

- I think it was an opportunity lost. This was an opportunity for us to set an example for the world. I think had we treated the detainees with greater dignity and respect, we would have elicited more information earlier from them. I think had we tried detainees in a fair and just process, had we release detainees after giving us information rather than keeping them, it would have opened up a greater collection of intelligence in the US. How did we finally break organized crime? We got people on the inside, we made deals with them, they gave us information, we took care of them, they didn't go to jail, they were released. So if someone actually wants to go home, what better example is there than having someone who has been cooperative be sent back home? Had we let the court system work out the kinks in the military commission process early on, we probably have a pretty good process today. A decade later we're still struggling down there with the process that was created. So in hindsight, the other piece, there was no effort to to deradicalize or disengage or rehabilitate detainees there. And so the fear had always been if you took someone who was not guilty and you placed them with some... Cause there were some pretty bad people down there. You placed them together with some pretty bad people and you did not treat them very well and you took them away from their families, might you not have created the very adversary that you feared in the beginning, even though they might've been that dangerous when they got there. So I think it was really an opportunity lost. This is the difficult part, you know, for folks who have been working Al-Qaeda for years. At the time of 9/11, the estimate range or the number of people who you would consider Al-Qaeda, probably ranged between two and 400. How many thousands now do we consider are among the ranks of Al-Qaeda? So, you know, their numbers have grown in spite of all of our efforts, and now they're franchised.