line:15%
what's the difference?
1840
01:32:14.653 --> 01:32:16.840 line:15%
Why do you see a difference?
1841
01:32:16.840 --> 01:32:20.820 line:15%
Well, for one thing, it's the issue of Guantanamo
1842
01:32:20.820 --> 01:32:22.779 line:15%
is neither in the United States
1843
01:32:22.779 --> 01:32:27.190 line:15%
nor under authority of another government.
1844
01:32:27.190 --> 01:32:31.700 line:15%
So, I mean, it's deliberately vague.
1845
01:32:31.700 --> 01:32:35.330 line:15%
So do you think if there were another war
1846
01:32:35.330 --> 01:32:39.700 line:15%
in the future, that same event could occur
1847
01:32:39.700 --> 01:32:41.930 line:15%
a place like Guantanamo, again,
1848
01:32:41.930 --> 01:32:44.780 line:15%
being in limbo, neither here, the way you see it
1849
01:32:44.780 --> 01:32:47.333 line:15%
neither here nor there, you think the same problem,
1850
01:32:47.333 --> 01:32:51.220 line:15%
or do you think your protocols would protect the detainees
1851
01:32:51.220 --> 01:32:53.320 line:15%
the next time around?
1852
01:32:53.320 --> 01:32:57.060 line:15%
I would like to see as an American citizen,
1853
01:32:57.060 --> 01:33:02.060 line:15%
the same concern for effectiveness and ethics
1854
01:33:02.760 --> 01:33:06.670 line:15%
and taking care of detainees that the military has adopted
1855
01:33:06.670 --> 01:33:08.270 line:15%
by the United States government.
1856
01:33:10.770 --> 01:33:13.840 line:15%
I would like to see our leaders,
1857
01:33:13.840 --> 01:33:18.223 line:15%
at all levels dedicate themselves to that.
1858
01:33:19.560 --> 01:33:23.450 line:15%
I would have liked to see our detention facility
1859
01:33:23.450 --> 01:33:27.900 line:15%
in Guantanamo closed within days
1860
01:33:27.900 --> 01:33:31.343 line:15%
after the election of president Obama.
1861
01:33:32.690 --> 01:33:37.690 line:15%
I would like to have seen opposition from media
1862
01:33:37.690 --> 01:33:42.690 line:15%
and political opponents approached with the same dedication
1863
01:33:43.810 --> 01:33:48.030 line:15%
as we've approached other national priorities,
1864
01:33:48.030 --> 01:33:52.070 line:15%
and that we would, we could have closed that facility.
1865
01:33:52.070 --> 01:33:53.870 line:15%
And I don't think we should ever have another one
1866
01:33:53.870 --> 01:33:55.120 line:15%
like that again.
1867
01:33:55.120 --> 01:34:00.120 line:15%
Now that's just me, but I was very happy
1868
01:34:01.200 --> 01:34:04.490 line:15%
at the pledge to close Guantanamo,
1869
01:34:04.490 --> 01:34:06.970 line:15%
and very dismayed that we did not.
1870
01:34:06.970 --> 01:34:11.110 line:15%
And I think I just, it really bothers me
1871
01:34:11.110 --> 01:34:12.330 line:15%
that we did not do that.
1872
01:34:12.330 --> 01:34:15.890 line:15%
You think Obama would be able to,
1873
01:34:15.890 --> 01:34:19.580 line:15%
or would even try after the election, if he were elected?
1874
01:34:19.580 --> 01:34:20.920 line:15%
You know, I don't know that there's enough
1875
01:34:20.920 --> 01:34:23.990 line:15%
of a constituency, and unfortunately we have to speak
1876
01:34:23.990 --> 01:34:28.850 line:15%
about it in those terms, if the constituency that,
1877
01:34:28.850 --> 01:34:33.330 line:15%
you know, and you know it is, our American politics
1878
01:34:33.330 --> 01:34:34.420 line:15%
is what it is.
1879
01:34:34.420 --> 01:34:36.380 line:15%
If there's not a political constituency
1880
01:34:36.380 --> 01:34:41.380 line:15%
that's strong enough to advocate for a policy change,
1881
01:34:41.600 --> 01:34:43.503 line:15%
then it's unlikely to happen.
1882
01:34:44.400 --> 01:34:47.260 line:15%
And I think, unfortunately I'm skeptical
1883
01:34:47.260 --> 01:34:50.290 line:15%
that that constituency is strong enough to do it.
