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<v ->There were a number of individuals</v>

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that were at Guantanamo that were cleared for release.

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But we recognized

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that they could not

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go back to their home country for whatever reason,

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but usually because of concerns

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about torture or mistreatment.

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I've already mentioned the Chinese Uyghurs

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that fell into this category.

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But there were a significantly larger group of people

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that fell into this category.

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So we were going out and trying to negotiate

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with countries that might be willing to accept them.

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Again because we were concerned

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about the human rights implications

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of sending these people back to their home countries.

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We were very concerned about the receiving country

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being a place that had stellar human rights records.

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So we were generally engaging European governments,

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some other governments in Africa, in Latin America,

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Australia, other places where we felt

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that they had a very strong record on human rights

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and there were no concerns

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about these people being abused.

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So as you pointed out,

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and the issue quickly became one,

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when I would start these discussions

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well why won't the United States take them?

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And

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there's no good answer to that question.

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And this is a point that I raised very early on in memos

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to Secretary Rice and to the Deputy Secretary of State

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saying this is the most significant hurdle

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to any type of diplomatic progress on these cases.

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In fairness to them, to Deputy Secretary Negroponte

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and Secretary Rice, they both recognized that.

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And Secretary Rice became very much a proponent

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for the US revising its policy, in this regard.

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It was quite delicate diplomacy

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because this was a very sensitive issue.

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And particularly because of the unpopularity

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of President Bush in Europe.

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It was a difficult sell.

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As we got closer to the Bush administration,

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to the end of the Bush administration,

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I think a lot of these governments

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were willing to talk to us about this

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but had already decided at that point,

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look we're not gonna make any decisions on this.

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We're gonna wait and if we're gonna do a favor,

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we're gonna do it for the new president.

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After President Obama's election,

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and the fact that he was quite popular in Europe,

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a lot of governments became much more receptive

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to this idea.

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When the administration did change,

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I came into my office on January 21st of 2009,

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I think I had five voicemail messages

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from different governments saying,

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"Okay, we're willing to talk now."