1884
01:34:50.290 --> 01:34:53.840 line:15%
You know, I really think that we had a chance to do that
1885
01:34:53.840 --> 01:34:55.033 line:15%
in 2009.
1886
01:34:55.951 --> 01:35:00.951 line:15%
You know, I happen to know the person
1887
01:35:01.040 --> 01:35:06.040 line:15%
who was put in charge of detainee affairs
1888
01:35:06.960 --> 01:35:09.650 line:15%
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
1889
01:35:09.650 --> 01:35:14.500 line:15%
after president Obama became the president.
1890
01:35:14.500 --> 01:35:17.860 line:15%
And he spent six months there,
1891
01:35:17.860 --> 01:35:22.020 line:15%
he was an attorney really, really good guy.
1892
01:35:22.020 --> 01:35:25.030 line:15%
Very dedicated to doing everything he could
1893
01:35:25.030 --> 01:35:27.363 line:15%
to close Guantanamo.
1894
01:35:28.220 --> 01:35:29.780 line:15%
And he left six months later
1895
01:35:29.780 --> 01:35:32.290 line:15%
because he just couldn't get anywhere.
1896
01:35:32.290 --> 01:35:33.417 line:15%
Did he tell you that?
1897
01:35:33.417 --> 01:35:37.940 line:15%
No, I know it, I was, I do, I know him, he's a great guy.
1898
01:35:37.940 --> 01:35:40.660 line:15%
And I know he was completely sincere
1899
01:35:40.660 --> 01:35:43.040 line:15%
about what he wanted to do,
1900
01:35:43.040 --> 01:35:46.563 line:15%
and he had, he had charge make it happen.
1901
01:35:47.640 --> 01:35:48.473 line:15%
He didn't make it happen.
1902
01:35:48.473 --> 01:35:49.980 line:15%
Can you tell us his name?
1903
01:35:49.980 --> 01:35:50.813 line:15%
I'd rather not.
1904
01:35:50.813 --> 01:35:51.646 line:15%
Okay.
1905
01:35:51.646 --> 01:35:54.760 line:15%
And so he was disappointed and that's why he left.
1906
01:35:54.760 --> 01:35:56.490 line:15%
Well, it was big part of it, yeah.
1907
01:35:56.490 --> 01:35:59.560 line:15%
He just didn't, he couldn't do what he came there to do.
1908
01:35:59.560 --> 01:36:02.930 line:15%
And he believed very strongly
1909
01:36:02.930 --> 01:36:04.180 line:15%
that that was the right thing to do,
1910
01:36:04.180 --> 01:36:06.490 line:15%
and it wasn't possible for him.
1911
01:36:06.490 --> 01:36:07.990 line:15%
There was a lot of opposition.
1912
01:36:09.480 --> 01:36:14.480 line:15%
It's hard, closing Guantanamo is hard,
1913
01:36:15.140 --> 01:36:17.910 line:15%
but that doesn't mean that you shouldn't do it.
1914
01:36:17.910 --> 01:36:20.630 line:15%
It's important for us to, for all good reasons,
1915
01:36:20.630 --> 01:36:22.710 line:15%
not just for our relationship with other countries
1916
01:36:22.710 --> 01:36:24.190 line:15%
and all that it's important,
1917
01:36:24.190 --> 01:36:25.593 line:15%
but because of who we are.
1918
01:36:26.730 --> 01:36:29.221 line:15%
Guantanamo was a stain of America,
1919
01:36:29.221 --> 01:36:32.670 line:15%
and the fact that we play this game,
1920
01:36:32.670 --> 01:36:36.923 line:15%
Oh it's not really in America, that makes me ill.
1921
01:36:37.940 --> 01:36:42.940 line:15%
That's, childish, that doesn't to me justify anything,
1922
01:36:43.640 --> 01:36:46.640 line:15%
except it means that the people who would make that argument
1923
01:36:46.640 --> 01:36:51.150 line:15%
are really, they take us all for fools.
1924
01:36:51.150 --> 01:36:52.450 line:15%
We know what the truth is.
1925
01:36:52.450 --> 01:36:55.060 line:15%
The truth is that it's convenient to do that,
1926
01:36:55.060 --> 01:36:56.810 line:15%
because we can do whatever we want.
1927
01:36:56.810 --> 01:37:00.520 line:15%
And it's not because it's dangerous to move prisoners
1928
01:37:00.520 --> 01:37:02.657 line:15%
to try them in the United States.
1929
01:37:02.657 --> 01:37:06.190 line:15%
You know, it's a false dichotomy to train,
1930
01:37:06.190 --> 01:37:07.720 line:15%
okay, so if we don't put,
1931
01:37:07.720 --> 01:37:10.401 line:15%
if they're not in Guantanamo then we have to try them,
1932
01:37:10.401 --> 01:37:12.860 line:15%
you know, within blocks of the World Trade Center,
1933
01:37:12.860 --> 01:37:15.160 line:15%
we don't, that's ridiculous.
1934
01:37:15.160 --> 01:37:17.357 line:15%
But that's the false dichotomy that they throw out.
1935
01:37:17.357 --> 01:37:18.560 line:15%
"Oh, we don't wanna try them
1936
01:37:18.560 --> 01:37:20.277 line:15%
in the World Trade Center area."
1937
01:37:20.277 --> 01:37:22.640 line:15%
Okay, try them in Nebraska.
1938
01:37:22.640 --> 01:37:27.640 line:15%
And, the notion that we can't take a dangerous person,
1939
01:37:28.000 --> 01:37:30.560 line:15%
and bring them to the United States
1940
01:37:30.560 --> 01:37:32.800 line:15%
and put them on trial for crimes,
1941
01:37:32.800 --> 01:37:37.800 line:15%
and give them the opportunity to, for justice is ridiculous.
1942
01:37:39.760 --> 01:37:42.890 line:15%
Of course we can, we do it all the time,
1943
01:37:42.890 --> 01:37:45.342 line:15%
with all kinds of crazy bad people.
1944
01:37:45.342 --> 01:37:47.930 line:15%
And, we do it well.
1945
01:37:47.930 --> 01:37:49.400 line:15%
Were you involved,
1946
01:37:49.400 --> 01:37:50.610 line:15%
just a couple of questions,
1947
01:37:50.610 --> 01:37:53.610 line:15%
in the military break in South Carolina?
1948
01:37:53.610 --> 01:37:56.380 line:15%
Was that year within your domain at all?
1949
01:37:56.380 --> 01:37:58.610 line:15%
When we held a few people in the military breaks
1950
01:37:58.610 --> 01:37:59.974 line:15%
in South Carolina?
1951
01:37:59.974 --> 01:38:00.807 line:15%
I don't know about that.
1952
01:38:00.807 --> 01:38:02.196 line:15%
You don't know about that.
1953
01:38:02.196 --> 01:38:04.596 line:15%
Do you, are you disappointed in president Obama?
1954
01:38:05.993 --> 01:38:07.630 line:15%
In terms of not closing Guantanamo?
1955
01:38:07.630 --> 01:38:09.753 line:15%
Yes, I am.
1956
01:38:11.160 --> 01:38:12.210 line:15%
And...
1957
01:38:15.000 --> 01:38:16.810 line:15%
I mean, it's not just him.
1958
01:38:16.810 --> 01:38:21.030 line:15%
I'm disappointed that we, all of us and many many people
1959
01:38:21.030 --> 01:38:26.030 line:15%
that I know who frankly worked hard to get him elected,
1960
01:38:27.030 --> 01:38:30.740 line:15%
who believed that this was something we could do.
1961
01:38:30.740 --> 01:38:33.570 line:15%
I'm disappointed that we couldn't do it.
1962
01:38:33.570 --> 01:38:38.570 line:15%
So it's not just one man, it's all of us.
1963
01:38:39.450 --> 01:38:41.610 line:15%
And we didn't do it.
1964
01:38:41.610 --> 01:38:43.780 line:15%
All of us share responsibility for that.
1965
01:38:43.780 --> 01:38:45.270 line:15%
It's not just him.
1966
01:38:45.270 --> 01:38:46.360 line:15%
So, yeah, I'm disappointed,
1967
01:38:46.360 --> 01:38:48.580 line:15%
I'm also disappointed in me.
1968
01:38:48.580 --> 01:38:49.473 line:15%
I couldn't do it.
1969
01:38:50.830 --> 01:38:54.590 line:15%
We couldn't do it, and it's wrong and we should have.
1970
01:38:54.590 --> 01:38:57.090 line:15%
But, and there's a lot of people who complete disagree
1971
01:38:57.090 --> 01:39:00.360 line:15%
and say, "Oh, we, why are we, it's working fine."
1972
01:39:00.360 --> 01:39:01.510 line:15%
Yeah, it's working fine
1973
01:39:01.510 --> 01:39:04.320 line:15%
unless you look at the constitution of the United States,
1974
01:39:04.320 --> 01:39:08.090 line:15%
and you take it seriously, then it's not working fine.
1975
01:39:08.090 --> 01:39:11.290 line:15%
And I like to live under the rule of law,
1976
01:39:11.290 --> 01:39:13.363 line:15%
and I happen to like our set of laws.
1977
01:39:14.230 --> 01:39:15.780 line:15%
I prefer that.
1978
01:39:15.780 --> 01:39:17.650 line:15%
Well, General two more questions,
1979
01:39:17.650 --> 01:39:19.597 line:15%
one is, did you like change the way you're talking,
1980
01:39:19.597 --> 01:39:22.550 line:15%
your life change after 9/11
1981
01:39:22.550 --> 01:39:23.990 line:15%
in terms of how you see the world,
1982
01:39:23.990 --> 01:39:28.090 line:15%
and how you see the military or politics, any of those,
1983
01:39:28.090 --> 01:39:29.287 line:15%
all the above?
1984
01:39:30.630 --> 01:39:33.460 line:15%
Yes, I think it really did.
1985
01:39:33.460 --> 01:39:37.750 line:15%
And I'll just give you a couple examples.
1986
01:39:37.750 --> 01:39:39.600 line:15%
One of them is real positive.
1987
01:39:39.600 --> 01:39:43.010 line:15%
The things I saw on the lawn and the Pentagon
1988
01:39:43.010 --> 01:39:46.610 line:15%
and the behavior I saw, people like Lisa Bronson,
1989
01:39:46.610 --> 01:39:48.760 line:15%
and that Lieutenant general that showed up,
1990
01:39:50.033 --> 01:39:51.390 line:15%
and friends that I'd known for years
1991
01:39:51.390 --> 01:39:55.540 line:15%
who were with me on the line, made me proud.
1992
01:39:55.540 --> 01:39:57.630 line:15%
And I'll never forget that feeling.
1993
01:39:57.630 --> 01:39:59.243 line:15%
That was important for me.
1994
01:39:59.243 --> 01:40:03.530 line:15%
That was good, and again, I'll never forget that,
1995
01:40:03.530 --> 01:40:06.270 line:15%
and I'll come back to that again.
1996
01:40:06.270 --> 01:40:08.200 line:15%
I don't wanna have a good experience like that again,
1997
01:40:08.200 --> 01:40:11.063 line:15%
but that is not something that makes me proud.
1998
01:40:12.050 --> 01:40:14.843 line:15%
But I also have been disappointed by,
1999
01:40:17.710 --> 01:40:22.180 line:15%
policies and actions of my country
2000
01:40:22.180 --> 01:40:26.040 line:15%
that don't live up to our own standards.
2001
01:40:26.040 --> 01:40:28.850 line:15%
And I've seen numerous examples of that.
2002
01:40:28.850 --> 01:40:33.850 line:15%
It bothers me when leaders who are intelligent adult,
2003
01:40:36.610 --> 01:40:41.610 line:15%
competent people, do things which they know very well
2004
01:40:42.000 --> 01:40:45.950 line:15%
are against our constitution, and against our way of life
2005
01:40:45.950 --> 01:40:47.260 line:15%
and our rule of law.
2006
01:40:47.260 --> 01:40:51.483 line:15%
It bothers me, and I, that's hard for me to forget too.
2007
01:40:52.420 --> 01:40:57.420 line:15%
Is I see that as an American, as a breach of trust.
2008
01:41:00.410 --> 01:41:04.450 line:15%
I'd like to think that I'm wrong, but I don't think
2009
01:41:04.450 --> 01:41:08.783 line:15%
that I am having seen it now for about 11 years.
2010
01:41:10.080 --> 01:41:12.620 line:15%
And that doesn't mean that I've given up hope,
2011
01:41:12.620 --> 01:41:16.790 line:15%
but it does mean that I am skept, more, much more skeptical
2012
01:41:16.790 --> 01:41:20.830 line:15%
and maybe even cynical than I was before.
2013
01:41:20.830 --> 01:41:23.570 line:15%
And I'd like to, I really, really would like to think
2014
01:41:23.570 --> 01:41:28.270 line:15%
that I don't need to be, and I'm not just saying this,
2015
01:41:28.270 --> 01:41:30.040 line:15%
and you probably take this off the tape,
2016
01:41:30.040 --> 01:41:34.200 line:15%
but it's exactly people like you
2017
01:41:34.200 --> 01:41:36.890 line:15%
that give me the hope that we can get through this.
2018
01:41:36.890 --> 01:41:39.090 line:15%
And what you're doing with this project
2019
01:41:39.090 --> 01:41:42.253 line:15%
is very very helpful to our country.
2020
01:41:43.320 --> 01:41:47.010 line:15%
We need, more truth tellers,
2021
01:41:47.010 --> 01:41:50.160 line:15%
and we need a lot of people that can participate
2022
01:41:50.160 --> 01:41:53.500 line:15%
in events like this, in efforts like this,
2023
01:41:53.500 --> 01:41:57.230 line:15%
to document what happened, I mean, I don't know
2024
01:41:57.230 --> 01:41:58.750 line:15%
if I've said what you wanted me to say,
2025
01:41:58.750 --> 01:42:01.000 line:15%
I've just told you what I think.
2026
01:42:01.000 --> 01:42:03.100 line:15%
But I think that we will identify, you know,
2027
01:42:03.100 --> 01:42:05.420 line:15%
you know my little strand
2028
01:42:05.420 --> 01:42:06.883 line:15%
and all the other strands that you've heard
2029
01:42:06.883 --> 01:42:08.350 line:15%
that I don't have access to,
2030
01:42:08.350 --> 01:42:09.850 line:15%
although I liked your website,
2031
01:42:12.539 --> 01:42:14.540 line:15%
I wanna do, I wanna listen more,
2032
01:42:14.540 --> 01:42:16.490 line:15%
but I think when we put this all together
2033
01:42:16.490 --> 01:42:18.690 line:15%
we'll have something we can all be proud of.
2034
01:42:20.260 --> 01:42:22.663 line:15%
America doesn't always get it right,
2035
01:42:23.670 --> 01:42:28.670 line:15%
But what you can depend upon I think is that
2036
01:42:28.680 --> 01:42:32.530 line:15%
most of us know right when we see it,
2037
01:42:32.530 --> 01:42:34.350 line:15%
and we try to go there.
2038
01:42:34.350 --> 01:42:38.150 line:15%
And we stumble and we fall down, but we always get up.
2039
01:42:38.150 --> 01:42:39.773 line:15%
And that gives me hope.
2040
01:42:41.720 --> 01:42:42.800 line:15%
That was wonderful.
2041
01:42:42.800 --> 01:42:45.280 line:15%
I usually ask people who's anything else you wanna add,
2042
01:42:45.280 --> 01:42:46.630 line:15%
but I think you just added it,
2043
01:42:46.630 --> 01:42:48.320 line:15%
but I will ask you that anyway,
2044
01:42:48.320 --> 01:42:52.190 line:15%
and before we close it, if there's something else
2045
01:42:52.190 --> 01:42:53.703 line:15%
that you I'd like to.
2046
01:43:01.490 --> 01:43:02.323 line:15%
I can't really think of anything.
2047
01:43:02.323 --> 01:43:04.833 line:15%
I think you ended on a beautiful note
2048
01:43:04.833 --> 01:43:07.513 line:15%
I wouldn't see any nails, but.
2049
01:43:08.880 --> 01:43:13.730 line:15%
I wanna do honor to you and justice to your work,
2050
01:43:13.730 --> 01:43:15.760 line:15%
and so if there's something you want me to speak to
2051
01:43:15.760 --> 01:43:17.230 line:15%
I'm happy to do it.
2052
01:43:17.230 --> 01:43:18.975 line:15%
I don't, can't think of anything off the top of my head.
2053
01:43:18.975 --> 01:43:19.808 line:15%
You said very,
2054
01:43:19.808 --> 01:43:21.370 line:15%
you were very kind in your words
2055
01:43:21.370 --> 01:43:24.501 line:15%
and I'm very grateful for that.
2056
01:43:24.501 --> 01:43:25.940 line:15%
I mean it.
2057
01:43:25.940 --> 01:43:26.830 line:15%
Appreciated it.
2058
01:43:26.830 --> 01:43:28.490 line:15%
I mean it.
2059
01:43:28.490 --> 01:43:32.200 line:15%
Well, Johnny needs 20 seconds of room tone
2060
01:43:32.200 --> 01:43:34.507 line:15%
where the room is quiet before
2061
01:43:34.507 --> 01:43:36.740 line:15%
he can turn off the tape, so--
2062
01:43:36.740 --> 01:43:37.573 line:15%
Okay.
2063
01:43:37.573 --> 01:43:38.406 line:15%
He's gonna, okay.
2064
01:43:38.406 --> 01:43:39.370 line:15%
Sure.
2065
01:43:39.370 --> 01:43:40.380 line:15%
Begin room tone
2066
01:43:55.060 --> 01:43:56.000 line:15%
End room tone.